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Abstract
On December 11, 2001, the People’s Republic of China officially joined the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). More than 15 years after it had announced the resumption of its 
status as a contracting party, the country that had since then become one of the largest 
telecommunication market in the world, would finally abide by a set of internationally 
defined norms and rules. In the course of the WTO accession, its telecommunication 
sector has undergone an extensive reform process, introducing competition and the 
foundation of a legislative framework. Yet, China’s telecommunication commitments 
have been notably weaker than those negotiated in other service sectors.
The restructuring of the telecommunications sector -  which started along the lines of 
global liberalisation programmes -  could have been buttressed by the accession to the 
WTO. It was however shaped and blocked by diverse interests emanating from the 
fragmented Chinese political structure and resulted in an environment fraught with 
substantive regulatory issues.
This thesis seeks to answer two inter-related questions: why did the government fail to 
reform in-depth the telecommunication sector and what mediated the impact the WTO 
accession process had on the sector’s reform. It argues that the Chinese government’s 
failure to create a regulatory regime to implement a policy of telecommunication 
liberalisation represents essentially a problem of institutional change.
The thesis demonstrates that the bargaining approach to policy-making in the 
telecommunication sector has allowed, and even facilitated, the first stage of reforms but 
that it is ill-suited for participation in a supranational framework.
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Part I:
Theoretical Considerations
11
1 Introduction
“Lack of empirical knowledge is among the main hindrances to infrastructure policy analysis and 
reform in developing and transition economies. ”
(Kessides, 2004: 22)
In the past decade, most countries have had to face the wave of telecommunication 
liberalisation that swept across the world. National telecommunication systems, 
regardless of regional, socio-economic and political differences, have undergone 
profound structural and institutional changes1. Operators became legally separated from 
the Ministry in charge of telecommunication. A majority of previously state-owned and 
state-run telecommunication operators were privatised and markets, both in developed 
and developing countries, were liberalised. In order to deal with the set of issues brought 
by these changes, many countries established regulatory agencies independent from 
operators and, in certain cases, separate from the Ministry2. While some scholars have 
labelled this broad trend as “regulatory convergence”3, an in-depth look at individual case 
studies reveals wide disparities in the nature, scope and extent of the regulatory reforms 
undertaken4. Whereas in certain countries ownership of operators rests entirely in private 
hands, many governments still consider majority control as a guarantee of sovereignty 
and national security. The degree of autonomy and functions of regulators also vary 
greatly across countries. And so does the degree of openness across market segments. 
Finally, the reforms have met with varying levels of success in both developed and 
developing countries. While the overall rate of telephone line penetration has globally 
risen, there are wide disparities on international, regional and intra-national basis5. In 
itself, this is not too surprising. Why would even similar reform policies produce identical 
results in countries with radically different social, economic and political environments?
On the surface, China is no exception to the worldwide transformation of 
telecommunication markets. Over the past 15 years, nationwide teledensity grew from 
1.11% to more than 40%6. China ranks today as the largest telecommunication market in
1 Cho (1998: 3).
2 In 1990 only 12 countries had regulatory agencies that functioned separately from telecommunication 
operators against 123 by mid-2003, and another 28 countries intend to establish a separate regulator in the 
next few years (Briceno, Estache et al., 2005: 24).
3 See (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 341; Garcia-Murillo and Machines, 2000).
4 Pisciotta (1997: 351), Bartle (2001: 3) and Li et al. (2000; 2002b).
5 In 2003 main line penetration rates reached 3.1% in Africa and 13.64% in Asia (respective compound 
annual growth rate of 5.9% and 12.6% between 1998 and 2003). Disparities between urban and rural 
development have also increased.
6 Teledensity is defined here as the combined fixed and mobile subscribers per hundred inhabitants.
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the world in terms of mobile and fixed-line subscribers. This phenomenal growth has 
been accompanied by a number of remarkable structural changes, which shared the 
characteristics of the market-oriented reforms carried out worldwide. The “pro forma” 
liberalisation programme consists of three elements (see Table 1).
Table 1: Components of market-oriented reforms
Elements Options China
Separation of PTO from Ministry Separation in 1998
a Deregulation Separation of regulator from Ministry Mil acts as Ministry and regulatoro
V Regulator’s autonomy level Weak
acsI* Competition
Competition in long distance Partial competition (China Telecom and China Netcom)
a
Competition in local telephony Partial competition (China Telecom and China Netcom)
Privatisation Type of privatisation (minority shares, majority share or complete privatisation) Minority share privatisation
Note: China Unicom is the only operator allowed to offer both mobile and fixed-line services.
Source: Adapted from Henisz, Zelner et al. (2004).
Thus, despite claims of developing a telecommunication market with Chinese 
characteristics, it appeared that some of the early elements of the regulatory reforms 
process bore strong resemblance with those found in other countries. China’s postal 
sector was separated from the telecommunication sector, operators were detached from
n
government agencies and new entrants started to challenge the incumbent . Institutional 
changes were carried out through the merger of archrival Ministries and the establishment 
of a regulatory body to supervise the sector. In other words, the leadership seemed to 
have adopted the major tenets of the programmes usually prescribed by multilateral 
lending agencies. In reality, growth took place in spite of the failure to successfully 
implement the liberalisation trinity consisting of deregulation, competition and 
privatisation. On the contrary, the Chinese government failed by-and-large both to create 
an independent regulator and to introduce significant competition, and maintained 
majority ownership in the operators while restricting market access to private and 
international operators. Why has this been the case? How has China been able to move 
from less than 1% of subscribers connected to a fixed-line to more than 20% in the span 
of 15 years without adopting the orthodox reform packages advocated by the World 
Bank8?
7 In 2005, a proposal was made to reform China's postal system by separating government functions from 
enterprise management, enhancing government supervision, completing market structure, securing 
universal and special services, reorganising the State Post Bureau to act as a state supervision institution, 
and accelerating the foundation of postal saving banks (Xinhua, 2005c).
8 Until 2004, the number of new mobile subscribers was growing roughly by 5 million per month.
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China’s accession to the WTO on November 14, 2001 and the commitments to 
progressive liberalisation led many observers to believe that the country was initiating a 
re-adjustment of its regulatory framework in line with international norms and standards. 
The adoption of the Reference Paper on telecommunication was heralded as the 
beginning of a new phase of policy-making characterised by increased transparency, 
regulatory independence and facilitated market access. Thus, at least in theory, the 
foundation for a new era of competition between Chinese enterprises and their foreign 
partners and counterparts had been laid. It turns out that the reality is much bleaker. 
Foreign companies are absent from the basic services segment and private domestic 
companies too remain for the time being barred from acquiring licences to conduct 
operations. In addition, foreign governments, chambers of commerce and other business 
associations routinely point the finger at the failure to set up an independent regulator and 
at the opaqueness of the market9. How has the government resisted to pressures from 
foreign government and operators to open its market?
The answers are to be found in China’s idiosyncratic approach to regulatory policy­
making in the telecommunication sector. On the whole, China’s telecommunication 
policy-making remains a fragmented bureaucratic structure of authority where, to borrow 
from Lieberthal and Oksenberg, “the policy process is protracted, disjointed and 
incremental10. This is not to say that it did not evolve over the years. For instance, the 
erstwhile opaque regulatory environment has become much more transparent over the 
years. The majority of regulations and administrative measures are now in the public 
domain and, in most of the cases, their official enactment follows their publication. 
Policy-makers have also moved from a heavy-hand approach to more sophisticated means 
of controlling the development of the market. In parallel, in recent years, the 
administrative re-shuffling of policy-making bodies has redefined the centres of power 
and decision-making. Both the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
have grabbed the centre-stage on a number of key policy-making issues11.
9 See (AmCham, 2003; US-China Business Council, 2003; USITO, 2004a).
10 Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988: 22).
11 In lieu of the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) and of the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC).
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Explaining China’s telecommunication policy-making in the reform era
Over the past decades telecommunication policy-making reached the top of the 
government’s agenda several times because it was recognised that an efficient and 
effective flow of information was vital for the Party and the government to manage the 
rapid diffusion of China’s economy and the government’s economic reforms. 
Telecommunication was regarded as important for two other reasons. The government 
strongly held onto its belief that telecommunication was central to China’s national 
security and sovereignty. At the same time, its high profitability provided the State with 
an important source of revenues that could be used to fund network deployment12. In 
short, the sector reached a strategic level for financial reasons, for security concerns and 
for social development purposes13.
In our view, China’s telecommunication policy-making is best analysed through the 
various reforms that the sector witnessed since the mid-1980s. Reforms can be explained 
as a tool for correction of market failure, as the result of international pressures, public 
interest, technological change, regulatory competition, ideation change -  new ideas, 
private interests, internal decay/cycling, environmental change or pressure of government. 
A brief examination of China’s telecommunication reform path between 1978 and 2001 
reveals two important milestones, which took the form of splits. The first split was 
“horizontal” and consisted in the separation of telecommunication enterprises from 
government administration. The second split was “vertical”. From 1994 onwards, 
competition was introduced and even encouraged as newcomers received dedicated 
support in attempt to break the monopoly and to curb unfair competitive practices by the 
incumbent.
This study is largely informed by the broad stream of literature dealing with the generic 
issue of telecommunication reforms. Four subsets of the literature on telecommunication 
reform are of particular interest. The first set of literature deals with theories of 
telecommunication reforms. A number of hypothesis-driven theories have been developed 
to explain the telecommunication reform process14, while a large body of literature has 
been devoted both to descriptive and normative aspects of the question15. The second set 
of literature deals with international trade and telecommunication -  in particular, the
12 Ure (1997b: 3).
13 Interview (B-002), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001.
14 Crisis-hypothesis, ideology, private and public interest theory.
15 See among others (Petrazzini, 1995; Melody, 1997d; Cho, 1998; ITU, 1999).
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reforms brought by the WTO Basic Telecommunication Agreement (BTA). Drahos and 
Joseph were among the first to discuss the impact of the emerging supranational 
telecommunication regime on domestic policies and reforms16. Cowhey and Klimenko 
assess how developing and transition economies have fared in profiting from changes in 
the telecommunications market. They also examine the policy challenges that remain, 
paying special attention to the global market and the regulatory milieu fostered by the 
BTA17. In a similar study, Low and Mattoo examine liberalisation of the basic 
telecommunications sector in a number of Asian countries as well as the role of the
1 ftGeneral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in this process . The third set deals 
with reform and regulation. Levy and Spiller’s landmark study on telecommunication 
regulation aims at understanding countries’ ability to commit to particular regulatory 
processes and institutions. Their approach looks at regulation as “a design problem with 
two components: regulatory governance and regulatory incentives”19. At the same time, a 
large body of literature has been devoted to the normative aspect of telecommunication
reforms, stressing for example that successful telecommunication reforms depend on
0(\policy-making, regulation and competition . Theories of telecommunication reforms can
0 1be placed in the wider context of theories of regulatory reform . Despite, or perhaps 
because of the fact that the predominant relations of state to industry are moving from 
ownership to regulation, there is still little literature that acknowledges the part that 
regulatory bodies play in the political process of distribution. Much of the literature
revolves around the traditional “public interest” concept of regulation, where a regulatory
00agency makes good market failure and regulates monopolies . Two general theories of 
regulation have been developed to explain the regulation of markets. The public interest 
theory argues that the reason for regulation is to avoid market failure when an industry is 
naturally monopolistic. The second, popularised by Stigler, Peltzman and Posner, is the
16 Drahos and Joseph (1995).
17 Cowhey and Klimenko (2001).
18 Low and Mattoo (1998). See also(Abrenica and Warren, 2000; Blouin, 2000; Warren, 2000; Tuthill, 
2003).
19 The governance structure incorporates the mechanisms a society uses to restrain the discretionary scope 
of regulators and to resolve the conflicts to which these restraints give rise. The regulatory incentive 
structure comprises the rules governing pricing, subsidies, competition and entry, interconnection, and the 
like (Levy and Spiller, 1996).
20 Melody (1995: 259; 1997b: 2; 1997c: 20).
21 Regulatory reform refers here to changes that improve regulatory quality -  enhance the performance, 
cost-effectiveness, or legal quality of regulations and related government formalities. Reform can mean 
revision of a single regulation, the scrapping and rebuilding of an entire regulatory regime and its 
institutions, or improvement of processes for making regulations and managing reform. Deregulation is a 
subset of regulatory reform and refers to complete or partial elimination of regulation in a sector to improve 
economic performance (OECD, 1997).
22 Lembke (2002). As pointed out by Laffont and Tirole (2000: 243), “the major obstacle to good regulation 
lies in the asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated firm”
16
economic theory of regulation. The essence of this approach is that regulators and 
politicians, like economic actors, weigh the benefits and costs of various courses of action 
in a political framework where the attainment of a voting majority determines success23.
The fourth set comprises telecommunication reforms in developing countries. Petrazzini 
finds that reforms are more likely to succeed in cases where the relative autonomy of the 
state is high, the reforms are relatively insulated from political pressure, and power within 
the state apparatus is highly concentrated, than in cases where political power is more 
evenly contested and administrative power is diffused24.
Alternative approaches to studying telecommunication reforms are borrowed from other 
disciplines, notably sociology and in particular Gidden’s theory of structuration . Cho 
focuses on the causes of the current worldwide wave of institutional reform in 
telecommunications and argues that studies of institutional telecommunication reforms 
fall into four categories of works -  dealing either with the regulatory agencies in relation 
to technological development, or discourse-based diffusion model, or the role of 
international organisations, or the efficiency claim of neo-classical economics. Using a 
meta-theoretical framework of structuration, he attempts to bridge the gap of 
systematically comprehending institutional telecommunications reform. The proposition 
of considering the emerging trade blocs as another principal system for study of 
telecommunications reforms is of particular interest26. Finally, other authors contend that 
telecommunication reforms are best evaluated by criteria rooted in dynamic institutional
oncontexts, and make reference to new institutional economics .
23 Wenders (1988: 17). More recently, Spiller and Tommasi (2005). have applied a transactional approach 
to public policy determination in understanding the origins, nature and the evolution o f the institutions of 
regulation. They analyse the institutional determinants o f regulatory policy-making by looking at regulation 
as the outcome of complex intertemporal exchanges among policy makers.
24 Petrazzini (1995). See (Li, Qiang et al., 2000; Fink, Mattoo et al., 2003) for a quantitative approach.
25 Giddens (1984).
26 Cho (1998).
27 Singh (2000: 887).
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Research question, methodological approach and problems
Social scientists have attempted to explain from a variety of angles how and why 
telecommunication policy changes are developed and implemented. Studies from a 
political perspective have stressed different levels of analysis, such as ideas and ideology, 
international factors, domestic interest groups and coalitions, political systems and the 
state28. Economists too have applied a broad range of theories, such as new institutional 
economics, to the study of policy changes.
For the most part the mechanisms behind different patterns of national adaptation remain 
unclear . Galperin argues that today, the rules created and enforced by traditional 
regulatory bodies on a national scale are only part of a multi-layered regime that includes 
international treaties, voluntary self-regulation, and semi-public cooperative arrangements 
under the umbrella of a vast collection of organisations .
This thesis sets out to examine the evolution of China’s telecommunication regulatory 
policy-making in the context of the trade and economic reforms the country initiated with 
the Open Door policy. The study covers the era from the start of economic reforms in 
1978 and runs all the way through 2004. The thesis addresses two central themes.
The first one relates to China’s domestic telecommunication policy-making and to the 
nature, scope and extent of the telecommunication reforms that took place in China 
during the past decade. Reform of the telecommunication sector dates back to the early 
1980s, but while driven by the central leadership, it was then limited in scope and extent. 
Today, the country is on the eve of a third round of reforms, which combines 
centralisation and high-decentralisation. As this thesis will demonstrate, the success of 
China’s telecommunication reforms is mitigated. The undeniable growth of diffusion 
masks an ever-increasing divide between rural and urban zones. The behemoth 
incumbent, China Telecom, has been sliced “into pieces” (geographically and by 
operating segments) but competition remains limited. Issues of interconnection and tariff 
wars plague the industry. Finally, in order to correct some of these failures, the 
government routinely resorts to heavy-handed interventionism. For example, in order to
28 Petrazzini (1995: 34).
29 The main determinant of this divergent convergence is the different domestic political structure o f the 
respective countries which disabled them from adopting a mere carbon copy of die American FCC-model 
(Schneider and Tenbucken, 2003: 26-27).
30 Galperin (2004: 166).
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insufflate competition in the sector, the government orchestrated the re-shuffle of 
operators’ executive officers.
The novel nature of the issues at stake and the changing functions and responsibilities of
the actors involved in telecommunication both had the potential to profoundly redefine
the regulatory policy-making environment. Yet the Ministry of Information Industry
(Mil) and domestic operators are mired in regulatory issues, which have slowed down the
restructuring of the sector. In fact, as we will see, reforms in the telecommunication
sector significantly lag behind the restructuring that has taken place in other utility
services sectors such as electricity. This comes as a surprise. As noted by Feketekuty:
“The economic logic for regulatory reform has been most obvious in the 
case o f telecommunication services. Not surprisingly regulatory reform in 
this sector is more advanced than in any other sector, globally. ”31
It turns out that unlike many developing countries China has resisted adopting a 
“standard” package in order to liberalise its telecommunication markets. Instead, it has 
developed and maintained an idiosyncratic approach to reforming the sector. Does it 
mean that China’s reform model has reached its limits? To a certain extent, yes. This 
thesis will show that the initial phase of reforms accommodated itself reasonably well 
with the weak regulatory environment, but that the failure to successfully instil reforms 
rests on the lack of empowered institutions and on the historical development of the 
actors involved in the sector.
The second theme addressed by the thesis relates to the relationship between the domestic 
and the international policy-making arena. A particular attention is given to the period 
surrounding China’s accession to the WTO. The thesis discusses the relative failure of the 
emerging supranational telecommunication regime and its associated liberalisation 
programme to exert a significant transformation on China’s telecommunication sector. It 
comes as a relative surprise that the WTO negotiations and accession process have had 
only a limited effect on the market structure and regulatory environment. In terms of 
market access, foreign (and domestic) operators remain conspicuous by their absence. 
Many of the substantive issues that plague the reforms of China’s telecommunication 
sector today are dealt by the Reference Paper. But the government has not been able to 
capitalise on the much-touted WTO accession to move the restructuring one step further 
and, at time of writing, little seems to have changed. In fact, the analysis of China’s 
telecommunication commitments reveals that they have been notably weaker than those
31 Feketekuty (1999).
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negotiated in other service sectors. What mitigated the impact the WTO accession process 
had on the sector’s reform? How did the Ministry who negotiated the schedule of 
commitments in the telecommunication sector succeed at delaying the opening of the 
telecommunication sector to international investors?
Several reasons explain the weak impact of China’s WTO accession on the sector’s 
reform. First, the negotiated agreement allowed the government and the domestic 
operators to “buy some time and re-organise” in face of the coming foreign competition. 
Second, a weak regulatory framework and the absence of an overarching 
telecommunication law have maintained a lack of transparency in the sector. Third, the 
government’s desire to maintain an overall control over the sector for security and 
sovereignty reasons has “cushioned” Mil’s position during the negotiation for accession.
Examining how China’s telecommunication regulatory policy-making developed in the 
context of trade and economic reforms is relevant for a number of reasons. First, it sheds 
some light on recent development in China’s telecommunication policy-making process. 
It does so by reviewing the role and functions of the major domestic policy-making 
bodies and by describing the evolution of China’s telecommunication regulatory 
framework over the past 15 years. The unfolding of the reforms in the telecommunication 
sector provides an interesting take on the dynamics of policy-making in the era of 
economic reforms. It addresses Ure’s statement that China’s telecommunication policy­
making is “a complex affair involving the interplay o f many different interests subsumed 
under the national priorities as determined by the Party leadership, and as reflected 
through the State Council and other organs o f government’32 and revisits Mueller and 
Tan’s description of policy changes33. Second, by studying the impact of China’s WTO 
accession on the telecommunication reform process and outcome, it seeks to improve our 
understanding of the connection between international trade and domestic 
telecommunication policy-making. By analysing in more details the supra-national 
bargaining layer described in Lovelock’s research on China’s national information 
infrastructure34, it adds to our empirical knowledge of the nature and effect of the 
relationship between the supranational telecommunication regime and domestic reforms. 
This allows us to verify a number of hypotheses on the impact of the supranational level
32 Ure (1997b: 3).
33 Proposals for policy changes come from top leaders. Government ministries and agencies can themselves 
initiate policy changes within their own jurisdiction, or a coalition of rival ministries propose a 
redistribution of power, control, and assets among rival ministries (Mueller and Tan, 1997: 53).
34 Lovelock (1999).
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on domestic regulatory reforms and in particular, the nature and extent of the regulatory 
alignment with the international telecommunication regime. Third, the examination of the 
evolution of China’s approach to telecommunication liberalisation, including 
corporatisation and the introduction of competition, provides a basis of comparison for 
other transition economies undergoing similar transformations. For example, Russia 
shares quite a number of similarities with China, both as a former socialist economy and 
as a country negotiating its entry to the WTO while engaged in the reform of its 
telecommunication sector . In other words, the challenge posed by China on the 
conventional wisdom about reforms may offer alternative paths to telecommunication 
policy-makers in developing countries. It shows at least that there is not a single approach 
as China has proven, by adapting rather than adopting, the “orthodox” liberalisation 
programme.
One of the problems faced by scholars in the study of telecommunication policy-making 
and reforms is that most of the work is atheoretical and therefore unable to provide 
systematic understanding, explanations, and evaluations of rapidly changing phenomena. 
In other words, social scientists lack systematic frameworks to comprehend the various 
elements involved in the phenomena . The second major problem when studying policy­
making in China is access to people and documents. Despite notable improvement in 
transparency, access to civil servants in the key policy-making agencies remains difficult. 
Copies of draft laws and regulations get published in an episodic manner. Even in 
international gatherings, such as APEC TelMin, the government seldom circulates formal 
statements or reviews of its telecommunication policies.
Studies in political science tend to bifurcate between those that emphasise policy 
preferences (e.g. Marxists) and those that emphasise institutions. Non-institutional 
approaches often overlook long-term institutional factors that shape the way in which 
regulators and legislators react to policy demands and translate those demands into 
government action37. An institutional approach is employed38. In much of this literature,
35 Yang (1999: 532).
36 Cho (1998: 18).
37 Galperin (2004: 163-164).
38 Institutions are defined as the formal rules governing decision-making. They are separated from the 
features of ‘policy’, which constitutes the dependent variable. In Thatcher’s study, the national institutions 
chosen for investigation are those relating to the telecommunication sector, such as ownership of suppliers, 
the establishment of sector-specific independent regulatory bodies and the formal powers of decision­
makers. The study examines ‘policy-making’ which includes processes, instruments, objectives and 
outcome (Thatcher, 1999: 25-26).
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the watchword has been the “path dependence” effect of institutions39. Historical 
institutionalists emphasise the role of institutional choices made early in the development 
of policy areas, or even of political systems. The argument is that these initial choices 
(structural as well as normative) have a pervasive effect on subsequent policy choices. It 
appears in these arguments that even if subsequent structural changes are made, the initial 
choices have an enduring impact.
The institutional approach rests on a number of concepts. First, institutions divide power 
and responsibilities between the organisations of the state. Second, the approach 
emphasises the uniqueness of institutions both in time and in place40. Third institutionalist 
arguments emphasise structure at the expense of agency41. Institutional analysis focuses 
attention on state actors and structures to explain public policies. It underscores how both 
formal and informal arrangements shape political interactions and influence the outcome 
of government action.
The institutional approach is divided into a number of sub-groups. The bureaucratic 
politics model postulates that interactions within bureaucracies explain policy-making as 
much as the intentions of politicians42. New institutionalism places the state at the centre 
of analysis but recognises a variety of influences on policy (e.g. economy). The approach 
provides a solid conceptual foundation to examine the determinants of communication 
and information policies, and is particularly useful for the study of long-term policy 
patterns or international comparisons.
Institutions are thought to affect the power of groups, shape the way ideas circulate to 
influence policy and influence coordination of public decisions43. Because of stability, 
institutions are an independent factor affecting political behaviour44. Thus, institutional 
analyses share the proposition that institutions are neither a mere reflection of other 
forces, nor neutral arenas within which political behaviour, driven by more fundamental
39 In contrast to the preference-based argument, ‘new institutionalists’ have focused on political institutions, 
largely to the exclusion of preferences. The rational choice version of institutionalism has focused on the 
problem of equilibrium selection. In the non-rational choice version of institutionalism, scholars have 
emphasised the role of formal and informal institutions in shaping policy choices.
40 See (Thatcher, 1999; Schneider and Tenbiicken, 2003).
41 See Finnemore (1996).
42 See (Allison, 1971; Rhodes and Dunleavy, 1995; Hills and Michalis, 2000).
43 John (1998: 57-58).
44 See (Hall, 1986; Steinmo, Thelen et al., 1992; Galperin, 2004). The neo-institutional theory is based on 
the assumption that the likelihood of institutional change increases when the current institutional 
arrangement is misaligned with the interests of the major groups involved.
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factors, occurs. Institutionalists argue that institutions shape policy by affecting the 
context of debate and the power of actors wishing to reform policy-making45.
A number of scholars have applied an institutional approach to the study of
telecommunication policy-making and reforms46. For example, at the heart of
institutionalist analysis lies the claim that a country's institutions do not adjust rapidly to
societal or other contextual and environmental changes, but represent a set of independent
variables that influence policy47. National institutionalists analyses link the characteristics
of institutions to the features of national policy-making that they are seeking to explain
(continuities and cross-national differences)48. For institutionalists, details of political
system, such as rules and organisations, matter in terms of public policy development.
Policies are conceived as the result of incentives operating on political officials and these
incentives are the result of interactions between political activities of constituents and
political institutions through which these activities must be channelled 49. The approach
stresses the characteristics of the formal political system, emphasising the role of different
national institutions as key independent variables in the policy-making process. The
domestic political system is thus seen as a central element in explaining variations in
telecommunication policy outcomes. For example, a closed policy process with a high
concentration of power in the state is more likely to succeed in introducing reforms in the
telecommunication sector than open, decentralised ones50. It is also argued that the
structure of political incentives and political institutions in each country powerfully shape
how the country will reallocate the property rights and reorganise the regulation of
communications system51. Thatcher argues that:
“National institutions are important for the starting point o f reform.
Policy modifications in a country are related to past circumstances, 
notably the institutional framework, which influence the actors involved in 
reform, their aims and ideas, and the distribution o f resources and powerc ^
amongst them. ”
In his view, three types of change can be envisaged: policies can be altered within a given 
set of national institutions, national institutions themselves can be modified, or 
institutions themselves may influence non-institutional pressure for change. In the first
45 March and Olsen (1989).
46 See Braathen (2004).
47 March and Olsen (1996).
48 Thatcher (1999: 12).
49 Noll (1986).
50 Petrazzini (1995: 41).
51 Cowhey (1990) and Petrazzini (1995).
52 Thatcher (1999: 16).
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case, exogenous factors can cause existing but previously latent institutions to become 
active and/or new actors to pursue new goals through existing institutions . Thatcher 
identifies four key institutional features for national patterns of policy-making in 
telecommunications: the organisational position of the network operator, the powers of 
elected politicians, financial instruments and rules applicable to public policy in the 
sector, and the existence and powers of an independent regulator54. Bartle notes that even 
in sectors where there are powerful trans-national economic and technological pressures, 
the only way to properly understand the process of reform is to analyse national 
institutional structures, norms and decision-making procedures55.
At the very least, a country's institutions provide the framework through which other 
factors -  be they market, demographic or technological forces or conflicts between 
interests -  must pass in order to influence public policy56. “Although national 
institutionalists explanations place a country’s institutions at the centre of their 
explanations, they do not claim institutional determinism. Rather institutions structure 
decisions”57.
Institutionalism is clearly differentiated from contextual approaches, which emphasise the 
way order is imposed on political institutions by an external environment. 
Institutionalism, by contrast, posits a greater independence for political institutions, which 
can provide order and influence change over and above exogenous imperatives. At the 
same time, a stress on national institutions should not underestimate the importance of the 
nature of the relationship between institutions and exogenous forces. Institutionalism is 
also challenged by statism, which sees the state as a decision-making entity analytically 
separate from its constituent parts and pursuing national interests, such as internal and
C O
external stability or positive assertion of national power in the international community . 
Here, the state is not discussed as a single entity, but rather as an aggregation of 
organisations and institutions, each with its own interests.
53 Thatcher (1999: 16-18).
54 Thatcher (1999: 309). Institutions are an exogenous factor in national policy-making: they influence 
public policy but policy-makers are not able to alter them rapidly.
55 Bartle (2001: 3-4). Institutional theory does not repudiate the context per se, but the primacy attached to 
it. In the new institutionalism, exogenous forces can provide the stimuli for policy and/or institutional 
change but the actual response is shaped by institutional factors.
56 Thatcher (1999: 10).
57 Thatcher (1999: 19).
58 For communications, relevant facts are linkages between the sector and policy, and the purpose of the 
state (Noll, 1986: 51-52). Tang and Lee (2003: 20) argue that China’s telecommunication development can 
be understood through the perspective of Statist Theory.
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One of the key criticisms to institutional approaches is that actors and groups often 
circumvent institutions in pursuit of their interests. Moreover, social context shapes and 
mediates formal arrangements. Another limitation of the approach is that it tends not to 
emphasise the distinctiveness of each policy sector: single-sector studies are limited in 
their ability to assess the relative influence of sector-specific technical and economic 
forces in the policy process. In his study of telecommunication reform in three European 
countries, Bartle finds that national institutions have significantly influenced the pace and 
timing of reform but that they can not clearly account either for the shift from monopoly 
to competition, nor for the decisions to liberalise, privatise, nor for the rise of 
competition-orientated regulation. At the same time, techno-economic forces have 
provided impetus for reform but they cannot sufficiently fill the explanatory gap left by 
institutions59. Hills and Michalis argue that regulatory regimes themselves are variables in 
bureaucratic and institutional turf wars and in the political process60. The second 
criticism is that the institutional approach works best when comparing policy-making and 
implementation between nation-states, but is less able to explain policy-making 
differences between policy sectors and policy change.
For Bauer,
“Neoclassical theory and traditional regulatory theory typically relegate 
technological change, innovation, and institutional and regulatory change 
to external forces impacting on an industry. In contrary, evolutionary 
models study the interplay o f endogenous forces within the economic 
system with the environment o f economic agents. ”61
Thus, the most promising avenue is a hybrid approach, combining case study work, 
diversity-based methods, and traditional quantitative methods using more carefully 
specified measures for legal and institutional variables62. In a way, our approach 
resembles what Dyson and Humpreys proposed. They argued for a neo-pluralist 
perspective in which communication policies are viewed by as “being shaped by highly 
complex configurations of forces, international and domestic, within which institutional 
structures and policy networks play a central role.”
59 Bartle (2002: 21-22).
60 Hills and Michalis (2000: 459).
61 Bauer (1999: 17).
62 Bauer (2003: 19).
63 Accordingly, attention must focus on such factors as the character of the governmental and administrative 
systems, the consensus requirements of the party system, electoral pressures, the characteristics o f policy 
networks, the nature of international institutions and the organisation o f markets. One needs to look not just 
at national political institutions but also at international institutions and sectoral variations (Dyson and 
Humphreys, 1990).
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In the historical-institutionalist tradition, factors such as policy learning, institutional 
isomorphism, state traditions and structures, political leadership, and the broader 
institutional context are at the centre of the analysis. In addition, historical 
institutionalism scholars stress the role of former or previous institutional arrangements or 
choices. These institutional arrangements may include, among other things, electoral 
rules, the relationship amongst the various departments in the government, and the 
relationship of the government and private actors64. A central goal of most historical 
institutional analysis is to estimate the impact of variations in institutional forms and 
configurations on a particular outcome or set of outcomes. It is historical because analysts 
argue that once constructed at a moment in history, institutions typically endure for 
significant periods of time, influencing political dynamics and associated outcomes in 
subsequent periods65. Hall and Taylor highlight four features of historical 
institutionalism66: 1) it has a tendency to conceptualise the relationship between 
institutions and individual behaviour in broad terms; 2) it emphasizes the asymmetries of 
power associated with the operation and development of institutions ; 3) it advocates a 
view of causation that is “path dependent” since the political forces will be mediated by 
the contextual features of a given situation inherited from the past; 4) it is concerned with 
integrating institutional analysis with the contribution that other kind of factors, such as 
ideas, can make to political outcomes68. Our purpose in adopting a historical institutional 
approach is to question just how those factors have affected China’s telecommunications 
regulatory policy-making. Whereas Lovelock and Ure contend that the ‘fragmented 
authority’ structure is strategic and that central authority has not been undermined69, this 
thesis argues that the conjunction of the reforms carried out since the mid-1990s and the 
accession to the WTO have dealt a fatal blow to the traditional bargaining regime under 
which China’s telecommunication policy-making operated until now.
Most of the research was carried out over a period of three years in Geneva (spring 2001), 
Beijing and Shanghai (autumn 2001, summer and autumn 2002, autumn 2003). A variety 
of text-based sources were used including online media (Factiva) and more traditional 
academic journals. In addition, more than 70 confidential interviews were conducted with
64 Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 2).
65 Liebermann (2001).
66 Hall and Taylor (1996: 939-942).
67 Historical institutionalists are likely to assume a world in which institutions give some groups or interests 
disproportionate access to the decision-making process.
68 It typically seeks to locate institutions in a causal chain that accommodates a role for others factors, 
notably socio-economic development and the diffusion of ideas in a world that is more complex than that of 
tastes and institutions often advocated by pure rational choice institutionalists.
69 Lovelock and Ure (2000: 10-11).
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Chinese and international telecommunication operators, equipment manufacturers, civil 
servants from the Ministry of Information Industry (Mil) and from the Ministry of 
Foreign Commerce (MOFCOM)70. Most interviews were conducted in English71 and 
“off-the-record”. Interviews usually lasted one hour and were structured around open- 
ended questions, following a list of pre-established questions. The majority of them were 
recorded and re-transcribed. All interviews were conducted under conditions of 
anonymity, but a confidential list of interviewee positions, location and date are available 
from the author on request.
70 Ex-Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC).
71 Interviews conducted in Chinese were translated by a Chinese doctoral student.
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A preview of the argument: WTO accession and telecommunication reforms on dual 
tracks
Two processes have influenced China’s telecommunication regulatory policy-making for 
most of the 1990s. First, China embarked in 1993 on a telecommunication liberalisation 
programme, which resulted in profound structural changes. Second, in line with its 
economic reforms and increased participation in the world economy, China has been 
seeking access to the WTO. This deeper integration in the global economic environment72 
should have resulted in the de jure and de facto alignment of the telecommunication 
regulatory environment with rules and norms in force in the international 
telecommunication regime. Indeed, telecommunication regulation is characterised by 
technical complexity and uncertainty. This, combined with the fact that governments are 
anxious to secure the benefits of reforms, make it an area ripe for modelling73. 
Braithwaite and Drahos have found that the modelling mechanism has been very 
important in the spread of regulatory policies for telecommunication, explaining both the 
diffusion of a regulatory scheme and its maintenance and stability74.
In reality, China’s telecommunication regulatory policy-making and the reforms that have 
resulted bear little resemblance with other countries, either developed or developing. In 
terms of privatisation, the government has maintained a majority ownership in the largest 
operators. Competition remains limited in basic services and the independence of the 
regulator is far from being achieved. This thesis argues that the idiosyncratic nature of 
China’s telecommunication reforms must be viewed in the broader institutional 
environment in which they took place.
Henisz et al. decompose market-oriented infrastructure reforms into domestic and 
international context (see Table 2). For them, “international coercion occurs when 
powerful actors influence the policy choices of governments directly, or when such actors 
alter the outcome of a domestic policy struggle by favouring the domestic coalition
72 See Lardy (2002).
73 Modelling is defined as “action(s) that constitute a process o f displaying, symbolically interpreting and 
copying conceptions of action (and the process itself). A model is a conception of action that is put on 
display during such a process of modelling. A model is that which is displayed, symbolically interpreted 
and copied” (Braithwaite, 1994).
74 Reciprocal adjustment has proven to be the other major mechanism in the globalisation of 
telecommunication regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 353-355). For a detailed analysis of coercive 
pressures, see Ives (2003).
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supporting a given policy. The former concept of ‘direct coercion’ implies that domestic 
groups or parties that set policy simply acquiesce to international pressures” .
Table 2: Domestic and international components of market-oriented reforms
Domestic International
Demand
(sector performance and interest groups) Coercion
Supply
(fiscal pressure, technology and political 
institutions)
Emulation
Source: Adapted from Henisz, Zelner et al. (2004).
What then explains the relatively weak impact of China’s WTO accession process on the 
overall telecommunication reform process? One could of course argue that it is due to the 
fact that both processes were going in the same direction. As we will see, this is not the 
case. On a number of issues, such as foreign direct investment or market access, China 
resists alteration of its telecommunication market. In other words, how can we then 
explain that China has been able to accommodate the changes that took place in the 
supranational telecommunication environment?
This thesis argues that both processes were on parallel tracks. WTO commitments did 
entail a certain number of concessions in terms of market access, as well as the abidance 
to the Reference Paper. But, on the other side, the issues brought by the on-going reforms 
of the sector, such as liberalisation, decentralisation or privatisation had in practice little 
direct relation to the WTO negotiations. Thus, both processes could be conducted at the 
same time with a relative insulation between them.
While the State Council and the Ministry in charge of the foreign trade were negotiating 
commitments that would result in the acceptance of supra-national rules and regulations 
with direct and lasting implications for the telecommunication sector, the Ministry in 
charge of telecommunications was attempting to reform the sector in a careful and 
gradual manner, thus leaving little opportunities to model its telecommunication reform 
programme on international norms. The explanation to the isolation of both processes is 
also to be accounted for by the periodisation of events (see Table 3). Whereas the 
resumption of negotiation started in 1986, the inclusion of telecommunication services in
75 Henisz, Zelner et al. (2004:15). For Henisz et al. “studies of the adoption of reform should include both 
the institutional forces emphasised by neo-institutional sociology, and the economic and political forces 
highlighted by scholars in positive political economy”. Deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation are 
used as dependent variables. The major weakness of Henisz et al. approach lies in the fact that they fail to 
separate direct coercion by multilateral lenders from the indirect empowerment of domestic political actors 
to achieve their desired policy outcomes.
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the schedule of commitments took place only after 1995 and it did not really become a 
source of intense negotiations until 1998.
Table 3: Telecommunication reforms and WTO accession on dual tracks
1986-1989 1989-1994 1995-2001
GATT/WTO accession Resumption of negotiations
Push for joining before 
conclusion of Uruguay 
Round (mostly goods)
Inclusion of services in 
the negotiation
T elecommunication 
sector No reforms
Structural and 
institutional reforms
Source: Adapted from Liang (2002).
A further argument is that the reform process was able to integrate, or at least 
accommodate, the external pressure brought by the WTO accession for two reasons. First, 
the Chinese government was not facing fiscal or debt crises during the accession process. 
The formidable growth of the Chinese economy over the past 20 years had given the 
government a cushion of security to deal with periods of inflation and insulated it from 
the conditionalities often imposed by multilateral agencies on developing countries. 
Second, the sheer size and potential of the Chinese telecommunication market has 
allowed the government to extract from its foreign partners concessions seldom granted to 
other developing economies.
Given the scale of China’s economic transformation in China over the past 20 years, the 
belated telecommunication reforms nonetheless raise the questions about the origin, 
nature and direction of change, albeit limited, in the industry. Much of the literature 
devoted to change in China’s telecommunication industry at the end of the 20th century 
mentions the accession to the WTO. While there is little doubt that more than 15 years of 
negotiations with foreign governments and the commitments that ensued have acted as an 
element of pressure on the telecommunication sector, the overall impact remains hard to 
estimate. While Tipson argues claims that “the greatest multilateral influence on Chinese 
telecommunications policies results from the leadership’s interest in seeing China
nf.
become a member o f the World Trade Organisation” , the pressure brought by the 
accession must indeed be seen in the context of numerous factors, both domestic and
nn
international, which have contributed to altering the course of the reforms process . For 
example, Zhang argues that the driving forces which placed China’s telecommunications 
industry on the liberalisation track came not from inside the telecommunications industry, 
but from the political will of China’s leadership and the pressures of accession to the
76 Tipson (1999: 244).
77 However, in some instances, international pressures ‘reverberate’ within domestic politics, tipping the 
domestic balance and thus influencing the international negotiations (Putnam, 1988: 454).
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WTO78. DeWoskin acknowledges the role of three factors: technological change, 
exposure to international capital markets and high-level recognition of the need to support 
China’s economic growth with a vastly improved IT infrastructure79. In other words, both 
the institutional setting and a number of elements exclusive to China’s economic 
development made it possible for China to largely resist a standard telecommunication 
reform model.
78 Zhang (2001: 468).
79 DeWoskin (2001: 652).
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Chapter plan
Chapter two presents China’s telecommunication policy-making framework. After 
drawing a boundary between the services and equipment sector, both the structure and the 
mechanism of the policy-making process are described. Key policy-making actors and 
instruments are identified.
Part II describes the domestic component of China’s telecommunication reforms. 
Chapter three provides data points on the growth of the telecommunication market. A 
number of elements, such as the overall decentralisation process and flexibility in 
funding, are put forward to explain the massive network deployment in the second part of 
the 1990s. Chapter four looks at China’s idiosyncratic telecommunication liberalisation 
programme. Special attention is paid to the introduction of competition and to China’s 
model of privatisation. A brief comparison with the reforms conducted in the electricity 
sector is provided to highlight the particularities of the telecommunication sector.
Part III studies the external pressures to reform. Chapter five describes the international 
telecommunication regime and China’s relationship with supranational actors. The issue 
of foreign direct investment is raised, before considering the questions of sovereignty and 
national security. Chapter six specifically analyses the impact (or lack of) played by the 
WTO accession on the reforms. Both the history of the accession and the outcome are 
reviewed. The discussion then turns to the issue of consistency with the domestic 
regulatory environment and raises the question of compliance.
Part IV evaluates the state-of-the-play regulatory environment and presents the 
conclusion of the thesis. Chapter seven presents an evaluation of the reforms and places 
them in an international context. It then highlights some of the open issues before asking 
whether China’s harmonisation with international norms and rules prefigures the birth of 
a regulatory state. Chapter eight gives an overview of the dissertation, summarises the 
key contributions and discusses future avenues for research.
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2 Framing China’s telecommunication policy-making
“The single most important institution that is creating a whole new set of relations and structures 
in modem telecommunications is the market. ”
(Joseph and Drahos, 1998: 100)
“The problem that many observers -  both Western and Chinese — have with the complexity of the 
policy-making process is separating out the various strands to understand each aspect and then 
re-integrating them into an overall policy perspective. ”
(Lovelock and Ure, 2000: 3)
Three schools tend to dominate Chinese policy-making theory -  pluralism, elitism and 
institutionalism. The first one stresses that competition and bargaining among political 
interests determine the direction and output of China’s policy-making80. It argues that 
China's policy-making process is increasingly pluralised within a framework of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism81. For instance in foreign trade, while the decision-making 
process still excludes societal interests, the decentralised governmental structure has 
opened the way for greater influence from a multitude of domestic bureaucracies as well 
as international forces. The second school stresses the decisive role of China’s top 
political elites in the policy process . There too, however, policy is increasingly formed 
on a more inclusive rather than exclusive basis, with a broader band of consultative 
organs involved in the process and also a shift in the principal loci of executive policy 
deliberation and decision-making to a wider and slightly different set of institutional 
actors . The third one emphasises the importance of institutionalised element on China’s 
policy-making process. It explores in particular the role of bureaucratic structures84. 
While China's formal political structure seems to produce a unified, interactive, and 
hierarchical chain of governance, in reality it is often divided, segmented, and stratified, 
generating interagency competition, power conflicts, and problems of coordination. A 
good example of this fragmentation is provided by the lack of national authority for 
overall coordination within China’s information industries that resulted in the split of
Of
responsibilities among several government agencies . In the early days, the 
telecommunication sector was firmly under control of the national monopoly and de facto 
of the central government. But telecommunication became caught in a cycle of 
bureaucratic competition and politicisation. Competitors of the Ministry of Post and
80 Conversely, Hamrin and Zhao (1995) have argued that the Chinese government has maintained its 
monopoly on policy-making authority despite finding itself “persuading, consulting or bargaining” with a 
multitude of lower-level actors over the implementation of its policies.
81 Zhao (1995: 241).
82 See (Dittmer, 1995,2001; Fewsmith, 2001).
83 Shambaugh (2001: 103).
84 See (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1986,1988; Lampton, 1992; Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992).
85 Kraemer and Dedrick (1994: 18).
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Telecommunication (MPT) mostly shunned cooperation adopting instead a strategy of 
monopoly breaking that politicised China's telecommunication industry over the course of 
the 1990s86.
Studies on China’s telecommunication policy-making are increasingly subject to 
scholarly research. One of the first and best studies available is Lovelock’s thesis on the 
evolution of China’s National Information Infrastructure (Nil). He offered to look at 
policy-making through a bargaining framework lens -  as an alternative to a regulatory 
model. A bargaining perspective is often used to study policy-making and reforms in 
China. Boisot and Child applied it to an analysis of the economic reforms and Ure 
employed a bargaining approach do describe how rivalling Ministries gained entry or
on
influence over different aspects of the national information infrastructure . The argument 
goes that, because of bureaucratic compartmentalism, the formulation and 
implementation of policy in China usually take place within bureaucracies and through
QQ
bargaining among central formal agencies . In other words, the Chinese government 
bureaucracy makes decisions by a system of “delegation by consensus” where Party 
leaders delegate the authority to subordinate government agencies, which then work out
OQ
economic policies . As Lampton has shown, the bargaining that has characterised 
China’s interaction with the outside world in gaining access to high technology and 
industrial finance has been replicated domestically between contending bureaucratic and 
entrepreneurial interests90. In the bargaining model, specific political outcomes arise from 
bargains struck when organisational goals of interested bureaucracies collide. In addition, 
the presence of a superior-ranking body is often necessary to manage the process and 
legitimise the outcome. It then often creates an ad hoc coordinating agency to represent it 
during the actual bargaining process. Such a model explains, for example, the creation of 
the Inter-ministerial Coordination Group on GATT to deal with the WTO negotiation or 
the fact that the policy-making system still relies heavily on “leading groups” (lingdao 
xiaoxu). The bargaining model appears very useful at dissecting the negotiations that take 
place among domestic actors. While apt to explain in good part the nature and process of 
reform that took place until 2001, a bargaining framework loses its explicative power 
when facing a more formal regulatory environment -  through the introduction of
86 Feigenbaum (2003: 209-210).
87 Boisot and Child (1988) and Ure (1997b).
88 Feigenbaum (2003: 172).
89 Shirk (1993: 127). The bureaucratic process of building consensus among agencies with different policy 
agendas is known as policy coordination or xietiao zhengce (Wang, 1999c: 43).
90 Lampton (1992).
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regulations or the creation of a regulatory agency. As we will see, the final years of the 
WTO accession have shown that bargaining did indeed take place between MOFTEC and 
Mil but that, whenever an issue remained undecided, the State Council stepped in to 
resolve the conflict. Lovelock’s work suffers however from having been written several 
years before China’s accession to the WTO. It could, thus, not take into account the 
changes brought by the process. Still, he surmised that “the impact o f China’s accession 
to the WTO on China’s policy-making could yet come to be more profound than any other 
influence”91. This was later partially addressed by Zhang who drew on bargaining and 
institutional theory to explore China's telecommunications policy-making mechanism as 
well as the impact of China's entry into the WTO on its telecommunications reform and 
transition. He found that policy-making is subject to “constraints o f political and 
administrative endowments, which undermine the independence o f telecommunications 
regulation and weaken policy-making authority” .
The bargaining model was preceded by the power model of Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 
which posited that policy outcomes result from struggles among the top leaders93. More 
recently, Mertha offered a “policy enforcement market” framework as an alternative to 
the power and bargaining model. His assumptions require to disaggregate from the state 
level of analysis and examine the discrete functional bureaucracies and the factors that 
shape the dynamics of interaction between them. In his model, dynamics between 
bureaucracies are resolved through competition, not consensus94. As we will see, a prime 
example of this dynamics is found in the creation of China Unicom, which broke the 
long-held monopoly of China Telecom.
Studies have also looked at the reform process per se. Works tend to be of descriptive 
nature and cover the reforms undertaken in the sector over the past decade. They consist 
in single case studies and general accounts95. One of the key studies on 
telecommunication reforms was written by Mueller and Tan. Although the authors 
underestimated the changes that were taking place, their study highlighted five distinct 
but related factors affecting telecommunication reforms in China: 1) the problem of 
central-local relations, 2) the unique political-economic pressures created by a state-
91 Lovelock (1999: 313). See also (Lovelock and Ure, 2000).
92 Zhang (2002: 337). Zhang makes a further partition between formal and informal institutions.
93 Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988).
94 Mertha (forthcoming: 22).
95 Chang (1994), Ure (1994a) and more recently (Liu, 2003; Lu and Wong, 2003; OECD, 2003b; Pearson, 
2003; Loo, 2004). See also (China (Hainan) Institute of Reform and Development, 2002; Taylor, 2002) for 
normative discussions of China’s telecommunication reforms.
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dominated economy subjected to market forces, 3) the problem of privatisation and legal 
reform, 4) the problem of foreign involvement; and 5) the need for political repression96.
Gao and Lyytinen address the issue of telecommunications reform from a macro 
perspective. Both the issue of reform in the regulatory regime and changes in the market 
structure are examined. The main argument is that China has pursued an ‘Act After 
Trials’ approach to reform. While offering an interesting historical approach to the 
telecommunications sector, their research suffers from a lack of links/explanations 
between the main periods and from an inexistent conceptual model. The latter weakness 
was partly corrected in a subsequent paper by adopting structuration theory97.
The last stream relevant to our research has concentrated on the WTO. This increasing 
body of literature predicts and discusses the impact of China’s accession to the WTO on 
the telecommunication industry and, in some cases, provides an initial analysis of the
98commitments .
A number of scholars have applied a public interest approach to the study of 
telecommunication reforms in China99. Using such an analytical framework, Fan provides 
an in-depth presentation of China's complex telecommunication infrastructure and 
regulatory underpinnings100. He argues that, following a tradition focusing on leadership 
and personalistic politics, political power and ensuing policies are often vested more in 
individuals than in specific institutions. Elite influence initiates policies, and relevant 
bureaucratic bodies configurate and implement them at both national and local levels. In 
his thesis on China's telecommunications reforms, Guan uses a “public choice plus ” 
theory101. Building on rational choice theory, he identifies a Chinese “iron triangle” of 
politicians, bureaucrats/regulators and interest groups. By studying the process by which 
China has gradually brought competition into its long monopolised telecommunications 
service market, he shows how factors and forces -  interests, ideology, technology, ideas, 
institutions and internationalisation of markets -  have affected, and will continue to affect 
the reform agenda, policy-making process and policy outcomes. Guan’s public choice
96 Mueller and Tan (1997: 9).
97 See (Gao and Lyytinen, 2000; Gao and Lyytinen, 2003; Yu, Berg et al., 2004).
98 Mueller and Lovelock (2000); Shen (2000); Xu (2000); Xu and Kan (2000); Pangestu and Mrongowius 
(2002); Zhang (2000; 2001; 2002) ; OECD (2003a).
99 According to Singh (2000: 900), the Chinese state is primarily driven by awarding of favours to groups 
with the most access to state decision-making. These personalistic favours and the definition of 
telecommunications as a public good shape the emerging property rights in telecommunications.
100 Fan (1996; Fan, 2001).
101 Guan (2003).
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approach provides a plausible explanation of why MPT and later Mil resisted so 
vehemently to the reforms. There is little doubt that increased transparency in the 
regulatory environment would reduce their ability to control the telecommunication sector 
and jeopardise a large amount of vested interests. This approach reaches its limit when 
trying to explain the stalemate in the reform process once operators gained independence 
from Mil through the policy of separation of enterprises from government (zhengqi 
fenkai). One could argue that, contrary to the claim of government officials, the 
independence of telecommunication operators from the ministry is relative, and that the 
latter thus derives benefits from maintaining a strong “involvement”. In fact, several 
instances tend to prove that the operators have indeed attained a certain level of 
autonomy. For example, operators have publicly voiced their impatience at the 
government indecision on 3G licence issuing, relative both to timing and technological 
choice. But the biggest fault one can find with this approach is probably the fact that it 
has been developed to study policy-making processes in democratic political systems and 
is therefore ill suited to the Chinese context. The iron-triangle of politicians, bureaucrats 
and interest groups carries little relevance in China.
From a broader perspective, many scholars argue that the understanding of
telecommunication reforms needs to take into account institutional factors102. In fact, the
role of institutions in the process of telecommunication reforms is dual. On the one hand,
telecommunication reforms have often caused profound institutional changes. Public
telecommunication operators (PTOs) were separated from the Ministry in charge of
telecommunications or had to face competition from new entrants. On the other hand,
existing institutions proved to be a factor slowing down the reform process. Thanks to
their long-lasting relationship with the Ministry, incumbents were able to extract rents
from the government. Surprisingly, relatively few telecommunication studies emphasise
the institutional aspect of the Chinese reform process. Even when doing so, they tend to
underestimate the broader impact of the WTO on the overall reform process:
“Subject to the deep-rooted political, legislative, and administrative 
constraints, the prospective implementation o f the WTO agreement in 
China's telecommunication industry is uncertain. In addition, the huge gap 
between China's telecommunication regulatory institutions and 
requirements o f Reference Paper, plus weak and moderate terms and 
conditions, constitute extra barriers for China's implementation o f its
102 Noll (1999b) and Singh (2000: 887). Petrazzini (1995: 5) argues that in LDCs, telecommunication 
reforms and their divergent policy outcomes have clear political underpinnings.
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commitments. All in all, the current overwhelming impacts o f the WTO on9>1 u3China's telecommunication industry would die away soon. ”
Even fewer efforts have been applied to isolating the impact of the WTO accession 
process on telecommunication policy-making in general and on the reform process in 
particular. There are some exceptions. DeWoskin centred his analysis on the WTO 
negotiation and its broader implications by placing telecommunication in the context of 
the declared overall goals of China’s GATT/WTO initiative (namely the securing of 
trading relations with the outside world and the stimulation of domestic reforms to 
prepare Chinese players for global competition)104. He notes the improved understanding 
of global telecommunication practices and structures gained by China. His work falls 
short on analysing the impact of the accession on post-WTO reforms. Zhang draws on 
institutional theory and bargaining theory to analyse China's telecommunications policy­
making mechanism. By drawing on new institutional economics, Zhang contends that the 
‘rules-of-law’ specified by the WTO, as an exogenous institution for the member states, 
will theoretically influence its members' domestic telecommunications regulatory 
institutions, but that the actual effects will be different and will depend on the institutional 
endowments of the host countries and their institutional stances105. This thesis provides a 
potential answer to Zhang’s hypothesis.
This chapter argues that China’s telecommunication policy-making is shifting from a 
closed arena to an agora where a multitude of actors have a role to play106. Unfortunately 
the increase in the number of stakeholders in the policy-making process has blurred the 
functions and responsibilities of the traditional policy maker (Mil). It has resulted in the 
agency’s incapacity to thoroughly restructure the telecommunication sector. The structure
1 onof this chapter follows Kitschelt analysis of policy-making . After establishing a 
boundary between telecommunication services and equipment manufacturing, this 
chapter reviews the structure and mechanisms of China’s telecommunication policy­
making. It identifies the key actors and their role. The last section presents the regulatory 
framework.
103 Zhang (2000: 31).
104 DeWoskin (2001:642).
105 Zhang (2001; 2002).
106 In other parts of the world, states no longer have, as they did in the past, a monopoly in 
telecommunications policy-making. As a result, policy-making proceeds under conditions of what might be 
termed concentrated pluralism (Joseph and Drahos, 1998: 99).
107 Kitschelt (1986: 66-67) distinguishes four analytical aspects of policy-making: the specific institutional 
arenas of political decision-making, the decision-making process, the social groups that mobilise around 
public policy, and the economic, social and political impacts of policy, i.e. its “outcomes”.
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Fluctuating boundaries between the equipment and services sector
Generally speaking, the telecommunication sector can be divided between equipment and 
services. This section reviews the components of both sectors, discusses the boundary
1 ORbetween them and highlights what sets them apart—. To a certain extent, drawing a
boundary between equipment and services is arbitrary when it comes to policy-making. In
fact, for many years, official pronouncements on the centrality of telecommunication in
China’s economic development did not make an explicit distinction between both sectors:
“The application o f modem electronic information technology will result 
in significant progress in the field o f national economy and society; the 
diffusion o f information technology will promote advances in production, 
working and living conditions; the National Information Infrastructure 
(Nil) will be primarily supported by wide-band ISDN technology; and the 
national economic informatisation level will be remarkably enhanced. ”109
In practice, however, the era where equipment manufacturers and services operators were 
all under one roof is long gone. It may even never have existed. In 1980, MPT restored its 
exclusive right and duty to plan, construct and manage the public network. Although 
telecommunication services were at the time bundled with postal services, they remained 
administratively separated from equipment manufacturing, which was controlled by the 
Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI). Over the years MPT had retained, both for 
military and commercial reasons, an elaborate system of institutes and factories from 
which it could source designs and equipment. The administrative separation did not 
prevent the Ministries from stepping into each other’s territory110. For instance, MEI 
developed its own private telecommunication network and acted as a key factor in the 
introduction of competition in the services sector111. The merger of both Ministries into 
Mil in 1998 had only a relatively little impact. By then, the equipment sector had been 
largely liberalised, while the services remained tightly controlled by the central 
government in a manner reminiscent of the European public telecommunication operators 
(PTOs).
The two sectors differ in at least three aspects. First, instead of the largely monopolistic 
industrial structure found in services, equipment manufacturing became characterised by
108 For a discussion on industry boundary, see Munir and Phillips (2002^
109 pth Fjve_Year-Plan (FYP) and long-range objective outline in 2010 of China’s national and economic 
development, passed by the 4th section of the 8 National People’s Congress (1996).
110 In the past, internal rivalries and anomalies have in fact been an important factor in the evolution of 
China’s telecommunication policies. Decisions often have been based on considerations of internal 
“bureaucratic politics” between MPT and its agency rivals and critics (Tipson, 1999: 246).
111 Feigenbaum (2003: 208). See also Chapter 3.
39
severe competition112. Second, equipment manufacturers come under various forms of 
ownership, ranging from traditional State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), like Putian, to 
private enterprises, like Huawei. In this respect, they mirror the ownership reform 
witnessed in other industrial sectors. Conversely, basic telecommunication operators 
remain, as of today, in majority owned by the state, barring private domestic and foreign 
entrepreneurs alike. Third, trade of telecommunication equipment and telecommunication 
services differs fundamentally. Information technology policy was recognised early as 
central to economic development and led the government to support both the 
development of indigenous production capacity and cooperation with foreign 
manufacturers. While trade was restricted in both sectors until the mid-1980s, the 
government has since opened the equipment sector to foreign trade while it restricted 
international carriers to operate domestically. In order to fill a mounting trade deficit in 
telecommunication equipment, China permitted and even encouraged foreign investment 
since the beginning of the 1990s113. Over time, foreign equipment manufacturers shifted 
their manufacturing to China while international operators remained barred from the 
Chinese market114. In the span of a decade, the ratio of office machines and 
telecommunication equipment (OMTE) imports and exports to total trade grew from a 
little above 5% to around 25%115. As a result, China has captured a significant part of 
world trade in OMTE (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). Motorola and Nokia were said to have 
investments in China totalling respectively USD 3.4 billion and EUR 2.3 billion by the 
end of 2004. Foreign telecommunication operators are largely absent from the services 
sector, except for value-added services (VAS). The difference of treatment between the 
two sectors became clear during the WTO negotiations. President Jiang announced as 
early as October 1997 China’s commitment to join the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA). Among Chinese quarters, ITA membership was viewed as “a positive 
development conducive to a more favourable and liberal environment for the growth o f 
China’s IT industry and related sectors, like telecommunications”116.
112 While benefiting customers in China and abroad, the intensive nature o f competition is actually a cause 
of concern to manufacturers who have seen their margin shrink in a process describes as commoditisation.
113 Horsley (2001b: 66-67) contests the openness of the equipment sector on grounds that foreign suppliers 
had to meet export and content requirements. She further points out that China shifted to non-tariff barriers, 
such as “buy local policies”, import inspection, network access permits and type approval licensing.
114 A good example of the evolution of the pattern of trading is provided by Nortel Networks: in 1996 more 
than 90% of all their sales in China was done on a cross-border basis; by 2001, more than 90% of all sales 
were done out of domestic joint ventures (Interview (B-039), conducted in Beijing, 27 November 2003).
115 In 2004 the most dynamic product category in China’s exports was office and telecom equipment, which 
increased by 45% to USD 171 billion (WTO, 2005).
116 Although China signed on ITA in the accession protocol, certain members initially disagreed with 
China’s participation on the ground of some tariffs on IT products (Interview (B-033), conducted in 
Geneva, 12 November 2003).
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Figure 1: Share of office and machine equipment in China’s total import and export, 1992-2003
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Note: A vivid debate animates academic circles as of who is actually behind the growth of OMTE in 
China’s exports with some arguing that up to three-fourth of the added value is provided by MNCs. 
Source: WTO (2004).
Figure 2: China’s share of world office and machine equipment imports and exports, 1992-2003
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Conversely, the bilateral negotiations on telecommunication services dragged on and 
provided a major stumbling block to China’s final schedule of commitments117. Later 
developments have confirmed China’s commitment, at least in principle. In 2003, China 
agreed to join the WTO agreement on removing all tariff barriers to information 
technology products, such as personal computers and telecommunication equipment118.
Dissimilarities in the regulatory environment of both sectors go a long way to explain 
those differences. On the one hand, the equipment sector is governed by clear rules. Joint 
venture laws have provided a stable environment to foreign manufacturers while 
provincial and private domestic companies have been allowed to compete alongside with 
the incumbent SOEs. On the other hand, the services sector lacks an all-encompassing 
law, relying instead on ad hoc interventions by MIL
Table 4: Difference in sub-sector regulatory framework between equipment and services, China, 2004
Equipment______________________________Services
Rules Investment, standards Tariffs, services, investment
Instruments Laws, decrees, contracts and licences Regulation and ad hoc intervention through
decrees
Government Mil, MOFCOM, NDRC, State Mil, NDRC, State Council
agencies Council
Source: Compiled by author.
This is not to say that there never were any regulatory issues for domestic or foreign 
companies in the equipment sector. In a country coming from a planned economy model, 
foreign investment was often controlled and, in the earlier stages, investment in 
manufacturing telecommunication equipment was managed (and still is to a certain 
degree) by MOFTEC and MIL Equipment manufacturers had to deal with Mil, 
MOFTEC, SDPC and SETC for projects involving foreign investment, as every Ministry 
had his own sphere119. There were also clear limitations on the number of foreign 
companies participating in handset manufacturing120. In addition, some of the original 
constraints on venture with a majority of foreign-ownership were internal policy (neibu)
117 Borrus and Cohen (1998: 1005).
118 Chen and Feng (2000) find China’s trade policy to be largely determined by the government’s concern to 
protect high value-added and high-tech industries and to protect industries that incur financial losses. In 
their view trade policy is mainly defined by an industrial policy favouring high-tech industries and a social 
policy minimising social instability.
119 Interview (B-010), conducted in Beijing, 5 September 2001.
120 By the end of 2002, Mil had issued 49 mobile phone production licences in total, including 30 GSM 
licences (13 JVs and 17 domestic firms) and 19 CDMA licences (18 domestic firms and Motorola). 11 
companies owned both CDMA and GSM handset production licences and 7 licensed manufacturers 
produce only CDMA mobile phones. Licensed JVs were required to export at least 60% of their output 
(Interfax, 2002a).
42
limitations121. Today, the attribution of new manufacturing licences remains managed by 
key policy-making agencies122, although the new legislation has simplified the licensing 
process. For example, the need for mobile phone makers to apply for a government 
licence before they can start manufacturing has been removed and applications for mobile
phone production need only to be examined by the National Development and Reform
101Commission (NDRC) . At the same time, a number of quantitative and qualitative 
requirements have been put in place so that the NDRC can maintain a limit on the pool of 
applicants124.
Although the boundary between equipment and services is clearly defined when it comes 
to the regulatory environment, both sectors remain intrinsically connected and conceal 
important policy linkages, often through outright state support. Prime examples are 
provided by TD-SCDMA and WAPI125. The Wireless Authentication and Privacy 
Infrastructure (WAPI) and the alternative standard for third generation (3G) mobile 
telephony (TD-SCDMA) are indeed two instances of policies to support domestic 
equipment manufacturers, which could wield significant importance on the services 
sector. Policies to support domestic manufacturers are neither new to the
t *)(\telecommunication industry nor limited to developing countries . In China, they usually 
take the form of industry funds, procurement rules or quotas. For instance, in August 
2003 the government “gave” RMB 700 million (USD 84.68 million) to the TD-SCDMA 
Industry Group, which is formed by eight domestic companies, to develop products and 
services based on TD-SCDMA127. An IT Fund, endowed with roughly RMB 500 million 
annually spent in grants, was formed in 1986 and is managed by Mil and the Ministry of
121 Those eventually went away but there still seems to be some limitation on wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise manufacturing telecommunication companies.
122 Under the new policy, handset manufacturers are awarded licences via government authorisation by both 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Mil (Chen, 2004b).
123 Lee (2005). Mil, which was the licensing authority for the sector, now plays an advisory role.
124 According to the NDRC, “project applicants shall be enterprises specialised in research, development, 
production and marketing of electronics and information products, operating for at least three years, of 
fairly powerful economic strength and capable of building efficient after-sale service supporting system; 
applicants for mobile communication system investment project shall have a registered capital o f no less 
than RMB 300 million; applicants for mobile communication terminal investment project shall have a 
registered capital of no less than RMB 200 million, have a research and development centre of perfect 
development platform and research environment, complete capability of designing complete sets and unit 
circuit hardware, developing chip group-based and protocol software and designing structural appearance”.
125 The WAPI standard has reportedly been acknowledged by the International Standardisation Organisation 
during the ISO/IEC JTC1 SC6 session despite strong objection from the United Kingdom, which suggested 
transferring the proposal to IEEE. See Chapter 7.
126 France, for example, has had a long history of supporting domestic companies in order to create national 
champions.
127 In a second round of funding the government is expected to invest RMB 1.4 billion (USD 168.7 million) 
to aid the development of the home-grown standard (Source: eastday.com November 11, 2003).
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Finance128. In the case of second-generation mobile telephony, it was clearly indicated 
that Unicom CDMA equipment purchases would only be from domestic suppliers 
(including foreign-invested ones). It was also quite clear that 30% of the market was
10Qgoing to be reserved for true local manufacturers . Quotas were used by Mil on the
import of certain material and components not available in China as a means to regulate
1the market and to support the domestic industry . Moreover, we assist today at the 
emergence of Chinese conglomerates with national and global ambitions in the equipment 
sector, which has led to strategic alliances with some of the leading multinational 
equipment manufacturers. Standards aside, policy-making and the overall reform process 
in the services sector have been both more complex and politically sensitive when 
compared to the equipment sector131.
Categorising basic and value-added services (VAS)
The service sector can be further divided into two main segments: basic and value-added 
services (VAS). According to the WTO, basic telecommunications services include “all 
telecommunications services, both public and private that involve end-to-end 
transmission of customer supplier information”. In comparison, value-added 
telecommunications services are “telecommunications for which suppliers ‘add value’ to 
the customer's information by enhancing its form or content or by providing for its 
storage and retrieval”, such as on-line data processing, e-mail, or on-line database storage 
and retrieval. In other words, the former includes the provision of public network 
infrastructure, public data transmission, and basic communications, whilst VAS are 
information services provided over public networks132.
In China, such categorisation was for many years either inexistent or restricted to 
government use (neibu). Since its official release as an appendix to the 
telecommunication regulation in 2000, the catalogue of telecommunications by category, 
detailing each type of basic and VAS service, was subsequently revised twice133. The 
revision introduced a new two-tiered system of classification, whereby basic and VAS
128 By 2002, the fund had fielded RMB 2.8 billion to 1’097 projects in software, semiconductors, 
communications, and networking.
129 Interview (B-039) conducted in Beijing, November 27,2003.
130 In addition, for the infrastructure business a certain level of local content was required (Interview (B- 
010), conducted in Beijing, 5 September 2001).
131 Notably because of concerns over national security and sovereignty (see Chapter 5).
132 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_coverage_e.htm.
133 On 11 June 2001 and 21 February 2003.
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services are each further divided into “class 1” and “class services134. Class 1 includes 
online data processing and data processing, domestic multi-party communication 
services, Internet data centre services, and domestic Internet virtual private network 
services. Class 2 covers call centres, Internet access, storage and retransmission (e-mail, 
voice mail, facsimile) and information services. Based on the premise that “regulating too 
early might have led to regulate wrongly”, the catalogue seemed to be designed to give 
Mil a maximum of flexibility “to re-adjust the categories as it goes along, as its 
understanding of the market develops, and as the market and technology change”135.
Whereas the Chinese classification of telecommunication services may lead to confusion, 
several other indicators provide us with a better idea of the market structure. On one 
hand, the number of operators offering basic services is limited to six companies. On the 
other hand, by July 2004, more than 14,000 companies had been licensed to provide 
value-added services136. The major reason explaining such a big difference is to be found 
in the conditions for obtaining a basic telecommunication service licence, which are much 
stricter and more restrictive than those imposed on VAS licence applicants137.
Table 5: Major differences between basic and value-added services, China, 2004
Criteria Basic services Value-added services
Ownership Exclusively state-owned enterprises; no private investment
Mix of state-owned, town and 
village enterprises and private 
companies
Market access Severely restricted
Partially restricted but 80% 
involve private capital and 
foreign investment
Market structure 6 operators 14’000 providers
Source: Compiled by author.
The enthusiasm for the Chinese telecommunication market has mesmerised and misled 
the most astute observers. For instance, not so long ago, Strange argued that the range of 
options open to China had narrowed to picking the foreign partners and negotiating with 
them the best terms of alliance. While her statement held partially true for the 
telecommunication equipment sector at the time, it proved totally wrong for services138: 
Chinese operators can chose from numerous foreign operators who have been knocking at 
the door for more than a decade in the hope of grabbing a slice of the market.
134 See Chapter 6 for an analysis of the consistency between China’s and the WTO’s classification.
135 Interview (B-032), conducted in Beijing, 18 November 2002 and Interview (B-007), conducted in 
Beijing, 31 August 2001.
136 Xinhua (2005b).
137 On one side, the valued-added area is extremely non-regulated and uon policy-made. It is a huge grey 
zone at the moment and letting it float too long will make it impossible to bring it together. On the other 
side, very few countries in the world impose so many restrictions in VAS (Interview (B-034), conducted in 
Shanghai, 21 November 2003).
138 Strange (1996).
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Structure and mechanism of telecommunication policy-making
Four characteristics appear central to China’s telecommunication policy-making structure 
and mechanism.
Local vs. central regulation
One of the main characteristics of China’s policy-making structure is its dual -  local and 
central -  regulation system139. Since the Open Door policy, the central government has 
increasingly devolved power to the periphery. Some provinces were given room to 
experiment early on, which led them to pass a number of sector legislations. In the case of 
telecommunications, it was not until 1989 that the first local telecommunications decree 
was issued in Liaoning as a basis to regulate its local market. As we will see in Chapter 3, 
the process of decentralisation was central to the fast development of the network. At the 
same time, the relaxing of central control created a form of regulatory fragmentation140. 
In recent years, provinces, like Guangdong, have attempted to address the inadequacy of 
the current telecommunication regulatory framework by drafting their own regulations141. 
In large municipalities, like Shanghai, the Telecommunication Bureau acts as a local 
regulator and implements complementary and detailed local rules pursuant to the national 
legislation. For example, the Shanghai Bureau states that its regulatory agenda is to 
“ensure fair competition and protect consumer interest”, in particular by placing emphasis 
on market access, tariffs, interconnection, network security, service levels, resources 
management and numbering allocation142. At the heart of the Bureau's approach to 
regulating the local telecommunication industry is a three-layer conceptual framework -  
regulation by the government, self-discipline by the industry; and supervision by 
consumers. This model draws from the Mil's own regulations designed to administer 
better service levels. The point made here is that regulatory pressures are not only being 
dogmatically handed down by the centre but also springing up at the provincial and 
municipal level.
139 Regulation is defined here as “the promulgation of a set o f rules, accompanied by some mechanism, 
typically a public agency, for monitoring and promoting compliance with those rules” (Baldwin, Scott et 
al., 1998).
140 Laffont (2004: 189). China’s telecommunication regulatory agencies consist of both industry-wide and 
sectoral agencies (ministries or departments) operating at both central and regional levels.
141 The draft legislation was submitted in late May 2004 for deliberation by the Standing Committee of the 
People’s Congress of Guangdong. It addresses issues of code of conduct and billing for premium services, 
handling of customer complaints (within 15 days) and the role of government in determining pricing 
(carriers are empowered to determine prices within fee guidelines provided by the government).
142 McKenzie (2003a: 103).
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Formal vs. informal policy-makers
In theory, the lines of influence in China’s telecommunication policy-making are 
straightforward: the State Council sits above the National Development and Reform 
Commission {fazhan he gaige weiyuanhui or NDRC), Mil, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (guoyou zichan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui or 
SASAC), the State Administration of Film, Radio and Television (guangbo dianxin 
dianshi zongju or SARFT), the Ministry of Commerce (shangwubu or MOFCOM) and 
other ministries. But unlike most Western countries, where formal politics is clearly 
dominant over informal politics and the relationship is one of “imposition and resistance”, 
the Chinese informal politics has been historically dominant, with formal politics often 
providing no more than a facade. Informal politics plays an important part in every 
organisation at every level, but the higher the organisation, the more important it 
becomes. At the highest level -  due to the fact that the tasks to be performed are relatively 
unstructured, the area of discretion is large, personal judgment is crucial, the demand for 
decisions is great, and secrecy imperative -  informal politics prevails. Although the 
historical trend is toward political formalisation, informal politics remains much more 
potent than in other countries and may be expected to prevail at the highest level well 
after formal-legal rationality has been superimposed in other areas. The formal rules of 
the game have the best chance of prevailing when they coincide with informal 
loyalties143. Thus, in practice, the relationships are much more complex than what formal 
political structures suggest144. For example, the NDRC is usually thought as an 
intermediate policy-making level between the State Council and M il145. In addition, 
bodies such as the State Council Informatisation Office (SCIO) represent additional 
layers in the policy-making edifice (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).
Domestic vs. international influences
Since the mid-1990s countries across world have been faced with the prospects of 
liberalising their telecommunication markets. These international and supranational 
diffusion mechanisms are often viewed as “coercing individual countries onto similar
143 Dittmer (1995: 16-19).
144 Fan (2001:105) notes that China's formal political structure seems to produce a unified, interactive, and 
hierarchical chain of governance. In reality it is often divided, segmented, and stratified, generating 
interagency competition, power conflicts, and problems o f coordination.
145 The State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and the SDPC had this kind of supra-ministerial 
status. It used to be the case that the State Planning Commission (SPC) was considered the all-powerful 
entity within government (Interview (B-019), conducted in Beijing, 17 September 2001).
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paths o f development.”146 In response governments have sought acceptable forms of 
international compatibility of policy and regulatory structures so as to facilitate their 
participation in the rapidly growing international networks147. However, national factors, 
such as different domestic political structures, are mediating the country-specific 
adaptation to the international diffusion mechanisms. Until the mid-1990s China had 
mostly resisted any external influence. Thanks to the previous restriction on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and a static international telecommunication regime dominated by the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Chinese policy-makers were “shielded” 
from the need to integrate the international dimension148. China’s bid to join the WTO 
and the signing of the basic telecommunication agreement (BTA) in 1995 resulted in 
accrued pressure from foreign government to liberalise the Chinese telecommunication 
sector. National telecommunication policies became influenced by the wish to be more 
integrated into the world economy. In other words, while changes in the regulatory 
environment remained driven mainly by domestic regulatory issues, they started to 
integrate the trends of the global telecommunication business149.
Broadening o f the policy-making process
Because of bureaucratic compartmentalism, the formulation and implementation of 
policies in China usually took place within bureaucracies and through bargaining among 
central formal agencies150. The major bodies in charge of regulating the 
telecommunications industry were (and are) technical ministries, like Mil, as well as the 
NDRC, MOFCOM (as far as foreign companies are concerned). For major issues and 
projects, all these ministries have to reach a balance together although all have their own 
dedicated functions in the process151. It also still happens that top leaders sitting on the 
political bureau of the Communist Party, the State Council, or the important commissions 
and ministries are the key drivers of policy-making. In that case, political power remains 
vested more in individuals than in specific institutions152.
146 Schneider and Tenbucken (2003: 13 & 27).
147 Melody (1997b: 6).
148 See Chapter 5.
149 Interview (C-010), conducted in Beijing, 18 June 2002.
150 Feigenbaum (2003:172).
151 Interview (B-010), conducted in Beijing, 5 September 2001.
152 For example, the elite initiates one or several policies and relevant bureaucratic bodies configure and 
implement them at both national and local levels (Fan, 2001: 103).
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Figure 3: Lines of influence in China telecommunication policy-making - The theory
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Figure 4: Lines of influence in China telecommunication policy-making - The reality
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That said, policy-making in China has generally become a pluralistic process involving
1hundreds of officials from various government departments and the Communist Party . 
As we will see, the pluralisation extends today to a new class of actors, encompassing 
both domestic and foreign semi-governmental and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). Policy-making is now formed more on an inclusive rather than on an exclusive 
basis, with a broader band of consultative organs involved in the process, and also a shift 
in the principal loci of executive policy deliberation and decision-making to a wider and 
slightly different set of institutional actors154. In the telecommunication sector Mil and 
NDRC probably remain the key policy-makers, but there too new actors have started to 
emerge155. Today, consumers, operators, scholars, and high-level officials are 
increasingly involved in the policy-making process, even though no formal channels have 
been established156. The next section turns to this intricate network. It reviews the key 
policy-makers and their functions as well as the regulatory agencies.
153 Shirk (1993: 7).
154 Shambaugh (2001:103).
155 Interview (B-017), conducted in Beijing, 14 September 2001.
156 Interview (B-018), conducted in Beijing, 14 September 2001.
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An intricate network of policy makers and regulatory agencies
A regulatory framework consists of rules (such as those governing tariffs or service 
standards), instruments (like laws, decrees, contracts or licences containing the rules), and 
institutions, which are the agencies that enforce the rules and update them as needed157.
Most of the key policy-makers are to be found within and below the State Council 
(guoyuyuan). The principal ones are Mil, the State Council Informatisation Leading 
Group and NDRC. Secondary actors are the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), the Ministry of Foreign Commerce (MOFCOM), 
the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) as well as a number of 
other ministries and bureaus, such as the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Public 
Security . Finally, at the periphery we find research institutes, such as the China 
Academy of Telecommunication Research (CATR). The role and functions of these 
policy makers are reviewed below.
The State Council and its organs
Except for very precise cases, the State Council never intervenes directly in the 
telecommunication industry. Instead, it makes use of a number of offices under its 
supervision to give a direction to the industry’s development. One of them has been of 
particular relevance to policy-making in the telecommunication industry: the State 
Council Informatisation Leading Group (xinxihua lingdao xiaoxu or SCILG)159. Created 
in 1993, it was for a long time considered a “second level” office but its status changed in 
1996 when the State Council upgraded the National Committee for the Informatisation of 
the Economy to the status of a Leading Group160. The major function of the Group is to 
coordinate the development of all telecommunication networks in the country.
157 Bellier and Zhou (2003: 23).
158 Interview (B-018), conducted in Beijing, 14 September 2001.
159 Shambaugh (2001: 104). Traditionally, China’s elite policy-making system has relied heavily on leading 
groups and their offices. It is important to remember that the high-profile nature of these offices principally 
stems from the leaders who sit on them.
160 Ure (1997b: 6). When established, the leading group had three offices: the State Council Information 
Office (SCIO), the Network Security Office, and the Year 2000 Office.
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Figure 5: Structure of China’s State Council Informatisation Leading Group, 2004
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Under Zhu Rongji’s direction, the SCILG set out to tackle some macro objectives, such as 
restructuring the relationship between government and business in the telecommunication
arching body governing telecommunications and the information industry162. The SCILG 
is a decision-making body but it does not draft policies . This task, as well as the 
provision of advice, information or reports, rests with the State Council Informatisation 
Office (SCIO). Akin to the SCILG, officials heading SCIO represent cross-sector 
interests instead of those of the incumbent China Telecom164. Over the years, there has 
been a clear shift in driving the telecommunication policy agenda from the Ministry of 
Information Industry (Mil) to the SCIO. A number of other organs within the State 
Council have sometimes played a policy-making role. The State Economic Restructuring 
Office (SERO) was involved with the State Development Research Centre in the planning 
of the regulatory regime and the restructuring of the industry. It acted as a think tank for 
the State Council by providing research and recommendations on industrial and economic 
reform, by conducting enterprise surveys, and by hosting conferences and forums on 
related issues165.
The Commissions: NDRC and SASAC
Before the creation of NDRC and SASAC, two commissions had played an important 
role in the reforms: the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and the State 
Development and Planning Commission (SDPC)166. Before the government 
reorganisation, both SETC and SDPC were linked to the State Council. They did not have 
a supervisory role over M il167. The former tended to have more of a regulatory function 
and was extremely influential across a wide range of sectors, including those related to 
information technology168. The latter wielded authority by controlling the overall funding
162 Lovelock distinguishes 3 periods starting with the National Joint Conference in 1994, which saw the 
battle between MPT and MIL In 1997, the emergence of the Internet and the issue of information control 
had become the core issue for the SCILG. In 1999, its task was to arbitrage the fight between Mil and 
SARFT. With the change of government in March 2003, membership of the SCILG was once again 
reshuffled (Lovelock, 2003).
163 The legislation that has come out today is principally from Mil. The SCIO plays somehow a more high- 
level policy-making role. Both institutions are generally thought as leading the government effort in this 
sector even though Mil is more active as a hands-on regulator at this point.
164 Interview (C-004), conducted in Beijing, 12 June 2000.
165 Until 1998 it was known as the State Economic Restructuring Commission (SERC) and had the 
authority to issue orders to enterprises and to oversee enterprise reform. In 1998, these powers were 
transferred to the SETC and the SERC, predecessor of SERO, was demoted to an office.
166 SDPC was responsible for macro-planning: it has for a long time been involved in determining which 
sectors are open to foreign investment (together with MOFTEC). SDPC has a department dedicated to 
information technology and high-tech industries and takes a policy-guidance role there. It often plays a role 
when conflicts or divisions arise between other ministries and a degree of adjudication is required: 
decisions on standards are a case in point (Interview (B-019), conducted in Beijing, 17 September 2001). 
From 1987 to 1994, the State Planning Commission (SPC) used its power to regulate switching system 
manufacturing and protect domestic R&D projects (Zhu, 2001: 45).
167 Interview (B-011), conducted in Beijing, 6 September 2001.
168 Interview (B-012), conducted in Beijing, 7 September 2001 and Interview (B-019), conducted in 
Beijing, 17 September 2001.
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and investment in the telecommunication industry169. SDPC’s influence culminated with 
China Telecom’s break up170. At the March 2004 National People’s Congress (NPC), 
SDPC was renamed as the National Development and Reform Commission (fazhan he 
gaige weiyuanhui or NDRC) after absorbing the former State Economic Reform Office, 
while SASAC (guoyou zichan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui) took over the former SETC.
Today, both NDRC and SASAC play a central role in the telecommunication policy­
making process. NDRC is now considered as China’s top-level economic policy-maker. 
In the telecommunication sector, it is involved at various levels in service and equipment. 
For example, NDRC submitted a proposal to the State Council in November 2004 
suggesting that China Telecom and China Netcom adopt TD-SCDMA as the major 
standard in 3G networks, making no secret that it “attached great importance to TD- 
SCDMA, and would spare no effort in further exploring the commercialisation o f the
171standard’ . In the equipment-manufacturing sector it published the authorisation system
for mobile phone production (previously a remit of Mil)172. SASAC appears to have an 
even more prominent role in policy-making173. In 2003 it absorbed control over finance 
from the Ministry of Finance and over personnel from the Ministry of Personnel and the 
functions of the Enterprise Working Committee of the CCP Central Committee. 
Moreover, it has taken over from the now dissolved State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC) the management of “industrial policy” to accelerate the structural 
change of SOEs. In other words, SASAC has assumed a combination of powers 
previously dispersed among different ministries and agencies and has thus been operating 
as a kind of “super-ministry”. SASAC embodies China’s strategy to create new 
institutions to manage state enterprises instead of privatising them. Its main responsibility 
is to monitor enterprise operations in order to protect the rights of the government owner. 
In telecommunication, SASAC’s visibility has been raised for two reasons. First, it has 
completed the ownership transfer (from various Ministries including Mil and the Ministry 
of Railways) of all the telecommunication operators so that they all belong to SASAC. 
Second, it has a taken public stance on some of the reform issues, such as the alleged split
169 Interview (B-011), conducted in Beijing, 6 September 2001.
170 Interview (B-026), conducted in Beijing, 11 October 2001.
171 Zhang Xiaoqiang, secretary-general of NDRC, quoted in Xinhua Financial News (2003).
172 Mil once implemented a strict examination and approval system for handset production, granting forty- 
nine handset production licences. At the end of 2004, the General Office o f the State Council and NDRC 
published two documents, which showed the authorisation system for handset production was on track.
173 SASAC was authorised at the 10th National People’s Congress in March 2003 and set up operations in 
June. It is complemented by the creation of local asset commissions (Naughton, 2003; Green and Ming, 
2005).
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of China Unicom and the timing for issuing 3G licences174. SASAC has also confirmed 
its plan to restructure the telecommunication industry as part of the overall SOE reform 
programme in order to provide a healthy environment for development and to maintain
1 7^and increase the value of state-owned assets . SASAC also signalled its intention to 
improve the efficiency of the telecommunication sector after having previously announced 
that each industrial category under its supervision should ideally have at most three large 
state-owned firms176. Apparently, SASAC is pursuing this “top three” principle quite 
seriously, which suggests that, over time, the current six operators could be merged into 
three.
The “functional” Ministries: Mil, SARFTandMOFCOM
In addition to the commissions and to the State Council, a number of ministries have been 
active in telecommunication policy-making. Before 1998, three key ministries -  the 
Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Commerce 
(MOFTEC, now known as MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication 
(youdianbu or MPT) -  were engaged in one way or another in the telecommunication 
industry, although all had different focus points177. Until 1998, the telecommunication 
industry was mostly governed by MPT and carried the same function as most Ministries 
of Post and Telecommunication across the world. The administrative reform of 1998 
considered how to effectively manage the industry178. At the time, MPT was thought as 
having fulfilled its duties and as needing to be replaced by another government body. 
This led to the creation of the Ministry of Information Industry (Mil) through the merger 
of MEI and MPT. While many of the post-1998 “ministries-tumed-bureaus” lost power 
and functions, Mil was an exception. Not only did it remain a ministry under the State 
Council, it grew in size and reported directly to the State Informatisation Leading Group 
under Zhu Rongji179. Thus, after 1998, the telecommunication industry became mainly 
governed and controlled by Mil, although other government organisations maintained 
policy-making roles.
174 See (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005). More recently, it has been rumoured as being behind the 
suggestion to the State Council to interchange the leaders o f China Mobile, China Unicom, and China 
Telecom.
175 The restructuring plans seem to have met with considerable resistance from some of the operators.
176 SASAC has warned SOEs that if they cannot become one of the top three firms in their sectors, they 
should be prepared to be acquired.
177 Interview (B-006), conducted in Beijing, 30 August 2001.
178 The frequent bureaucratic reorganisations since the 1950s were efforts by the Chinese leaders to change 
the structure of interest articulation and aggregation as well as to improve efficiency (Shirk, 1993: 111).
179 Pearson (2003: 12).
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i finM il’s tasks can be summarised by three core functions . First, it acts as the de facto 
telecommunication (and Internet) regulator181. Second, it implements the rules and
1 fi9regulations passed by the various government agencies . Third, Mil oversees planning
functions183. In its original remit, Mil has been responsible for improving the
telecommunication, software and social informatisation (shehui xinxihua). Its main task is
to prepare the plan for the whole industry and telecommunication administration184. One
of Mil’s stated goals is to:
“Facilitate the rapid growth o f the whole industry by intensifying the 
structural adjustment, expanding domestic demand, increasing the export 
volume and promoting the exploitation o f information resources for the 
21st century. ”185
One of Mil’s principal difficulties lies in performing the function of coordinating the 
development of the various networks as they fell under the control of individual 
governmental departments and ministries186. In September 2001, the government set up a 
new informatisation commission (xinxihua weiyuanhui) to work on major policies and 
legislation for the telecommunication sector, while leaving ME in charge of 
implementing the rules187. While the creation of Mil in 1998 may have appeared as mere 
re-shuffling of bureaucracies, it underscores some fundamental changes in the nature and 
scope of the Ministry’s functions.
An important difference with the previous ministry is that Mil no longer does business
1 fifiitself, but instead concentrates on making laws and regulations . In other words, Mil has 
swapped the role of player for the role of referee. Secondly, since its creation, new issues 
-  such as network convergence or new technologies bringing about new services -  have
180 In fact, Mil is a massive organisation with 13 departments responsible for telecommunications, 
electronics, military applications, information promotion, frequency allocation and management, among 
others. Major functions of the Mil include: developing national communications policy; sector regulation 
for IT manufacturing, communications and software; planning public communications networks (local and 
long-haul), broadcasting networks (over-the-air and cable) and other private networks; developing technical 
standards and specifications, managing equipment used in the public networks and overseeing the quality of 
the product; national frequency allocation for wireless services, approval o f new frequency bands and 
services using these bands; setting national telecommunications fee policies and enforcement; representing 
China to sign relevant regional and international treaties for China foreign cooperation.
181 Macintosh (2001: 2). The telecommunication regulation makes no explicit reference to Mil as the de 
jure regulator.
182 Interview (B-008), conducted in Beijing, 3 September 2001.
183 Interview (B-012), conducted in Beijing, 7 September 2001.
184 In theory all enterprises were officially made independent from the Ministry in 1999 through a process 
known as “corporatisation”.
185 Ministry o f Information Industry (1999).
186 Ho, Scott et al. (2002: 4).
187 Pangestu and Mrongowius (2002: 29).
188 A similar pattern of change in functions was observed in other Ministries after the State Council required 
them to separate administration from operations.
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appeared189. At the same time, the resources available to conduct these new tasks have 
shrunk (see Table 6). As a result, Mil consults more widely with the various think tanks 
active in telecommunication.
Table 6: Staff cut and transfer in selected infrastructure Ministries in the 1998 reform
Ministry Staff before the Staff before the Staff after the Reduction
________________________________1993 reform 1998 reform 1998 reform_____________
Ministry of Railways 1,011 751 397 47.1%
Ministry of Information Industry 538 450 320 28.9%
Source: Adapted from Chan and Drewry (2001) and Bums (2003).
Most telecommunication policy-making issues are under the responsibility of Mil’s 
Telecommunication Administration Bureau (dianxin guanliju or TAB), which in effect 
comes across as a regulator190.
Paradoxically, the administrative re-shuffling of 1998 has considerably limited Mil’s 
ability to reform the sector. First, Mil is currently very decentralised -  it is a functional 
Ministry with surrogates in every province -  and many of its policies are designed and 
implemented at a provincial level, akin to other Ministries. This has left the local bureaus 
open to persuasion by particular vendors, creating a patchwork where sometimes the 
interconnection between the different types of equipments does not work191. Second, Mil 
has to coordinate important policies with NDRC and other government bodies, such as 
SASAC192. For example, telecommunications fees are currently set by NDRC. In 
addition, NDRC must give its approval for telecommunication venture projects involving 
investment over USD 50 million. Third, the agency, far from being a monolith actually 
combines different generations of people and different ideologies193. Despite the merger 
o f MEI and MPT in 1998, a lot of political struggling and vested interests remained194. It 
has been argued that Mil is still “in politics” and that it is the battle ground between a 
conservative group that would like to see China as protected as possible and a liberal 
group that wants to see more reforms take place195. Despite the rift, over the past few
189 Interview (B-040), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
19a) Interview (C-002), conducted in Beijing, 11 June 2002. To some observers, Mil current influence on the 
service sector is limited to regulatory issues (Interview (C-008), conducted in Beijing, 17 June 2002).
19n Interview (B-019), conducted in Beijing, 17 September 2001.
192 Interview (B-040), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
193 Interview (C-006), conducted in Beijing, 13 June 2002.
1941 Interview (B-006), conducted in Beijing, 30 August 2001 and Mertha and Zeng (2002: 7).
1935 Mil has been representing a legacy industry for a long time and there are some really good forward- 
locoking teams in the Ministry, but it is actually hard to have the highest level agree to certain drastic 
changes (Interview (B-029), conducted in Beijing, 12 October 2001 and interview (B-017), conducted in 
Beijing, 14 September 2001.
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years the Ministry has moved towards offering increasingly an “equal and fair” treatment 
to all players by working in a consensual and transparent mode196.
In other words, while Mil has not acted as the most radical reformer, its influence over 
policy-making remains important. Since the involvement of the State Council tends to be 
limited to issuing specific orders -  such as those concerning large-scale investments - , it 
leaves a broad room to manoeuvre to M il197.
The second “functional” agency is the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television 
(guangbo dianxin dianshi zongju or SARFT). While technically reporting directly to the 
State Council, SARFT is also affiliated with the Ministry of Propaganda and reports to 
the Communist Party. These different command lines partly explain why Mil has not 
been able to prevail over SARFT198. A second difference between SARFT and Mil is the 
extent of decentralisation. SARFT, as opposed to Mil, has long been a highly 
decentralised organisation. In order to prevent the opening of cable to other operators, 
provincial SARFT have actually requested the county-level SARFT to hand over their 
networks while attempting to put in place a profit sharing plan. SARFT’s control over the 
cable TV network has however never been comparable to MR and China Telecom’s 
control over the telecommunication network. It benefited much more from an organic 
growth structure than the telecommunication network because it was not regarded as 
strategic199. As in other countries, the blurring of lines between traditional telephone, 
media broadcasting and the use of the Internet brought on by rapid developments in 
technology has led to a patchwork of regulations and approaches to regulating 
convergence of technologies. For years Mil has overseen the telecommunications and 
Internet spheres, while SARFT has focused on regulating broadcasting and related 
media200. The issue of convergence has led to a fierce battle between both agencies,
196 For example, Mil has used non-officials communiques to test the market’s reaction (Interview (C-006), 
conducted in Beijing, 13 June 2002 and interview (B-014), conducted in Beijing, 10 September 2001. In 
some instances, it has led to problems o f non-decision.
197 The regulatory issues around Little Smart (xiaolingtong) illustrates M il’s margin of manoeuvre. In spite 
of being ruled illegal, or at least at being at the very edge of the grey area, the diffusion o f Little Smart 
rocketed between 2000 and 2002. The prime beneficiary of M il’s lack of enforcement was no other than 
China Telecom.
198 Interview (B-005), conducted in Beijing, 13 September 2001 and interview (B-011), conducted in 
Beijing, 6 September 2001.
199 For example, most of the cable networks (as opposed to the telecommunication network) are not 
adequately interconnected (Interview (B-001), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001).
200 In 2001 the government announced that within 5 years SARFT and Mil would be dissolved and that 
NDRC would be overseeing telecommunication regulations (Interview (B-017), conducted in Beijing, 14 
September 2001).
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which vied not only for regulatory control, but also for the possibility to enter each 
other’s turf201.
The third Ministry with a role in telecommunication is the Ministry of Commerce 
(shangwubu or MOFCOM202). Three factors have nevertheless limited MOFCOM 
importance in the telecommunication policy-making process. First, it does not make any 
functional decisions . Second, its role has been more or less restricted to the equipment 
sector. Third, by its nature it acts as the interface with foreign parties as it approves 
foreign investment in the telecommunication sector, including foreign-invested JVs (in 
conjunction with Mil and NDRC). As a result, companies like Siemens or Nokia dealt 
with MOFTEC, SETC and SDPC on a corporate level, while the business divisions were 
dealing with Mil on a technical level, e.g. product approval and standardisation 
process204. As we will see, the Ministry suffered from a strong credibility problem at 
home during the WTO negotiation since telecommunications wasn’t considered a foreign 
trade issue, and hence fell outside of its scope205. To sum it up, MOFCOM remains a 
central player both for foreign equipment manufacturers and service operators but plays
906less of a policy-making role . The persistence of its power in the telecommunication 
sector rests on the requirement for companies to form a venture before applying for a 
licence207.
At the periphery
Since the mid-1980s a number of semi-independent research institutes and think tanks 
have been known for being more or less closely involved in policy-making208. While not 
entrusted with formal powers, the Mil and other Ministries consult them on particular 
issues as well as on broader strategic issues. They tend to be sought after by the
201 Although SARFT is the weaker of the two organisations and has not been as effective in restricting 
telecom actors from entering media, it has sought to use its regulatory authority to stave off convergence.
Of the 66 licences SARFT has issued for Video-on-Demand (VOD) services, only one has been issued to a 
telecom operator, despite the fact that telecom operators are among the largest VOD providers in China 
(Soderberg, Bjorkstrom et al., 2005: 20).
202 MOFCOM combines the former foreign (MOFTEC) and internal trade ministries.
203 Interview (B-019), conducted in Beijing, 17 September 2001.
204 Interview (B-010), conducted in Beijing, 5 September 2001 and interview (B-013), conducted in Beijing, 
7 September 2001.
205 Interview (B-001), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001.
206 Interview (B-024), conducted in Beijing, 19 September 2001.
207 Interview (B-017), conducted in Beijing, 14 September 2001.
208 According to Tanner (2002: 559) China’s growing networks of government affiliated research institutes 
(colloquially referred to as “think tanks” by most foreign analysts) have become some of the most important 
windows through which foreign analysts can observe China’s usually opaque policy-making system. See 
also Naughton (2002).
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government since they are considered as “neutral”209. Some of them are actually of 
sizeable importance . Research institutes have, among others, the following activities: 
cooperation strategy, industry plans and, sometimes, training of managers. The institutes
911have often been spun-off from Mil and had to find a commercial role for themselves . 
They can be divided into technical and non-technical institutes. Non-technical research 
institutes, such as the China Academy of Social Science (CASS), happen to be called 
upon on an issue-by-issue basis212. Technical research institutes capture the majority of 
the work. One of them has been especially visible in the past years. The China Academy 
of Telecommunication Research of Mil (CATR) is the only telecom research institution 
of the Chinese government at the national level. CATR was established in 1994 from the 
Research Institute of Transmission Technology (RITT), the Planning Institute, the 
Information Institute, the Communications Measurement Center, and the Industrial 
Standardisation Institute of the former MPT. Its predecessor was the Posts and 
Telecommunications Academy of MPT founded in the mid-1950s. Perhaps the most 
telling way to define CATR is their slogan “supporting the government and serving the 
industry” (dingli zhicheng zhengfu, rechen fuwu hangye). For instance, CATR 
“suggested” to Mil to set up a system to test if interconnection was good. In addition, it
91^offered schemes for regulating pricing . Finally, both domestic and foreign associations 
are claiming for a seat at the policy-making table. While their visibility waxes and wanes 
with policy issues and their influence remains at best weak, there are signs that the more 
established policy-making bodies are increasingly paying attention to them.
209 Interview (B-015), conducted in Beijing, 11 September 2001.
210 For example the Development Strategy Research Department of the Institute of Telecommunication 
Policy has more than 800 researchers.
211 Interview (C-002), conducted in Beijing, 11 June 2002.
212 Interview (B-005), conducted in Beijing, 13 September 2001.
213 CATT persuaded Mil and other departments, such as the reform and development department to change 
this situation (Interview (B-040), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003).
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Rise of semi-governmental actors and industry associations
"China’s telecommunications sector needs to form an industry alliance to avoid domestic 
competition hurting the sector as it opens to overseas rivals. ”
(Long Yongtu quoted in China Daily, 2005)
In parallel to the rise of research institutes and think tanks, the sector has witnessed the 
rise of non-governmental actors in the policy-making process214. Organs of civil society, 
such as NGOs, remain by-and-large under-developed and existing industry associations 
have often been criticised for lacking “a mind of their own”215. However, requirements of 
greater transparency, complexity of the issues at hand as well as the confinement of 
Mil to a regulatory role explain in part the potentially greater role for non-government 
actors -  operators, users, and other relevant parties217. Three types of organisations have 
seen their role in telecommunication policy-making increase over the years: domestic 
associations, domestic operators, and foreign companies and associations218.
Associations are not something new in China. Historically, each Ministry had its own 
industry association but the typical membership roster consisted entirely of SOEs that 
were effectively compelled to join219. In other words, the associations were created by the 
state but sustained by the SOEs and many of them limited their activity to organisation of 
events. In the telecommunication industry, official associations include the China 
Telecommunication Association (CTA), the China Communication Enterprises Union 
(CCEU), and the China Information Industry Association (CIIA). In recent years a new 
and different type of associations has started to spring up. Although their true value-added 
remains to be seen, most of them provide a platform to exchange information and try to
A A A
act as a bridge between the government and private enterprises . One of them is the
214 For theoretical framework on Chinese NGOs, see Ma (2002a) and Saich (2001).
215 Interview (B-002), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001.
216 Technological innovation has eased outside influence. In the past Mil officials had a full set of 
knowledge, the competence and the direction of fixed-wire and transmission networks. With the advent of 
wireless telephony and the issue of convergence, regulators have felt the need to seek advice from outside 
to make the right decisions.
217 Pangestu and Mrongowius (2002: 29). For example, by providing input to rates, commenting on draft 
regulations or providing technical expertise on standards.
218 The boundary between domestic and foreign actors should not be over-emphasised as both have on 
occasion found an interest in joining their efforts. For example, Qualcomm secured the support of domestic 
manufacturers to promote CDMA, after the royalty discussion with Unicom and Mil had stalled. Moreover, 
joint ventures between domestic and foreign partners have proved important channels to voice views to the 
government Interview (B-010), conducted in Beijing, 5 September 2001 and interview (B-015), conducted 
in Beijing, 11 September 2001).
219 They have always existed under the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Interview (B-024), conducted in Beijing, 
19 September 2001) and interview (B-006), conducted in Beijing, 30 August 2001 and Interview (C-002), 
conducted in Beijing, 11 June 2002).
220 Interview (B-012), conducted in Beijing, 7 September 2001.
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newly created China Mobile Communication Association (CMC A). CMC A was formally 
founded with the approval of the State Council in September 2000 and is registered as an 
independent legal body led directly by MIL It comprises the four largest domestic
telecommunication operators as well as all major manufacturers and suppliers in mobile
001communications equipment business . Industry associations illustrate well the 
transitional process since most of them remain highly under government control. 
Meaningful involvement in the policy-making process will nevertheless be going to take 
some time for a number of reasons222. Industry association have emerged later in 
telecommunication than it has in other sectors. In addition, and unlike in foreign 
countries, industry associations have never been playing a significant role, other than 
organising events, symposium, or seminars to make some money223. Their dismal 
influence in the telecommunication sector is also attributed in part to the lack of a proper 
culture of associations. As a result, domestic operators have until now refused to consider 
these bodies as effective avenues for lobbying224. This is not to say that they are devoid of 
use to the industry. They help organise shows and seminars, as well as invite high-level 
civil servants to expose the government’s latest policies. In addition, the recently 
launched Mobile Multimedia Technology Alliance (MMTA) initiative or the China Fixed 
Phone Terminal Alliance (CFPTA) -  formed by China Telecom and China Netcom in 
cooperation with Huawei Technologies, Zhongxing Telecom and UTStarcom -  indicate
the willingness of the major. Chinese operators and equipment manufacturers to play an
00^active role in the development of communications technologies .
Domestic associations are also embodied in consumer associations. For example, the 
China Consumer Association (xiaofeizhexiehui) is very active. It has been the instigator
221 Most of industry associations have a history of more than 10 years, while CMCA is a young one with 
only a 2-year history. CMCA is a private forum focusing on the mobile communication industry. Its 
purpose is to promote the industry’s development, domestically and internationally. Its functions encompass 
the implementation o f the government’s policy, the study of the relationship between the development of 
the information industry and the macro-control of the authorities and the promotion of business and 
technical exchanges and alliance among all China mobile communication business entities. Among other 
things, CMCA is working out how to support domestic mobile manufacturers and to promote new 
standards. It also puts forward proposals to the government. It aims at bridging the companies and the 
government, the manufacturers and operators. CMCA sees itself as being able to “fully reflect the voice o f  
the companies to the government while speaking out companies’ opinions, which would otherwise be 
reluctant (Interview (C-016), conducted in Beijing, 21 June 2002 and interview (C-018), conducted in 
Beijing, 30 August 2002).
222 For example, they have strictly no say in the industry’s restructuring or in standard-setting (Interview (B- 
026), conducted in Beijing, 11 October 2001).
223 Interview (C-008), conducted in Beijing, 17 June 2002.
224 Interview (B-024), conducted in Beijing, 19 September 2001 and Interview (B-010), conducted in 
Beijing, 5 September 2001.
225 MMTA was founded in October 2004 by Mil along with M il’s Telecommunications Research Centre, 
China Mobile, China Unicom, China Telecom, China Netcom, China Putian, Huawei, ZTE, and Vimicro.
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of the “Three guarantees” policy (sanbao) -  one week (return no questions asked, one 
month (return/trade in for equal value), one year (maintenance and repair). The major cuts 
in ISP tariff, which take took place in March 1999, are said to be partly in response to 
“grass root opposition” at how expensive it was to get online . During the price hearings 
held by Mil in September 2000, the representatives of the consumer association attacked 
operators and the Ministry for “providing terrible quality at very high prices with no 
customer service”. Since then, Mil has published quarterly reports of the quality of 
service for all operators227. In other words, having understood that it cannot simply just 
make decisions that will go over consumer interests anymore, the government has started 
to balance customers’ dissatisfaction and the operators’ value228.
However, even if consumer rights lobbies have become both more vocal and effective, 
their influence on the policy-making process remains rather weak and targeted at specific 
issues229. Several other factors have hindered the emergence of associations in China’s 
telecommunication services sectors. First, Ministerial rivalry largely prevented 
cooperation between the operators until the separation of the government from operations. 
Second, operators have found it very hard to reach consensus on industry-wide issues, 
like standards, which has limited the number of issues that could be taken on at an 
industry level230. Third, the government has been very sensitive to the emergence of 
grassroots movements. There are signs that this could be changing and that China too 
could be following the worldwide trend of opening to the influence of a new set of actors. 
As noted, this would mainly manifest itself through the creation of associations and by 
their lobbying on specific issues231.
Unlike domestic associations, domestic operators play a considerable role in the policy­
making process. They are extremely influential both because of their political 
backgrounds -  having been spun-off one government agency or another -  and their
226 An argument that appealed more directly to the State Council was that SOEs and the government are 
huge consumers of telecommunication services so that artificially inflating tariffs might be good for China 
Telecom but not for the rest of the SOEs or the government (Interview (B-008), conducted in Beijing, 3 
September 2001).
227 Interview (C-003), conducted in Beijing, 11 June 2002.
228 Interview (C-002), conducted in Beijing, 11 June 2002 and interview (C-006), conducted in Beijing, 13 
June 2002. Operators too have realised the emergence o f consumer awareness and have developed more 
sophisticated and segmented marketing -  adjusting their strategies to meet customer requirements.
229 Interview (C-002), conducted in Beijing, 11 June 2002 and Interview (C-008), conducted in Beijing, 17 
June 2002.
230 Interview (B-024), conducted in Beijing, 19 September 2001. In the equipment market, finding common 
grounds and value in gathering industry players has been even harder.
231 There are, for example, a number of alliances, such as the TD-SCDMA association, which managed to 
pool together important players, although these vendor-driven associations are often considered partial.
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commercial influence232. In addition to the direct relationship they enjoyed with MPT or 
MEI, operators deal routinely with Mil or high-level commissions (such as NDRC) to 
obtain approval for construction projects, international cooperation or financing plans . 
Moreover, operators have started to influence the policy-making process from the 
“outside” by tackling the issue of price war through introducing industry-led agreements.
The last category of actors, and paradoxically quite visible, are foreign organisations234. 
They can be divided into two categories: companies and associations. Equipment 
manufacturers, such as Motorola usually have full time people working on Capitol Hill to 
influence Chinese-US relationships around policy-making issues, such as standards or 
regulations. At the same time, they have the resources to fully invest in regulatory 
influence in China . Given their relatively long involvement in the telecommunication 
industry, the large MNCs have established relatively good two-ways communication 
channels with the government . For example, Ericsson makes sure that its view on how 
to regulate the market gets “somehow heard”. When it comes to the use of technology and 
licensing that the Swedish manufacturer wants to make sure that the government is not 
taking decisions that are going to affect its operations negatively . Given their size, 
MNCs tend as much as possible to work “one-on-one” with the government238. They 
nevertheless use other avenues such as Chambers of Commerce or associations for 
industry-wide issues239.
Most of the value brought by foreign associations, such as USITO and the US-China 
Business Council, lies in the education process -  laying out the views of foreign 
companies looking into the Chinese market -  or dealing with a particular issue -  such as
232 Interview (C-002), conducted in Beijing, 11 June 2002.
233 Interview (B-029), conducted in Beijing, 12 October 2001.
234 Although this may come as a surprise, it can in fact be explained by the experience foreign companies 
have developed through the lobbying of government in other markets.
235 Interview (B-017), conducted in Beijing, 14 September 2001.
236 Even foreign operators, which have been banned from conducting large-scale operations in China, were 
routinely called upon by Mil and other Ministries to explain the situation and developments of the 
telecommunication industry in their home country as well as the rationale, issues and difficulties 
encountered in their respective market (Interview (B-016), conducted in Beijing, September 2001).
237 Interview (B-007), conducted in Beijing, 31 August 2001.
238 Interview (B-005), conducted in Beijing, 13 September 2001 and interview (B-015), conducted in 
Beijing, 11 September 2001.
239 When the issue of quotas came up, Nokia lobbied hard with the decision-makers, mainly SDPC and MIL 
In addition it joined hands with other companies.
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mutual recognition agreements (MRA)240. At times, those coalitions have also been 
helpful in voicing the foreign community’s concerns241.
Lobbying the Chinese government
Exchange between MNCs and the Chinese government take place directly, via the use of 
public affairs consultants (e.g. APCO), at the govemment-to-govemment level or via
'y A 'jsemi-governmental bodies such as USITO . Inviting special groups of experts from 
corporations, academia and government into discrete settings is also working very well243. 
However, the task of influencing the policy-making process from the “outside” is made 
more complicated as the locus of decision is not restricted to Mil but comprises experts 
from other Ministries, such as NDRC244. Moreover, in China the traditional lobbying 
groups tend to be replaced by well-connected individuals245.
A first case of (successful) lobbying is provided by the row over encryption. China's 
encryption rules were initially publicised in October 1999, with a public notice released in 
November 1999. In brief, the regulation required everybody using encryption software to 
register with the government. Negative reaction to the regulations by foreign industry was 
strong246. Foreign industry groups and companies signed onto a letter delivered to the 
Chinese government in early March 2000 and proposed easing of the regulations. On 
March 14, the newly created State Encryption Management Commission said it would 
only require certain hardware and software products containing encryption technology to 
register with the agency247. In addition, China would not carry out key escrow of foreign 
encryption products or equipment.
The “Provisions on the Administration o f Foreign-Invested Telecommunications 
Enterprises” (waishan touzi dianxin qiye guanli guiding or FITE) is an additional 
example of the increased interaction between the traditional set of policy-makers and
240 Interview (B-008), conducted in Beijing, 3 September 2001 and interview (B-019), conducted in Beijing, 
17 September 2001.
241 Interview (B-024), conducted in Beijing, 19 September 2001.
242 Interview (B-002), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001.
243 Interview (B-027), conducted in Beijing, 11 October 2001.
244 Interview (B-006), conducted in Beijing, 30 August 2001.
245 Interview (B-029), conducted in Beijing, 12 October 2001.
246 USITO and AmCham wrote a position paper, contacted the office that had issued the regulation as well 
as MOFTEC to make it a bilateral trade issue. The government claimed initially that it was a 
misunderstanding of the regulation (Interview (B-011), conducted in Beijing, 6 September 2001).
247 It was clarified that wireless phones, Microsoft Windows software and browser software would not to be 
covered by the regulations.
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')A Qsemi-governmental actors . The initial drafts were clearly intended at shielding 
domestic service providers from foreign entrants. By setting the qualification 
requirements very high, the potential pool of foreign investors in basic telecommunication 
services was restricted to a dozen operators. Many Chinese firms would too be prevented 
from entering cooperative agreements because of insufficient equity to put into the JV. 
Foreign representatives from Chambers of Commerce and operators met in order to draw 
up a white paper to be circulated to the government. Having reached a consensus on the 
need for practical and effective licensing and implementation measures, they lobbied the 
government to get the public equity listings considered separately from foreign 
investment249. In addition, they voiced concerns over the size limitation of the companies, 
type of venture, licensing and timing issues (allowing for concurrent application) . 
Although the concerns of the foreign community met with little official reaction, the final 
regulation indicates that some comments were taken into consideration . Earlier 
requirements that foreign investors needed to have USD 10 billion annual revenues and a 
representative office in China for at least three years did not appear in the final regulation, 
which simply demanded “funds and personnel appropriate to the business activities 
engaged in” (Article 9). While some deemed the effort partly unsuccessful, what actually 
came out in the end was “a little bit less unfavourable to foreign investors than what had 
been in the earlier draft and not really in ways that the WTO would have required'252.
In other words, we are witnessing the early signs of non-state actors’ involvement in the 
policy-making process, whose views are channelled through associations. In spite of early 
successes from foreign actors, there is little doubt that, in the foreseeable future, domestic 
operators will remain the most effective lobbying force in China’s telecommunication 
sector253. It is important to underline that the trend of dialogue between the government 
and the market is more than a cosmetic operation of transparency. The government 
appears to increasingly understand and value the importance of dialogue with the 
market254. In due course, it may even lead to a re-definition of the boundary of policy­
248 Decree 333, December 21 (State Council of the People's Republic o f China, 2001a).
249 Interview (B-019), conducted in Beijing, 17 September 2001.
250 For ventures with less than 51% owned by SOEs, the JV has to re-apply for the licences (Interview (B- 
017), conducted in Beijing, 14 September 2001). See appendix 2 for a comparison of the evolution between 
the draft and final regulation.
251 Interview (C-001), conducted in Beijing, 10 June 2002.
252 Interview (B-032), conducted in Beijing, 18 November 2002.
253 It will be interesting to see the extent to which their lobbying efforts may negate each other if  they are 
entering in diametrically opposite positions (such as on technological choices).
254 Interview (B-015), conducted in Beijing, 11 September 2001.
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making where associations and other non-governmental bodies become explicitly and 
permanently integrated in the policy-making process.
From informal consultations to public hearings?
As far as consultations are concerned, Mil has operated a change in attitude. Despite the 
absence of official consultation channels, it is engaging more readily with industry 
players255. Consultations are happening through various means. Meetings are taking place 
between Mil and representatives of all the domestic carriers, but the consultation process 
has also been broadened to encompass the foreign community at large256. Policy-makers 
and regulators mostly seek “foreign opinions” through industry associations like the 
United States Information Technology Office (USITO) or the American Chamber of 
Commerce (AmCham)257. While there is a more consistent and regular practice within the 
regulatory process to engage MNCs, it is still early to talk about an interactive 
communication between the government and foreign players258.
Government officials have also shown a keen interest in studying reform experiences and 
regulatory frameworks from other countries. For the past twenty years, Chinese policy­
makers have engaged in govemment-to-govemment consultation, via study tours and 
seminars with foreign regulators such as FCC or OFCOM. The study groups are 
composed of representatives from different Ministries and institutes and who travel to 
various countries, pooling and digesting information before making decisions based on 
China’s “special circumstance”259. Consultations are conducted on various issues. They 
happen when new regulations or legislations are introduced. For example, draft 
regulations are leaked to get a sense of the telecommunication community’s reactions260. 
New policy directions about pricing, interconnection, licensing or resource allocation, are 
also presented to operators. In the case of tariff changes, Mil has organised hearings
255 Other Ministries, such as MOFTEC have had a longer history of consultation. Whenever they were 
drafting a new piece o f legislation, MNCs would get invited to comment (Interview (B-010), conducted in 
Beijing, 5 September 2001).
256 Interview (B-017), conducted in Beijing, 14 September 2001.
257 In the eyes of Mil, these foreign organisations provide a relatively impartial industry opinion. The role 
and resources of industry associations were previously ignored and only individual companies were 
consulted (Interview (B-011), conducted in Beijing, 6 September 2001).
258 The relation is mostly driven by the foreign part. There appears to be a “built-in bias” that MNCs are just 
there “to draw revenue from Chinese companies no matter what they advise and get business for 
themselves” (Interview (C-001), conducted in Beijing, 10 June 2002 and interview (C-013), conducted in 
Beijing, 20 June 2002).
259 Interview (B-005), conducted in Beijing, 13 September 2001.
260 Interview (B-017), conducted in Beijing, 14 September 2001.
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where representatives from foreign MNCs were invited as “friends”261. Mil also sends out 
envoys who visit each potential manufacturer in order to check their ideas, get their input
Of/)and help define the criteria for licence issuing . There is also a willingness to let 
companies become more engaged in the standard-setting process. Large MNCs, such as 
Siemens, UTStarcom or Motorola, are from time to time invited to closed groups -  under 
the aegis of Mil -  in order to discuss standards with domestic companies and joint 
ventures263.
Likewise, foreign companies resort to a number of bodies to feed their information, such 
as the European Union or AmCham’s IT forum, and government institutions and bureaus 
are generally most receptive to comments when they are given in the context of the 
Chinese bureaucratic system264. But, as of today, there is not any procedure similar to 
FCC’s public hearings system in China. In all likelihood, Mil will implement such a 
system since NDRC has already committed to have such a scheme in place for price 
setting265. In short, the increase in communication is not unidirectional. Although Mil 
does not host commercial industry meetings anymore and concentrates on govemment-to- 
govemment work, since 2003 it has convened an annual meeting to present its policy 
objectives to the industry266.
Major changes in the policy-making nexus can be identified along two axes. First and 
foremost, there have been important structural and functional changes. A single Ministry 
has replaced two rival ministries as the overall supervision body of telecommunication 
services. NDRC has replaced a system in which a multitude of commissions each had 
administrative power on parts and parcels of the telecommunication sector. In addition, 
ownership has been transferred to a single entity -  SASAC -  reducing the potential for 
inter-Ministerial rivalry to extend on policy-making. At the same time, a number of new 
actors have emerged. The most potent ones are of course the domestic operators even
261 Interview (B-006), conducted in Beijing, 30 August 2001. Most of the representatives at this hearing 
were selected by Mil and SDPC (Cui, 2001).
262 Interview (B-020), conducted in Beijing, 17 September 2001.
263 However, standards discussions are not something where international consensus is easily achieved. 
Influence is limited to technical exchanges between technical experts and the standards making officials and 
committees. (Interview (B-010), conducted in Beijing, 5 September 2001 and Interview (B-026), 
conducted in Beijing, 11 October 2001).
264 Interview (B-006), conducted in Beijing, 30 August 2001 and Interview (B-024), conducted in Beijing, 
19 September 2001.
265 Interview (B-005), conducted in Beijing, 13 September 2001 and interview (B-024), conducted in 
Beijing, 19 September 2001.
266 The meeting is usually held at the beginning of the year and is open to the public (Interview (B-021), 
conducted in Beijing, 17 September 2001).
68
though they are devoid offormal policy-making power. Through corporatisation and sub­
sequent listing on foreign stock exchanges, Chinese operators have indeed acquired a 
growing source of influence, both technically and financially. Some lower-level 
commissions have influenced policy-making on limited issues. For example, in wireless 
broadband, the State Radio Regulation Commission (SRRC) has played a role in 
managing resources as different provinces used different frequencies267. There are also a 
handful of examples of non-state actors’ influence -  to provide input to rates, 
implementation of regulations, setting of standards and so on. These changes illustrate 
well the pluralisation process that has characterised policy-making in China. At the same 
time, it appears that the administrative reforms carried out in 1998 aimed at streamlining 
the policy-making agencies (see Table 7).
Table 7: Evolution of policy-making actors’ responsibilities 
Responsibility Pre-1998_______________________________ Post-2003_______
Overall Ministry of Post and Telecommunications Ministry of Information Industry (Mil)
supervision (MPT), Ministry of Electronics Industry
(MEI)
Ownership Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Railways, State-owned Asset Supervision
Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI) Commission (SASAC)
Rules and State Development and Planning National Development and Reform
policies Commission (SDPC), Ministry of Finance Commission (NDRC), Ministry of
(MoF), State Economic and Trade Information Industry (Mil), industry-led
Commission (SETC) agreements
Source: Compiled by author.
Second, and linked to the streamlining, the major actors involved in policy-making have 
become much more sophisticated and attuned to the market’s needs. This is particularly 
noticeable with MOFCOM. Thanks to more than a decade of interaction with foreign 
investors, the Ministry now understands their needs and tries to balance them with its own
96Rpolicy objectives . Mil has also improved its ways of dealing with the market. For 
example, it has included operators in the policy-making process by inviting them to 
seminars and forums to discuss tariff cuts or new issues popping up in the industry. This 
has however not prevented Mil from having to retract from sharply raising IDD 
interconnection fees in an attempt to bolster China Telecom’s IPO. As we will see in the 
next section, a large part of Mil’s discretion can be attributed to a weak and regulatory 
environment. In short, despite its genuine desire to listen and get input, the Ministry still
96Qlacks a sense of structure and transparency in its relationship with the market .
267 Interview (B-013), conducted in Beijing, 7 September 2001.
268 Interview (B-010), conducted in Beijing, 5 September 2001.
269 The voice of foreign investors in the telecommunication services policy-making process pales in 
comparison with other sectors like banking or in manufacturing (Interview (B-002), conducted in Beijing, 
27 August 2001).
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The “lawless” regulatory framework
"The regulatory fram ework has to start from  scratch. On the one hand it is a  problem  because the 
government has to take care o f  it. On the other hand, it is a  tremendous opportunity to write down 
whatever it wants to say because it is unprecedented and new. ”
(Interview B-006, conducted in Beijing, 30 August 2001)
Regulatory mechanism and history o f regulation
From a legislative point of view, three levels of regulatory instruments co-exist in China. 
The highest level comprises laws validated by China’s Congress Law Commission {falu 
you quanguan renda changanhui) and ratified by the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
or the Standing Committee of the NPC. As we will see shortly, there is no such thing as a 
telecommunication law in China, despite more than a decade of drafting and 
consultations. In addition to the laws enacted by the NPC and Standing Committee, the 
State Council can adopt administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui and tiaoli) and 
promulgate directives {guiding) and notices (tongzhi). Until the enactment of the 
telecommunication regulation (<dianxin tiaoli) in September 2000, and except for Order 
No. 128 which regulated the administration of spectrum (wuxiandian guanli tiaoli), the 
State Council used legal instruments with extreme parsimony, issuing directives and 
notices only on three occasions270. Meanwhile, it issued regulations on radio, film and 
television administration and on Internet-related domains. The third level consists of 
industry-level regulations. Some of these are confusingly labelled as regulations {tiaoli), 
measures (banfa), rules (guize and guizhang), provisions {guiding), or detailed rules for 
implementation {shixing xize). The latter are usually drafted by the main policy- 
implementing organisations and departments {bumen guizhang he zhengce), such as Mil, 
and issued together with or after the promulgation of a more general law. These three 
types of instruments all have different functions: laws usually establish the overarching 
principles, while regulations and rules usually provide details for the implementation of 
laws271.
Until the early 1990s, the regulation of telecommunications services in most countries 
was not a priority, as the state-owned operator in many countries was under a self-
270 In 1982, Directive No. 28 dealt with the protection of telecommunications lines; in 1990 Directive No.
54 aimed at enforcing coordination between public and private networks and in 1993 Notice No. 55 called 
for strengthening regulation in the management of the sector.
271 Interview (B-031), Beijing, 15 November 2002 and interview (B-032), conducted in Beijing, 18 
November 2002. Article 90 of the Constitution stipulates that “The ministries and commissions issue 
orders, directives, and regulations within the jurisdiction of their respective departments and in accordance 
with the law and the administrative rules and regulations, decisions, and orders issued by the State 
Council”.
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OHOregulation regime . A similar pattern can be found in China, where a de jure regulatory 
framework did not seem to be a major concern for the leadership until the end of the 
1990s. Three major periods of regulatory activity can be identified since the beginning of 
the economic reforms. The first one, which lasted between 1978 and 1993, is best 
described as “dormant”. During the 1980s, the only regulation pertaining to 
telecommunications was the Directive No. 28, “Regulations on the Protection of 
Telecommunication Lines” {guanyu baohu tongxin xianlu de guiding) . Recognising the 
existence of an increasing number of Ministry-owned networks and preoccupied with the 
duplication and waste of resources the State Council passed in 1990 the Directive 54 
aimed at enforcing coordination between public and private networks. The second period 
started in August 1993, when the State Council passed the Notice 55, “Provision on 
Strengthening Regulations in the Management of the Telecommunications Sector” 
(guanyu jiaqiang dianxin yewu shichang guanli yijian de tongzhi). The “Interim 
Provisions on the Approval and Regulations of Businesses Engaging in Public 
Telecommunications Services”, issued by MPT and Order 128, issued by the State 
Council on the “Regulation on the Administration of Spectrum” (wuxiandian guanli 
tiaoli) followed shortly. This sudden regulatory activity owes to the recognition of the 
importance of the telecommunication sector as a key factor in economic development, as 
well as the more pragmatic requirement to have a blueprint dealing with the introduction 
of competition in the sector. As we will see in the next chapter, this renewed activity 
preceded by little profound changes in the structure of the telecommunication market. 
The third period was initiated at the end of the 1990s. It started with the passing of the 
telecommunication regulation issued by the State Council in 2000 and was followed by a 
number of regulations enacted by MIL
The telecommunication regulation
Passed in September 2000, the telecommunication regulation (dianxin tiaoli) was the first
more or less comprehensive legislative instrument regulating telecommunications. Its
importance is emphasised by several scholars274. DeWoskin notes that:
“The document is an extremely important step towards clarifying the roles 
o f all the players in the telecommunication sector. It represents the most 
recent stage o f discussion and debate that goes back to the early years o f  
the decade at the highest levels o f the Chinese government. And it has
272 Li, Qiang et al. (2000: 7).
273 These regulations, passed in September 1982 by the State Council and the Military Commission o f the 
Central Party Committee, defined the boundaries of telecommunication lines and facilities, the acts of 
damage to telecommunication lines, and the criminal liability of offenders (He, 1997: 77).
274 See (DeWoskin, 2001; Horsley, 2001a).
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created a fixed set reference points for further regulatory work. More 
importantly it has already helped make evident the acute need for a more 
fully developed regulatory statement that will encompass everything from 
network standards to taxation policy to universal service obligations. ”275
By setting out a transitional administrative regulation prior to the establishment of a full- 
scale telecommunication law, this document represented an initial attempt by a national 
rule-making body to standardise the administration of China's rapidly changing 
telecommunications industry and to develop a comprehensive and pro-competitive
onfkregulatory framework. As such it touched upon most substantive issues (see Table 8) . It
also touched upon structural issues. For example, the regulation defined M il’s role as an 
independent government agency to regulate China’s telecommunication. It confirmed 
M il’s separation from any business operation to ensure open and fair competition (Article 
4). The question of decentralisation was addressed by requiring provincial offices to 
“exercise supervision and regulation over the telecommunication industry within their 
respective administrative regions under the leadership o f the department in charge o f the 
information industry”277. Finally, it touched upon procedural issues. As a 
telecommunication regulator, Mil was to issue telecommunication operation licences and 
telecommunication equipment licences and to supervise the operations of 
telecommunication service providers to ensure that they did not break China’s
77%telecommunication regulations . Yet the regulation suffered from a number of 
shortcomings. While it emphasised the importance of interconnection, it made no 
reference to unbundling279. In addition, it failed to cover foreign investment280.
The regulation nonetheless offered important insight into the future of foreign telecom 
investment in China. It helped to prepare and position China to undertake many, though 
not all, of its telecom-related WTO commitments by introducing the principle of
transparency in rulemaking, administrative decision-making, resource allocation, and
281interconnection .
275 DeWoskin (2001:641).
276 The enactment of the telecommunication regulation was followed by an important number of decrees 
that complemented it.
277 This resulted in the creation o f Provincial Telecommunication Administrations (PTAs) in provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities.
278 Interfax (2000).
279 OECD (2003b: 18).
280 This was later corrected by the Foreign Invested Telecommunications Enterprises (FITE) regulation.
281 Horsley (2001a: 37).
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Table 8: Key components of the telecommunication regulation
Area Articles Comment
Licensing Article7-16
Follows the “Interim Administrative Measures for the Examination and 
Approval o f the Engaging in Liberalised Telecommunications Business” 
(MPT, September 1993). Complemented by the “Measures on the 
Management of Licence for Telecommunication Businesses Operations” 
(Decree No. 19 of Mil, December 2001)
Interconnection Article17-22
Complemented by the “Public Interconnection Administrative Provisions”, 
establishing technical standards for telecom network interconnection and fee 
structure (Decree No. 9 of Mil, May 2001) and the “Measures for Settlement 
of Interconnection Disputes in Telecommunications Networks” (Decree No. 
15 of Mil, 2002)
Tariffs Article 5, 23-26
Article 28 of the regulation provides that detailed fee standards for operators’ 
use of telecom resources will be drafted
Spectrum Article27-30
Complements the “Regulation on the Administration of Spectrum” (Order 
No. 128 by the State Council, September 1993) and the “Interim Measures on 
the Administration of Number Resources of Telecommunications Network” 
(Decree No. 1 o f Mil, August 2000)
Service level Article31-44
Complemented by the “Interim Measures for Handling Complaints from 
Telecommunications Users” (Decree No. 7 of Mil, January 2001)
Construction Article45-53
Complemented by the “Measures on the Administration of the 
Telecommunications Construction” (Decree No. 20 of Mil)
Network
access
Article
54-56
Complemented by the “Measures of Telecom Equipment Network Access” 
(Mil, May 2001)
Security Article57-66
Complements the “Provision on the Protection of Telecommunications 
Lines” (Directive No. 28 of the State Council and Military Commission of 
the CPC, September 1982)
Penalties Article67-79
Complemented by the “Measures on the Implementation of Administration 
Reconsideration of the Ministry of Information Industry” (Decree No. 25 o f 
Mil) and “Provisions on Procedures for Communications Administrative 
Penalties” (Decree No. 10 o f Mil, April 2001)
Competition Article 4, 41-42
Measure to curb irrational competition (Document No. 204 of SDRC and 
Mil)
Source: Compiled by author.
Finally, it re-inforced the importance placed by the Chinese government on retaining 
ownership and control of basic service and, in turn, the entire telecom network
The “missing ” Telecommunication Law
One of the most noteworthy facets of China’s telecommunication regulatory framework is 
without any doubt the absence of an overarching law governing the sector. Although a 
Telecommunication Law (TL) has long been in the works, the government has only 
passed ad-hoc administrative regulations. In 1980, MPT started drafting the 
Telecommunications Law of the People’s Republic of China, which was similar in 
mandatory power to the Posts Law passed in 1986283. The first draft was submitted to the 
State Council for review in 1982 and failed to get finalised. Another draft was submitted
282 Magida (2001: 78). Conversely, companies carrying out value-added service, while requiring a Chinese 
partner, do not require state ownership.
Actually, the drafting of the first Electric Communications Law, Post and Telecommunications Act 
began in 1955 and was completed in 1958 but was never enacted. A draft of the Electric Communication 
Law, which separated mail and telecommunications, was later reviewed by the National Assembly in 1982 
and again in 1986, but was vetoed both times (OECD, 2003b).
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to the State Council and the relevant military departments for suggestions in July 1990. 
After some revisions and consultation, a third draft was again sent to the State Council in 
December 1991284. In June 2004, it was announced that a draft would be submitted to the 
State Council. While it has been said that “there are internal pressures from the State 
Council to accelerate the speed o f getting the law in place”, the most recent 
announcement mentions that the Law will not be passed before mid-2006 .
Table 9: Milestones in the Telecommunication Law drafting
1980 Drafting begins
1988 Task of drafting put into the State Council 
One-year Legislative Plan
1993 Task of drafting put into the 8th NPC 
Standing Committee Legislative Plan
1998 Task of drafting marked as the first item of 
agenda within the centrally approved 
legislative plan of the 8th session of the NPC 
standing Committee
2001 Draft process picks up speed. Expert 
consultants organise many discussions 
groups
2003 Telecom Law drafting complete. Comprises 
14 chapters and a basic roadmap for 
telecommunication reform
2004 Not included in the 2004 NPC Standing 
Committee law-making plan but draft 
submitted to the Legislative Office
2005 Listed as priority item for NPC legislation
Members of Telecom Law Drafting Groupa 
Wang Xudong, Minister of Mil 
(September 2003)*
Xi Guohua, vice minister of Mil 
Wu Jichuan, former minister of Mil and 
vice director of the China People's 
Congress (CPC) Education, Science, 
Culture and Health Committee 
Jiang Yaoping, director of Mil's Policy 
and Statute Department 
Wang Jianzhang, director of Mil's 
Integrated Planning Department 
Wen Ku, director of Mil's Science and 
Technology Department 
Su Jinsheng, director of Mil’s Telecom 
Administration
a As of December 2003 
* Director
Source: Adapted and updated from Li (2003).
The current draft of the law is said to contain 15 chapters with nearly 200 articles and to 
be centred around a number of key tenets, which are the fostering of competition, tariff 
deregulation, unified licensing, interconnection, universal service obligation and better 
enforcement guidelines, including enhanced transparency286. In its present form, it is said 
to touch upon procedural issues such as the administrative structure and responsibilities of 
the regulator or the establishment of an arbitration panel to handle interconnection 
disputes with a ruling mandated within 90 days. It is also said to cover substantive issues 
such as market entrance requirements (including compulsory technological specifications
284 He (1997: 77).
285 The Law “will put forward the principle that the telecom charge shall transit from government guiding 
price to market regulating price” (SinoCast, 2004b).
286 Xinhua Financial News (2004) and Chen (2004a). Schwarz and Satola highlight three key components 
of a telecommunication law. First, it should be responsive to global trends in the sector to allow countries to 
position themselves on a competitive footing vis-a-vis other telecommunication markets. Second, it should 
be technology-neutral, so as to provide flexibility for the introduction of new services. Finally, in absence 
of a general competition law, it should include provisions for fair competition. In addition, the function of 
law is to organise how regulatory power is exercised, rather than to provide detailed technical prescriptions 
(Scott, 1998: 243; Schwarz and Satola, 2000: 9).
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and future post-convergence requirements), frequency administration, universal service or
287interconnection .
Over the years, several problems have delayed the drafting process: the merger of MEI 
and MPT and subsequent creation of Mil, more substantive issues like interconnection 
and universal service or the prospects of network convergence have often forced the 
drafters to start back from scratch . In addition the government wanted to protect its 
own interests in a fast-changing telecommunications environment that made it very hard 
to come up with a regulatory framework. Three additional factors have complicated the 
exercise. First, the drafting process is relatively complex and involves numerous “going 
back-and-forth” between the various parties, since all major telecommunication policies 
and documents proposed by Mil must go through the State Council’s prior review (see 
Figure 6)289. Furthermore, many regulations and policies issued by the industry ministries 
have to go through the NDRC first and then, after approval, can be escalated to the State 
Council290. In the case of the telecommunication law, drafting began with Mil, probably 
with broad guidelines from the State Council. As part of the process, drafters typically 
solicit views from other related government bodies and agencies in China, principally at 
the government level291. The State Council Legal Affairs Bureau reviews the drafted 
documents, and the State Council Standing Committee approves or disapproves them. 
Second, the current system actually creates disincentives for Mil to speed up the drafting. 
Mil's interest has been served by delaying the enactment of the law, since it would likely 
entail, among other things, a clarification of regulatory procedures and thus remove the 
ministry's power to make arbitrary decisions292. Third, bureaucratic reforms that have 
gone on in tandem with industry reforms and rapid changes in technology have forced 
revisions of the drafts before they were even issued293. Fourth, Chinese lawmakers are 
busy not only with the telecommunication law, but also with many other laws294.
287 In addition, it is said to touch upon issues of coding and pricing standards, infrastructure, and network 
information safety (Li, 2003). The law is said to leave a grey area around pricing policy. Market pricing 
will be employed as long as there is competition to provide the service in question and as long as the 
services do not unduly “affect consumers' interests”. Otherwise, the government will regulate prices via 
public hearings.
88 Li (2003) and interview (B-003), conducted in Beijing, 28 August 2001.
289 Fan (2001).
290 Interview (B-006), conducted in Beijing, 30 August 2001.
291 Interview (B-032), conducted in Beijing, 18 November 2002.
292 OECD (2003b: 11).
293 Pangestu and Mrongowius (2002: 25).
294 Interview (B-009), conducted in Beijing, 4 September 2001.
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Figure 6: Telecommunication law and regulation drafting process, China, 2004
- The National People’s Congress 
approves the lawLaw
Regulation
- The State Council Legal Affairs 
Bureau reviews the drafted 
documents, and the State Council 
Standing Committee approves or 
disapproves them
- Mil issues telecommunication 
licences and drafts 
telecommunication administrative 
orders and directives with 
consultation, if needed, from relevant 
ministries or commissions
Department of 
Policy and 
Regulation
Mil
Other departments 
within Mil
NPC
State Council 
Standing 
Committee
NDRC
State Council 
Legislative Affairs 
Bureau
Note: Telecommunication operational directives are first drafted by a specific Mil department, sent to the 
Mil Department of Policy and Regulation for review, and go through an approving process by Mil Minister 
and other senior officials. For example, the telecommunication regulation was “cooked” by MIL Mil did 
all the preliminary drafting and contributed to all the essential parts. NDRC limited its role to an arbitrator, 
giving other agencies and departments a chance to say a few words about the regulations. Mil then made 
the necessary amendment and it went again through the NDRC and various State Council bureaus for the 
final approval295.
Source: Adapted from Fan (2001) and personal interviews.
Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, the drafting process suffers from a lack of 
inclusion. Although forty-two ministries, commissions, and offices have reviewed the 
draft, a formal process of consultation where concerned parties in the industry can have 
an input, is not yet in place296. This lack of a feedback mechanism has caused the 
government to rely mostly on Mil (and its institutes) and consultation abroad to tackle 
increasingly complex issues, leaving operators aside.
As noted by Brahm, a tension remains between legal certainty and predictability and the 
need for experimentation and flexibility during the present stage of China’s economic 
reform. Chinese laws are characterised by a tendency to state general principles (open to a 
range of interpretations and therefore flexible in application), a large number of 
administrative regulations (often provisional and, which can be modified more easily than
295 Interview (B-006), conducted in Beijing, 30 August 2001.
296 Interview (B-012), conducted in Beijing, 7 September 2001.
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laws in order to adjust to changing circumstances or experience), and a high degree of 
administrative discretion in implementing laws and regulations . In effect, the absence 
of a law regulating the telecommunication sector is probably one of the most important 
causes of today’s regulatory stalemate. Nonetheless, the substantial components of the 
law now exist in the regulations promulgated in September 2000. As such, the issuance of 
the telecommunication regulation marks a milestone in China’s drive to define its 
telecommunication sector in terms that match with the WTO agreement, while 
maintaining market-driven reform, greater openness, and the divorce of government from 
business. The regulation itself and some follow-up administrative measures, notices and 
directives are a very important first step towards developing a comprehensive and pro- 
competitive regulatory framework, although many issues such as interpretation, clarity 
and implementation remain298. Moreover, some substantive areas have yet to be 
adequately addressed.
Table 10: Overview of China’s telecommunication regulatory situation, 2004
Regulator Ministry of Information Industry (Mil)
Legal instruments A series of legislations and administrative methods but no 
Telecommunication Law as of January 1,2005
Regulatory responsibilities Except for tariff approval, all other regulatory functions are carried by 
Mil299
Licensing regimes Unclear and split between Mil and NDRC
Ownership Grouped under SASAC and partially privatised (China Telecom, China 
Netcom, China Mobile and China Unicom).
Universal service No USO fund
Source: Compiled and adapted from ITU website (http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/).
In other words, China’s design of the regulatory enironment can be characterised as 
pragmatic: by regulating “loosely” Mil is testing to see what happens, what works and 
what does not300. But the absence of clear and transparent regulatory environment leaves 
the current regulator vulnerable to political manoeuvres. Indeed, since its inception Mil 
has experienced difficulties pushing through the Telecommunication Law, although drafts 
have been around for years. Rapid technological changes, bureaucratic competition and 
conflicting interests among the various stakeholders, as well as central government policy 
changes have so far stalled efforts to finalise the telecommunication law301. In addition, 
the law and other regulatory measures still face important substantive and procedural
297 Brahm (2001: 350).
298 Pangestu and Mrongowius (2002: 26). However, they do not have the full effectiveness that a true law 
would have.
299 Regulatory functions include numbering plans, tariff proposal, technical standards, interconnection 
charges, arbitration of disputes, frequency allocation, type approval, monitoring of service quality, 
establishment of licence fees, approval of mergers and universal service.
300 Interview (B-007), conducted in Beijing, 31 August 2001.
301 Horsley (2001a: 41) and Lu (2002a: 22).
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issues. The latter tend to come in “bundles” and are introduced without much lead- 
time302. Current policy coordination is still carried out by numerous agencies with 
conflicting interests and thus often characterised by ad hoc administrative intervention or
OAT
arbitrated negotiations . Administrative network boundaries have made it difficult for 
Chinese authorities to deal with the gradual convergence of media and 
telecommunications in a comprehensive manner. As a result, the absence of a 
telecommunication law represents a major obstacle standing in the healthy development 
of the Chinese telecommunication sector. Let us underline, however, that there is an 
evolving legal framework based on the powers of the State Council and its Ministries to 
adopt secondary and tertiary regulations. For instance, the mere fact that the regulation 
was passed by the State Council (and not Mil) indicates its heightened role in trying to 
synthesise what will be falling into the telecommunication regulatory structure304.
302 This is not restricted to the telecommunications sector.
303 Keller (2000: 271-273) and Lu and Wong (2003: 41).
304 Interview (B-024), conducted in Beijing, 19 September 2001.
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Concluding remarks
For many years, China’s policy-making process was viewed as a black box, but it has 
become increasingly transparent and predictable. A quick glance at China’s 
telecommunication regulatory framework would probably miss on the extensive reforms 
that have taken place in the past decade. While the state retains majority ownership in all 
the operators through SASAC and the sector clearly lacks an authoritative independent 
regulator, the pace and breadth of reforms has been nothing less than impressive. The 
regulatory framework is developing in an internationally compatible manner. While it has 
been a struggle to come up with the telecommunication regulation, China has come a long 
way and the current situation is not so far from regulatory developments elsewhere -  as 
regulations and deregulations in other countries all had their own pitfall305. Since there is 
always a risk of obsolescence by the time a legislation is promulgated, some have argued 
that this has prompted for a loose definition of the legislation, leaving room for 
interpretation.
Thus, two opposite trends characterise the current regulatory environment: 1) the 
government’s effort to control and manage the sector, based on the conviction that all the 
basic telecommunication operators are state assets, and 2) moving towards more market- 
oriented regulations and the inclusion of non-government actors . More pressure already 
comes from various public institutions, such as the official press, the non-official press, 
from the more free thinking academic element and more significantly from the State 
Council307. Despite its diffuseness, the financial community has also played an increasing 
role. Unexpected policy decisions, which occurred without being flagged ahead of time, 
have made significant impact on revenue predictions for the listed entities and led to a 
plummeting in valuation, leading the government to make a number of policy statement 
“adjustments”308.
305 Interview (B-002), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001.
306 On the one hand the government is loosening up and liberalising, e.g. there have even been talks about 
totally giving up control of pricing, and on the other hand one can see the government tightening its 
administrative control over the major seven operators, e.g. by appointing senior management (Interview (B- 
011), conducted in Beijing, 6 September 2001).
307 Interview (B-019), conducted in Beijing, 17 September 2001.
308 Interview (C-002), conducted in Beijing, 11 June 2002 and Holland (2002).
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Part II:
Pressure from the Inside
3 Overall reforms and the pressure for change
"Telecommunication reforms are not the mechanical outcome o f  policy implementation. To the 
contrary, they are the product o f  complex and dynamic interactions among conflictive interests. ”
(Petrazzini, 1995: 5).
“It is a mistake to believe that China’s government wants to reform its telecommunication sector 
along Western lines. ”
(Mueller and Tan, 1997: 9)
A vast literature documents the reform process initiated with the Open Door policy309 as 
well as the internationalisation of China’s economy310. Most of the research conducted in 
the first half of the 1990s was concerned mainly with reforms in agriculture and industry. 
It is only in recent years that a number of scholars have turned their attention to services 
and sectoral issues, such as financial or telecommunication services. In terms of economic 
reforms, the ground covered between the start of the Open Door policy and China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is phenomenal. The country has lifted
o ii
millions out of poverty and quite successfully initiated the transition from a centrally 
planned towards a market economy. It has done so at relatively low social cost, although 
some of the hidden costs of economic development, such as environment damage, are 
starting to emerge
The Third Plenum of the 11th Communist Party Central Committee gave way to a series 
of policies designed to reform the structure of the Chinese economy312. Reform was 
introduced first in the countryside, with the decision by the government in 1978 to raise 
agricultural procurement prices, in order to improve production incentives, and to narrow 
the gap between the price of industrial and agricultural goods. In addition to the 
adjustment of economic policies, it brought some re-examination of ideology, including 
the role of foreign linkages in China's modernisation313. Reform was extended to the 
cities in 1984, when the Communist Party adopted “The Decision on the Reform of the 
Economic Structure”. Chinese planners acknowledged that market forces would supplant 
planning measures as the engine for economic growth by introducing the ‘two track’ price
314system .
309 See (Shirk, 1993; Houben, 1999; OECD, Fukasaku et al., 1999; Liu, 2001; Lieberthal, 2003).
310 See (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990; Keohane and Milner, 1996; Economy and Oksenberg, 1999; 
Pearson, 1999b, 1999a; Economy, 2001; Lardy, 2002; Zweig, 2002).
311 Between 1981 and 2000, the number of people living with less than USD 1 per day dropped from 789 
million to 203 million (Ali and Fan, 2004).
312 Shirk (1993: 38).
313 Tan (1995: 267).
314 Whereby a certain product would have an ‘in plan’ price set by the state, and, for production that 
exceeded the state quota, would have an ‘out plan’ price that would be determined by the market.
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The centrepieces of industrial reform in the 1980s involved the decentralisation of power 
to the enterprises and local governments315. These reforms aimed to improve the 
efficiency of the state sector by expanding enterprise autonomy, increasing incentives and 
introducing markets to complement or replace the existing planning system. The reforms 
also allowed SOEs to retain some of their profits, which were then used to increase 
rewards to workers and to finance the introduction of new products. As a whole, these 
reforms significantly altered the environment in which the SOEs operated and the way in 
which they were managed. SOEs began to respond to market signals to determine which 
goods to produce and in what quantities . The government supported the growth of 
powerful SOEs to compete with leading multinational companies, but the main goals of 
their reform was autonomy and competition rather than privatisation317. In the 1980s 
Chinese economic reforms were characterised by gradualism, administrative
*5 1 Qdecentralisation and particularistic contracting . In the 1990s, the reform process 
remained by-and-large on course; with the difference that China’s negotiations with 
members of the WTO to join the trading club increasingly dictated the agenda of China’s 
economic reform319.
In parallel to the waves of economic reforms, the Chinese government launched a series 
of institutional reforms (zhengfu jigou gaige) in 1982, 1988, 1993 and 1998. They were 
usually accompanied by administrative and regulatory reforms in various sectors320. As 
noted by Pearson:
“The drive for regulatory reform has been especially intensive since the 
mid-1990s, both as a result o f Zhu Rongji’s efforts to reorganize the State 
Council bureaucracy (notably, the elimination o f many line ministries and 
establishment o f several ‘independent regulators ’) and as a result o f  
requirements o f China’s WTO entry ”321.
During the 1980s, the Chinese Government launched two major administrative initiatives, 
the 1982-85 government organisation restructuring and the 1988 central government 
administrative restructuring. While the former was aimed largely at downsizing, the latter 
emphasised the restructuring of economic management departments. In 1992, China 
started a new round of administrative reforms focusing on establishing an administrative
315 Nee (1992: 5).
316 Between 1981 and 1990 the percentage of retail goods whose demand was determined by the market 
rose from 30% to 90%.
317 Nolan and Wang (1999: 180-181).
318 Shirk (1996: 196).
319 Zhang (2003: 707).
320 The frequent bureaucratic reorganisation since the 1950s signal efforts by Chinese leaders to alter the 
articulation of interests and to increase efficiency (Shirk, 1993: 110).
321 Pearson (2003: 2).
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system, which would conform to the socialist market economic system322. The latest 
bureaucratic reform of 1998 resulted in the creation of a more centralised decision­
making system323. In the case of telecommunication, some specialised economic 
departments were merged into new departments . One of the main effects of the 
administrative reforms in the last two decades was the creation of new incentives and 
opportunities for government agencies to compete with one another for economic 
resources, including FDI325.
In parallel to the bureaucratic reforms, the country engaged in regulatory reform. These 
reforms have two major components -  the creation of governmental regulators, and a 
restructuring of business actors to create competition . Overall, it maintained strong 
social and industrial policy imperatives. Regulations, particularly of network industries 
seen as central to the industrialisation goals of the government, were designed to achieve 
social policies -  such as continuing the inflow of revenues from large state enterprises -  
as well as the provision of universal services and development of the country’s Western
-.327part .
On the whole, China’s telecommunication reforms process differs only slightly from 
those witnessed in other sectors of the economy. The government granted fiscal leeway to 
provinces through a process of decentralisation early on. In parallel, it took a pragmatic 
approach to finance the network’s development. Two things set China’s 
telecommunication service sector apart. First, the outcome of the reforms. Despite 
involvement from the highest level and the passing of a telecommunication legislation, 
the sector remains “poorly” regulated. Second, and more surprisingly, the weak 
regulatory environment does not seem to have greatly affected the diffusion of 
telecommunication.
Views concerning the most desirable rate of development for the telecommunication 
sector can be grouped into three general categories: those who feel that 
telecommunication investment should be held well below what would be indicated by the
322 The reform in central government had three dimensions: reform of comprehensive economic 
departments, reform of local government and overall administrative simplification (UNPAN, 1998: 2-5).
323 Chan and Drewry (2001: 569).
324 MPT, MEI were combined into Mil and the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television was demoted to a 
State Bureau (Chan and Drewry, 2001: 563-564).
325 Wang (2000: 540).
326 Pearson (2003: 9) traces the origins of China’s regulatory changes to technocratic responses, from 
economic reformers in the State Council to the need to foster industrialization in a market context.
327 Pearson (2003: 28).
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market forces, those who contend that telecommunication should grow mostly as 
indicated by the market -  with operating entities behaving in most respects like 
commercial enterprises -  and those promoting rapidly advancing telecommunication 
technology as a prime means to achieve a wide range of social and economic goals in 
numerous socially oriented sectors . While there is no universal formula to reform a 
state-owned and state-run telecommunication industry, a number of elements invariably 
compose a reform programme . Kessides argues that:
“Every infrastructure reform program has three main elements:
privatisation, competitive restructuring, and regulatory reform ”330.
-jo 1
In its initial phase, reforms usually entail a split of operations from regulation , 
implying a change of ownership, the introduction of competition and strengthened 
regulation. In addition, the sequence of reforms is important332. In other words, reform of 
the telecommunication sector usually implies the reform of government institutions, 
market structure adjustments and the establishment of a legal system. Each country 
implementing telecommunication reforms faces unique political and cultural issues333. 
For example, China ranks among the few countries that have allowed some degree of 
competition (in long distance services) prior to allowing a change of ownership in the 
incumbent supplier and creating an independent regulator.
After presenting some figures on diffusion, Chapter 3 describes some of the major 
policies that have influenced the sector’s growth. Two of them have played a central role 
in the reform process: the decentralisation of administrative power and the diversification 
of the source of funding. The importance of telecommunication in the government’s 
strategy is also highlighted.
328 Saunders, Warford et al. (1983:16).
329 Kessides (2004: 42-43) argues that every restructuring and privatisation program must take explicit 
account o f a sector’s features and the country’s economic, institutional, social, and political characteristics. 
Melody argues that policy-making, supplying services and regulation are three sets of activities 
fundamental to telecommunication reform (Melody, 1997c: 20). See also Fink, Mattoo et al. (2003).
330 Kessides (2004: 59).
331 Gillick (1992: 726) and Pisciotta (1997: 348).
332 Wallsten (2002) and Melody (1995: 251-253). For example, slow development of regulatory agencies 
has often limited the benefits of reform (Smith and Wellenius, 1999: 1).
333 Pisciotta (1997: 347).
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Network development: the mix of government policies and natural growth
“The crucial issues concerning China’s communications and information development rest on 
China’s present political structure, policy-making processes, and regulatory regime at both 
central and local levels. ”
(Fan, 2001: 104)
At the end of 2004, the number o f fixed-line subscribers in China had reached 316 million 
subscribers and 334 million mobile subscribers. The compound annual growth rates 
during the period 1994-2004 amounts to 26.6% for fixed-lines subscribers and 70.8% for 
mobile subscribers. Figure 7 shows a close correlation between the growth o f GDP and 
the growth o f mobile and PSTN users. Two considerations make such growth remarkable. 
First, the environment in which it took place. These impressive rates were achieved in a 
centrally planned, state-owned and largely monopolistic environment. Second, the focus
weak country? Given the lack of knowledge between telecommunication investment and
development at the time of the Open Door policy, Chinese leaders’ emphasis on
A number of studies -  using more or less sophisticated econometric approaches -  have 
attempted to link telecommunication reforms with telecommunication growth334. They 
find that developing countries, whose policies promote economic growth and private 
sector competition, have experienced much more rapid diffusion of telecommunication 
services. In addition, greater market openness, coupled with pro-competitive regulation, 
acts as a strong driver of telecommunications sector growth335.
Establishing such a link of causality between the reforms undertaken since 1993 and the 
development of China’s telecommunication sector has too been subject of investigation. 
Ure attributes the State Council’s emphasis up to the mid-1980s on telecommunication to 
a combination of factors including the Open Door policy, national security and China's 
science and technology programme336. Lu and Wong see organisational shake-up, 
restructuring incentives, state support and capital formation as key factors337. Singh noted 
that demand for telecommunication services grew several fold with the market
■ j i g
liberalisation that began with Deng Xiaoping . Later on, Cheung attributed the growth 
rate of mobile technology to market openness, heavy FDI inflow, rapid economic growth, 
China's interest in WTO membership, and re-structuring of the telecommunication 
sector339. Finally, some of the efforts to upgrade telecommunication have also been 
credited to the PLA’s modernisation drive340. Pinpointing at a single factor -  or for that 
matter at a set of factors -  as a driver for telecommunication growth remains undeniably 
subject to debate. It is not the purpose of this thesis to attribute the performance to any 
given factor. We limit ourselves to observing when and how much growth took place. A 
brief analysis of selected performance indicators of China’s telecommunication sector 
allow us to find a number of parallels with the reform periods described in this thesis (see 
Table 11). As expected, the period preceding the first set of reforms (pre-1993) reveals 
extremely low figures for both the connection capacity and the number of mainlines
334 See (Noll, 1999b; Ros, 1999; Dasgupta, Lall et al., 2001; Li and Xu, 2002b; Fink, Mattoo et al., 2003). A 
growing body of country experiences shows that reform of economic, social, and administrative regulations 
can produce substantial and long-lasting benefits, although it is often difficult to isolate the effects of 
regulatory reform from the many other factors that affect economic performance and policy effectiveness 
(OECD, 1997).
335 Varoudakis and Rossotto (2004: 75).
336 Ure (1997a: 247-249). See also (Feigenbaum, 2003).
337 See (Lu, 2000; Lu and Wong, 2003).
338 Singh (1999).
339 Cheung (2002).
340 For Mulvenon and Bickford (1999: 246-248) the PLA was one of the key players in China’s 
telecommunications modernisation. For historical reasons, it controlled large sections of commercially 
exploitable broadcast bandwidth in China (e.g. the 800-MhZ spectrum, suited for cellular communications). 
The role of the military in telecommunications stemmed from a combination of structural factors -  the 
structure of the Chinese Leninist state and the PLA enterprise system.
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actually in service. In spite of some investments -  revealed by increased availability of 
digital main lines -  the overall growth remained dismal.
Table 11: Selected performance indicators of China’s telecommunication reforms, 1989-2004
Availability Number of Mobile Mainlines Mainlines Connection ~ .. .,Connectivity-Year of digital mainlines users per per 100 capacity . .. f.” mainline 1*9x10
_______ main lines (thousand) (thousand) employee inhabitants (thousand)_______________
1989 0.220 5,680 10 n.a. 0.51 10,347 1.82
O n 1990 0.290 6,850 18 n.a. 0.60 12,318 1.80
O n00A 1991 0.380 8,451 48 n.a. 0.73 14,922 1.77Wa
1992 0.498 11,469 177 n.a. 0.97 19,151 1.67
1993 0.655 17,332 638 37.03 1.45 30,408 1.75
00
a \
O n
1994 0.965 27,295 1,568 56.39 2.26 49,262 1.80
1 1995 0.992 40,796 3,629 85.17 3.35 72,036 1.77
O n
Q \ 1996 0.995 54,947 6,853 114.23 4.47 92,912 1.69
1997 0.997 70,310 13,230 150.24 5.66 112,692 1.60
1998 0.999 87,421 24,980 196.45 6.98 138,237 1.58
ooM 1999 0.999 108,716 43,100 158.71 8.61 158,531 1.46
00
O n
O n
2000 1 144,829 85,260 207.91 11.38 178,256 1.23
2001 1 180,368 144,810 253.83 14.08 205,695 1.14
2002 1 214,419 190,390 295.55 16.62 283,584 1.32
i/i ©o o 2003 1 263,305 269,000 354.77 20.26 354,010 1.34
2004 1 312,443 334,824 410.71 23.88 421,020 1.35
Source: Compiled by author from ITU, Mil and Frost.
The following periods (between 1993 and 2001, and after 2001) clearly contrasts with the 
pre-reform era. First, the connection capacity grows significantly (respective CAGR of 
28.74% and 26.97%). Second, the number of mainlines per 100 inhabitants grows 
accordingly (respective CAGR of 34.22% and 19.26%). Since mobile telephony is not 
encompassed in the figures, one can a priori exclude technological leapfrogging as an 
explanatory factor. Third, the connectivity-main lines ratio falls regularly after 1994, 
indicating possibly that the planning of network deployment was conducted more in line 
with market demands. It is interesting to put in perspective GDP growth figures with 
mobile and fixed-line adoption (see Figure 7). We can immediately observe a good 
correlation between all three variables. This is not so surprising. Studies have shown that 
telecommunications is both statistically significant and positively correlated to regional 
economic growth in real GDP per capita growth in China341. Second, the peaks of growth 
for mobile and fixed users actually take place at the eve of the reform period. Third, 
despite the relative decrease of growth after 1993, the yearly adoption remains extremely 
high. Unfortunately, it is not possible to infer from the statistics any direction of causality.
341 Ding and Haynes (2004: 13). Datta and Agarwal (Datta and Agarwal, 2004) find that 
telecommunications infrastructure plays a positive and significant role in economic growth in 22 OECD 
countries from 1980-1992.
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It is also important to remember here that investment in telecommunication (both in 
absolute terms and relative to GDP) significantly grew from 1993 onwards342.
Setting and maintaining telecommunication as a strategic priority 
The development of the telecommunication sector wasn’t the first priority during the pre- 
1978 period, unlike the development of the industrial structure. But in the early 1980s the 
government changed its mind about the role of telecommunication for economic 
development and the improvement of the telecommunication infrastructure became a 
priority in the reform process343. A number of preferential policies designed to relax 
control over the industry and to encourage investment were promulgated. A key step was 
to introduce the “Three-90 percent policy” in 1984, which played a pivotal role in 
propelling the telecommunication sector’s take off. Then, in October 1988, the State 
Council announced the “16-character policy” for telecommunication infrastructure 
development. Four principles were outlined: unification of planning and industrial 
development under MPT, coordination of ministerial administration with regional 
authorities, definition and sharing of responsibilities among different administrative levels 
and mobilisation of resources from all concerned to construct infrastructure344.
The mid-1990s marked a second set of important development policies. By then, 
communications had once again become a bottleneck in China’s national economy345. In 
1994, the State Council announced the “Eight policies of telecommunication 
development”. The development strategies gave priority and policy support to the 
telecommunication sector, calling for the central planning of network and service 
development as well as a focus on the construction of a unified nation-wide public 
network. Their strategies also crystallised independent accounting and hierarchical 
administration for the Post and Telecommunication Enterprises (PTEs) and linked 
employee rewards to enterprise performance. Moreover, PTEs were allowed to raise 
capital from various ways and to collect installation fees. Importing foreign equipment 
and technology and utilising foreign fund sources also became possible346. In parallel to 
those policies, the government included telecommunication into its Five Year Planning
342 See Figure 8.
343 Wauschkuhn (2001: 2-3) and Wang (2001a: 289-294).
344 Lu and Wong (2003: 25).
345 Chang (1994: 206). In Shanghai, the average waiting for fixed lines grew from 100,000 to 700,000 
between 1990 and 1994 (Mueller and Tan, 1997: 29).
346 It was accompanied by the licensing of value-added and mobile telecommunication services and the 
deregulation of the equipment manufacturing market (Lu, 2002a: 17).
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(FYP) process347. According to Naughton, in the 7th FYP (1986-1990) priority was given 
to continued agricultural growth, consumer goods industry and to the completion of key 
projects in energy, transport and communication348. As a result, planned build-up of 
telecommunication infrastructure was “conservative” and targets were achieved both in 
the 6th and 7th FYP (see Table 12).
Table 12: Build-up of telecommunication infrastructure, 1981-2000
Five-Year
Plan
Items
6th
(1981-1985) 
Planned Achieved
yth
(1986-1990) 
Planned Achieved
8th
(1991-1995) 
Planned Achieved
C)th
(1996-2000) 
Planned Achieved
Switchboard 
capacity 
(urban lines)
2.7
million
3.37
million
6.35
million
8.26
million
18
million
54.56
million
150
million
179
million
Long distance 
phone lines 28,011 37,551 109,615 112,437 350,000 735,545 2,800,000 5,490,000
Telephone 
terminals per 
100 residents
n.a. 0.6 (N) 2.0 (U) n.a.
1.11 (N) 
4.71 (U)
Above
2.0
4.6 (N) 
17.0 (U)
10 (N) 
30 (U)
20.1 (N) 
39.0 (U)
Administrative
villages
connected349
40% 100% 80%
Average 
annual growth 
rate of P&T 5.0% 9.8% 11.05% 22.5% 20% 35.1% 20% 36.7%
turnover
IT industry as 
% of GDP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2% n.a. 4%
Note: (N)ational and (U)rban. The country’s 10th FYP calls for promoting the convergence of 
telecommunications, TV and computer networks. The government has set out strategic plans to: 1) expand 
the nationwide broadband network using fibre optic cable, microwave and satellite systems; 2) build out the 
nationwide GSM mobile network and explore services like mobile banking and Internet access based on the 
existing GSM network; 3) prepare for the deployment of 3G technology of mobile communications; 4) 
improve management and billing systems; 5) promote Internet usage, particularly e-commerce and 
electronic business. In the 10th FYP, the government has also targeted 95% of administrative village 
connection and 40 telephone terminals per 100 residents.
Source: Adapted from Lee (1997), TRP (2001), Lu (2002a), and Euromonitor (2003).
Since the 6th FYP, the build-up of the telecommunication infrastructure presents three 
remarkable facets. First, all the targets have been largely achieved, except for the 
percentage of administrative villages connected. Even there, the government has renewed 
in 2005 its pledge to connect 95% of the villages to “universal telecommunication
347 China has both Five Year Plans and annual plans. Both are drafted by the NDRC with input from all 
relevant ministries and organisations of the State Council. FYPs tend to be general, setting goals and 
directing rather than offering detailed and concrete planning. They leave considerable room for decisions to 
be made on an annual basis (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988: 131). As a general rule, FYP provide a good 
indicator of the government’s macro objectives as they establish official national targets, priorities, policy 
concerns and directions.
348 Naughton (1995: 175). From the beginning o f the 1990s, investment in infrastructure has been reasserted 
progressively as a major national policy priority, leading to a large increase in the share o f transportation 
and telecommunication services in state fixed-assets investment, up to 30% in 1998 (Ddmurger, 2001).
349 Defined as a fixed line connection within a radius of 3 kilometres of the village.
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Aservices” by the end of the year . Second, the growth is rapid for a developing 
economy351. In comparison with India, whose size and state of advancement in the 
telecommunication sector at the beginning of the 1990s was more or less similar, the 
Chinese growth has been no less than staggering. Third, most of the growth happened 
during the 8th and 9th FYP periods352. According to Hao, the rapid development during the 
8th FYP is explained by the fact that “the telephone entered family life, making the 
transition from office use to private use”353.
As we will see shortly, this coincides with a number of drastic changes that took place 
within the telecommunication regulatory environment. These regulatory changes 
followed from a number of broad policies. China's administration primary focus in 
telecommunications and information infrastructure development by the 1990s was to spur 
network development while coordinating the whole process354. In practice, the policy of 
building infrastructure to allow for communication and for economic efficiency resulted 
in a heavy hand from the government355. Di and Liu have argued that Chinese planners 
were “fully aware” of the relationship between general economic development and the 
development of an infrastructure for telecommunication356. This is not surprising in itself. 
A number of studies documented the correlation between the level of telecommunications 
infrastructure (represented by teledensity) and the level of economic development 
(represented by per capita GDP)357.
While the NDRC and its predecessors did an admirable job at drafting ambitious FYPs, 
this was not enough to ensure that the targets were being met. In our view, the growth of 
the telecommunication network was made possible by a number of policies which 
accompanied the plans -  such as decentralisation and opportunistic diversification of 
funding mechanisms. The next two sections describe the two policies that were central to 
achieving the strategy.
350 More than 50,000 villages remain unconnected (Asia Pulse, 2005b). In 2004, Mil, together with all 
major operators, launched a “cuntong” project to speed up the connection of all villages in rural areas.
351 Ure attributes the little influence of cyclical growth to the reliance on installation and connection fees 
(Ure, 2004: 4).
352 Singh argues that the difference between the 6th and 7th FYP marks the passage from a development to a 
strategic priority (Singh, 1999: 94).
353 Hao (1997: 11).
354 Lovelock and Ure (2000).
355 Interview (B-027), conducted in Beijing, 11 October 2001.
356 Di and Liu (1994).
357 See (Hardy, 1980; Saunders, Warford et al., 1983; Cronin, Parker et al., 1991). In their study o f Shaanxi, 
Tang and Lee found that telecommunications development in China depended not merely on economic 
factors, but also on non-economic factors such as political, historical and national security considerations 
(Tang and Lee, 2003).
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Decentralisation: from the centre to the periphery and back again
"China's development is driven by a tension between economic freedom and political 
authoritarianism, between decentralisation and centralisation, between capitalist practice and 
socialist ideology ”
(Mueller quoted in Singh, 1999: 97).
"The general trend toward highly decentralised telecommunication regulation and operation in 
China will continue and probably even intensify. ”
(Lynch, 2000: 192)
An important element of China’s economic reform process has been the progressive 
decentralisation of powers away from central government agencies to those at lower
OfO
levels . A similar pattern can be observed in the telecommunication industry. In 1993, 
Directive 165 issued by State Council initiated the decentralisation process (fenquan 
rangli) by stipulating that “in post and telecommunications industries the government 
administration and business should be separated, postal business and telecommunications 
business should also be separately administered, and enterprises should have their own 
accounts and be financially independent” . Provincial bureaus, which used to be under 
the direct control of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT), were granted 
independent accounting . Whereas previously all revenue was turned over to the MPT 
and all investment was funded by the MPT, provincial bureaus could from then on retain 
part of their revenue for re-investment. They were also encouraged to seek investment 
from local governments and other local interests . Thus, MPT’s responsibilities became 
largely confined to managing the national trunk network (i.e. linkages above the 
provincial level) and international connections. At the provincial level and below, MPT 
very quickly became virtually powerless to influence telecommunication development, 
except insofar as central intervention was necessary to insure nationwide inter­
compatibility of technical standards. In the early 1990s a further degree of local autonomy 
was introduced, allowing the local Posts and Telecommunications Administrations 
(PTAs) greater management flexibility in planning, investment and tariffing policies. This 
ensured room to develop the industry at the local level at a pace that would have been
358 Saich (2001: 152).
359 By the end of the 1980s most provincial legislature bodies had passed laws and regulations to define the 
division of responsibilities between the MPT and the local governments (Lu and Wong, 2003: 29).
360 The MPT administration was divided into a three-tier hierarchy with the national MPT at the top in 
charge of domestic and international long distance services. Provincial level Posts and Telecommunications 
Administrations (PTAs) reported directly to the national MPT and were responsible for all intra-provincial 
network development and operations. Country and city level Posts and Telecommunications Bureaus 
(PTBs) reported to the PTAs and handled post and telecommunication service and network maintenance in 
rural areas.
361 Tan (1994: 178).
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impossible for the central government362 and opened the door to foreign investors 
involvement363. PTAs were also designed as a tool to ensure uniform standards, 
coordinated equipment purchases364 and regulated development across the country in an
-j/rc
attempt to put an end to the fractioning of the industry . As put by a large MNC
equipment manufacturer:
“When selling equipment, and despite trying to negotiate a countrywide 
deal, you basically win or lose a province ” .
In other words, every single purchase order was a separate contract, preventing 
nationwide procurement policies367.
In 2000, following a proposal by Mil, provincial Telecommunication Administrations 
Bureaus (dianxin guanlibu) were established to create a nationwide supervision system
/^JD
overseen by Mil and provincial governments . The new administrative model embodies 
the policy of “hangye guanlf\ Administrations are responsible for the planning and 
management of public telecommunication facilities, special-purpose telecommunications 
networks and radio and TV transmission networks in their own areas. In addition, they are 
entrusted with ensuring fair market competition . They are however clearly separated 
from operators. In contrast to the previous administrative model, TABs are under the dual 
hierarchy of local governments and the Ministry, instead of answering mostly to local 
governments370. While local administrations act as branches of the central administration, 
they retain a certain level of flexibility within the limitations set by Mil371. Such 
examples of local initiatives can be found in the telecommunication regulations passed by 
Guangzhou or Shanghai in 1996, or more recently by the notices promulgated by
362 Interview (B-038), conducted in Beijing, 25 November 2003.
363 See below the section on CCF.
364 Although China Unicom is said to be better than the other operators, individual provinces behave as 
independent power bases and negotiate their own deals (Interview (B-039), conducted in Beijing, 27 
November 2003).
365 In the mid-1980s the Chinese leadership had made moves to dilute the strength of powerful industrial 
ministries (Harwit, 1998: 189).
366 Interview (B-005), conducted in Beijing, 13 September 2001.
367 Contracts were even sometimes signed at the sub-provincial level. China Mobile has been trying to bring 
everybody in the listed company closer to a more uniform standard on how to operate, but this is still an 
issue (Interview (B-039), conducted in Beijing, 27 November 2003).
368 Cui (2002: 158) argues that a two-level, direct instruction regulation structure system is taking shape.
369 EIU ViewsWire (2001).
370 Interview (B-040), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
371 Interview (B-038), conducted in Beijing, 25 November 2003.
372 These regulations are limited in geographical scope to the Guangzhou Municipality and supplementing 
existing national and provincial regulations passed by the relevant departments of telecommunications. In 
essence, the regulations confirmed that the Municipal Telecommunications Authority is responsible for 
licensing essentially local services such as radio paging, mobile telephones and VSAT but that information 
services licensed by the Municipality must nevertheless also be licensed at a higher level (Mondaq Business 
Briefing, 1996).
92
Shanghai and Beijing on SMS374. In addition, informatisation projects, such as Infoports,
nnc
are usually initiated and run by municipal governments . In the area of pricing, PTAs 
actually complement NDRC-issued notices, by giving providers the right to set fees for 
some services and creating a new system for companies to apply for pricing changes. 
Despite policy restrictions on competition, local governments and the bureaus of 
telecommunication management can decide to a large extent whether or not to make price
One would nevertheless be mistaken to infer that the central government has become 
totally dissociated from the running of the sector. One area where the centre has not 
relinquished its power is licensing. Mil remains in charge of the licence issuance in basic 
telecommunication services for the whole country. According to State Council Directive
nnn
No. 333, local authorities cannot approve any FDI project , but the local bureau is 
authorized to do pre-reviewing on FDI applications378. Thus, in the case of the AT&T and 
Shanghai Telecom deal, the agreement was reached at the local government level, but 
Mil had to approve it by affirming the eligibility of the JV. For value-added services, the 
local branches issue licences but they must be put forward to Mil for registration . 
Thus, and contrary to other sectors, the creation of the TABs has reduced local 
administrations’ leeway in regulatory affairs by forcing them to make their decisions 
within guidelines of national regulations380. Moreover, China has announced its plan to 
establish in 2005 a telecommunications supervision system covering market access 
(control basic telecommunication services and open value-added services), 
interconnection (draft documents on administration and publish explanations on legal
373 The “Procedures of the Shanghai Municipality on the Administration of Telecommunications Services” 
limited applications to state-owned or collective-owned enterprises with corporate capacity or an enterprise 
whose interest is controlled by it, but remained vague as to capital requirements. Foreign companies or 
foreign-invested enterprises were to be dealt “in accordance with relevant State provisions”. The city of 
Shanghai has also passed a trial “Administrative Method of Broadband Subscriber Network” (shanghaishi 
kuandai yonghu zhudiwang guanli banfa -  shixing).
374 Promulgated by the Shanghai Telecommunications Bureau on 26 June 2003, the Shanghai Rules 
prohibit, among other, SMS operators from selling their SMS services at below-cost prices as well as from 
providing premium SMS services to users who have not voluntarily subscribed to such services. Using a 
slightly different approach, the Beijing Administration for Industry and Commerce announced on 29 
October 2003 that it had coordinated with four online SMS providers to revise their SMS user service 
agreements and begin using a standardized SMS Service Basic Clause (Interview B-040, conducted in 
Beijing, 28 November 2003).
375 Shanghai is said to be a showcase because of the investment and regulatory efforts of the Shanghai 
government (Interview (B-027), conducted in Beijing, 11 October 2001). Ma, Chung et al. (forthcoming) 
provide an overview of city-level informatisation projects.
76 Interview (B-035), conducted in Shanghai, 21 November 2003.
377 In-depth treatment of FDI in the telecommunication industry is provided in Chapter 5.
378 Interview (B-043), conducted in Shanghai, 10 May 2004.
379 Interview (B-040), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
380 Interview (B-034), conducted in Shanghai, 21 November 2003.
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documents), price control (adopt ceiling and bottom prices), universal service (open a 
fund to support development of telecommunication in poverty-stricken areas), customer 
service, and information safety381.
As noted, the major distinction from the previous system is the “separation between 
government and enterprises”, replacing “zhengqi bufen” by “hangye guanlF382. The new 
system seems to leave even less leeway for local TABs. With the creation of the new 
provincial bureaus, Mil is trying to establish more consistency, and while struggling to 
become less hierarchical, aims at having the provinces follow central government policies 
to avoid network fragmentation or spectrum allocation conflicts. Whether the provincial 
governments enjoy xingzheng lingdao guanxi (administrative leadership powers -  setting 
budgets and controlling senior appointments at the provincial bureaus) or only yewu 
lingdao guanxi (business leadership relations -  only offering guidance on policy) is hard 
to answer: provincial Telecommunication Administrations (PTAs) or local Mil are 
appointed by provincial politicians, but industrial policy has to listen to Beijing for 
guidance383. Fundamentally though, the government cannot play the double role of 
regulator and operator. The enterprise management relationship {hangye guanli) means 
that administrative bureaus have no intervening rights into enterprises personnel, finance 
and assets management384. In other sectors, bureaus have established local offices around 
the country over the past couple of years and they seem to be focused on supervision385. 
Early initiatives point to similar roles. Thus, in Shanghai, two administrative bodies have 
the responsibility to regulate telecommunication. First, the Shanghai Telecom 
Administration Bureau, an agency affiliated to Mil, is responsible for regulating 
operations by implementing national laws, regulations and directives. It “listens” to the 
central government in a vertical way. Second, the Shanghai Municipal Informatisation 
Commission, an important branch of the Shanghai Municipal government, regulates 
telecommunication manufacturing and software.
381 Asia Pulse (2004). The basic objective is to install public payphones or public call offices in at lest 95% 
of rural villages by the end of 2005 (Roseman, 2005: 40).
382 In the words of a local PTA head, “the government is now seen as a referee rather than a sportsman” 
(Interview (B-043), conducted in Beijing, 10 May 2004).
383 One could call this the double leadership: accountability to provincial leaders as well as to Mil, but with 
a different focus (Interview (B-033), conducted in Geneva, 12 November 2003).
384 According to the Telecommunication Regulation, the telecommunication administrative bureau is 
obliged to regulate operating and pricing behaviours, while telecommunication enterprises are treated as 
independent enterprises.
385 Interview (B-024), conducted in Beijing, 19 September 2001.
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Enforcement of the new administrative structure will hopefully prevent cooperative 
arrangements and regulatory capture. Furthermore, local authority regulation provides for 
more democratic control by those with detailed knowledge of an area, and more 
responsive control to particular regional concerns386.
The extent to which the decentralisation process has been successful is questionable. On 
the one hand, development has proceeded at impressive speed while maintaining more or 
less uniform standards across the country . Without the delegation to lower levels, such 
massive build-up of the network would probably have been much more difficult and time- 
consuming. Through their subsidiaries, like Shanghai Mobile or Shanghai Telecom, 
operators were allowed to become an integral part of the reform process. Today those 
subsidiaries deal directly with local governments and the relationship between high-level 
managers and high-level local government leaders is said to weight considerably on local 
economics388. On the other hand, the sharing of responsibilities among different 
administrative levels has probably undermined the government’s capacity to control the 
nationwide development of the industry, which has led to differences in provincial 
treatment and gradual fragmentation of telecommunication policies. Mil’s function 
appears more and more often restricted to issuing general policies with limited 
enforcement capacity. For example, the government was forced several times to warn 
against wasteful duplication of resources and price wars, but with little impact. Although 
partly explained by budgeting reasons and by the trial phases orchestrated by the 
operators, implementation and enforcement of directives can take up to 12 months or 
more
The overall decentralisation process has been taking place in a very complex environment 
fraught with tensions. The telecommunication sector is no exception: despite the 
“normalisation” of the market, the relationship between the periphery and the centre 
remains intricate390. Since 1949, the telecommunication sector has been treated as a 
means of connecting the central government with its local branches but even in the era of 
central economic planning, the telecommunication service market was for years a
386 Baldwin and Cave (1999: 66).
387 For an interesting discussion on the barriers encountered, see Mertha and Zeng (2002).
388 Interview (B-035), conducted in Shanghai, 21 November 2003.
389 Interview (B-017), conducted in Beijing, 14 September 2001 and interview (B-020), conducted in 
Beijing, 17 September 2001. Some rich provinces are sometimes allowed more flexibility while poor 
provinces get all their funds from the central government.
390 For example, the office chief of Shanghai’s telecommunication management bureau became China 
Unicorn’s new president (Interview (B-035), conducted in Shanghai, 21 November 2003).
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fragmented administrative structure391. As a result, provincial and local bureaus have 
attempted to occupy the void by issuing local, and at times nation-wide392, regulations. 
As it is often the case, the dynamics of Chinese politics are to a great extent determined 
by the realities on the ground -  with enormous power in the hands of regional and local 
governments . This has led to a picture, which is by far not homogenous, where some 
governments were being given (or took) more freedom to experiment394. Unfortunately, 
M il’s decentralisation attempts and the use of local test beds have hardly served as a 
bottom-up channel for policy-makers on a large scale395. The several waves of 
decentralisation may at first have given the impression of strengthening the role of the 
centre by consolidating the industry’s development under MPT (and later Mil). An 
additional factor mitigating local control has been the corporatisation process : while 
local government can impact the provincial subsidiaries of service providers, their 
increased integration via listed vehicles makes it harder and harder397.
The various waves of decentralisation have not only impacted the administrative structure 
of the sector but also deeply influenced its sources of funding. As noted above, the end of 
MPT’s complete control happened around the same time as the devolution of 
administrative power to sub-central government levels.
391 Davidson, Wang et al. (1989: 99) and Lu and Wong (2003: 36).
392 A striking example is the regulation for websites issued by the Beijing Municipal Administration for 
Industry and Commerce that purported to require website registration in Beijing for businesses all over 
China (Interview (B-032), conducted in Beijing, 18 November 2002).
393 Van Der Geest (1998: 109).
394 Interview (B-029), conducted in Beijing, 12 October 2001. The government’s strategy to allow 
experiments at the provincial level is to a certain extent embodied in Article 9 of the telecommunications 
regulation, which stipulates that “New types of telecom services other than those in the Catalogue of 
Telecom Service Classifications that are carried out on a experimental basis using new technologies should 
be submitted to telecom regulatory authorities at the provincial level for record” (GAO, 2004: 73).
395 Interview (B-024), conducted in Beijing, 19 September 2001 and Interview (B-029), conducted in 
Beijing, 12 October 2001.
396 See Chapter 4.
397 Interview (B-035), conducted in Shanghai, 21 November 2003.
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Investment and sources of funding: a pragmatic approach
In many respects, China’s case is atypical. Many transition countries that undergo reform 
tend to be characterised by under-investment, very low tariffs and the lack of independent 
regulators398. Although China shares the latter characteristic, it seems to have managed 
investment extremely well. The cumulated capital investment in telecommunication 
between 1986 and 2003 exceeded USD 200 billion (see Figure 8). The central 
government approached this phenomenal network build-out by introducing a number of 
policies over the years and with a certain dose of pragmatism. First, from 1982 to 1993, 
funds were allocated to telecommunications under preferential policies399. For example, 
in 1984 the government introduced the “Three 90% policy”, which allowed the 
telecommunication industry to retain 90% of its profits (compared with a 55% taxation of 
non-preferred industries), 90% of its foreign currency earnings from international 
telephony traffic, and was exempted from repaying 90% of central government loans400. 
Second, instead of relying solely on the revenues of the telecommunication network, the 
government sought various sources of financing, including foreign ones, as opportunities 
arose. As a result, funding in China’s telecommunication sector shifted during the reforms 
from being mostly state investments to self-raised funds, and by 1998 the percentage of 
self-raised funds had actually exceed budgeted previsions401. The sources of funding can 
be divided into three main periods, which coincide by-and-large with major periods of the 
reform process (see Table 13).
Table 13: Change in the composition of investment in the P&T industry, 1978-1998
1978 1982 1992 1998
Total investment (RMB 100 million) 4.34 9.15 162.49 1771.66
State investment in budget 90% 40.80% 2.93% 0.07%
Domestic loans 0.5% 0.20% 6.72% 8.83%
Foreign loans 0.50% 13.23% 1.37%
Self-raised (locally) funds 8% 58.50% 75.09% 87.26%
Source: Compiled from Fan (1996), Lovelock and Ure (2000: 21), Wu and Zhu (2003).
From the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 to the onset of economic 
reform in 1978, telecommunications was treated as a means of connecting the central
398 This in turn creates a vicious circle reinforcing under-investment (Vagliasindi, 2004: 303).
399 Wang (2003: 270).
400 He (1997: 76) and Wauschkuhn (2001: 3). For investment in local telephone networks the “mobilising 
four resources together” policy drew on the resources of government fiscal expenditure, users’ 
contributions, enterprises’ internal finance, and loans.
401 The budget for the telecommunication sector for 1994-2000 had been set at RMB 490 billion, of which 
80% were to be sourced domestically. RMB 98 billion (20%) were to come from telephone installation fees, 
another RMB 196 billion (40%) were to be raised through revenues collected on local and long-distance 
calls and subsidies from local governments. While domestic bank loans and foreign capital were each to 
contribute another 20%
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government with its local branches402 and investment rested almost exclusively on the 
state.
Foreign loan management-1982-1993403
During the period China borrowed more than USD 5 billion in foreign loans for 
telecommunications404. Part of it came from soft loans405 and from international lenders. 
In the early 1990s, prediction after prediction was made that China would have to open its 
telecommunication industry to foreign participation in order to secure the capital needed 
to finance its expansion plans. At that time, foreign investment accounted for around 20- 
25% of the MPT's total telecommunication investment, the main sources being supplier 
credits, commercial investment, international loans from the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank, and Western government soft loans. While China became the World 
Bank’s biggest borrowing client in 1993 (a position it has retained as of today406), 
borrowing from the World Bank for projects related to telecommunication has been 
limited to a USD 250 million loan to help fund a project designed to restructure the sector 
and make it more market-oriented407. A multilateral agreement among countries 
belonging to the OECD was reached in 1993 to cut government soft loans to 
telecommunications projects in China. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
also announced their intention gradually to eliminate loans to telecommunication projects 
in China. Thus, while in the first part of the 1990s much of the fixed assets investment 
came from foreign government and international financial organisation loans, from 1993 
onwards, enterprises turned to domestic financing, including loans from domestic banks, 
instalments and leasing408.
402 Davidson, Wang et al. (1989: 99).
403 Enterprises mainly utilised favourable loans from foreign governments, loans from international 
financial organisations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and primary credit 
interest with some subsidies provided by the government (Wu and Zhu, 2003: 140).
404 Anonymous (1994).
405 During the 1980-1989 period, soft loan telecommunication contracts -  loans made to a country on a 
concessionary basis such as a lower rate of interest -  amounted to USD 728 million. Multilateral 
development loans have not been employed in telecommunications, but both the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank investigated projects (Zita, 1994: 100).
406 Studwell (2002: 101).
407 The USD 623 million project was used to fund fibre-optic cables as well as 920,000 new lines in 
Jiangsu. The World Bank's funding also supported reforms of the accounting (following international 
standards) and pricing systems in the telecommunication sector, the establishment of a legal and regulatoiy 
structure and the training of some 25,000 telecommunication bureaucrats (Clifford, 1994: 47).
408 Wu and Zhu (2003: 140).
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Figure 8: Annual growth rates of real GDP and investment in telecommunication, 1986-2003
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Figure 9: Percentage of investment to gross telecommunication revenues, 1986-2003
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Domestic loans and international financing -  1994-1997
As noted, due to the high profitability of the sector, soft loans from the multilateral 
agencies were no longer available during the second part of the 1990s409. Moreover, the 
policies introduced in the early 1990s allowed central and provincial governments to 
make investments in the sector and to negotiate international JVs for technology transfer 
and production410. This opened the door to the creation of Chinese-Chinese-Foreign 
(CCF) JVs or “zhong zhong w ar  pioneered in 1995 by China Unicom411. In this finance 
model, a foreign company partnered with a domestic company, usually in a JV. In return 
for investment, equipment and management expertise, it received a revenue share from 
the network’s operations. This complex arrangement was designed to circumvent China’s 
strict ban on foreign companies having any equity ownership or operational control over 
networks and network services. As local authorities needed the investment, local 
regulators were willing to turn a blind eye. Although these arrangements were approved 
by relevant officials in MOFTEC and by the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC), they were deemed unlawful by Mil and fell into an administrative 
and regulatory grey zone. There is little doubt that both Ministries had a very different 
outlook on CCF, but what is important to remember here is that their liberal or 
conservative interpretation was in large part driven by their respective remit412. On the 
one hand, MOFTEC’s main objective was to attract as much foreign investment to China 
“at all costs”. On the other hand, Mil’s political salience rested on the development of the 
national telecommunication network under governmental control. In addition, since China 
Telecom drove most of the growth, Mil was keen on maintaining a strict protection ring 
around the incumbent.
Mix o f IPOs and bonds - 1997-2004
After 1997, as fewer and fewer government policies directly supported the industry, 
operators turned to the Hong Kong and New York capital markets413. They proceeded by 
spinning-off provincial networks and grouping them under a newly created company (e.g. 
China Mobile or China Netcom) thus preparing for listing the entity overseas at a later
409 Anonymous (1997).
410 Jussawalla (1997: 48).
411 With the help of CCF, China Unicom was able to build up its nationwide GSM system in less than three 
years. By the end of 1997 it had signed 23 GSM projects with foreign companies and raised RMB 11.85 
billion (72% of total investment in the projects).
412 Macintosh attributes the divergence of views on CCF between MOFTEC and Mil to ideological 
divisions within the Chinese bureaucracy (2003: 266).
413 Only China Unicom has listed on the domestic market in 2002 (see Table 14).
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stage414. At first, all the financing happened through Initial Public Offerings (shouci 
gongkai faxing or IPOs). The country's four major operators have so far raised USD 25.2 
billion in the international market and RMB 34.5 billion (USD 4.2 billion) in the domestic 
market415 (see Table 14).
Table 14: IPOs by China's telecommunication operators, 1997-2004
Company Date Amount
(billion)
Comment
China
Mobile 1997-10 USD 4.20
Listing on HKSE and NYSE of Guangdong and Zhejiang 
networks. 24.3% publicly held
China
Unicom 2000-06 USD 4.92 Listing on HKSE and NYSE. 22.53% publicly held
China
Unicom 2002-09 RMB 11.5 Listing on SSE; 39.5% stake in China Unicom (HK)
China
Telecom 2002-11 USD 1.43
Listing on HKSE and NYSE of 4 provincial networks (Shanghai, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang). 20% publicly held
China
Netcom 2004-11 USD 1.13
Listing on HKSE and NYSE of Shanghai, Guangdong, Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Henan and Liaoning. 27.7% publicly 
held
China
Tietong 2005 RMB 2.00 Listing on SSE (A shares) postponed
Note: SSE=Shanghai Stock Exchange; HKSE=Hong Kong Stock Exchange; NYSE=New York Stock 
Exchange.
Source: Compiled by author from Factiva.
Stock financing was also preferred over bond issuing. Corporate bonds have a relative 
short period of development in China (see Table 15). In addition, the Chinese government 
exercises strict control over bonds issuing, due to the widely recognised lack of bond 
evaluating agencies, and the credit of many enterprises' bonds is thus low416. The result 
has been a limited usage of bond financing417. Nevertheless, in the current financial 
structure of China Telecom or China Unicom, equity is very small (i.e. there is a lot of 
debt). In the future, interest rates might increase and there might be a convertibility (zai 
zuan gu) of debt into equity418.
414 Interview (B-007), conducted in Beijing, 31 August 2001.
415 Business Daily Update (2004). This includes IPOs as well as further network listings.
416 Wu and Zhu (2003: 142).
417 Before 1999, “Regulations on the Management of Enterprise Bonds”, which came into effect in 1993, 
were jointly administered by SDPC and PBOC (the latter was the lead regulator in practice). In 1999, the 
regulations were suspended; thereafter, new issue applications were approved by the State Council on a 
case-by-case basis through the SDPC. CSRC’ role on the corporate bonds market is limited: it only 
examines and approves bond-listing applications. While 17 enterprises were allowed to issue bonds in 1999, 
the numbers of corporate bonds issued dropped to 6 in both 2000 and 2001 (Kim, Ho et al., 2003: 33).
418 Interview (B-025), conducted in Beijing, 10 October 2001.
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Table 15: Bond issues by China's telecommunication operators, 1997-2004
Issuers Date Amount Comment 
__________________ (billion)___________
China
Telecom 1999-10
USD
0.6419
5-year bond. To finance the purchase of 3 provincial mobile networks 
from its parent company (Fujian, Henan and Hainan).
China
Mobile 2000-10
USD
0.69
2.25% convertible notes due 2005. Listing on the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange
China
Mobile 2001-06
RMB
5.0420
10-year floating rate corporate bond (paying a 1.75% interest). RMB 
4.57 billion o f the bonds sold eligible for trading on the Shanghai 
exchange. Via Guangdong Mobile. Used to refinance a portion of a 
bank loan due June 2001. China Mobile (HK) borrowed RMB 12.5 
billion from 8 domestic banks in October 2000 to finance its acquisition 
of 7 provincial mobile networks from its parent China Mobile.
China
Mobile 2002-11
RMB
8.0
RMB 3 billion in 5-year debt (paying a 3.5% coupon) and RMB 5 
billion in 15-year securities (with a 4.5% coupon). Via Guangdong 
Mobile. Purchase of 8 networks from its state-owned parent
China
Netcom 2003-12
RMB
5.0
RMB 4 billion of 10-year fixed-interest bonds and RMB 1 billion of 
floating-interest bonds, guaranteed by China Construction Bank. Funds 
used to improve inter-provincial networks, expand intra-provincial 
networks and build local networks.
China 
Unicom* 2005
RMB
10.0
Corporate bond to fund CDMA network expansion and improve 
performance and pay off existing obligations
China
Railcom* 2005-08
RMB
1.0
Fund new network construction and upgrades
Note: *Italics indicate a tentative issue. Bond issues need the approval of the NDRC, CSRC and Central 
Bank. In 2002, the total amount of outstanding corporate bonds was RMB 133 billion in China, accounting 
for 1.3% of the country's GDP, while the total market capitalisation of China-listed companies accounted 
for about 45% of GDP. In 2002, RMB 27 billion were approved by China’s NDRC. In 2002, the Chinese 
government sold around RMB 600 billion in bonds. In 1999, the telecommunication sector was slated to 
receive a total of RMB 1.2 billion from the RMB 100 billion new Treasury bond issue by the government to 
boost infrastructure spending.
Source: Compiled from Factiva (as of January 30,2004).
There is a rich vein of research in the telecommunications literature built around the 
concept of ‘sustainable development,’ essentially suggesting that as the network expands, 
average costs fall and subscriber utility rises until a critical mass is reached when, in 
principle, the network can become self-financing. What is remarkable is the timing of 
Chinese policymakers to switch between various means of funding. By diversifying the 
sources, the government has managed to maintain high levels of investments in the sector 
and achieve aggressive growth targets.
419 First dollar debt issued by a Chinese telecommunication operator. The bond, rated Baa2 by Moody's 
Investors Service and BBB by Standard and Poor's Corp, was launched concurrently with a HKD 13.51 
billion equity offering to finance the company's expansion in mainland China.
420 By selling a RMB-denominated debt through its subsidiary Guangdong Mobile Communications Corp., 
China Mobile was able to take advantage of the RMB market's flush liquidity and low interest rates (a long­
term bond in the U.S. market would have cost the highest-rated issuers over 6.0%).
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Concluding remarks
Scholars have identified a number of drivers behind China’s telecommunication reforms. 
Tan argues that the phenomenal growth of user demand for telecommunications appears 
to be the major driving force behind the reform process421. For Zhang, the regulatory 
struggles and political quarrels pushed China’s government to streamline its telecom 
policy and regulatory institution422. Others saw the need to support China’s economic 
growth with a vastly improved IT infrastructure and the dependence and exposure to 
international capital markets as converging pressures423. In a number of countries, moves 
to deregulate occurred after macro-economic shocks, because of excess capacity or 
because of technical progress and market growth allowing smaller entrants to compete 
with the incumbent. While the origin of liberalisation in the United States can be 
attributed to the imbalance between long-distance and local tariffs424, the source of 
China’s telecommunication reforms are linked to the pressure of rivalling Ministries to 
bring their private networks into the public realm, to state-owned companies demand to 
reduce prices and to the central government’s desire to initiate competition. China’s 
central planners played a pivotal role in introducing a variety of innovative measures to 
jump-start the diffusion of telecommunication. By carefully balancing decentralisation 
measures and modifying over time the sources of funding, they managed to continuously 
exceed growth targets. As noted by Newbery, the challenge facing telecommunication 
regulators and governments in countries where telecommunication is still under public 
ownership is to manage the transition to high-capacity, low-priced telecommunication 
networks without unduly delaying network rollout and the introduction of new services, 
and without transferring too much of the rent to telecommunication operators425. The 
Chinese government has managed to boost the telecommunication sector through 
preferential policies, not only from a macroeconomic point of view, but also through the 
implementation of sector-specific regulatory policies426. The second, and probably most 
crucial point is that the highest levels of government maintained their support. Whenever 
the State Council felt that the reforms were becoming bogged down, it introduced a new 
set of policies encouraging investment. The next chapter describes China’s idiosyncratic 
telecommunication liberalisation programme in more details.
421 Tan (1994: 181) and Loo (2004: 698).
422 Zhang (2000: 12).
423 DeWoskin (2001).
424 Newbery (1999: 154).
425 Newbery (1999: 293).
426 OECD (2003b: 58).
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4 Liberalisation through quasi-competition and corporatisation
“China’s journey toward liberalisation has in recent history taken an evolutionary pace, rather 
than the revolutionary one many observers had hoped for".
(Wang, 1999b: 9-10)
The second half of the 1980s saw telecommunications policy across the world enter an 
era of neo-liberal reform427. In developed countries, the main proponents of liberalisation 
are said to have been large business users seeking lower rates and more specialised 
services, as well as manufacturers looking for economies of scale428. As free trade 
principles gained ground, and despite the variety of institutional settings and uneven 
levels of development, most countries embarked on a programme of telecommunications 
liberalisation, undergoing in the process profound institutional changes 429.
As globalisation of regulation made it hard to resist the push to telecommunication 
liberalisation, for some countries the only choice often was (and is) how best to achieve 
the transition to a market access model430. That said, the case for liberalisation is not as 
clear-cut as claimed by its advocates. First, while studies indicate that it improves 
performance, different country samples and estimation techniques have led to differing 
conclusions about the effects of specific policies. Second, the sequencing of liberalisation 
matters, as regulatory agencies are still heavily involved in the pursuit of more general 
socio-economic goals, such as the expansion of basic services, the building of a national 
infrastructure, or the control of the industry “in the national interest”431. In fact, a key 
explanatory variable of liberalisation outcome is the status of the domestic economy at 
the moment of privatisation and how investors assessed market prospects in each 
country432. It is also important to note that liberalisation of telecommunications does not 
automatically lead to deregulation433. To the contrary, most countries engaged in 
liberalisation commonly experienced a need for increased regulation for which there is a
427 In the early 1980s, the dominant institutional arrangement began moving from state-owned monopolies 
towards a privatised and at least partially competitive industry subject to looser public control (Noll, 1999b: 
1).
428 Comor (1998: 132) and Simpson and Wilkinson (2001: 11).
429 Cho (1998: 3).
430 The market access model requires regulatory complementarities, competition policy being amongst the 
most important (Hufbauer and Wada, 1997: 3; Joseph and Drahos, 1998: 101-102; Wang, 2003: 273).
431 Petrazzini (1997: 333-337).
432 Fink, Mattoo et al (2003: 444), Saga (1999: 338) and Petrazzini (1995: 7).
433 Deregulation is defines as the loosening of restrictions on the entry or exit from a market and on the 
setting of prices (Rubsamen, 1989: 105). It must be distinguished from re-regulation to the extent that 
deregulation applies to the (quantitative) dismantling o f regulatory barriers and hurdles while regulation 
pertains to the re-formulation of existing and the creation of new rules to facilitate the transformation from 
monopoly to competition (Vogel, 1996: 3).
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price to be paid by both the public sector and those companies being regulated434. This 
increased demand for regulatory intervention can stretch regulatory resources in 
developing countries to their limits. Policies to liberalise have also to contend with 
existing cultures, traditions and laws and cannot be transplanted from one country to 
another435. In short, there is not one model of liberalisation and the shared goal of 
deregulation can often be reached at different rates by different routes (or “policy paths”) 
dependent on situational contingencies. However, there is little doubt that the trend 
towards liberalisation exerts a strong influence on the actions and attitudes adopted in 
different nations436.
China is no exception to the worldwide liberalisation trend. Like in many other countries 
the introduction of competition initiated China’s liberalisation process. But, as we will 
see, its domestic institutional setting mediated the outcome. While China embarked on the 
liberalisation path roughly around the same time as many other countries, its response to 
the liberalisation trend has been extremely conservative, and in a sense slow and shallow. 
For example, much of the reorganisation brought about by the 1993 reforms has been 
described as “elaborate shadow boxing for the benefit of international financial 
organisations desiring liberalisation of the telecommunication sector”437. Moreover, the 
government refrained from adopting an ambitious privatisation programme, preferring 
instead to maintain a majority-control of its operators, despite listing on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (HKSE) or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
This chapter will argue that liberalisation not only responded to, but also more 
importantly was driven first and foremost by domestic pressures. It describes how 
China’s model of telecommunication liberalisation came to conform only partially to 
models found in other regions of the world, either developed or developing. It argues that 
the institutional setting mediated not only the outcome of the liberalisation programme, 
but also its design. The first section examines the development of competition and looks 
at how domestic institutions determined its nature and extent. The second section looks at 
China’s model of privatisation through the process of corporatisation and public 
offerings, presenting evidence that the State has shown no intention to relax control on 
basic telecommunication services. The last section puts China’s model of
434 Gillick (1992: 729) and Pisciotta (1997: 339).
435 Jussawalla (1995).
436 Xu and Pitt (1999) and Zhao (2002: 293).
437 Rimmer and Comtois (2002: 108).
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telecommunication liberalisation in a broader context by comparing it to the electricity 
sector. By doing so it highlights the particularity of the liberalisation path within China’s 
reform of public utilities, as well as the idiosyncrasy of the telecommunication sector.
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Did you say competition?
“Ifyou look at a country of the size of China, you can easily foster four to six operators without 
any issues whatsoever of being profitable. ”
(Interview (B-007), conducted in Beijing, 31 August 2001)
“Right now China is trying to develop fair competition, not free competition. ”
(Interview (C-018), conducted in Beijing, 30 August 2002)
As in many parts of the world, the Chinese telecommunication services sector operated 
for a long time under a monopoly regime . As can be expected, politically powerful 
operators sought to slow down the ability of new entrants to reach customers on 
competitive terms and stood in the way of necessary regulatory reform439. The 
monopolistic structure was nonetheless significantly knocked down by factions within the 
government pushing for the break-up of China Telecom, by the actual break-up that 
ensued and by the fragmentation of the telecommunications market in which new kinds of 
services and products became available to consumers. In the last couple of years the 
determination to foster more domestic competition has been apparent and numerous steps 
have been taken in that direction. But while the monopoly of China Telecom is over, the 
state is certainly not exiting telecommunication service by any means. This section traces 
the history of competition, its impact and some of the issues faced by the government 
during the various round of reforms. Finally, it highlights the strong institutional 
component that crafted China’s competitive environment.
China’s attempt at managed competition
Telecommunication is a field in which the business consumers of telecommunication 
services have been important agents of change440. Like elsewhere, the push for 
competition originated outside of China’s Ministry of Post and Telecommunication 
(MPT). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) played an important role in the promotion of 
competition, albeit indirectly and through their parent-Ministries: as they grew unhappy 
with the quality and cost of services provided by MPT, other Ministries started to develop 
private communication networks for their own use441. The realisation that those networks
438 The assumption underpinning state regulation at both national and international levels was that the 
technology that lies at the heart of the means of communication represented a natural monopoly (Wilkin, 
2001:27).
439 Esserman (2000: 4).
440 Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 341).
441 Tan (1994: 176). In addition to the networks traditionally run by the Ministry of Railways and the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
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could be used to generate interesting revenues prompted them to lobby for the 
introduction of competition.
The earliest attempts at competition took place in non-basic services that did not have 
high network dependence in the late 1980s442. Beginning in 1993, value-added services 
(VAS), radio-based mobile communications and satellite telecommunications were 
opened to non-MPT actors443 and, while the opening of VAS served as a test bed, it did 
not take long until domestic actors called for an extension to basic services.
The introduction of competition in basic services dates back to the creation of Jitong and 
Liantong (China Unicom) in 1994. Organized under the Ministry of Electronic Industries 
(MEI), Jitong’s shareholders came from a multitude of state-owned enterprises and 
research institutes. Several ministries were involved along with the State Council’s 
investment arm, China International Trust and Investment Corporation (OTIC). Jitong’s 
approved business scope included communications research and product development, 
the building of local trunked radio, paging, cellular networks, and the provision of public 
data and value-added network services throughout China444. Compared to Jitong, China 
Unicom was bigger in size and licensed to provide two key basic services: mobile and 
fixed line telephone services. Integrating several domestic non-public networks, the 
company was initially seen as a serious competitor to the incumbent China Telecom. Its 
creation came at the same time as the effort to change “one country, many networks” into 
“one country, one unified network”445. Strong factions within the government, and 
especially within the then Ministry of Post and Telecommunication (MPT) nevertheless 
resisted the attempt to break the monopoly through various means. For example, China 
Unicom had to obtain approval from MPT before it could formally launch service in a 
specific city even though its licence entitled provision of all kinds of telecommunications 
services nationwide446. It was also required to support the full financial burden of 
constructing gateways with the incumbent to achieve interconnection. Thus, despite 
continuous support from the State Council and a certain margin of manoeuvre within the
442 Those operations were actually illegal until the issuing of the Decree No. 55 by the State Council in 
1993 (Gao and Lyytinen, 2000: 726).
443 Lovelock and Ure (2000: 26). By mid-1995, licences had been issued to 2,200 operators including: 1,871 
for radio paging service§;l 16 for 800MHz trunk phone services;82 for 450MHz mobile services.;15 for 
Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) services; 16 for value-added services. At its peak, the wireless 
paging market counted more than 2’900 providers serving up to 25 million subscribers. Paging services 
have declined since the end of 2000, due to the rapid increase in wireless telephone services.
444 Ure (1994b: 182).
445 Chang (1994: 209).
446 Guan (2002: 4).
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tightly controlled telecommunication sector, China Unicom was unable to achieve 
economies of scale in its mobile communications system and did not succeed at grabbing 
any significant market share for many years.
By the end of 1997, competition had been created but it had come into being mainly by 
administrative fiat from the senior political leadership in Beijing. Leading groups and 
super-coordinating structures either became bargaining areas or else committees in which 
the MPT and its rivals struggled over control of the agenda. The situation started to 
change after the creation of Mil447. In February 1999, the Chinese government made the 
decision to split the monopolistic China Telecom into four parts: fixed-line telephone 
services, mobile telecommunications, paging services and satellite communications. Two 
new companies emerged from the split, China Mobile and China Satellite. The paging 
service sector, Guoxing Paging Service Group, was merged into China Unicom. Through 
this reorganisation, Mil openly promoted the policy of “breaking up the monopoly and 
introducing competition” (pochu longduan, yinru jingzheng)44*. Subsequently, two 
operators were established, China Network Communications Corporations (China 
Netcom) in 1999449 and China Railway Telecommunications Corporation (China 
Railcom450) in 2000. The second round of competitive restructuring was plagued by one 
major shortcoming: breaking up by type of services still protected the incumbent’s 
dominant position as it did not end China Telecom’s monopoly over local networks451. 
The latest and probably most important step in establishing competition was the split of 
China Telecom into two carriers towards the end of 2001452. The network of 10 northern 
provincial regions was taken over by China Netcom while the remaining 21 southern 
provincial regions were retained by the “new” China Telecom. Currently, there are 6 
companies in China licensed to provide basic telecommunications services, often referred 
to as 4+2, i.e. 4 main operators -  China Telecom Group, China Netcom, China Unicom 
and China Mobile -  and two smaller operators -  China Tietong and China Satellite (see 
Table 16).
447 To some, the main reason to merge the MPT and MEI into Mil in 1998 was to spearhead competition 
(Interview (B-007), conducted in Beijing, 31 August 2001).
448 Lu (2002b: 11).
449 Backed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the State Administration of Radio, Film & Television, the 
Ministry of Railway and the Shanghai Municipal Government.
450 In August 2004, China Railcom was renamed China Tietong.
451 Guan (2002: 7) and Interview (B-009), conducted in Beijing, 4 September 2001
452 The break-up of China Telecom into a northern and southern unit illustrates well China’s policy-making 
intricacies. In order to take place, consensus needed to take place among a number of policy-makers -  
SDPC and the Office for Restructuring Economic Systems. In the meantime, China Telecom had to 
postpone its network construction plans, dismaying foreign and Chinese equipment makers.
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Table 16: Market structure and level of competition (as of December 2003)
Market ChinaTelecom
China
Netcom
China
Unicom
China
Mobile
China
Tietong Level of competition
Local X X X X Partial competition
Domestic LD X X X X Partial competition
International LD X X X Partial competition
VoIP X X X X Competition
Mobile X X Partial competition
Internet access X X X X Competition
Paging X Competition
Cable Telephony Numerous provincial and local operators Local monopoly
Source: Adapted from ITU.
Evaluation o f the years o f managed competition
Despite not having yet succeeded at achieving a fair competitive environment, the effect 
of additional operators has been manifest in several ways. First, and despite China 
Unicorn’s early difficulties at seizing an important market share, the entry of a second 
carrier into the market dramatically improved the rate of network deployment. The 
average growth rate for fixed and mobile services between 1993 and 2003 were 
respectively 31.75% and 86.06% (see Figure 10)453. Second, after the major re­
organisation of 1999 and despite guidelines issued by various government bodies, prices 
in various segments dropped significantly in the fixed market (see Table 17)454. Likewise, 
competition has driven provincial mobile operators to offer schemes that actually reduce 
prices drastically455. Some have argued that the reduction of fees since 1999 can be 
assumed to be the result of governmental decision rather than that of competition among 
businesses456. This is only correct to a certain extent. A cutthroat price war between 
China Mobile and China Unicom has forced Mil to repeatedly intervene since 2001. 
Moreover, price competition and its effect on reducing prices is evident with services, 
such as IP telephony, where the government does not control pricing. The government 
has indicated its wish to leave price setting to operators although it continues to set basic 
telecommunication charges, including monthly fees and mobile calling charges. In 
practice, however, provincial operators enjoy a large freedom to depart from the fixed 
tariffs.
453 By comparison in 1990 the network growth rate was 25.7%.
454 Interview (B-011), conducted in Beijing, 6 September 2001.
455 To circumvent the guidelines, most competition in pricing takes place through packaging mechanisms, 
which are not subject to the constraints of the established price ranges.
456 OECD (2003b: 66).
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Figure 10: Subscribers and growth rates in the competition era, 1994-2004
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Table 17: Price reduction in selected markets, 1999-2001
Price (in RMB)
1999 June 2001
Fixed (LAN) line installation (analog) 725 Free
Domestic leased lines (digital) (per month)
For telecommunications services 9,000 3,000
For Internet services 4,500 2,000
International Leased lines (per month)
HK, Macao and Taiwan 27,400 2,800
Other Asia 28,900 14,000
Other 30,800 15,000
Domestic long distance fee (per minute) 0.5-1.00 0.7 (flat fee)
Mobile network access fee 500 Free
Source: Adapted from Pangestu and Mrongowius (2002: 22).
Third, the quality and breadth o f services improved. In fact, the disadvantages o f the 
monopolistic system were neither the pace o f development, nor uncompetitive pricing but 
the low quality o f services provided by the incumbent457. Fourth, competition between 
China Unicom and China Telecom resulted in the adoption o f more advanced 
technology458. In turn, the introduction o f new technologies (e.g. VoIP telephony) also 
had an effect on prices. For example, when a cable operator started offering some sort o f
457 Interview (B-038), conducted in Beijing, 25 November 2003.
458 Before China Unicom entered the mobile communication market with advanced digital Global System 
for Mobile (GSM) in 1995, China Telecom was still using the analog Total Access Communication System 
(TACS) that it had adopted in 1987, even though GSM had become available as early as 1991 (Guan, 2002: 
5).
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data services, the tariffs for ADSL immediately came down tremendously and ADSL was 
promoted much more aggressively459.
However, a number of important issues still loom over the development of the 
telecommunication market environment. First, in spite of a major restructuring in May 
2002, the overall level of competition in the fixed-line market remains weak. Market 
shares of China Telecom and China Netcom in their respective markets are well above 
80% and newcomers such as China Tietong (ex- China Railcom) and China Satellite, are 
at best marginal players460. Unless each regional company has the means to compete in 
the other company’s geographic territory, the situation will hardly change. In mobile 
services, the situation looks somewhat different. The market share of the incumbent has 
continuously declined over time, but China Unicom still struggles to capture market share 
from the behemoth China Mobile (see Table 18). Moreover, the improvement in 
competitiveness has in part been attributed to preferential policies (e.g. China Unicom can 
charge 10% less than China Mobile) and massive state support.
Table 18: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for Chinese mobile operators, 1994-2004461
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004F
Market share (%)
China Mobile 100.00% 94.50% 92.70% 92.45% 93.70% 87.95% 77.84% 71.70% 67.00% 65.70%64.80%
China Unicom 0.00% 5.50% 7.30% 7.55% 6.30% 12.15%22.16%28.30%33.00%34.30%35.20%
China Telecom 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
China Netcom 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0-00%
HHI______________ 1 0.8961 0.8647 0.8604 0.8819 0.7883 0.6550 0.5942 0.5578 0.5493 0.5440
Source: Deutsche Bank (2003).
Ultimately, for a telecommunication market to enjoy meaningful competition, players 
need to be of relatively equal size462. Conscious of the difficulty to establish a balance of 
forces, government rumours aired various plans to merge the operators into two entities 
and divide the assets more or less equally. Second, achieving fair competition is highly 
dependent on interconnection regulation. In network industries such as 
telecommunications, it is not simply enough to introduce competition through licensing. 
Even at the point of introducing competition a number of related actions are necessary,
459 Interview (B-008), conducted in Beijing, 3 September 2001.
460 In terms of lines in service China Telecom and China Netcom have retained 98-99% market share in 
their respective service regions. After struggling to reach 2-3% of market share in the fixed-line segment, 
China Tietong is shifting its strategy to trunk telecommunications.
461 HHI = (share l)2 + (share 2 )2+ . . . + (share n) 2. In the context of telecommunications, the analysis must 
always move beyond HHIs and towards the evaluation of the elasticities of supply and demand and, in 
particular, the presence (or lack) of barriers to entry (Naftel and Spivak, 2000: 76). The Landes-Posner 
index offers such a measure.
462 Interview (B-013), conducted in Beijing, 7 September 2001.
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especially with regard to interconnection and access to scarce resources such as 
frequencies, numbers and rights of way463. Third, the number of facilities-based 
competitors is restricted in China, and though this is expected to change because of 
China’s WTO accession commitments, it is not yet clear what form changes will take464. 
Unbundling is likely to be particularly attractive when market size and density permit 
many operators to function, providing both active and potential competition465. A factor 
required for unbundling is a mature, well-developed set of network facilities, so that there 
is little need for new investments where incentive problems are more likely466. Fourth, 
“lack of competition” has been replaced by “malign competition” and abusive practice. 
As China's biggest telecommunication companies are state-owned enterprises, managers 
are motivated by market shares and sales performance. Instead of focusing on profit they 
had to use simple pricing strategies offering endless discounts to gain customers467. Fifth, 
one of the fundamental shortcomings of the competition policy articulated by the 
government is the omission of convergence468. An extensive cable network reaches more 
than 100 million household. It is, however, controlled by SARFT and the rivalry inherent 
to the system, which often pitches Ministries and Administrations against each other, has 
not yet disappeared469. The transfer of the vast majority of telecommunication assets to 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is one 
step towards the reduction of Ministerial involvement but it has done little to lessen inter- 
Ministerial rivalry between the cable and telecommunication sector. Sixth, the plan to 
grant comprehensive licences (i.e. for multiple services) is problematic. Having four 
national telecommunication operators, all majority-owned by the state and funded by 
taxpayers’ money, will increase competition but only at the cost of enormous
470investments .
463 Samarajiva (2000b: 712).
464 Facilities-based telecommunications competition can prosper in many different regulatory environments, 
often bringing startling gains (Spiller and Cardilli, 1997: 137). See also Willner (2002: 47).
465 The primary virtue of unbundling is that it promotes competition, ensuring that firms provide their 
services at efficient prices.
466 Kessides (2004: 5).
467 Interview (B-038), conducted in Beijing, 25 November 2003.
468 Following China’s accession to WTO, the State Council looked into setting up an organisation to 
oversee reforms in the country’s key telecommunication and broadcasting sectors in an attempt to end 
protracted turf wars that have hampered development in both areas. Early matters for discussion included 
the restructuring of China Telecom and the convergence of telecom services and television broadcasting, 
areas traditionally monitored by separate regulatory bodies. The proposed body was intended to have 
authority over the individual ministries, which are often more concerned with protecting companies in the 
sectors that they oversee than with promoting the overall development of the industry. The proposed 
organisation failed to materialise after several years of discussions.
469 In the past, China Unicom was under control of MEI while China Telecom was run by Mil. Today, 
competition in China still suffers from governmental rivalries, e.g. between SARFT and MIL
470 The prospect of having to duplicate investments has been at the core of the proposal to merge the current 
operators into two “super-companies”.
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Why competition has failed...for now!
It is important to remember that the presence of network externalities makes perfect 
competition difficult to attain471. Nevertheless, several factors specific to China explain 
the failure of achieving competition in the telecommunication sector. Feigenbaum places 
MPT at the centre of his analysis: as China entered the 1990s, MPT retained an elaborate 
system of institutes and factories from which it sourced its own equipment and designs, 
performing little, if any, collaborative research with MEI, the military, or others. As its 
monopoly came under assault in the mid-1990s, MPT sought to protect its position of 
strength while its competitors mostly shunned cooperation. Instead, they adopted a 
strategy of monopoly breaking that politicised China's telecommunication industry over 
the course of the 1990s. Thus, the process became caught in a cycle of bureaucratic 
competition and politicisation472.
State control is a hurdle to the further development of competition in the sector. As firms 
remain partly funded by the government and do not usually need to worry too much about 
the sentiment of the stock market, and/or the investment return of private investors, there 
are limited incentives for them to push through efficiency improvements or to compete 
with one another in the market. Instead, the temptation will be to compete for preferential 
policies. Faced with the conflicting goals of introducing competition and avoiding the 
waste of resources, the State Council was unable to exert much influence over the MPT 
and for that matter over its successor MIL Finally, the weak regulatory framework 
prevented the new operators from challenging the incumbent’s uncompetitive behaviour 
legally.
Competitive policy as a potential solution to the problem?
In most countries or country groups, competition policy in the telecommunications sector 
comprises two policy regimes -  antitrust and regulation -  both of which in turn interact 
with international negotiations aimed at the liberalisation of markets in the field. The 
typical policy configuration in telecommunications at the national/regional level is a dual 
regime consisting of sector-specific regulation and enforcement of antitrust rules, which 
apply to other sectors as well, or in other words, of telecommunications regulations and a
471 Naftel and Spivak (2000: 89).
472 Feigenbaum (2003: 210-213). At the time of the creation o f Liantong and Jitong, the central government 
had given MPT a regulatory role, since a truly autonomous regulatory structure had yet to be created.
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competition law473. Two Chinese regulations contain elements of a standard competition 
policy -  the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of 1993 and the Telecommunication 
Regulation of 2000474. While the former outlaws business conduct regarded as unfair 
competition, such as misrepresentation, imitation of trademarks, blocking of access for 
non-local companies, bribery, or stealing of business secrets, it reads more like a 
consumer protection regulation than a standard competition law and targets mainly the 
private sector, rather than problems of monopolistic conduct by administrative 
departments and local governments. The latter is the first and so far the only law in China 
to set up a framework for the division of responsibility between the state regulatory body, 
the State Government, and possible private operators. However, the current legal 
framework governing competition remains fragmented and over-simplistic and, as a 
result, general legal requirements directed at preventing “illegal competition” have not 
played a substantial role in the telecommunications sector475. In fact, China’s model of 
regulation relies mostly on regulation-for-competition476.
External factors
The analysis of competition would not be complete without making reference to external 
factors. Since the second part of the 1990s, Chinese policy-makers have worked hard to 
enable the sector to adapt to the opening of the global telecommunication market and 
pave the way for China's integration in the global economy477. As noted by Langdale, the 
nature of competition that emerges in domestic and international telecommunications 
strongly influences the countries that end up as “winners” and “losers” in international 
trade in information equipment and services478, both sectors deemed as “strategic” by the 
Chinese leadership479. The telecommunication equipment market, where both domestic 
and international companies compete fiercely, attests of this. Second, and as discussed in 
Chapter 6, the government carefully “prepared” the services market for the post-WTO
473 Koopmann (2001: 5-6) and ITU (2002: 10).
474 Before 2000 China did not have any significant policy or regulations dealing with competition or market 
entry. To some extent it is fair because before 1999, there was not truly any real competition in China’s 
telecommunication industry although by then there were two operators (Interview (B-006), conducted in 
Beijing, 30 August 2001). In addition, the first Anti-Monopoly Law is in drafting since May 2001 (Wei, 
2001:40).
475 Willner (2002: 49) and Asia Development Bank (2003: 188-189).
476 Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004: 6-7) identify five notions to define the relations between competition and 
regulation: deregulation, re-regulation, regulation-of-competition, regulation-for-competition and meta­
regulation.
477 OECD (2003b: 60).
478 Langdale (1982: 283).
479 The Chinese leadership has not simply thought of the telecommunication industry as a source of 
government revenue, but more of a crucial infrastructure for sustaining China's economic development 
(Yang, 2001: 65).
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era. There was little doubt that a number of comprehensive domestic service providers 
would be allowed at some point to enter each other’s markets and compete effectively. 
But the restructuring efforts would have been useless if the domestic companies had not 
developed enough competitiveness once the country eventually opened its basic service 
market to foreign competitors. In fact, Mil believed that the market liberalisation forced 
by China's WTO membership would bring more disadvantages and risks than benefits. 
Moreover, it feared that the monopoly it enjoyed would be sacrificed as a “pawn” during 
China’s accession to the WTO480. Thus, while the WTO accession could have been used 
as a means for the reform-minded leadership to force competition onto the market, Mil’s 
resistance succeeded in postponing market access, making the threat serious only after 
2005, and by the same time, relieved domestic companies from immediate competitive 
pressures. In other words, encouraging competition while preventing damaging the 
overall health of the industry over competition figured high on the policy-maker’s 
agenda481.
Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has come under considerable pressure to 
break the monopoly in basic telecommunication service, but the transition to a 
competitive market has proved much harder than what was initially hoped for. Growing 
expectations from telephone users, both in terms of quality and breadth of services, 
coupled with increasing critics and complaints482, participated in pushing for an end to the 
monopoly policy, while competing ministries were anxious to participate in the profitable 
telecommunication market. A number of institutional features, such as the absence of a 
telecommunication and competition law, as well as rivalling factions delayed the 
introduction of real competition and thus reduced its benefits. The sheer size and power 
of the incumbent also prevented any significant dent into the monopoly until the 
engineered division of China Telecom created in 2001 a Southern and Northern company. 
Finally external pressures, such as lending agencies or even China’s accession to the 
WTO have had little impact on the introduction of competition, which, in absence of 
foreign operators, remains mostly driven from within.
480 Fan (1999) and Pangestu and Mrongowius (2002: 4).
481 Interview (B-029), conducted in Beijing, 12 October 2001.
482 Interview (B-038), conducted in Beijing, 25 November 2003.
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The Chinese model of privatisation: corporatisation and IPOs
“Restructure, regulate, and only then privatise. ”
(Kessides, 2004: 11)
Many studies have shown that the beneficial effect of competition primarily occurs 
through its interaction with privatisation. This section looks at China’s model of 
privatisation. As noted, since the mid-1990s China’s telecommunication sector has 
undergone a series of reforms that have profoundly transformed the industry’s landscape. 
But the depth and breadth of reforms is by no means uniform. While telecommunication 
manufacturing has been open to competition and foreign investment, there has been slow 
progress in the liberalisation of service operations. Despite a number of restructuring 
efforts, competition in fixed-line and mobile remains sporadic. Large initial public 
offerings (IPOs) on the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges have left ownership, 
and more importantly management, first in the hands of rival ministries and government- 
appointed executives. On the one hand, China’s reluctance to privatise its 
telecommunications sector could come as a surprise. Trade sale privatisation, or the 
transfer of equity to another firm or group of (corporate) investors, continues to be the 
main transaction strategy in developing economies and many countries have privatised 
the national telecommunication operator early on in their reform programs as part of an 
effort to improve efficiency . Privatisation programmes have also provided substantial 
financial windfalls to cash-strapped governments while shifting the burden of network 
development to the private sector. On the other hand, many public utilities in China, such 
as water and railways, remain under government or quasi-government control. Also, the 
fact that telecommunication services generate large and continuous revenue streams 
reduces the incentives for sale484. Finally, control of communications networks and 
services has always been viewed by senior officials as an essential component of national 
security and, indeed, China’s sovereignty485. Privatisation, or at least the injection of 
private capital, is thus an increasingly important issue as reforms of the 
telecommunication sector continue and the PRC government copes with the conflicting 
goals of sovereignty and development.
483 Welch and Molz (2002: 4). Between 1990 and 1998, the proceeds of telecommunication infrastructure 
privatisation in developing and transition economies amounted to USD 70,579 million. The number of 
transaction was 125, i.e. an average of USD 564 million per transaction, compared with USD 195 million 
for electricity and power and USD 133 million for railways (Wallsten, Clarke et al., 2004: 11).
484 China Mobile and China Telecom net profit for 2003 respectively amount to RMB 35.5 billion and RMB 
24.69 billion (Xinhua, 2004a).
485 As pointed out by Noll (1999b: 8) an important barrier to liberalisation in all developing countries is the 
view that privatisation amounts to loss of sovereignty. See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on 
sovereignty.
117
The privatisation o f telecommunication486
The World Bank estimates that private investment in telecommunication in developing 
and transitional economies between 1990 and 2001 amounted to USD 331.5 billion487. 
Since 1988 over USD 70 billion has been raised by the privatisation of public 
telecommunication operators (PTOs) in developing countries, of which 14%, nearly USD 
10 billion, has come from East Asia and the Pacific region488. Several reasons explain the 
privatisation trend in developing countries. Privatisation became a popular policy as the 
limited capacity of government-owned companies to provide reliable telecommunication 
services on a national scale was recognised. It was partly driven by government under- 
funding and the problem of an uncompetitive natural monopoly in the sector489. In 
developing countries, private sector investment -  through privatisation of the national 
carrier or other forms of private sector involvement -  has often been the only solution as 
governments have struggled with fiscal and debt crisis490. A frequent privatisation method 
consists in the issuance of stock in a new telecommunication entity formed from the 
former government telecommunication agency491. In most countries, however, the sale of 
equity to private investors has not involved the complete loss of control by the state since 
it usually maintains the largest single share of the PTO’s share capital492.
Despite the resistance of many governments to fully privatise their PTOs, numerous 
studies have shown the benefits of such a policy. Increased participation of private capital 
facilitates a more rapid increase in network penetration493. In fact, privatisation, with the 
right institutional conditions, can lead to substantial improvements in performance494. It 
also allows a net inflow of capital from abroad while shielding the firms from political
486 Privatisation is defined as the sale of at least 50% of the assets to the private sector but it can take other 
forms such as partial privatisation (the sale of less than 50% of assets), the transfer of assets to the private 
sector under a leasing arrangement, or the introduction of management contracting arrangements (Ros and 
Baneijee, 2000: 234).
487 Kessides (2004: 11).
488 Ure (2004). By the end of 1999 more than half of Asian and Latin American countries and one-third of 
African countries had privatised their telecommunications providers (Wallsten, 2000: 3).
489 Privatisation of incumbent operators started in the early 1980s with the privatisation of British 
Telecommunication in the United Kingdom (Li, Qiang et al., 2000: 5). See also Ambrose, Hennemeyer et 
al. (1990: 11).
490 Pisciotta (1997: 333).
491 The stock is owned and held by the government and slowly sold on open markets. This slow path to real 
privatisation was taken in France, Germany and Japan (Noll, 2000a: 22).
492 Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000: 11).
493 Petrazzini (1997: 352). Li and Xu (2002a) find strong evidence of the complementarity between 
privatisation and competition. In addition share issue privatisation is associated with a marked expansion of 
mobile phone density, but a much weaker response in fixed line phone density.
494 Wallsten (2000: 16).
118
pressure over employment and procurement issues495. Privatised operators are often able 
to raise additional funds from the capital market, and independent suppliers of capital will 
pressure management to operate more efficiently and profitably, as well as resist 
interference from bureaucrats and politicians496. Privatisation also often means less cross­
subsidisation in the telecommunications sector497. Finally, many governments have 
chosen to privatise their national telecommunications carriers early on as a way to signal 
their commitment to market reforms, to attract private and foreign investment into 
national infrastructure, to raise revenues and thereby reduce the public debt and also to 
transfer management know-how498.
That said, given the telecommunications sector's economic, social, and technological 
importance, many privatisation programmes have generated considerable controversy499. 
Even though privatisation enhances the prospects for universal service, governments face 
the major issue of the inevitable trade-off between commercial and social goals500. 
Second, state ownership and prospective privatisation leave prices and quality largely 
unaffected, as it is not ownership per se but the degree of competition in the market that 
influences prices. Third, the impact of state ownership and the right privatisation 
sequencing differs across different telecommunication businesses, e.g. local fixed-line 
and mobile services need to be privatised in different ways501. Fourth, there is no 
evidence that privatisation leads to higher growth in main lines per 100 inhabitants in 
those countries with GDP per capita of less than USD 10,0005°2. Lack of transparency 
can also significantly slow the process of liberalisation and reduce the benefits of 
privatisation503. Competition and increased private participation are policies that 
regulators can use to effectively fulfil most social and economic goals, but a privatised 
market can also dramatically increase the demand for regulatory intervention and stretch 
regulatory resources (particularly in developing countries) to their limit504. Finally, efforts 
to improve the allocation of property rights and to introduce better incentives for 
managers can yield positive benefits without privatisation505.
495 Noll (1999b: 14).
496 Melody (1997c: 20).
497 One problem with government ownership is that new competitive entrants will not be treated on the 
same basis as the incumbent (Noll, 2000a: 22).
498 Li and Xu (2002b: 441).
499 Bortolotti, D ’Souza et al. (2002: 244-245).
500 Petrazzini (1996a: 2); Ambrose et al. (1990: 3).
501 Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000: 22).
502 Ros (1999: 88).
503 Intven, Oliver et al. (2000:11-17).
504 Petrazzini (1997: 349).
505 Megginson and Netter (2001).
119
Moreover, the privatisation of the telecommunication industry is rendered more complex 
by the fact that its benefits are maximised when coupled with other liberalisation policies, 
particularly those involving competition and regulatory reforms. First, private ownership 
is most efficient in markets where there is effective competition. Private participation has 
had overwhelmingly positive impacts in cases where meaningful competition for service 
provision has been introduced506. Where monopolies or oligopolies exist, the benefits of 
introducing private ownership are limited and the case for privatisation is considerably 
weakened507. Moreover, simply transferring a monopoly provider from the public sphere
C A Q
into the private sector will not result in competitive behaviour . Put simply, optimal 
policy involves bundling competition policies with privatisation. Second, successful 
privatisation of a formerly state-owned infrastructure monopoly requires the creation of a 
new institutional framework centred on the creation of rules, incentives to promote 
competition, and a regulatory organisation able to police these rules509. Establishing a 
regulatory authority before telecommunication privatisation is positively correlated with 
higher levels post sale of telephone penetration, investment in the telecommunication 
infrastructure, and mobile cellular subscriptions. In addition, a significant source of 
improvements in the financial and operating performance of telecom companies post sale 
is derived from regulatory changes alone or a combination of those with privatisation, 
rather than from privatisation alone510.
The experience of numerous countries suggests a variety of approaches to privatisation. 
Latin American countries are much more likely to fully privatise when they sell state- 
owned assets, whereas Asian governments take a more gradualist approach, selling 
minority stakes over time511. Despite the move away from traditional public monopolies, 
most governments of them still appear unwilling to allow unrestricted entry, to eliminate 
limits on private and foreign ownership, and to establish strong independent regulators in 
this sector512.
506 In the absence of competition, on the other hand, private participation can produce poor results (Harris, 
2003: 24-25).
507 Fink, Mattoo et al. (2001: 7). State policy-makers have used the privatisation argument to justify neglect 
of competitive regulations and, simultaneously, to disguise their primary imperative, maximizing stock 
prices and thus the budgetary windfall from privatisation (Domisch, 2001: 398).
08 Ambrose, Hennemeyer et al. (1990: 12).
509 Levi-Faur (2003: 710) and Noll (2000b: 6). Issues of regulatory commitment to safeguard private 
investors are probably less important than issues of regulatory design to facilitate competitive entry and 
price reductions (Kessides, 2004: 8).
Wallsten (2002: 15), Bortolotti, D ’Souza et al. (2002: 266) and Kessides (2004: 58).
511 Doh and Teegen (2003: 50). In Brazil, privatisation has been carried out through the granting of 
concessions rather than a permanent transfer of assets (Amann and Baer, 2005: 424).
512 Fink, Mattoo et al.(2001: 1). In this respect, China’s approach to reform is not that different from the rest 
of Asia.
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China’s model o f telecommunication privatisation: incorporation and IPO 
The privatisation of China’s telecommunication sector rests on two pillars: the 
incorporation of operators -  also known as corporatisation -  and the sale of public equity 
in them on overseas stock exchanges. Beginning in 1993, the State Council has allowed a 
select number of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to issues shares on overseas stock
c  1 *3
markets, the vast majority in Hong Kong and New York . In each case, the original 
SOE has separated its social functions (schools, clinics, restaurants etc.) from the main 
company and established a new limited shareholding company in which the original SOE 
becomes a majority shareholder. A minority stake in this listing vehicle is floated 
abroad514. Similarly, after the initial separation of post from telecommunications 
businesses, and the separation of operational and regulatory functions, the government 
opted for the incorporation of the incumbents and partial listing abroad515.
What makes the privatisation of China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom unique 
is the size of the companies, the huge scale of their capital raising, and the fact that the 
IPO involves the sale of claims on assets administered by state-owned firms516. The listed 
companies then use the funds to purchase operating assets from state-owned holding 
companies and progressively gained control over a large part of the mainland network 
(see Table 19 and Figure 11). Contrary to the majority of telecommunication share 
offerings around the world, which are secondary issues (the proceeds of the sale flow 
directly to the government), all IPOs by Mainland Chinese telecommunication firms can 
be considered as capital-raising, primary offerings517.
513 Listing of Chinese SOEs in Hong Kong is a major form of foreign participation in China’s privatisation, 
also called “informal privatisation through internationalisation” (Ma, 2002b: 283).
514 Nolan and Wang (1999: 188).
515 The transfer of assets from SOEs such as China Telecom Group, China Mobile Communications and 
China Unicom Group to their respective overseas-listed units, China Telecom, China Mobile (Hong Kong) 
and China Unicom, is another way of reducing the state's holding of major assets and in line with practice in 
other sectors.
516 Ure (2004: 6).
517 Megginson, Bortolotti et al. (2001: 6).
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Table 19: Network acquisitions by listed vehicles, 1997-2004 
Company Date Amount in Network
China Mobile (HK) 1997-10 USD 4.20 Guangdong and Zhejiang
China Mobile (HK) 1998-06 USD 2.91 Jiangsu
China Mobile (HK) 1999-11 USD 6.42 Fujian, Henan and Hainan
China Mobile (HK) 2000-11 USD 32.4 Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong and Guangxi
China Mobile (HK) 2002-07 USD 10.2 Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Shanxi and Chongqing
China Telecom 
(HK) 2002-11 USD 1.43
Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang
China Unicom 
(HK) 2002-12 USD 2.70
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Henan, Shaanxi, Jiangxi, Guangxi, 
Sichuan, Chongqing and Xinjiang
China Telecom 
_ (HK)
2003-10 RMB 46.0 Anhui, Chongqing, Fujian, Guangxi, Jiangxi and Sichuan
China Unicom 
(HK) 2003-11 RMB 3.20
Shanxi, Hunan, Hainan, Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai, Inner 
Mongolia, Ningxia and Xizang
China Mobile (HK) 2004-05 USD 3.65 Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang
China Telecom 
(HK) 2004-04
USD
3.36
Hubei, Hunan, Hainan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang
Source: Compiled by author from Factiva.
Figure 11: China Mobile (HK) listing vehicle, as of 2004
Sells
100%
75.7% 24.3%
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China Mobile 
Communication 
Corporation
Public investors, 
including 
Vodafone
China Mobile 
Hong Kong 
(BVI)
China Mobile 
Hong Kong Ltd
IPO in 1997 (USD 4.2 bn) with Guangdong 
and Zhejiang Mobile
Acquisition in June 1998 (USD 2.91 bn) of 
Jiangsu Mobile
Acquisition in November 1999 (USD 6.42 
bn) of Fujian, Henan and Hainan Mobile
Acquisition in November 2000 (USD 32.4 
bn) of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Hebei, 
Liaoning, Shandong and Guangxi Mobile
Acquisition in May 2002 (USD 10.2 bn) of 
Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Sichuan, 
Shaanxi, Shanxi and Chongqing Mobile
Acquisition in May 2004 (USD 3.65 bn) of 
Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Guizhou, 
Yunnan, Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and 
Xinjiang Mobile
Source: Compiled by author from Factiva.
Non-privatisation is not the story for the whole of the telecommunications sector, 
however. Whereas the government seems determined to maintain its grip on fixed and
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mobile services, there is already significant private capital, both domestic and foreign, 
involved in value-added services, such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs)518, 
Application Service Providers (ASPs), web hosting companies, and Internet data centres 
(IDCs). It has to be noted that ISPs aside, most of these companies were privately funded 
from the start519. Owing to their relatively small size and the grey zone in which VAS 
providers have operated during the past five years, they have been prevented from openly 
seeking to raise capital on domestic and overseas markets . The survival and recent 
improved profitability of NASDAQ-listed Chinese Internet portals such as Sohu, Sina and 
Netease has taken many by surprise and this has generated a new wave of Nasdaq EPOs in 
2004 (see Table 20).
In great contrast to the service sector, equipment manufacturers such as Eastcom and 
Shanghai Bell, which have been open to market competition and foreign investment for 
many years, have made few IPOs at home and none abroad. Domestic equipment 
manufacturers, such as Huawei and Zhongxing Telecom Equipment (ZTE), are not only 
emerging as strong competitors in China but have set their sights on becoming world- 
class companies, vying for market shares in more lucrative developed markets. 
Ownership types vary greatly, ranging from fully private companies like Huawei to the 
state-owned TCL Mobile Communication or Shenzhen-listed ZTE (see Table 21 and 
Table 22).
518 Following the WTO bilateral agreement with the United States, thresholds for foreign participation in 
ISPs was set at 50% of total equity but China Telecom, via Chinanet, and China Netcom remain the 
dominant ISPs, reselling some of their capacity to other ISPs.
519 This has not prevented Asialnfo from building most of China’s Internet infrastructure, designing and 
building the country's first national commercial Internet backbone (ChinaNet), as well as its first provincial 
Internet backbone (GuangdongNet). According to Mil, private capital takes up 69.81% of the investment in 
China's value-added mobile communications service (Asia Pulse, 2005a).
520 Even with the clearing of the most important regulatory barriers, the IPOs of Sina, Sohu and Netease 
have been rather complex financial montages involving offshore companies with holdings in the Cayman 
Islands or British Virgin Islands.
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Table 20: IPOs of Chinese telecommunication value-added service providers, 1999-2004
~ T 4 * Date of Amount ~ .Company Location .. ^ _ .... . Comment
China.com Nasdaq July 1999 USD0.495 n.a.
TOM.com Nasdaq March 2000 USD0.174 n.a.
Sina Nasdaq April 2000 USD0.068 n.a.
Netease Nasdaq June 2000 USD0.069 4.5 million ADS
Sohu Nasdaq July 2000 USD0.059 4.6 million ADS
Yangtze Telecoma TSX September2003 n.a.
Ctrip.com Nasdaq December2003
USD
0.075 n.a.
Linktone Nasdaq March 2004 USD0.085
6.14 million American Depositary 
Shares (ADS)
TOM Online Nasdaq,GEM March 2004
USD
0.195 11.25 million ADS
Shanda Interactive 
Entertainment* Nasdaq 2004
USD
0.2598
17.32 million ADS -  about 34.64 
million ordinary shares (24.7% of 
enlarged share cajpital)
Mtone Wireless* Nasdaq 2004 USD0.055 n.a.
Tencent
Technology* Nasdaq 2004
USD
0.250 n.a.
Note: * Tentative. “Owner of ChengXi Information Technology Co. Ltd. 
Source: Compiled by author from Factiva.
Table 21: Structure of ownership of selected domestic operators and equipment manufacturers, 2004
__________________________________ China Unicom China Satcom______ZTE_________Datang
Total Shares 21,196,596100.00%401,371100.00%959,522100.00%438,987100.00%
Total O f Shares Listed 6,500,000 30.67% 60,869 15.17%>462,205 48.17%165,374 37.67%
Public Owned Shares 6,500,000 30.67% 60,869 15.17%302,054 31.48% 165,374 37.67%
Institution Shares-Outstanding 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Foreign Shares, B H & N 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 160,151 16.69% 0 0.00%
Other Outstanding Shares 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Unlisted Shares 14,696,596 69.33%340,502 84.83%497,316 51.83%273,613 62.33%
Stated-Owned Shares 0 0.00% 236,338 58.88%462,272 48.18%220,235 50.17%
Domestic Institution Owned Shares 14,696,596 69.33% 0 0.00% 35,044 3.65% 19,718 4.49%
Foreign Institution Owned Shares 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 33,660 7.67%
Other Founder Shares 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Preferred Shares 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Institute Shares From Placement 0 0.00% 104,164 25.95% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Employees Shares 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Transferred Shares 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Others Non-outstanding Shares 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Note: H stands for Hong Kong shares 521 and N stands for New York shares. 
Source: Compiled by author from Factiva.
521 In June 1993, the CSRC and Joint-Stock Exchange of Hong Kong jointly signed the Cooperation of 
Securities Supervision between China and Hong Kong, which set a legal foundation for Chinese mainland- 
funded enterprises listed on the Hong Kong S AR market
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Table 22: Ratio of holding shares vs. total shares, 2004
Company Type Listing date Total shares Holding shares %
China Satcom Operator 1993-04-07 401,371,188 284,969,403 71.00
Shanghai P&T Equipment 1993-10-18 304,925,337 154,676,746 50.73
Eastcom Equipment 1996-07-28 628,000,000 375,538,610 59.80
Nanjing Putian Equipment 1997-05-22 215,000,000 119,123,505 55.41
ZTE Equipment 1997-11-18 959,521,650 687,897,226 71.69
Datang Equipment 1998-10-21 438,986,400 271,983,272 61.96
China Unicom Operator 2002-10-09 19,696,596,395 15,277,570,902 77.56
TCL Equipment 2004-01-30 2,586,331,144 1,423,054,403 55.02
Source: Compiled from Factiva.
Unfortunately only 2 operators -  China Satcom and China Unicom -  are listed on 
mainland stock exchanges (compared to more than 10 equipment manufacturers), limiting 
somewhat the analysis. A certain number of elements emerge nevertheless. Despite 
significant variations, the ratio of listed vs. unlisted shares never exceed 50%. The 
unlisted portion of shares generally falls within the category of state-owned shares (guojia 
gu), except for China Unicom, whose unlisted shares are entirely in the hands of domestic 
institutions (jingnei faren gu). Certain companies, like Datang and TCL, have placed a 
number of unlisted shares with foreign institutions (waizi faren gu) respectively 7.67% 
and 7.62%.
Equipment firms and telecommunication services firms have behaved differently when it 
comes to the location of public share issuance (see Table 23 and Table 24). Why? There 
are two reasons. First, the scale of funding required by service firms is much greater than 
that demanded by equipment manufacturers, and the incumbent firms lack sufficient 
access to that capital. The IPO model was introduced by MPT in 1997 with the listing of 
China Mobile on the HKSE as an alternative to the traditional funding model that relied 
upon domestic installation and connection fees. . The second reason is that regulatory 
restrictions in the fixed and mobile services basic services for domestic and foreign 
investors left these firms no other choice than to seek a listing on a foreign stock 
exchange.
At the same time, the ownership structure of equipment manufacturers, as well as the 
high-level of liberalisation in the sector, has allowed various modes of participation by 
other investors, rendering the IPO route a less attractive option. For example, many 
domestic manufacturers have set up joint ventures with foreign companies that are now 
being transformed into strategic partnerships.
522 These accounted for around 40% of total investment in China’s telecommunications sector during the 
1990s (Ure, 2004: 6).
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Table 23: Selected IPOs of Chinese telecommunication equipment manufacturers, 1993-2005
Company Location and code
Date of Comment
China Putian 
(PTIC) Shanghai
October
1993 Listing on SHSE
China Eastern
Communications
(Eastcom)
Shanghai
600776
August
1996
Listing of 40 million A shares and 100 million B shares 
on SHSE
Zhongxing
Telecom
Equipment (ZTE)
Shenzhen
000063
November 
6,1997
65 million shares were listed (including 6.5 million 
shares for staff and workers -  floated May 18, 1998)
Datang Telecom 
Technology
Shanghai
600198
September
1998 80 million shares (RMB 0.478 billion)
Qiao Xing 
Universal
New York 
XING
February
1999 Listing on NASDAQ of 1.6 million shares at USD 4.50
TCL Corp Shenzhen000100
January 30, 
2004 Listing abroad approved by regulator
Zhongxing
Telecom
Equipment (ZTE)
Hong
Kong
December 
3, 2004
Plans for listing 160 million shares (USD 398 million). 
60% of proceedings earmarked for expansion abroad and 
the rest for R&D
China Putian 
(PTIC)*
Hong
Kong
New
York
2005
Planned listing o f on HKSE and NYSE o f mobile phone 
equipment businesses — 87.5% stake in Beijing Capitel, 
51.59% in Eastcom, 33.75% in Ningbo Bird, 20% in 
Nanjing Ericsson Panda Communications, 27% in 
Beijing Ericsson Mobile Communications and its wholly 
owned mobile phone sales unit Putian Taili 
Communications
China Harbour 
Networks*
Hong
Kong 2005 Planned listing on the HKSE
Note: * indicates tentative IPOs.
Source: Compiled by author from Factiva.
Table 24: IPOs by sub-sector and issue date
Domestic stock 
exchange 
1993-2004
Number Value 
o f IPOs (USD billion)
Foreign stock exchange Foreign stock exchange 
1993-2003 2004
Number Value Number Value 
o f IPOs (USD billion) o f IPOs (USD
billion)
Fixed-line 0 - 1 1.43 2 3.36*
Mobile
Value-added
Equipment
1
0
5
1.38
n.a.
2 9.12 0 
5 0.94 6 0.8448* 
0 -  3 0.85*
Note: * indicates expected capital raising. 
Source: Compiled by author from Factiva.
In 2002, Alcatel Shanghai Bell, which focuses on both fixed and mobile infrastructure 
markets, became the first foreign-invested company limited by shares in China's 
telecommunication sector, with Alcatel holding a 50% plus one share in the venture, and 
the domestic entities owning the remaining shares .
523 Interfax (2002b). Some industry insiders claim that Alcatel has been “offered” Shanghai Bell because 
none of the other domestic equipment manufacturers wanted it (Interview (D-008), conducted in Beijing, 3 
September 2002).
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Despite its WTO commitments to allow 49% participation in mobile telecommunication 
joint ventures (50% in firms operating in VAS) by the end of 2003, only two domestic 
service operators have benefited from an injection of foreign capital so far524. The lack of 
activity can not only be attributed to a worldwide slump in the telecommunication market, 
which forced the world’s largest operators to focus on their core markets. The huge 
amount of capital needed (more than USD 250 million) to operate in the basic services 
sector has de facto restricted the number of investors interested in and capable of making 
such an investment. Finally, the attractiveness of the market allows domestic operators, 
limited to a handful, to be selective in their choice of partner and in the nature of 
partnerships they construct. The terms on which they wish to do business are acceptable 
to only a few foreign operators.
Alternatives to IPOs
A number of mechanisms, such as concessions (e.g. BTO, or build-transfer-operate), have 
been used in other countries to increase private sector participation and, by the same 
token, reduce state intervention525. Although the Chinese government has experienced 
with a number of schemes in other utilities sectors, concessions do not appear to be an 
option in the foreseeable future. In the mid-1990s, China Unicom used a large number of 
China-China-Foreign (zhong-zhong-wai) partnerships but these schemes were banned by 
the State Council in order to restore order in the sector and to maintain bargaining power 
in the WTO negotiations526. Two options could help to inject additional capital in PTOs 
and prepare for the next step in the privatisation process. The first one, and closest to the 
IPO model, is private placements. The most high-profile example of this was China 
Netcom’s placement of its equity with an international consortium in March 2001, but 
other operators, such as Jitong, have toyed with the idea. In addition, Chinese operators 
have opted for strategic partnerships with foreign investors. Those partnerships have 
taken the shape of important financial investments, in the case of Vodafone of more than 
USD 3 billion. Table 25 lists the major private placement deals in the sector since 2000.
524 See Chapter 5. In fact, China’s first joint venture in basic telecommunication services -  Shenda 
Telephone Co. Ltd., now incorporated into Shenzhen Telecom, a subsidiary of China Telecom -  was 
originally formed in 1983 by Shenzhen Telecom Development Corporation (51%) and Cable & Wireless 
Pic., with a registered capital of RMB 20 million.
525 Under a BTO, the equipment supplier or other type of investor, often operating via an investment 
consortium, finances and builds a complete turn-key system (e.g. a regional network segment), transfers the 
ownership of the system, but manages and operates it in exchange for a proportion of the revenues.
526 Operating revenues were shared with the local partner, who in turn shared these revenues with their 
foreign partner for management, technology and network services.
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Table 25: Private placement and minority shares in China's telecommunication operators
Company Date Amount(billion) Comment
China Netcom 2005-09 EUR 0.178 Additional acquisition of 2.01% by Telefonica
China Netcom 2005-06 EUR 0.240 Acquisition of 2.99% by Telefonica
China Mobile (HK) 2002-05 USD 0.750 Additional acquisition of 1.09% CMHK shares by Vodafone
China Netcom 2002-03 RMB 0.520
Placement of 12% of equity. Investors include Goldman 
Sachs, News Corp, Bank of China and China 
Construction Bank
China Mobile (HK) 2000-10 USD 2.500 Sale of 2.18% of CMHK shares to Vodafone
China Unicom 
(HK) 2000-06 USD 0.400
Acquisition of 10% by Hutchison Whampoa
Source: Compiled from China International Capital Limited 
(http://www.cicc.com.cn/english/about/completed.htm) and Factiva.
The second option could be to issue depository receipts. This would be based on the 
American Depository Receipt (ADR) model whereby a company listed in Hong Kong is 
traded in the United States through an intermediary bank which holds its shares on 
deposit and issues tradable receipts for them. If China were to use this model, red chip 
companies would be able to issue certificates representing their shares, which could be 
then listed on the mainland stock exchanges and quoted in domestic currency . China 
Depository Receipts (CDRs) would allow operators to raise money domestically, thus 
tapping an investor base that has so far been prevented from buying telecommunication 
shares. But there is at present no regulation allowing such instruments to be traded in the 
mainland528.
Lessons from China’s experience with privatisation
The Chinese model of privatisation is not exempt of problems. The incorporation of 
provincial postal and telecommunication companies, such as Shanghai Telecom, has not 
resulted in the breaking of the firms’ connection with the state. It is impossible to discern 
exactly how much support these companies still receive from their shareholders and how 
many are actually sustained by their own generated revenues. The fact that firms such as 
China Telecom and China Mobile remain state-controlled creates much ambiguity about 
the actual aims and role of government. On one side, it would like to gain the benefits of
527 Due to the lack of detailed regulations and rules, no breakthrough has been made, even though CITIC 
Securities, designer of the CDR plan, submitted a detailed proposal to the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. Companies have instead turned to bond issues to pay for deals as the CDR scheme still had 
not been approved by the State Council and new share placements might have had a negative impact on the 
share prices (Ng, 2002; Wang, 2002).
528 China Mobile already wanted to issue CDR a few years ago but Zhu Rongji cancelled the plan 
(Interview (B-026) conducted in Beijing, 11 October 2001).
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competition by liberalising the sector529. On the other side, as telecommunications were 
and are still considered a strategic industry, full privatisation, like majority foreign direct
r - i A
investment, remains a highly sensitive issue, and an unrealistic policy option .For some 
observers, incorporation without privatisation has actually worsened the agency problem 
at many firms, because they are owned by the state but control rights are divided between 
government bureaucrats and enterprise managers of the enterprises531. There is a strong 
possibility that China’s telecommunication industry strategy is doing little to lessen the 
state’s role in decision-making, at either the macro or the micro-economic level, with 
damaging consequences. Some scholars have argued that listing enterprises in Hong 
Kong has helped China to raise a significant amount of foreign capital, but that it has 
contributed little to improving firms’ performance, partly because the listing fails to 
introduce effective monitoring mechanisms by investors . In addition, this model fails to 
capture the advantages of a direct investment by a foreign operator, for example advanced 
technology and management experience533.
In both fixed and mobile services the extent of privatisation, and for that matter foreign 
direct investment (FDI), has lagged behind other infrastructures534. In many respects, this 
has not been an obvious obstacle to network development. The percentage of 
telecommunication penetration has risen to 20.92 main telephone lines and 21.40 mobile 
phone subscribers in 2003 (up from 1.45 and 0.05 in 1993, respectively). Thanks to the 
formidable growth of demand and the availability of funding sources for investments 
through overseas equity issuance, the generally conservative Ministry of Information 
Industry has been able to largely maintain the institutional status quo . Despite several 
rounds of administrative restructuring, Mil has managed to maintain a central role in 
telecommunication policy-making -  it was instrumental in negotiating WTO 
commitments in telecommunication services and the concessions made were less 
significant than those made in China’s other sectors, for example, financial services. The 
Ministry’s officials have been able to resist pressure for greater privatisation by 
implementing other elements of the liberalisation programme, although this has required 
bargaining at all levels of government and several interventions from the highest level.
529 Li, Qiang et al. (2000: 5).
530 Xu, Pitt et al. (1998: 376).
531 Guo (2003: 570).
532 Ma (2002b: 279).
533 Xu and Kan (2000: 12-13).
534 In the power sector, attracting FDI was made an explicit goal (Blackman and Wu, 1999: 700). See 
Chapter 5.
535 The Telecommunication Law, which has been in drafting process for the past 20 years, is another 
example of the M il’s capacity to stall reform.
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China’s half-baked and belated privatisation efforts can also be explained by the fact that 
the main wave of telecommunication privatisation around the world took place in the 
second half of the 1990s -  in the majority of countries this sector has been one of the last 
to undergo liberalisation536. At the same time, pressure from multilateral agencies, such as 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to liberalise the economy has tended 
to be concentrated in other sectors. They have provided loans to China's power companies 
since the mid-1980s but there has been scant lending activity in the telecommunication 
sector, and none at all after the mid-90s because of policy stasis and limited demand for 
loans537. Finally, China was not under pressure to privatise because of fiscal or debt 
crises, unlike many Latin American countries.
Issues with China’s privatisation process
Although the incorporation and IPO strategy may have fulfilled the objectives of the 
conservative fringes of the government, particularly those of Mil’s leadership, a number 
of issues have been left unresolved. First, one feature of the model is that once operators 
are listed, Mil has shown more of an interest in supporting the share price than in creating 
an effective regulatory regime538. Important decisions are left to local authorities, such as 
provincial telecommunication administrations, and the rules, institutions and instruments 
commonly associated with independent regulation are left undeveloped . In the absence 
of an overarching Telecommunications Law, the sector is reliant upon State Council (and 
ministry-level) regulation and ad hoc intervention. Public policy objectives aside, the lack 
of a comprehensive legal framework for the sector represents a major obstacle to broader 
private participation. Second, many of the board members and top-level managers of the 
telecommunication operators remain closely connected with the authorities, while 
investors, both domestic and foreign, have little opportunity of significantly influencing 
management decisions540. The confused ownership structure has also sometimes created 
divergent incentives for the listed companies and their headquarters, and it is not 
unprecedented to have conflicting announcements from, for instance, company
536 Until the signature of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement (BTA) many governments were 
shielded from taking earlier liberalisation measures. While the WTO’s BTA does not cover directly 
privatisation, its emphasis on market access and regulatory frameworks has forced many governments to 
seriously re-think their telecommunication policies and offered them a possibility to bundle competition, 
regulation and privatisation issues together.
537 Andrews-Speed and Dow (2000: 339). E-mail communication with a senior ADB representative in 
Beijing, 18 November 2003.
538 Interview (B-039), conducted in Beijing, 27 November 2003). Since it peaked in March 2000, China 
Mobile has declined in price by 74%, while China Unicom has now fallen by 71% since its launch 
(Holland, 2002).
539 Bellier (2003: xvi-xvii) and Kong (2003).
540Nolan and Wang (1999: 190) and Pangestu and Mrongowius (2002: 16).
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representatives of China Mobile (HK) and China Mobile Corporation541. In addition, the 
salaries of managers of service providers tend to be relatively low, and are still 
insufficiently linked to the performance and profitability of their companies, although 
transfer of control to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), on which more below, might result in their improvement542. 
Third, a defining characteristic of the industry is how private capital is accommodated in 
telecommunications investments. From a legal perspective, the “Provisional 
Arrangements for Approval and Regulation of Decentralised Telecommunication 
Services,” promulgated by the State Council in November 1993, explicitly permits both 
state-owned and collective enterprises to offer public telecommunication services, 
provided that the enterprises first obtain a licence543. In practice, such services turned out 
to be restricted to paging and valued-added services. For fixed and mobile services, the 
dominant role of the state is guaranteed by regulations that require that the Chinese JV 
partner has to be state- or majority state-owned544. Paradoxically, opportunities for private 
investment in those services remain open only to foreign companies. Influential scholars 
such as Zhou Qiren (formerly at Beijing University), as well as members of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), have raised this issue for many years, arguing that private 
domestic companies should have the same opportunity as foreign companies, even though 
the first attempt by domestic private capital to enter the telecom sector ended in failure545.
There is no simple solution for these issues. As noted above, opening the sector to 
domestic private capital would probably not suffice, as privatisation is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for successful reform546. Even if private ownership and 
operation of telecom services were not specifically forbidden, the dominance of the 
present incumbents would make it extremely difficult for new market entrants547. The 
priority instead should be to create a regulatory framework that facilitates the creation of 
a competitive operating environment and to complete the transfer of networks to the listed
541 Interview (B-011), conducted in Beijing, 6 September 2001.
542 Guan (2002: 24).
543 Lynch (2000: 193).
544 Interview (B-002), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001.
545 Interview (B-025), conducted in Beijing, 10 October 2001. China Jitong (now merged with China 
Netcom) accepted investment from a private firm, Jinzhou Port, after Jitong’s failure to get a public listing 
in 2000. In July 2001, Jinzhou Port acquired the transferred shares, which accounted for 14.72% of its 
registered capital, thus Jinzhou Port theoretically became the number one shareholder in China Jitong. 
However, in September 2002 Jinzhou Port was informed by the Ministry of Finance and Mil that ‘Jinzhou 
Port's acquisition of China Jitong’s shares is against the relevant rules and therefore void’ (Wu and Zhu, 
2003: 151).
546 Melody (1995: 259).
547 Pangestu and Mrongowius (2002: 32-33).
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companies, so that fixed and mobile operators can operate efficiently. An important step 
towards the normalisation of the sector is taking place through the recent involvement of 
the SASAC, a body established on March 2003 to streamline control over public firms. 
With the transfer of China Railcom from the Ministry of Railway’s control to SASAC in 
early 2004, the latter now exercises the rights of ownership as the representative of the 
state on all of China’s telecom operators548. Several benefits should accrue from this 
development. First, there should be better insulation of the operators from their parent 
Ministries. The transfer of control from the hands of the Ministry of Railways, for 
instance, insulates China Tietong’s management from demands to generate more revenue 
for the railway operations. Second, China Tietong now faces direct competition from the 
country's other telecom carriers, and the hope is that SASAC will be able to provide a 
more level playing field. Third, unified management under the SASAC should play a 
positive role in the supervision, administration and regulation of China's 
telecommunications market and help to prepare the ground for a new round of 
restructuring of the telecommunication companies.
The case for privatisation is that it locks in hard-won regulatory reforms that continued 
state-ownership would erode, while the case against hurried privatisation is that is 
foregoes the option of future restructuring and better regulatory design549. In 1997, Ure 
and Vivorakil predicted that privatisation of China’s telecom services operations would 
be carried out through encouraging the participation of private capital, while the mixture 
of private and public-sector management and control of networks and services (for 
example, in the Chinese-Chinese-Foreign joint ventures) would remain unclear550. With 
hindsight, Chinese policy-makers have displayed a definite preference for public 
management, as well as strict public control, of all basic networks and services. In short 
and like for other Chinese utilities, the reform of the telecommunication has been 
concerned more with better management of state assets than with engaging in ownership 
reform.
As of today, China’s telecommunication sector remains largely state-controlled and 
government plans give no indication that current reforms will lead to a future round of 
privatisation. By opting for incorporation and partial public offerings, the government has
548 China's other telecommunication operators are China Mobile, China Unicom, China Telecom, China 
Netcom, and China Satcom (SinoCast, 2004a).
549 Newbery (1999:128).
550 Ure and Vivorakil (1997: 3).
132
succeeded in raising some USD 10 billion in investment capital for its 
telecommunications sector, while retaining ownership and control of the operators. Given 
the importance placed on maintaining such control, full privatisation or sales, which 
would leave the state as a minority shareholder, are not likely in the near term. The 
current institutional setting, characterised among other by a lack of independent judiciary 
and regulatory body, offers no credible method of deterring regulatory opportunism and 
leaves public ownership as the default option551. In itself, this is not a problem since 
ownership is only one part of a range of measures, such as changes to market structure, 
and the creation of a pro-market regulatory framework, that are necessary to improve 
performance552. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the healthy development of the 
sector relies on the creation of a level playing field, and that this will necessitate further 
rounds of restructuring. Ultimately, full privatisation or majority ownership, by reducing 
the conflicts of interest that are inherent in the current system, would at least enable the 
government to better perform its regulatory role and better serve the interest of both the 
public and the investor community.
551 Newbery (1999: 57).
552 Bauer (1995: 272).
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Putting China’s telecommunication liberalisation model in a sectoral context
"Telecoms liberalisation was no doubt less risky than that o f  electricity”
(Levi-Faur, 2003: 724)
Comparison with the electricity sector
How much does China’s model of telecommunication liberalisation differ from other 
sectors’ experiences? To provide some answer, we compare it to reforms in the electricity 
sector. Of all utilities, electricity probably offers the best comparison perspective . Just 
like the telecommunication sector, electricity reforms in developing and transition 
countries were driven by the poor operating and financial performance of state-owned 
electricity systems, the lack of public funds, the unavailability of service for large 
portions of the population, and government desires to raise revenue through
554privatisation .
In China, the electricity sector is dominated by state-owned companies, which are 
vertically integrated on generation, transmission, distribution and retail, both at national 
and provincial level. The industry is highly regulated by a number of central government 
agencies and their subsidiaries in each province (e.g. provincial planning commissions, 
provincial economy and trade commissions, provincial price bureau and provincial Power 
Company). Prices too are centrally fixed. Finally, the state has placed a high priority on 
the development of the power sector and allocated large investments (see Table 26)555.
Table 26: Total investment in the power and telecommunication sector in the 9th FYP (USD billion)
Sector_______________ 1996________ 1997_______ 1998_______1999________2000_______Total
Power 14.4 18.7 20.7 22.1 25.4 101.3
Telecommunication 10.9 12.7 18.1 19.3 26.8 87.8
Source: Compiled from Yeoh and Rajamaran (2004) and Zhang and Heller (2004).
Similarities and differences between both sectors' liberalisation
Reforms in the telecommunication and electricity sector share a number of characteristics. 
First, in 1995 the electricity industry underwent institutional restructuring and separation
553 For a long time, utilities have been considered natural monopolies, that is until the unbundling of the 
value-chain has showed that only a few elements in the service are usually non-competitive, such as local 
residential telephony or local loop for telecommunication and high-voltage transmission and local 
distribution for electricity (Kessides, 2004: 37). However, the comparison between privatising energy and 
telecommunication holds to a certain extent only as the gains from relaxing the constraints on investment 
are much larger and there is less concern on the part o f the buyers that the regulatory compact will fail 
(Newbery, 1999: 291).
554 Kessides (2004: 135).
555 In the sector of power the role of private investors was seen as complementary and additional to that of 
public enterprises (Gabriele, 2004: 1323). Moreover direct supervision by higher-level government bodies, 
as well as horizontal and vertical inter-agency negotiations leading to consensus solutions, have been the 
norm in the power industry.
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of government regulatory function from business operations556. Second, the privatisation 
of energy companies at the national, provincial and municipal levels has resulted in the 
state retaining a majority o f the shares. Third, akin to Mil and its predecessor, the 
Ministry o f Electric Power as owner, regulator and policy-maker has dominated the 
electric industry. Although both sectors share many structural similarities, the timing, 
pace and nature o f reforms varies significantly. What explains this? Is it because power 
was exposed to international pressures (multilateral lending agencies and FDI)? Why 
does it take so long to pass the Telecommunication Law when the Chinese leadership 
acknowledges the weakness o f the currently regulatory structure? Why has the 
government failed to replicate the reforms o f the electricity sector?
A closer look at some o f the reforms will help bring initial answers to those questions. 
First, the electricity sector benefits from a much better defined regulatory framework. The 
first Electricity Law was issued by the Ministry o f Electric Power in 1995. Second, the 
amount o f revenues generated by both sectors varies greatly, making telecommunication a 
much more strategic sector, at least from a financial perspective (see Figure 12). This has 
prompted the government to handle the reform with extra-care.
Figure 12: Electricity and telecommunication revenue growth in China, 1991-2001
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Source: Compiled by author.
Third, foreign investment has been allowed in the power industry through a set o f 
regulations enacted as early as 1995 and through concession projects (BOT). Fourth, 
institutional continuity has meant that the government has been able to appropriately 
restructure the bureaucracies that oversee the electricity sector to smooth the way for
556 Lamech, Berrah et al. (2001).
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independent power producers (IPPs). For instance, it abolished the Ministry of Electric 
Power (MOEP) that traditionally oversaw the sector and replaced it with the State Power 
Corporation557. Restructuring of the policy-implementing machinery has reinforced the 
pragmatism at the policy-making levels, leading to relatively frictionless 
implementation . Fifth, in the sector of power, China saw the role of private investors as 
complementary to that of public enterprises559. DeWoskin has argued that the 
restructuring telecommunication sector prior to the WTO accession has gone in the exact 
opposite direction of many other sectors, faced as it is with a unique set of forces and 
conditions560.
This brief comparison with the electricity sector reveals that the liberalisation process in 
both utilities shares a number of similarities and difference but that the outcome of the 
liberalisation efforts differs notably (see Table 27 and Table 28)561.
Table 27: Summary of outcome of reforms between China's telecommunication and electricity sectors
Telecommunication_____________________Electricity
Competition562 Duopolies in fixed and mobile Monopolies in distribution Competition in generation
Privatisation No, except in value-added services No, except in generation
Funding Revenues and IPOs n.a.
Decentralisation Local administration bureaus Direct supervision by higher- level government bodies
Legislative framework No Telecommunication Law but Telecommunication Regulation
Electricity Law 
Electricity Regulation 
Regulations on Electricity 
Supervision and Control
Regulator No independent regulator SERC
Source: Compiled by author.
557 During the 1998 restructuring, the former Ministry of Power's functions were assigned to three new 
entities. The Electric Power Administrative Department, under the recently disbanded SETC, has 
functioned as a typical governmental agency, taking the role of a regulator. The China Electricity Council 
(CEC) has functioned as an industrial association and acted as an industrial coordinator. The State Power 
Corp. has invested in state-owned assets in the power sector and has invested and managed these state- 
owned assets. China initiated yet another round of restructuring in 2002 (Zhu and Li, 2003).
558 Rufin, Rangan et al. (2003: 661-662).
559 Gabriele (2004: 1323).
560 “Whereas the State Council chose to consolidate fragments of many industries into chaebol-like, entities, 
it permitted telecommunication to diversify, and diversify quickly and deeply.” (DeWoskin, 2001: 654).
561 Interview (B-034), conducted in Shanghai, 21 November 2003.
562 Whereas it was possible to introduce competition to segments o f the markets in telecommunication 
(equipment, international and long-distance calls, mobile) and thus to experiment with competitive markets, 
the possibility of doing so in electricity was limited. In electricity, generation and supply to final customers 
are activities generally considered as competitive, while high-voltage transmission and local distribution are 
not (Kessides, 2004: 37).
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Table 28: Comparison between the telecommunication and electricity sectors
Telecommunication Electricity
Structure Pre-1998: Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications (MPT) and 
Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI) 
Post-1998: Ministry of Information 
Industry (Mil)
Pre-1997: Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP), 
policy-maker, regulator and enterprise manager 
for most of China’s power industry 
Post-1997: State Power Corporation of China563 
(SPCC) takes over the enterprise management 
Post-1998: Abolition of MOEP and transfer of its 
government function to the SETC; plans to 
separate generation from transmission and 
distribution
Effect of
1998
reforms
1. Creation of a new Ministry, the 
Ministry of Information Industry 
(Mil) to centrally coordinate 
infrastructure investment
2. Separation of government and 
enterprise
1. Function of enterprise management nominally 
removed from the government and assigned to 
the energy companies themselves
2. State Economic and Trade Commission 
(SETC) given an apparently important position 
in the energy sector
3. Creation of a new Ministry, the Ministry of 
Land and Resources (MLR)
Pricing Prices fixed by operators within M il’s 
guidelines; involvement of local 
government and SDRC
Producer and consumer prices fixed by central 
and local governments with high levels of 
subsidies and cross-subsidies; Functions of 
policy-making and regulation mixed together in 
SETC; SDRC retains some influence on pricing 
and investment policy; SPC seems to be driving 
the reform policy
Policy­
maker
Mil SETC
Undergoing
reforms
Attribution of licences across services 
to all operators at time of 3G 
introduction; Supervision of assets by 
the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission 
(SASAC)
Vertical separation of the generation, 
transmission and distribution functions -  the 
reform will separate power plants and power 
grids and let power plants enter power grids 
through bidding.
State Power Corp (SPC) is focused on 
transmission after the State Development and 
Reform Commission (SDRC) created five, 
roughly equal, nationwide generation groups by 
dividing up the capacity formerly controlled by 
SPC.
WTO effect Geographic and phase-in Not included in WTO commitments564
Operators China Netcom (North) and China 
Telecom (South); China Mobile and 
China Unicom
State Power Grid Co. (North) and the Southern 
Power Grid Co. (South)
Legal
framework
Telecommunication Regulation (2000), 
various regulations. 
Telecommunication Law in draft
Electricity Law (1995)
Regulator Ministry of Information Industry (Mil). 
Local enforcement agencies (e.g. 
Shanghai Telecommunication 
Administration Bureau)
State Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(SERC). A law enforcement agency directly 
under the State Council, it is responsible for 
supervising and regulating market competition. It 
will also issue licences to operators, monitor their 
operations and hold them accountable for 
violations of pricing and competition rules.
Note: In early March 2005 China’s government announced that it intended to establish a national leading 
group under the State Council to oversee the energy sector.
Source: Adapted from Andrews-Speed, P., Dow, S., et al. (2000), Wu (2003).
563 SPCC is a holding company, which owns most of the transmission and distribution infrastructure 
through its ownership of nearly all the Provincial Power Companies.
564 Energy services were not negotiated as a separate sector during the Uruguay Round. Though a few WTO 
Members undertook sparse commitments in various energy-related services, the vast majority o f the global 
energy services industry is not covered by specific commitments under the GATS.
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Particularities of China’s telecommunication liberalisation model
A number of particularities emerge from China’s model of telecommunication 
liberalisation. As far as the process is concerned, the emergence of China Unicom and 
other new players in the industry was more a product o f domestic political power games 
than o f market economics. As noted, the initial push to introduce competition came 
through the bargaining of divided special interests. Wu Jichuan, formerly in charge of 
MPT and later Mil, worked over the years to protect China Telecom’s monopoly 
position, defending it with arguments of universal service and infrastructure rollout565. 
For strategic reform forces to outweigh Minister Wu’s resistance to liberalisation, the 
most senior level of the government (i.e. the State Council) had to intervene566. As we 
will see, the lack of direct international pressure played an important role at maintaining 
the status quo or at least at delaying the liberalisation process. International lending 
agencies have hardly been involved in the telecommunication liberalisation process, 
focusing their attention on other sectors judged more prone to reform. Moreover, in light 
of China’s limited WTO commitments and the global slump of telecommunication, in the 
foreseeable future, competition is not going to be among foreign operators but among 
domestic companies567.
If we consider the outcome, unlike other countries, most, if not all, of the competition in 
basic services still takes place between state-owned or state-run enterprises . This 
overwhelming presence of the state can be attributed to historical reasons. Since the 
creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the incumbent has been state-owned. 
While other countries undergoing liberalisation have opened the market to non-state 
operators and reduced their ownership in the incumbents, the Chinese government seems 
keen on maintaining control over all basic services.
565 The plan for the break-up of China Telecom is said to have been sent back and forth between the Mil 
and the State Council about 6 times before it was finally accepted because it was not radical enough 
(Interview (B-019), conducted in Beijing, 17 September 2001). Towards the end of his career, Wu Jichuan 
seemed, at least in public, to have accepted the rhetoric of competition and market economy (Interview (B- 
002), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001).
566 Interview (B-033), conducted in Geneva, 12 November 2003.
567 Interview (B-009), conducted in Beijing, 4 September 2001.
568 Willner (2002: 42). Major international operators have integrated this in their strategy by either entering 
partnerships (e.g. Vodafone and China Mobile) or focusing on the value-added segment.
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Concluding remarks
This chapter has discussed the introduction of competition in telecommunication services 
and the “privatisation” of Chinese operators. It has argued that reforms taking place in 
developed countries were not totally devoid of influence on China’s domestic 
telecommunication reforms. In fact, China’s attempt to introduce competition does not 
lag much behind other countries’. While not comparable to American or British early 
efforts, its experience is not radically different from other developing countries either and 
even from some industrialised ones. Whether the introduction of competition has met 
with success is altogether another question. As we have seen, basic services operators 
remain quasi-monopolies and despite major restructuring efforts, changes only take place 
at a very slow pace. The unsatisfactory level of competition, and of reforms in general, 
can be traced back to the late separation of government from operations, the size and 
power of the incumbent and a legacy of vested interests. In addition, this chapter has 
shown that both the origin and outcome of China’s telecommunication reforms differ 
from other countries. Pressure to liberalise originated from MPT’s rival Ministries and 
not from international organisations or large telecommunication users. Despite several 
rounds of restructuring, reforms in the services sector are at a standstill. After more than 
10 years of reforms, the country has barely achieved competition in basic 
telecommunication services and full privatisation remains out of the question in the 
foreseeable fixture.
It has been argued in this chapter that the drivers of China’s model of telecommunication
liberalisation are to be found primarily domestically, and that the international pressures
have had only limited impact on the extent of liberalisation. In her study on China’s
international engagement Pearson has argued that:
“Change in China is due predominantly to domestic forces. The norms and 
rules o f the international economic regime must be fed  through the prism 
o f Chinese perceptions and domestic political structures. ”569
Nevertheless, two mechanisms have at least been at work in helping to spread domestic 
liberalisation polices to China. These are modelling mechanism and what might be called 
a rational actor mechanism570. On one side, the introduction of limited competition 
happened at around the same time as other countries. On the other side, the government 
has largely refrained from privatising the telecommunication operators, opting instead for
569 Pearson (1999b: 227).
570 Modelling can be defined as “action(s) that constitute a process of displaying, symbolically interpreting 
and copying conceptions of actions and this process itself’. The rational actor mechanism involves a 
conception of the states as unitary, rational self-interested actors (Joseph and Drahos, 1998:102).
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a model that assured constant revenue streams and maintaining control on the sector. 
Most important, though, have been the institutional factors specific to China’s 
telecommunication sector. They have permitted Mil to maintain its stronghold on the 
industry in accordance with the central government’s desire to maintain control on the 
overall reform process. Thus, while the key tenets of the liberalisation programme have 
largely been modelled on those found in other countries, its outcome has differed notably.
There is little doubt that the massive diffusion of telecommunication services results from 
a combination of factors. But the causal link between the factors and the growth is hard to 
establish. Chapter 3 has shown that the process of decentralisation initiated in the 1980s 
was closely linked with the funding of the telecommunication sector. By delegating 
administrative powers to the provincial telecommunication bureaus as well as reducing 
the government investment in the sector, the central government did in fact loosen its 
control over the telecommunication sector. The “empowerment” of sub-national 
administrations and operators ensured allocative efficiency. At the same time, it created a 
fragmentation of the telecommunication sector. Chapter 4 has described in details the 
programme of competition and privatisation. While domestic constraints have played a 
significant role on both the nature and pace of liberalisation, the next part seeks to 
integrate the international dimension. It will be argued that, despite the predominance of 
domestic factors and China’s relative isolation from international pressures during most 
part of the reform era, external pressures nonetheless affected China’s telecommunication 
reform model.
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Part III:
Pressure from the Outside
5 Reforms within an evolving supranational telecommunication order
" The old  telecommunication regime provided  China with a  comfortable "womb" o f  state  
sovereignty within which to develop po licy  a t its own pace. ”
(Tipson, 1999)
“7b date, China’s government has not taken the steps to bring regulation in the 
telecommunication sector into practice with international norms. ”
(USITO, 2004b)
This part discusses some of the major international factors driving the reform process in 
the telecommunication industry. It reviews the role of major international organisation as 
well as foreign direct investment (FDI) over Chinese telecommunication reforms. It 
argues that for a large part of the reform era, telecommunication services were almost 
totally shielded from international pressures, and this for two reasons. First, despite 
China’s membership in a number of international organisations, its actual involvement 
remained limited. Second, pressure to liberalise the telecommunication sector cropped up 
relatively late in the WTO accession negotiation. And success at claiming the status of 
“developing country” allowed China to negotiate a favourable schedule of commitments 
for its telecommunication sector. As foreign investment remained largely banned from 
telecommunication services until 2001, the regulator felt no real need to speed up a 
reform process that would require a fundamental transformation of the market structure as 
well as a redefinition of its own role.
That said, despite this apparent imperviousness, China’s accession to the WTO has 
marked a turning point. By committing to a strictly defined liberalisation path, the 
Chinese government has reduced its future margin of manoeuvre. In addition to granting 
market access in line with its schedule of commitments and to abiding by the Reference 
Paper, the government will have, sooner or later, to integrate the outcome of the current 
WTO round of telecommunication negotiation into domestic reforms.
Chapter 5 looks at some of the major international factors driving reforms in the 
telecommunication industry across the world. At the same time, it places the Chinese 
WTO offers in the broader context of telecommunication developments at the 
supranational and domestic levels. After a brief description of the international 
telecommunication regime, the first section reviews key supranational actors, like the ITU 
and the World Bank, and their relevance to China’s telecommunication reform process.
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The second section discusses China’s relationship with supranational actors in the realm 
of telecommunication. It heightens the importance of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT) and of the WTO on the international telecommunication regime’s 
transformation. The last section widens the perspective by discussing the role played by 
multinational corporations on China’s telecommunication reforms through foreign direct 
investment (FDI).
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The international telecommunication regime
For many years the international telecommunication regime, embodied mainly by the 
ITU, remained unchallenged. It provided a multilateral framework reinforcing domestic 
monopolies and bilateral cartel arrangements that fitted well with national governments’ 
grip over the sector571. In the mid-1970s, international responses to technology change 
triggered reconsideration of the established order . Among the key tenets of the regime 
to be questioned was the idea that telecommunications services and equipment were best 
supplied by national monopolies.
In addition to the major transformations that ensued in the market structure, 
telecommunication policy issues took an international dimension at the beginning of the 
1990s, blurring the limit between domestic and international policy issues . Thus, 
telecommunication regulations, which were mostly the remit of state authorities, now 
increasingly fall within the scope of regional and global organisations574. Broadly 
speaking, the key feature of the new international telecommunication regime is 
competition between firms and countries in the area of international telecommunication 
services. The integration of telecommunications into the supranational regulatory order 
has also increased the range of actors affecting the evolution of telecommunications 
policy and weighed on domestic reform processes575. Hills has argued that in the case of 
LDCs, international actors, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World 
Bank, played a major role in shaping telecommunication reform576. Furthermore, Henisz, 
Zelner et al. found that that the coercive effect of multilateral lending agencies has 
increased over time577. While their finding is consistent with evidence that multilateral 
organisations have broadened the scope of the ‘conditionality’ terms specifying market- 
oriented reforms imposed on borrowing countries, it poses the question of why China, 
who is the World Bank’s largest borrower, has managed to postpone the liberalisation of 
telecommunication services for so long and stir its own path.
571 Governments cooperated to maintain a regime based on the overarching principles of national 
sovereignty, network interconnection and joint service provisioning (Drake, 2000: 124).
572 (Ruggie, 1975; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989; Cowhey, 1990: 174).
573 Robinson (1991b).
574 Simpson and Wilkinson (2001: 3-4) argue that they constitute the emergence of a global system of 
regulation.
575 Joseph and Drahos (1998: 99). Indeed, until recently telecommunications-operating agencies were 
concerned primarily with domestic requirements in a purely domestic environment and thus mostly isolated 
from the globalisation process.
576 Hills (1994). While those key players pressed governments to reform, providing at the same time 
financial support for the task, the magnitude of their influence on the success or failure to reform is difficult 
to assess.
577 Henisz, Zelner et al. (2004).
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Telecommunication and international trade -  from ITU to GATT and the WTO 
The international telecommunication regime has been deeply transformed by the US- 
initiated push to shift the liberalisation agenda from the ITU to the GATT. One of the key 
reasons behind this shift laid in the emergence of domestic competition578. As noted by 
Cowhey:
“Significant efforts were made to restructure the telecommunication 
regime by introducing competition and granting some jurisdiction over 
telecommunications to trade institutions that served new political
579constituencies. ”
Until the mid-1980s, trade and telecommunication were viewed as separate realms of
activity, both domestically and at the international level. As such they operated as two
distinct and quite different international regimes580. In the mid-1980s an extension of
international trade issues to services, including telecommunication, started to be
considered and some international organisations, encouraged particularly by the United
States, began to confront the problem of defining an open international framework
covering foreign direct investment and trade in services581. As early as 1995, Drahos and
Joseph argued that:
“The future evolution o f telecommunications will be profoundly affected 
by the emerging supranational regulatory order. This order is 
characterised by the presence o f a hierarchy o f players who vie to link 
principles like most favoured nation and national treatment to certain 
standards in ways that produce economic gains for them. The integration 
o f telecommunications into the supranational system means that the 
evolution o f telecommunications policy must be understood in a cross-
582regulatory fashion. ”
However, the efforts to push communication in the trade arena did not enthuse everyone. 
While agreeing on the intrinsic nature of the links between information flows and trade 
flows, various scholars questioned the development impact of communication technology 
for developing countries, reviving the dependency theory583.
578 Cowhey (1990: 169) and Feketekuty (1992: 172).
579 Cowhey further suggests that in the telecommunication industry, the United States, Japan, and the 
United Kingdom had enough market power to stimulate global reform when they unilaterally changed their 
national telecommunication policies (Cowhey, 1990: 172).
580 Woodrow (1991: 325-342).
581 Feketekuty (1988). On the ground that “data flows are commodity flows” (Sauvant, 1983: 360). Until 
then, international economic agreements had traditionally dealt only with trade in manufactured products 
(Sauvant, 1986; Aronson and Cowhey, 1988; Robinson, 1991a: 808). The fundamental difficulty with 
telecommunication and data services as a trade-in-services issue is that it is both a telecommunication- 
policy issue and a trade-policy issue simultaneously and interactively. Telecommunication services clearly 
fall within both the WTO's and the ITU’s jurisdiction, and the potential exist for the two bodies to address 
similar issues from different perspectives (Frieden, 2001: 231-233).
582 Drahos and Joseph (1995: 635).
583 See (Jussawalla, 1982; Hills, 1994).
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A turning point in the rise of international trade in telecommunication services is without 
any doubt the signature of the Basic Telecommunication Agreement (BTA) in 1997, 
although some academics initially downplayed its significance on the basis that most 
policy changes were taking place anyway584. While it is unnecessary here to revisit the 
BTA in depth, a number of elements are nonetheless worth reviewing since they directly 
impact any signatory country to the WTO585.
GATS586 and the Reference Paper
Regulatory disciplines specific to telecommunications services are primarily found in the 
GATS Annex on Telecommunications, which applies to all WTO Members, and in the 
Reference Paper (RP) on regulatory principles drawn up by the WTO Negotiating Group 
on Basic Telecommunications587.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the WTO instrument governing 
trade in telecommunication services. The GATS can be summed up to a set of 
fundamental principles: progressive liberalisation through binding commitments in 
schedules; non-discrimination and transparency; regulations that are reasonable, 
objective, impartial, and not more burdensome than necessary; competition safeguards 
aimed at the realisation of obligations and commitments; and flexibility in recognition of
584 Drake and Noam (1997). Negotiations on the Annex on Telecommunications and the specific 
commitments on value-added services were completed in December 1993 and entered into force on 1 
January 1995 at the same time as the rest of the GATS. Negotiations on basic telecommunications services 
did not conclude until 15 February 1997 and did not enter into force until 5 February 1998.
585 See Cowhey and Klimenko (2001) for a treatment on the BTA and telecommunication reform, and 
Wunsch-Vincent (2004) for a detailed analysis of GATS and telecommunications.
586 The GATS regime comprises three major elements. The first one is the Framework Agreement, which 
includes fifteen principles or General Obligations and Disciplines, such as most-favoured-nation status, that 
usually apply to national commitments. The second component of the GATS regime is the eight annexes. 
These clarify or modify how the general obligations apply to issues unique to certain services sectors and 
modes o f supply and establish the legal basis for future negotiations on them. The third component of the 
GATS is the National Schedules in which governments list their commitments (Drake, 2001: 39).
587 WTO (1999a: 3-4). The Reference Paper is used as a basis for additional commitments in schedules 
where, if included, it becomes legally binding on the Member concerned. The core obligations of the 
Telecommunications Annex are contained in paragraph 5, entitled “Access to and use o f Public 
Telecommunications Transport Networks and Services” (essentially regarding basic telecommunications 
that are required, explicitly or in effect, to be made generally available to the public). Paragraph 4 of the 
Annex obliges governments to ensure the transparency of "information on conditions affecting access to 
and use of' basic public telecommunications. Regarding technical standards, paragraph 7(a) of the Annex 
states, “Members recognize the importance of international standards for global compatibility in inter­
operability of telecommunication networks and services and undertake to promote such standards through 
the work of relevant international bodies, including the International Telecommunication Union and the 
International Organization for Standardization”. The vast majority o f regulatory measures scheduled by 
Members, in accordance with the Additional Commitments provisions of GATS Article XVIII, involve the 
Reference Paper.
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national sovereignty and economic development needs588. There are several GATS 
mechanisms that directly influence the members’ regulation of the telecommunications 
sector: (1) GATS Article VI, a general obligation regarding domestic regulation; (2) the 
Annex on Telecommunications, a general obligation regarding access to public 
telecommunications networks ; (3) specific commitments to provide market access (Art. 
XIV) and national treatment (Art. XVII); and (4) the Reference Paper (RP), specific 
commitments to be applied to major suppliers of basic telecommunications services (see 
Table 29)590. The objective of the latter is twofold. First, it aims to provide foreign service 
providers with regulatory safeguards to guarantee that monopolies or former monopolies 
do not abuse their market power to undermine competition. The concern is not about the 
existence of monopoly per se but about the anti-competitive practices of major suppliers 
in a particular market591. Second, it aims to provide a harmonized set of regulations in 
order to minimize the phenomenon of asymmetric regulation. From an international 
telecommunication law perspective the Reference Paper is the first document that 
contains a set of rules in relation to telecommunications regulation. As such, it provides 
policymakers in developing countries with a road map on how to reform or establish a 
regulatory framework592. The document aimed to address the issue of the dominance of 
the incumbents and to ensure that competitive conditions were created. Nevertheless, 
national policy-makers remain free to adopt a variety of criteria in the granting of 
licences, as long as they are public and transparent593.
Three other WTO agreements have an impact on the telecommunication sector: the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA) and the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)594.
588 Tuthill (1997). During the Uruguay Round, the negotiators developed four “categories” of services to 
further define their basic telecom commitments: geography (local, long distance, and international); 
technology (wire-based or radio-based, including satellite); delivery (facilities based or on a resale basis); 
and clientele (for public use or non-public use (closed user groups)). Unless otherwise specified, a specific 
commitment for any of the telecommunications sub-sectors includes all four categories.
589 During the Uruguay Round, Members agreed to include the Annex on Telecommunications as part of the 
GATS and 48 Members submitted schedules offering specific commitments to liberalise trade in 
telecommunication services.
590 Wunsch-Vincent (2004).
591 Six main objectives in support of competition were debated: regulatory reform, interconnection, 
structural and accounting separation, number portability, pricing policy and accounting rate reform 
(Petrazzini, 1996b: 6).
592 Guermazi (2000: 1-5).
593 Blouin (2000: 137, 140).
594 Only few GPA members cover telecommunication operators.
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Table 29: Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications
______________________Reference Paper_____________________________________
The Reference Paper establishes a set of pro-competitive regulatory principles to 
safeguard foreign services and service suppliers from monopoly or dominant suppliers 
of basic telecommunications services
The Reference Paper applies only to the extent that WTO Members incorporate it in 
column 4, “additional commitments,” of their schedules of specific commitments for 
basic telecommunications services
The Reference Paper is the first legally enforceable, multilateral trade instrument 
establishing standards to safeguard competition, provide transparent licensing 
procedures, and require independent regulators
The Reference Paper requires Members to: prevent anti-competitive practices such as 
cross-subsidisation; ensure interconnection at any technically feasible point in the 
network under non-discriminatory terms, conditions, and rates; administer universal 
service obligations in a transparent, non-discriminatory, and competitively neutral 
manner; make licensing criteria publicly available; establish a regulator that is separate 
from and not accountable to any supplier of basic telecommunications services (but not 
necessarily independent o f all government ministries); and manage the allocation and 
use of scarce resources such as frequencies in an objective, timely, transparent, and non- 
discriminatory manner 
Source: Wunsch-Vincent (2004).
Shortcomings and open issues
Warren has argued that, to achieve complete liberalisation, the scope of 
telecommunications negotiations needs to broaden to allow reformers to build cross­
industry coalitions of interest. In addition, the WTO agreement does not satisfactorily 
address either the issues of subsidies and safeguards, or the problem of international 
pricing for telecommunications services595. Another open issue is whether the duty of 
non-discrimination extends on an intra-country basis. In other words, does the WTO 
require its members to ensure that domestic network providers give access to domestic 
competitors on the same terms it itself enjoys596?
WTO and ITU597
On the surface, the WTO and the ITU have complementary roles598. The two institutions 
have actually initiated cooperation in the field of accounting rates reforms. However, 
given that multilateral telecommunications rules will be needed, they will be provided by
595 Warren (1998: 94) and Drabek (2002: 57).
596 Naftel and Spivak (2000: 104). In 2004, the WTO issued a ruling on competition policy, which clarified 
this aspect. First, the term “anti-competitive practices” has been given a wide interpretation, following 
standard competition policy analysis, and has not been restricted to the illustrative list contained in the 
Reference Paper. Second, the panel stated that actions mandated by law were to be judged under the 
standard of anti-competitive behaviour, and might not be excused from competition standards as is 
sometimes the case in national competition laws. Thirdly, the Reference Paper entails a commitment to 
maintain appropriate measures to prevent anti-competitive practices by a dominant supplier (Hauser, 2004).
597 The ITU is further discussed in the next section.
598 The former is best equipped to deal with international commercial issues that arise in the context of 
competitive markets and the relationship between competitive and non-competitive markets. The latter best 
deals with issues that arise from the operation o f an international communications network, and the 
relationship between non-competitive suppliers (Feketekuty, 1988: 255).
Purpose 
Applicability 
Impact 
Key Provisions
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the WTO, other trade institutions and a diverse range of private sector-led standards 
bodies, and not by the ITU599. In fact, the BTA is designed to accelerate a movement 
away from the “old ITU system” -  based on exchanges among sovereign national 
monopolies and heavily weighted with subsidy policies -  towards a market-based
international order allowing foreign entry into home markets and promoting
600competition .
During most of the 1990s a debate raged between those arguing that the international 
telecommunication regime would outpace governments’ ability to keep abreast of 
developments and put an end to the monopoly of states in telecommunication policy­
making601 and those who did not believe in a single regulatory trend imposed by the 
regime602. For Levi-Faur, the BTA created a regulatory environment in the extra-national 
arena:
“It is not about the retreat ofpolitics but about the creation o f a two-level 
political structure which enforces and promotes competition. ”
At the same time, a number of authors have hinted at the changing role of the state in the 
field of telecommunications arguing that “state-capital relations were being transformed 
and the state versus market balance had tilted in favour of the market in many 
countries.”604
The BTA negotiation acted as a reminder that globalisation was neither preventing 
governments from playing a major role in regulations, nor entailing the abdication of 
national authority to international institutions. Rather, the BTA’s regulatory principles put 
national governments under significant obligations to use their competition powers to 
curb anti-competitive behaviour by incumbent large carriers605. The telecom negotiations 
underscored the importance of three trade concepts: the most-favoured nation (MFN) 
principle, the national-treatment principle, and market access606. But, rather than 
requiring countries to liberalise fully and immediately, GATS established a process by 
which countries are channelled in the direction of liberalising trade in services. The 
agreement highlights the fact that telecommunications trade is now a multilateral, not a
599 Drake (2000).
600 Naftel and Spivak (2000: 92).
601 See Robinson (1991b) and Joseph and Drahos (1998).
602 Vogel (1997).
603 Levi-Faur (1997).
604 See Mody and Tsui (1995) and Strange (1996).
605 Cowhey and Richards (2000: 283). The BTA is also the first multilateral agreement to adopt competitive 
safeguards in industrial and developing countries.
606 Petrazzini (1996b: 14). See also Braga, Fink et al. (2002: 8).
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f X \1bilateral “affair” . It attracted widespread attention because it succeeded, on a large 
scale, in establishing the free trade principle in an area previously closed to foreign 
intervention608. However, it is important to underline that the Fourth Protocol is only a 
skeletal document and that the essence of the BTA is to be found in the range of national 
schedules of commitments, including the crucial dimension of market access609.
607 Taijanne (1999: 58). Conversely, Vogel notes that in telecommunications (and finance) there has been 
no single global trend toward regulatory laxity or regulatory subsidy and that national authorities will 
continue to have difficulty in shifting regulation to the international level (1997).
608 Wang (2003: 272).
609 The WTO negotiations in basic telecommunications did not take place in the usual context of a multi­
sectoral and multi-issue round of negotiations. Although this had, of course, been the original intention, 
failure to complete the negotiations before the end of the Uruguay Round effectively turned basic 
telecommunications into a single-sector negotiation. This tended to divide countries into those that looked 
for export gains and those whose focus could only be the conditions of competition in the domestic market 
(Low and Mattoo, 1998: 20).
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China’s relationship with supranational actors
Some scholars have argued that restructuring national policies and institutions and 
internalising practices, principles and standards to accommodate the exigencies of the 
world economy has become an inevitable process for China to rejoin the global economic 
system610. Conversely, scholars have argued that the main influences causing the shift in 
China's international attitude are coming from the country's huge domestic transformation 
and that the international environment and pressure have been a relatively minor factors 
in forming and changing China's foreign policy-making. We share the view that much of 
the evolution in Chinese policy and attitude toward international market norms is a result 
of China's participation in global and domestic markets per se, not of the influence of 
multilateral institutions611.
Table 30: Key actors in telecommunication regulation and their relevance to China 
Key Actors________ Internationally___________________________ China_______________
Organisation of 
states APEC, ITU, OECD, World Bank, WTO
Member of ITU, World Bank, 
WTO and APEC but limited 
participation
States US, UK
Not considered as active, except 
through USITO and Chambers of 
Commerce
International
business
organisations
INTUG, SWIFT, SITA, ICC
Partial presence through local 
chapters but no noteworthy 
influence
National business 
organisations
Telecommunications Managers Association 
(UK), Corporate Committee of 
Telecommunication Users (US)
Early days and difficulties to get 
organised
Corporations IBM, Time-Wamer, Citicorp, Bank of America, accounting firms
No large international Chinese 
MNC yet playing a significant role 
internationally
International NGOs ISO, International Electrochemical Commission, IFIP, Union of Radio Science
Not relevant except in the case of 
standard-setting
National NGOs National Telecoms Users Groups Some user groups, like the consumer association
Mass publics Radio regulation safety methods catalysed by sinking of Titanic Not relevant
Epistemic 
communities of 
actors
Strong Potentially influential but often divided along political lines
Source: Adapted from Braithwaite and Drahos (2000).
Like in many other countries, China’s telecommunications-operating agencies were 
isolated from the globalisation process and concerned primarily with domestic 
requirements well into the 1990s612. In their study on regulation, Braithwaite and Drahos
610 Zhang (2003: 706).
611 Pearson (1999b: 227) and Wang (2001b: 113).
612 Robinson (1991a: 804).
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identify the various actors making up the telecommunication regulatory system (see Table 
30)613. Among the major multilateral economic institutions that make up the global 
economic regime, those relevant to China include the World Bank, the IMF and the 
WTO614. China has gained membership in all of them615.
Table 31: China participation in major international fora, 1972-2001
Forum Commentaccession
1972 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Passive membership
1977 International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation 
(ITSO)616
Member of advisory 
committee
1980 World Bank617 and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Key loans recipient
1982 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) Observer status618
1986 Asian Development Bank (ADB) -
1990 APEC TELMIN Very limited activity
2001 World Trade Organisation (WTO) -
Source: Adapted from Liang and Zhu (1994) and Pearson (1999b).
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
In the past it was possible to view telecommunications policy issues solely from a 
domestic perspective, with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) acting as an 
international forum for developing the necessary standards and protocols for interworking 
between independent domestic networks, and for developing the necessary administrative 
arrangements for such matters as revenue sharing619. Composed almost entirely of 
countries with state-owned monopolies for telephone service, the body has performed 
these functions well and the global telecommunication system has evolved in a generally 
cooperative environment. While the ITU still carries out the important activities of 
coordination and standardisation, it remains essentially a technical and regulatory
613 Braithwaite and Drahos (2000). See also Drahos and Joseph (1995: 621) who include states, 
international organisations, US multinationals, users of services and manufacturers of telecommunications 
equipment, national and international organisational representatives.
614 Pearson (1999b: 207).
615 China's integration into the world trade and investment systems has occurred without significant 
disruption to the regime. China has not forced a change of rules on those systems; rather the dominant trend 
has been for its reformers to adjust their rules to those of the regime (Pearson, 1999a: 184).
616 Previously known as Intelsat.
617 China was a founding member of the World Bank. On 14 April 1980, the World Bank declared in a 
statement that since the day when the People's Republic of China represented China in IBRD, IDA and IFC, 
the three agencies would develop relations only with the People's Republic of China.
618 China did not formally apply for GATT membership until 1986, well into the Open Door era (Roy,
1998: 92). China participated fully in the Uruguay Round negotiations as an observer of the GATT. On 
July 19,1991, the Chinese delegation formally presented its initial offer of commitments on trade in 
services. Later on, the offer was revised three times. In April 1994, China submitted its conditional offer of 
commitments on trade in services in the form of schedule of specific commitments (WTO, 2002).
619 Robinson (1991a: 804).
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(\0C\body . China’s involvement in the ITU is more than 80 years old. China joined the ITU 
in 1920. In 1932, the first delegation was sent to attend the Plenipotentiary Conference of 
ITU where China signed the International Telecommunication Convention. In 1947, 
China was elected to the Executive Council of ITU. After the founding of the People’s 
Republic in 1949, China was deprived for a period of time of its seat but it was restored in 
May 1972 when the PRC assumed membership from its rival regime in Taipei. In its 
subsequent participation, the government, represented successively by MPT and Mil, has 
done little to reshape the parameters of the telecommunication regime, finding its own 
interest as essentially compatible with the state-centric thrust of that regime’s traditional 
norms. In addition, the ITU was central in maintaining the international accounting rate 
system, thus providing China with an important inflow of hard currency to build the 
domestic network621. At least since the 7th Five-Year Plan (i.e. in 1985), China has been 
pre-occupied with the internal development of a telecommunication network sufficient to 
support the massive growth targets set by the Five-Year Plans, rather than seeking a 
leading role in shaping the development of international and supranational bodies622.
For many years, Chinese companies did not depart much from their government’s 
“passive” attitude. For example, China Telecom seemed mostly concerned with following 
ITU discussions on interconnection, switching and transmission standards, and was not 
active in other fora such as the World Summit on Information Society. However, today, 
all major Chinese operators and equipment makers with views on the global 
telecommunication market are members of the ITU (see Table 32)623.
Table 32: Chinese companies members of ITU
620 Zhao (2002: 295-296). The functions of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) are organised 
and carried out in three areas of work, referred to as sectors. These are radiocommunications, 
standardization, and development. Of these, both the Radiocommunication Sector and the 
Telecommunication Standardisation Sector play an important role in the development of internationally 
agreed standards and other national regulatory measures. For its part, the Development Sector (ITU-D) has 
primary responsibility for activities aimed at facilitating and enhancing telecommunication development by 
offering, organising and coordinating technical cooperation and assistance in five major areas -  sector 
reform, technologies, management, finance and human resources. Some of the instruments, which are the 
basis for and which also result from ITU activities, such as the Radio Regulations, are legally binding 
obligations on its Member States. In its work on standardisation, ITU-T has recognised the implications of 
a world-wide trend towards a “market-driven” approach, and the increased involvement of the private sector 
in the standardisation process (WTO, 1999a: 17).
621 Lovelock (1999: 310).
622 Tipson (1999: 241-242).
623 China Telecom has adopted all ITU standards and only purchases standard equipment (Interview (B- 
036), conducted in Beijing by phone, 24 November 2003).
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Name___________________________________________ ITU-R ITU-T ITU-D Categories
Alcatel Shanghai Bell, Shanghai X X X SIOa
China Mobile Communications Corporation, Beijing X X ROAb
China Network Communication Group Corporation, Beijing X X X ROA
China Telecommunications Corporation, Beijing X X ROA
China United Telecommunications Corporation, Beijing X X ROA
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Shenzhen X X X SIO
ZTE Corporation, Shenzhen X X X SIO
Note:a Scientific or Industrial Organisation;b Recognised Operating Agency.
Source: Compiled by author from ITU.
In July 2004, ZTE submitted seven proposals on different subjects and was authorised to 
draft two standards for NGN (Next Generation Network) service quality624. It was also 
granted the right to draft new analysis standards related to core mobile communications 
networks and radio access technologies using the Chinese developed 3G standard TD- 
SCDMA by 3 GPP.
The World Bank
The World Bank became involved in the telecommunication sector through its support for 
privatisation. Beginning in the early 1980s, and mainly in developing countries, the 
World Bank's lending operations supported the privatisation of many state-owned 
telecommunication enterprises625. It is said to have wielded enormous influence in the 
restructuring of telecommunications in developing countries through its research and 
contributions to developmental telecommunication policy discussions. Through its 
advisory and lending capacities, it has helped to institutionalise regulatory policies in 
countries moving towards a market model of telecommunication626. That the World Bank 
could have played “a major role in pushing restructuring and opening up the 
telecommunications market in both China and India” should not come as a surprise as it 
pressed governments to reform, providing “in exchange” financial support for the task627. 
Nevertheless, the impetus for the original contacts with the World Bank (and the IMF) 
came from China. Chinese leaders made the decision to approach the Bank and Fund 
carefully, following a number of path-breaking domestic policy changes628. Studies 
indicate that over the years the relationship between China and the World Bank remained
624 Including the requirements for NGN quality of service (QoS), the general reference model of NGN QoS, 
QoS structure of IP connections, definition of NGN, business guarantee frame of NGN and the function 
module of NGN.
625 Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 346) and Intven, Oliver et al. (2000:1-8).
626 Urey (1995: 114) and Drahos and Joseph (1995: 625).
627 Mody and Tsui (1995: 187) and Petrazzini (1995: 36).
628 The most important of these were the elimination of the Cultural Revolution leadership, the decision to 
place economic reform at the forefront of the domestic agenda, the end of strict self-reliance, and the related 
legitimation of the concept of economic interdependence (Pearson, 1999b: 215).
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relatively cooperative and that China has become an active participant in the major other 
multinational financial institutions (e.g. the Asian Development Bank)629. Despite 
international pressure to break the state monopoly on telecommunications and broaden 
market forces that originated at the World Bank, the impact of its cooperation in the 
telecommunication sector is minimal both in absolute terms and in comparison with other 
sectors of the Chinese economy630. As noted earlier, multilateral development loans were 
employed in telecommunications only until 1995. The World Bank’s Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) supported a number of projects on top of the 
cooperation in regulatory and institutional reform (see Table 33).
Table 33: World Bank's participation in China's divestiture projects, 1997-2002
Financial „ , ,  T . , Total*_ . A_T o x  rp ennr Subtype InvestmentClosure Project Name Segment TypeofPPI o f p Jp j  Years USD million
Year
1997 China Mobile HK Mobile access Divestiture b Partial 1997-2001 5,970
2000 China United Fixed access, mobile Divestiture Partial 2000-2002 5,600
Communications access, and long distance
2001 China Netcom Fixed access and long 
distance
Divestiture Partial 2001-2001 325
2002 China Telecom Fixed access and long 
distance
Divestiture Partial 2002-2002 1,130
Note: “The investment figures include private and public contributions; Divestiture: A private entity buys 
an equity stake in a state-owned enterprise through an asset sale, public offering, or mass privatisation 
program.
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructures Project Database.
In addition to the World Bank, China has cooperated with the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and with the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) on a limited 
number of projects. Two loans631 of USD 100 million each632 (or 1.64% of total ADB 
lending as of 2002), in the early to mid-1990s, supported development of the fibre optic 
network. They were preceded by two small loans from UNDP in 1991 and 1992 to 
support a telecommunication modernisation programme (respectively USD 12 million 
and USD 10.5 million). More recently, the Asian Infrastructure Development Company 
invested in two companies in the road and telecommunications sectors, while Asian 
Infrastructure Mezzanine Capital Fund invested in one company in the
629 China did not seek a major leadership role but was involved productively in the policy-making o f these 
institutions (Pearson, 1999a: 168). See also Lieberthal (1995: 335).
630 Harwit (1998: 189).
631 The first loan was granted in 1993. The second project (1995) also included a USD 600,000 technical 
assistance grant. The project was to “relieve congestion in the long distance network, meet traffic growth 
resulting from local network expansion, improve network quality and efficiency, enhance reliability and 
flexibility, modernise the network for new services, contribute to a more equitable distribution of the 
benefits of telecommunications, and promote the continuation of sector reform in the 9th Five-Year Plan 
period”. While technical assistance was to “assist the provincial telecommunications authorities to become 
more market oriented in their business planning, operations and management” (ADB, September 26,1995).
632 Actual disbursement of the second loan amounted to USD 65.46 million (Asian Development Bank, 
2000: 22).
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telecommunications/internet sector. While investment goes on, lending to the 
telecommunication sector was stopped because policy reform was not happening fast 
enough, and the linkage between telecommunications and poverty reduction (ADB's 
overarching objective) was weak and there was limited demand for future lending633.
China’s role in regional bodies
In addition to global institutions, there are at least six bodies in the Asia Pacific that aim 
to promote regional cooperation on telecommunications issues634. APEC is the sole 
regional body with the governmental authority to pursue coordinated liberalisation and 
one of the most advanced in terms of substance, delivery of outputs or stakeholders’ 
involvement635. Through the APEC's Telecommunications Working Group (APEC Tel), 
it is pursuing a number of activities concerning the regulatory aspects of international 
trade in services -  it has completed a report on the legal and regulatory issues pertaining 
to electronic commerce636. Until the end of the 1990s, China’s APEC proposals for 
telecommunication services were "‘notable for their lack o f substance and the absence o f 
any long-term agenda”6*1. More recently, in the framework of APEC’s Tel, China has 
taken a number of steps, such as the unification of the national quality accreditation and 
certification system and the mutual recognition agreement (MRA)638. It has also 
submitted over time various plans allowing foreign investors to explore services, notably 
value-added services. Its most visible activity has been the establishment in China of an 
APEC MRA working group in May 2001, whose main task is to design the strategy and 
the general plan for Tel MRA, coordinate all the regulations and works concerned and 
push forward the implementation of APEC MRA639.
633 E-mail communication from a senior ADB representative in Beijing, 18 November 2003.
634 The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation process (APEC); the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
(PECC); the Pacific Telecommunications Council (PTC); the Asia Pacific Telecommunity (APT); and the 
Asian ISDN Council. For example, APT has launched its Asia-Pacific Telecommunity Standardization 
Program (ASTAP) in February 1998 to promote and coordinate expert activity in telecommunications 
standardisation across the Asia-Pacific region.
635 Warren (1995: 16-17).
636 Instigated in 1990, APEC Tel's agenda includes the introduction of region-wide standards, intra-regional 
technology transfer, infrastructure development and accelerated trade and investment liberalisation to create 
an open, multilateral trading system.
637 Mueller (1997: 4). Minister Wu took part in the APEC Telmin both in 1995 and 1996.
638 The APEC Leaders adopted the Osaka Action Agenda in November 1995, which states that APEC 
economies will develop and begin to implement, on an elective basis, a model mutual recognition 
arrangement on conformity assessment of telecommunications equipment. MRA is divided into two phases: 
Mutual Recognition of Test Reports (Phase I) and Mutual Recognition of Equipment Certification (Phase 
II). As of August 2002, China’s commitment to APEC’s MRA was “to be confirmed, Terminal Equipment 
Only” for MRTR and “To be advised” for MREC.
639 China reported that it would participate in Phase I procedures in 2004.
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Furthermore, the promulgation of the new “Arrangements for the Approval of Network 
Access of Telecommunications Equipment” reflects how China’s adjusted its 
management regulations of telecommunication equipment towards international 
practice640. While China’s proposals in the APEC Tel remain few and limited -  such as 
the Proposal for establishing a group on information communication and network 
security641 -  its participation to the meeting indicates a willingness to further integrate the 
various supranational bodies regulating the telecommunication sector. Formal accession 
to the WTO has created even better conditions for China to participate in APEC’s 
MRA642. Nevertheless, and although China has participated for several years in the APEC 
Telecommunication Working Group, U.S. negotiators had not perceived, until quite 
recently, that Chinese authorities felt any immediate pressure to comply with external 
expectations regarding the pace of their market liberalisation643.
Li, Qiang et al. find that “policy reforms are more likely where the constituents’ demand 
was larger, where institutional environments are better, and where foreign aid is larger 
and there are World Bank telecommunications loans”644. While some international 
organisations began to confront the problem of defining an open international framework 
covering foreign direct investment and trade in services, Chinese leaders kept considering 
telecommunication services as a purely domestic issue. WTO aside, there is scant 
evidence that China’s participation in international fora fundamentally impacted the 
telecommunication reform path. Unlike other developing countries, no fiscal crisis or debt 
burden forced the government to adopt a liberalisation programme dictated by 
multilateral lending agencies. However, China’s telecommunication reforms cannot 
solely be attributed to the government’s diktat. The next section turns to foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which has been “at work” since the mid-90s.
640 This regulation has completely adopted TEL MRA in its network access procedure by promising in 
Article 14 that “MRA arrangements will be carried out if  the mutual recognition agreement for telecom 
equipment test laboratories and test reports exists between Chinese Government and other countries or 
regions”.
641 It proposed to establish a group on information communication and network security within APEC TEL, 
which is set to achieve the goals as described in e-APEC strategy, namely to ensure the safety and security 
of information networks and transactions by those who use the internet, and to foster confidence in 
information infrastructure and networks through market-driven solutions to electronic security needs 
(APEC Telecommunications Working Group, 2002).
642 Some further adjustments of regulations relating to the implementation of APEC MRA are still going on 
smoothly in China since APEC Tel24 Meeting (He, 2002).
643 Tipson (1999: 243). Moreover, since 1999 nobody from China Telecom, or any other operator, has 
attended any of the APEC Telmin meetings, which may attest of the priorities of Chinese operators’ 
leadership.
644 Li, Qiang et al. (2000: 3).
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Foreign Direct Investment in telecommunication services, MNCs and equipment 
manufacturing
"No organizations and individuals outside China or solely foreign-funded enterprises, Sino- 
foreign joint ventures and cooperative businesses on the territory of China shall invest in, operate 
or participate in the operation of telecommunications services in China. ”
(MPT, 1993)
On the surface, the role of FDI in China’s telecommunication reforms appears rather 
limited. From a strictly legal perspective, FDI remained banned from the sector until 
China’s accession to the WTO and the passing of the Foreign Invested 
Telecommunication Enterprises (waishan touzi dianxin qiye guanli guiding or FITE) 
regulation645. In practice, however, the ban was not total. Foreign companies were able to 
exploit inter-Ministerial rivalries, taking advantage of the grey zone created by the ill- 
defined regulatory framework. This window of opportunity for investing in 
telecommunication services nonetheless remained limited both in time and in scope. On 
the one hand, the ban of FDI from China telecommunication sector is surprising. Studies 
show that FDI has increased supply capacity in telecommunications in developing and 
transition economies and improved reliability, especially by providing mobile telephony. 
In countries with strong regulatory systems, FDI has led to improved telecommunication 
services and contributed to higher economic growth. In other sectors, FDI has permitted 
the transfer of technical and management knowledge, leading to a significant upgrade of 
domestic companies’ competitiveness. On the other hand, the picture of FDI in 
telecommunication is not one of unalloyed benefits. Competition problems have emerged 
in several cases. In mobile telephony, bidding for licences resulted in oligopolistic 
competition. For fixed-line services, state monopolies were frequently turned into 
foreign-owned quasi-monopolies with long exclusivity periods. Prices sometimes rose 
because of reductions in subsidies.
History o f FDI in Chinese telecommunication services
While the Chinese government used early on the lure of foreign investment opportunities 
in China’s huge potential market in order to secure technical transfer from multinational 
equipment manufacturers, its FDI policy in the services sector has been ambivalent646. 
The FDI policy can be divided into four phases: explicit ban on foreign investment, 
circumvention of the ban, era of WTO negotiations, and policy development to comply 
with WTO647.
645 Decree No. 333 of the State Council (2001b).
646 Nolan and Wang (1999: 182).
647 Xu (2002: 27) and Du (2003: 6).
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In contrast to the equipment sector, China enforced a strict ban on foreign investment in 
telecommunication services well into the economic reform era. In itself, this is not a 
surprise as the ban resembled policies applied to other domestic public utilities648. In the 
second half of the 1990s, China’s FDI policy on telecommunication services was 
implemented through the “Government Guidelines for Foreign Investment in 
Telecommunications” issued by the State Council in 1994649. The guidelines separated 
investment into “Encouraged, Permitted, Restricted and Prohibited”, with 
telecommunication services falling into the latter category650. Thanks to inter-Ministerial 
rivalry and the need to finance the network, foreign investors were able for a few years to 
circumvent the ban. Investment was channelled inside the telecommunication sector 
through the zhong-zhong-wai financing scheme (see Chapter 3). While at odds with the 
legislative framework, many foreign investors viewed at the time the scheme as one of 
the numerous grey zones in which to operate. In practice, China’s well defined but ill- 
enforced policy on foreign investment mostly favoured China Unicorn’s interests and the 
funds helped build a lot of GSM networks and greatly facilitated the company’s take- 
off651.
The arrangement came under fire from the Mil shortly after a report (Document 405) 
from the SDPC, the SETC and the Ministry of Finance raised concerns that, through this 
back door method, foreign companies were getting too close to network operations. State 
Council Document 98 was subsequently issued with instructions to the Mil to investigate 
existing Unicom contracts and by 1998 the State Council had officially outlawed FDI in 
the basic services sector. The policy reversal caused trouble to many joint ventures, which 
had to dismantle their operations. Some of them left the country altogether, while others, 
like France Telecom, managed to keep a form of technical cooperation (in Guangzhou). 
The majority retreated to their representative offices in Beijing, with the hope to be ready 
when the gates would open. While many reasons may have contributed to the reversal of 
the situation, three of them stand out652. First, the administrative restructuring of the 
telecommunication sector and the creation of a new entity, Mil, put an end to the “dual 
structure” of the industry. In the past, foreign companies had been able to set up joint
648 As noted in the first section of this chapter, it is only at the beginning of the 1990s that the 
telecommunication regime came under pressure to integrate international trade and more specifically 
foreign direct investment in its liberalisation agenda.
649 State Council (1994).
650 WTO membership shifts telecommunications services from ‘Prohibited’ to ‘Restricted’ (see Chapter 6).
651 Interview (B-032), conducted in Beijing, 18 November 2002 and Harwit (1998:190).
652 In addition to questions of control, the CCF situation is also said to have broken apart because of failures 
on the contractual situation.
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ventures with China Unicom mostly by exploiting the rivalry between MEI and MPT. 
Since China Unicom and its parent, MEI, were not granted access to funding under the 
same conditions as the incumbent, they resorted to other sources of financing. Of course, 
it is not the creation of Mil per se that precipitated the end of the CCF scheme but rather 
the fact that Mil was mostly made of personnel from the former MPT and maintained 
strong links to the incumbent China Telecom. Second, the State Council saw an 
opportunity to put some order in the telecommunication sector and re-establish the central 
government’s authority. In a way, this resembled a process often observed in China, 
where the centre devolves power to the periphery for some time before seizing it back. 
The decentralisation process that had taken place in telecommunication had given 
provincial authorities room to manoeuvre, leading to issues of standardisation and 
diversity of regulation653. Third, WTO negotiations were entering a new phase and the 
telecommunication sector, which was until that point not discussed, became subject of 
intense haggling654. By shutting down joint ventures, the State Council was able to draw a 
clear line between what was allowed and what was not. By doing so, it made room for a 
more comfortable bargaining position in its WTO negotiation on market access in 
telecommunication. The State Council’s decision was also eased by the fact that the WTO 
commitments would allow FDI back in the country, albeit under uniform conditions and 
much stricter supervision than previously.
No exception is the rule
One company initially thought it had escaped the measures. Bom out of a memorandum 
signed in February 1993 with the State Planning Commission (SCP), Shanghai Symphony 
Telecommunication was intended to be something of a trailblazing test case, well in 
advance of WTO accession and above commitments655. Many observers had expected the 
deal between AT&T and Shanghai Telecom to serve as a reference to how the regulation 
would play out for foreign-invested operators. But to their dismay, not only did the joint- 
venture encounter many problems to get off the ground, in the end AT&T’s equity 
participation was trimmed down and market access was restricted to Pudong, in 
accordance with China’s WTO commitment656. Actors close to the deal attribute the 
difficulties to the novel nature of the venture and to the lack of existing regulations
653 Interview (B-004), conducted in Beijing, 19 September 2001.
654 See Chapter 6.
655 Studwell (2002: 104).
656 Reducing many years of expensive negotiations to little (Interview (B-002), conducted in Beijing, 27 
August 2001).
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dealing with such a joint venture. In the words of a manager directly involved with the 
venture:
“Whenever AT&T met a problem, it felt like making the rules on the go, on 
the run: regulatory problems were encountered at each step in the process 
o f setting up the JV, defining the business scope, and even defining
657whether the actual regulator was local or central. ”
The Shanghai Symphony case served as a brutal reminder of the keen attention that the 
government paid to its telecommunication sector. It also demonstrated the intricate 
relationship between local and central policy-makers and the inability of the domestic 
partner to broker a deal that would have given a foreign company a head start in the 
Chinese market658. However, other telecommunication services providers have made 
inroads in the market since then. Flag Telecom became the first and only private operator 
having landed a submarine telecommunication cable in China659. In addition, in March 
2003 South Korea’s SK Telecom joined hands with China Unicom to create the first 
Sino-foreign value-added mobile telecom service provider in China (see Table 34).
In line with its WTO commitments, China allows, as of December 2004, foreign 
operators a 25% stake in basic services joint ventures. Although 18 overseas firms are 
said to have applied to establish foreign-invested telecommunication enterprises by 
November 2004, investment remains scant660. This lack of interest for major acquisitions 
should not only be attributed to regulatory uncertainty or the ceiling on foreign 
participation661. The problem also lies with the imbalance between the five or six state- 
owned companies who can choose from more than a dozen international carriers. Chinese 
operators are therefore in no hurry to come to grip with foreign competition and as long 
as they are able to meet their investment needs on the international financial market, they 
will remain in a very comfortable bargaining position662.
657 Interview (B-011), conducted in Beijing, 6 September 2001.
658 Some observers have attributed the relative failure of the deal to Shanghai Telecom’s reluctance to 
cannibalise its own business.
659 A privilege granted because the landing of the cable brought a lot of experience, technology and modem 
equipment at a time where CoCom was still in place (Interview (B-003), conducted in Beijing, 28 August 
2001).
660 Like DoCoMo’s USD 8 million investment in two wireless value-added service providers.
661 The way the regulatory structure was set up for foreign investment does not provide a model where there 
is any inducement for the Chinese operators to partner with a foreign operator: the two partners have to set 
up a separate joint venture and get a separate licence (Interview (B-039), conducted in Beijing, 27 
November 2003).
662 Interview (B-009), conducted in Beijing, 4 September 2001 and (B-017), conducted in Beijing, 14 
September 2001.
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Company
name
Table 34: Operating joint ventures in China telecommunication services, 2004 
Domestic company Foreign percentage Comment
Shanghai
Symphony
Telecom
Shanghai Telecom (60%) 
and Shanghai Information 
Investment (15%)
AT&T 25%
March 2002. Offers IP-based 
data services for business 
clients in Shanghai’s Pudong 
district
UNISK
(Beijing)
Information
Technology
China Unicom SKTelecom 49%
2003. Registered capital of 
USD 6 million. Provides value- 
added mobile
telecommunication services
Beijing 
Honglian 95 
Information 
Industries
OTIC 21CN (Bermuda-incorporated) 49%
2004. Provides value-added 
mobile telecommunication 
services
Source: Compiled by author from Factiva and Interfax (2004).
In addition, for most international flag carriers, the capital requirements and, more 
importantly, the foreign equity limits have acted as a disincentive (see Table 35).
Table 35: Capital requirements and equity limits for foreign operators
Category Coverage Minimum registered capital Maximum foreign equity *
Basic
services
Nation-wide or across 
provinces
RMB 2 billion 
USD 247 million 49%Within provinces RMB 200 million 
USD 24.7 million
Value-
added
services
Nation-wide or across 
provinces
RMB 10 million 
USD 1.24 million 50%Within provinces RMB 1 million 
USD 0.124 million
Note:a An additional requirement rules out consortiums made of investors whose shares cannot reach a 
30% threshold (e.g. respectively 15.3% and 14.7% for Chinese and foreign investors applying for a basic 
licence).
Source: Compiled by author from FITE (article 5, 6 and 8).
As a result, a few companies have resorted to alternative ways of taking part in the market 
by taking participation in some of the Chinese operators via the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange or private placements (see Table 36).
Foreign investors are left with one of the following avenues: passive investment in red- 
chip telecommunication companies (e.g. China Netcom), minority investment in national 
telecommunication company (e.g. Vodafone and China Mobile), new WTO joint venture 
(e.g. SK Telecom and China Unicom) or offshore indirect investment structures. But even 
after spending more than USD 3 billion, Vodafone’s relationship with China Mobile
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remains mostly limited to technical cooperation and excludes any form of relation with
provincial subsidiaries663
Domestic
Table 36: Foreign participation in China basic telecommunication services, 2005 
Foreign company Percentage Comment
China
Mobile Vodafone 3.27%
Two-step acquisition (USD 2.5 billion in late 
2000 and USD 750 million in May 2002). 
Interested in raising this to 20% if 3G services 
are launched
China
Unicom Hutchison Whampoa 1.6%
USD 400 million stake at time of IPO (June 
2000). In addition, 49-51% joint-venture 
focusing on telecom consultancy and marketing 
services in China established in September 2000
China
Netcom
(HK)
Goldman Sachs, News 
Corp., Dell, Sun Hung 
Kai, Henderson Land and 
Kerry Group
12% USD 300 million through equity financing
China
Netcom
(HK)
Telefonica 9.9%
After a first 3% and 2% acquisition, the 
additional 4.9% stake is worth about USD 538 
million
Note: In addition, China Telecom is considering taking on international strategic investors, with potential 
candidates including NTT DoCoMo, France Telecom or Verizon Communications Inc (AFX, 2005a). 
Source: Analysts reports and FT (2003).
This lack of activity hides a deeper form of integration. Both companies are actually 
cooperating on deep-level issues that will have repercussions on the whole industry. The 
outcome of this strategy will only be visible in 3-5 years, i.e. with the delivery of new 
services based on a common standard. This kind of technical cooperation is in line with 
the announced strategy to take common position on standards issues664. In other words, 
all foreign shareholdings in the listed subsidiaries are merely portfolio investment with no 
direct influence over corporate behaviour665.
Two questions are relevant here. First, why has FDI remained absent from the 
telecommunication sector, with the exception of some equity stakes and value-added 
services ventures, despite the WTO-mandated opening of the market? Second, why had 
the government acted so defensively in comparison to the manufacturing sector?
In our view, three factors have prevented investment. First, foreign companies are not 
sure about the predictability and transparency of the Chinese environment. Right after
663 This has partly to do with the fact that China Mobile’s provincial subsidiaries have often had very 
privileged relationship with the local governments and that their strategies have been correspondingly 
impacted.
664 Interview (C-021), conducted in Beijing, 3 September 2002. Another instance of the collaboration of 
CMC and Vodafone is within 3GPP and Open Mobile Alliance (OMA).
665 Roseman (2005: 35).
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accession foreign investors were confused over the timeline for the liberalisation of 
different services, the requirement that foreign operators have to go into JVs, and the fact 
that the Ministry of Information Industry (Mil) applies a very restrictive and narrow 
interpretation to the scope of liberalisation under the framework of the WTO 
agreement666. Second, they are not sure of the profitability of the market. Third, there are
rcn
significant barriers in terms of level of capital required .
Comparison with manufacturing
China's rejection of FDI in telecommunication services was unusual relative to other
f.f .Q
economic sectors in China or to other countries at a similar level of development . In 
telecommunication equipment manufacturing, except for the period from 1978 to 1986 
where it remained banned from some infrastructure industries, FDI was selectively 
promoted in China and integrated with its industrial policy, embodying the government’s 
principle of “importing and transferring, digesting and absorbing, and growing and 
exporting”669. The promotion of FDI in the manufacturing of telecommunication 
equipment and terminals derived from China’s objective to become a major 
manufacturing and R&D base for MNCs and, in the mid-1980s the information 
technology industry (i.e. electronics and telecommunications) even became the leading 
beneficiary of FDI670. But the manufacturing sector did not remain exempt of restrictions. 
In addition to maintaining a licensing system671, Mil set up “one-on-one” regulations that 
required one exported terminal for each terminal sold domestically. The National 
People’s Congress (NPC) approved in 2000 and 2001 Amendments to the Chinese and 
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures Law, Amendments to the Chinese and Foreign Contractual 
Co-operative Enterprise Law, and Amendments to the Foreign-Capital Enterprise Law672. 
The Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry, which came into effect on
666 Interview (C-004), conducted in Beijing, 12 June 2002.
667 Interview (C-002), conducted in Beijing, 11 June 2004. In their study on telecommunication 
liberalisation in Asia, Fink, Mattoo et al. attribute limits on foreign ownership to two additional reasons: in 
case of rent-generating restrictions on competition, limits may seek to balance the efficiency-enhancing and 
the rent appropriation aspects of foreign investment; limits may also induce foreigners to form equity joint 
ventures so that local investors can learn by collaborating (Fink, Mattoo et al., 2001).
668 Mueller and Lovelock (2000: 732).
669 Tan (2001: 8,14).
670 Statistics reveal that, between 1983 and 1994,40 JVs were formed in the telecommunication sector 
(Zhu, 2001: 50). For example Motorola established a strategy consisting of investment (part of that was 
bringing technology to China), localisation of management (in 1994-1995, 11-12% of the management was 
local while in 2001, it was up to over 75%), local content and local sourcing (which matched up with the 
government’s agenda to locate in China, export and buy local), and joint ventures and partnerships 
(Interview (B-005), conducted in Beijing, 13 September 2001).
671 Initially 10 licences were issued to GSM phone sets manufacturers. The same practice was repeated for 
CDMA terminal manufacturers for which Mil issued 19 licences (Interview (B-020), conducted in Beijing, 
17 September 2001).
672 The three laws are the pillars of China’s FDI legal framework (Tang, 2002: 37).
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April 1, 2002, encourages foreign investment in the production of 29 specific categories 
of electronic and communications equipment. It reflects China's WTO commitments and, 
in particular, it addresses a number of areas of interest to technology, media and 
telecommunications companies673.
The causes for banning FDI from telecommunication services are numerous and they 
evolved over time, but two stand out674. First, by restricting access to FDI, MPT shielded 
the incumbent operator from domestic competition . Second, Chinese policy-makers 
tend, like in other countries, to safeguard the national industry’s interests. As we will see 
in the next chapter, the difference of treatment between manufacturing and services lasted 
well after China’s accession to the WTO. In fact, some of the largest foreign equipment 
manufacturers, such as Ericsson, were not expecting to be much affected by the WTO 
accession on the grounds that they already knew how to set up JVs, make them 
operational and profitable676. But the sharp decline in protection of electronics goods 
(from 21.69 to 3.44%) is undoubtedly related to China's agreement to implement the ITA 
as part of its accession package677. First of all, when it came to setting up a new factory or 
joint venture, large equipment manufacturer have always been closer to MOFTEC than to 
Mil. If not an ally of multinationals, the former was often described as being heedful to 
the interests of foreign investors. Second, since foreign trade was mostly the prerogative 
of MOFTEC, the regulations were “favourable” to foreign investment678.
Would the presence of FDI have altered the scope, nature and pace of reforms? Mueller 
and Lovelock found that the prospect of WTO accession was a highly influential factor in 
motivating the Chinese to open up their domestic market to foreign direct investment. 
They argued that in the absence of external pressure:
673 The aim of the new legislation is to channel foreign investment into areas where the central government 
desires increased foreign involvement and to strictly control other industries where foreign capital and 
expertise is required but only under close supervision (Leigh, 2002).
674 For Mueller and Tan (1997: 39), the restriction on foreign involvement rest on security concerns, 
financial reasons and the lack of reform at the provincial and local level. Several factors, including top-level 
political interventions and a tug-of-war among government agencies, have been attributed to China's policy 
change regarding foreign investment in telecommunications (Wang, 2003: 276).
675 Ure (2002: 2).
676 Interview (B-007), conducted in Beijing, 31 August 2001.
677 Ianchovichina, Martin et al. (2000: 26).
678 Interview (B-007), conducted in Beijing, 31 August 2001.
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“China's state would remain closed to FDI and rely entirely upon 
domestic competition and structural reform o f China Telecom to 
modernise and develop its telecommunication sector679. ”
Similarly, Mueller and Tan had argued that services markets in China would remain 
closed as long as national industrial policy and domestic political considerations define
/ J Q A
the agenda . The question of whether trade policy would override the status quo was of 
course central to the WTO negotiations. The ban coincided with a renewed activity in 
WTO negotiations and a broader administrative restructuring led by the State Council, 
and aimed at personnel reduction and change of government functions681.
At first glance, China’s policy towards FDI in the telecommunication sector during the 
period preceding the WTO accession may seem paradoxical. The government was at the 
same time willing to attract foreign capital to develop the industry and banning foreign 
participation in management . However, this apparent contradiction disappears under 
closer examination. The government has taken advantage of foreign investors’ longing to 
access the Chinese market. Or as Sautede put it, “Chinese authorities have been able to 
keep control o f the agenda for foreign investment as a function o f their own requirements 
for national development. ”683
679 Mueller and Lovelock (2000: 756). In their model, the state's willingness to keep a ban on FDI depends 
heavily upon the assumption that foreign strategic investors would continue to make substantial investments 
without equity.
680 Mueller and Tan (1997: 112).
681 Chan and Drewry (2001).
682 Lu (1994: 202).
683 Sauted6 (2002: 37).
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Explaining FDI restrictions through national security and sovereignty 
Administrative reforms in the last two decades have created new incentives and 
opportunities for government agencies to compete with one another for economic 
resources, including FDI684. One factor that sets the reform of Chinese telecommunication 
apart is the government’s ability to stir a path which put enough pressure on the 
incumbent operator and Mil to initiate reforms without giving in to the demands of 
foreign multinationals and governments. To achieve this, the government was able to rely 
on the sacred principles of national security and sovereignty685. Control of 
communications networks and services has long been viewed as an essential component 
of national sovereignty, and in Asia the linkage between national security and 
telecommunications has frequently been invoked as one reason for restricting foreign 
ownership of operators. The ability to communicate internationally was nevertheless 
equally recognised as being of critical importance to a country’s prospects of 
development, leading governments to balance these opposite political and functional 
imperatives686.
Historically, concerns about national sovereignty in telecommunications emerged with 
the proliferation of Western technology in the 1950s and accelerated throughout the 
1960s, becoming of pivotal importance during the 1970s in the multilateral negotiations 
on the standards for direct satellite broadcasting687. From the mid-1970s to the mid- 
1980s, the debate revolved around transborder data flows688. The centrality of national 
sovereignty in the international telecommunication regime was further eroded during the 
Uruguay Round689. This is not to say that it has been fully discarded, as today’s trade 
rules for telecommunications services are a compromise between trade liberalisation and 
state sovereignty690. Nations nonetheless achieved a shared view on international 
telecommunications issues, based on the pragmatic assessment that relinquishing a degree
684 Wang (2000: 540).
685 Chinese policies in the human rights and telecommunication regimes, for example, have reflected its 
leaders’ resolve to guard against the influx of foreign values and ideas “to take what is goodfrom the 
outside world and filter out what is potentially harmful to them” (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999: 20).
686 Chong and Chow (1999: 5), Janda (1999) and Drake (2001: 27-28).
687 Hamelink (1993).
688 Many governments and independent analysts worried that the use of TDF, particularly by American- 
based MNCs, could have negative effects on national economic, legal, and socio-cultural independence. 
Cumulatively, these effects were said to undermine national sovereignty and justify new regulations (Drake, 
1993: 259-260).
689 Taijanne (1997: 43). From a regime standpoint, WATTC-88 had already initiated a progressive 
decoupling of the traditionally linked concepts o f sovereignty and national monopolies over international 
telecommunications (Drake, 2000: 150).
690 Wolfe (1999) and Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 352). International negotiations in particular were 
careful to preserve the sovereignty of independent nations to do what they wished with the revenues 
generated from international telecom services (Taijanne, 1997: 50).
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of national sovereignty would accrue ample dividends in terms of enhanced consumer 
welfare and speedy deployment of equipment and services691.
The sovereignty principle rests on two dimensions. Internally, states can configure and 
govern their national networks and industries however they please as long as they play by 
the rules where international correspondence is concerned. Thus, sovereignty was 
routinely invoked to justify practices that had the effect of buttressing state monopoly 
control, an objective achieved by means of licence attribution . It was also used to 
support the notion that a national, unitary network under state control was a great device 
in the pursuit of national integration and the consolidation of national identity693. 
Externally, international relations have to be conducted in accordance with the mutual 
consent of the countries involved.
Table 37: Foreign-ownership concerns and counter-arguments
Concerns Counter-arguments
Foreign ownership might • Armed forces in most countries have their own communication
compromise a nation’s networks with the internal capability of operating them
'g defence • Most networks have sunk costs that make them easy targets for
o(3 nationalisationOo • There is an increasing variety of communication options available to
1
G large userso Foreign owners may be • No proof of domestic inclination to support those objectives vs.
less sympathetic to broad profitability
social objectives
Market will fail to • Restrictions on foreign ownership are probably not the optimal way
produce an efficient for the host economy to capture the rent as they encourage
outcome (economic rent) production by less efficient domestic suppliers at the expense of
o
eo
more efficient foreign suppliers
go Market will fail to • Technological externalities result from the diffusion of technology
w produce an efficient andR&D
outcome (external • Foreign ownership restrictions almost certainly retard technological
economies) changes
Source: Adapted from Globerman (1995).
The argument goes that technological innovations in telecommunications, liberalising 
policies, and the Internet's ascendancy threaten the ability of national governments to 
control the flow of communication and centrally manage that sector of the economy694.
691 Frieden (2001: 149).
692 Wright (1999: 558) and Drake (2000: 133).
693 Petrazzini (1995: 12).
694 Frieden (2001: 63). Globerman (1995) refutes the conventional sovereignty argument (i.e. foreign 
ownership might compromise a nation’s defence) on the basis that armed forces in most countries have then- 
own communication networks with the internal capability of operating them, and that there is an increasing 
variety of communication options available to large users. Mulvenon and Bickford (1999) provide a good 
insight of the PLA and the telecommunications industry in China.
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Telecommunication sovereignty with Chinese characteristics
China’s concept of sovereignty is closely inspired from the Western one where policy 
linkages between foreign investment and sovereignty are commonly made695. Chinese 
leaders have held the notion that telecommunication concerns the nation’s security and 
sovereignty and therefore could not be opened to the outside world, a belief re-enforced 
by the old telecommunication regime, which provided China with a comfortable “womb” 
of state sovereignty within which to develop policy at its own pace696. In a centrally 
administered country like China, telecommunications were part of the national security 
network and part of Beijing’s need to keep in touch with, and control the outlying 
provinces. In addition, telecommunication remains used as an instrument of industrial 
policy and as a vehicle to stimulate domestic equipment and component manufacturing. 
As a result, sovereignty, as well as the closely related issue of national security, has 
continuously influenced China’s position on FDI and the broader direction of 
telecommunication reforms697.
Thanks to the WTO accession, China’s policy debate on foreign investment in 
telecommunication has shifted from a strict ban to considerations of what degree and how 
soon foreign network equity ownership and telecommunication service operation could be 
allowed without subverting China’s national interest. But while the long-held position has 
been challenged in recent years, the government remains concerned about 
telecommunications safety, national security and sovereignty. Recent regulations 
explicitly incorporate the notion of sovereignty. For example, the rules governing the 
administration of telecommunications construction (tongxin jianshe guanli hanfa) provide 
that “when managing telecommunications construction, it is necessary to safeguard the
f .Q O
state sovereignty in telecommunications” .
695 A country’s policy on foreign investment in services making the backbone of a nation’s communications 
and information infrastructure is indeed often regarded as the indicator of a government’s position on 
sovereignty vis-^-vis trade opportunities and economic growth (Wang, 2003: 268). For example, in the 
United States the need to keep national control of radio transmission systems was felt after an experience 
during the Second World War during which the US government could not control radio broadcast systems 
because of foreign ownership (OECD and Kurisaki, 1995).
696 Tipson (1999: 255).
697 Several scholars have directly attributed the country’s conservative stance on FDI to the issue of 
sovereignty and national security. See Zhang and Peng (2000: 14), Rimmer and Comtois (2002: 108) and 
Xu (2002: 25-26).
698 Decree No. 20 jointly issued by Mil and SDPC in February 2002. These worries are also illustrated by 
how the government deals with the Internet. In terms o f legislation, China’s State Secrets Bureau has issued 
in January 2000 the “State Secrecy Protection Regulations for Computer and Information Systems on the 
Internet”.
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In other words, the basic dilemma faced by China is one between social and political 
stability, national sovereignty and development. On one side, there is an acknowledgment 
that FDI can contribute to the development of the sector through transfer of capital, 
technology and management know-how. On the other side, policy-makers have 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of the telecommunication industry as well as its 
sensitivity:
“The industry is essential to state sovereignty, security and economic 
lifelines. ”699
“Communications networks are part o f a country's basic public facilities 
and serve as its nervous system, making their governance an issue o f 
national sovereignty and security. ”700
In their view, the principal threat to sovereignty and national security comes via FDI in 
telecommunication operations. Such argumentation is however contested by Janda, who 
argues that China is in a position to avoid both issues of dependency and control. The 
former is addressed both by legislation and by the army’s own sophisticated and elaborate 
telecommunications network . For example, the PL A was given control over large 
sections of the broadcast spectrum for reasons of national security. China also has the 
necessary tools to protect national security both under its domestic legislative regime and 
under Articles XIV and XlVbis of the GATS702.
Thus, what explains the persistence of sovereignty and national security in the rhetoric 
and actions of the government? Could the issue of sovereignty mask a legacy of power 
struggles or vested interests? For example, the issues of sovereignty and national security 
could have been put forward by MPT in an attempt to protect its monopoly from domestic 
and international competitors. As noted, senior MPT officials emphasised the centrality of 
telecommunication in terms of sovereignty and national security. In fact, they made no 
secret of their intention to keep all foreign influences away from the sector for security 
and sovereignty reasons, in spite of pressures from the WTO membership negotiations 
and of the need for network development703. The prominence should thus be understood 
as a continuity of the State Council’s policies of economic development. Since the early 
1980s, the State Council commissioned and endorsed proposals to give
699 Wu Jichuan quoted in (Savadove, 2002).
700 Liu Cai quoted in (Renmin Youdian, 1999).
701 In particular, the 1993 National Security Law.
702 See Janda (1999: 24-25) and Mulvenon and Bickford (1999). Similar arrangement such as “golden 
share” and legal doctrines like Section 606 of the Telecommunications Act of the United State grant power 
to the President to take over telecommunications system in such urgent occasions as war (Xu and Kan,
2000: 15).
703 Wang (2003: 274).
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telecommunications development a key role in the national economy. It is however 
important to keep in mind that the notion of sovereignty is not restricted to the 
telecommunication sector. Chinese leaders remain vigilant against the potential incursion 
of unwanted foreign influence in areas as disparate as human rights and the environment. 
Thus, while embracing the technological advantages of participating in the 
telecommunications regime, Chinese leaders engage in a continuous battle against the 
“spiritual pollution” that such technology invites704. Sovereignty is closely related to the 
concept of national security. There is a worry that foreign ownership of 
telecommunication facilities might enable state secrets to be sent out of China easily and 
that the telecommunications infrastructure might be out of control during a state of 
emergency705. Accordingly, concerns over national security are addressed in the 
telecommunication regulation (article 57 to 66).
Chinese policy-makers are also certainly aware that the choice of ICT architecture is not
7 06politically neutral, especially when it comes to considerations of national security . As 
noted, China has expressed security concerns through technology policy and 
legislation707. The need to upgrade their technology has, nonetheless, forced the 
government to make exceptions708. The FLAG Europe-Asia cable system went live on 22 
November 1997, carrying traffic for over 60 leading international carriers. With the help 
of China Telecom, it became the first and only private operator to land a submarine cable 
in China. For people close to the deal, the reasons the government agreed were threefold: 
first, landing a submarine cable in China was bringing experience, technology and 
modem equipment; second, at the time, China still suffered from a number of export 
controls because of the of the Wassenaar Arrangement709 and last, the capacity of 
circumventing the foreign investment blockade also lied in the nature of Flag’s business. 
Far from offering customer telecommunication services, one could argue that Flag “only” 
sold undersea capacity from Europe to Japan and happened to have a landing station in 
Shanghai. Having said this, a number of constraints remained. First, no law or regulation 
was governing the business of international submarine capacity. Second, when the 
company attempted to branch into the wholesale service area, i.e. selling network and
704 Economy (1998: 8).
705 Xu and Kan (2000: 5).
706 Hughes (2002: 208-210). Still, some observers believe that national security concerns will have lesser 
influence and determining weight (Interview (B-003), conducted in Beijing, 28 August 2001).
707 Feigenbaum (2003: 202) and Segal (2003: 167).
708 Most of this section is based on interview (B-003), conducted in Beijing, 28 August 2001.
709 The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in order to contribute to regional and international security 
and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and 
dual-use goods and technologies.
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managed bandwidth services, the initial findings were not very encouraging. It also 
appears that the main concern was about the ownership of the submarine cable710.
In summary, the shift of telecommunication to the supranational level has heightened the 
visibility of sovereignty and national security in the policy debates. Although the 
emphasis on national sovereignty in dealing with network use may sound somewhat out 
of tune with the age of global communication, Mil is likely to remain highly 
interventionist given concerns over security and sovereignty711. In fact, concerns over 
sovereignty and national security have been included in the regulatory framework.
Outwardforeign direct investment
China’s increased integration in the world economy has had important effects on its 
domestic economy712. The opening of the country to foreign investment, products and 
services, has turned the country into a key market for most MNCs. In turn, we assist 
today at the first signs of China’s expansion abroad713. Basic computing and network 
equipments are the first areas in the telecommunication sector where China is becoming 
globally competitive714. Over the past few years, some of the leading domestic equipment 
manufacturers have seen their revenues from domestic and foreign sales grow 
dramatically, with the latter accounting for around 40% of total revenue (see Table 38)715.
Table 38: Leading Chinese equipment manufacturers foreign and total sales, 2001-2004
2001 Sales 2002 Sales 2003 Sales 2004 Sales*
(USD million) (USD million) (USD million) (USD million)_________
Company Foreign Total Foreign Total Foreign Total Foreign Total %
ZTE Corporation 260 1,685 558 1,330 600 3,200 1,640 4,100 39.05%
Huawei 328 3,100 610 3,035 1,050 3,830 2,280 5,580 40.86%
Note: * Contracted sales; exports by Chinese telecommunication equipment makers were worth nearly 
USD30 billion in 2004.
Source: Compiled by author from various sources.
In parallel, domestic companies started to acquire assets and invest abroad. In 2002, TCL 
bought the bankrupt Schneider Electronics. Huawei, as part of a venture capital
710 In the second part of the 1990s, ownership o f submarine cables moved relatively rapidly from the “club” 
model, in which consortia of dominant Telecommunications Operators (TOs) jointly owned the cables, to a 
private ownership model where private companies or new operators financed the construction o f the cable 
and then sold capacity to whomever required it.
711 Wang (1999a: 283)
712 See (Lardy, 2002; Zweig, 2002).
713 The average annual outward FDI flow has grown from USD 0.4 billion in the 1980s to USD 2.3 billion 
in the 1990s. In 2002 China invested USD 2.7 billion abroad, contributing to an accumulated book value of 
at least USD 35 billion outward FDI stock (on a balance-of-payments basis) at the end of 2002 (UNCTAD, 
2003).
714 At least in lower and mid-level markets (Interview (B-027), conducted in Beijing, 11 October 2001).
715 For example, ZTE has joined with a regional telecommunication group in Africa to install a new 
communication system in 20 countries (Shacinda, 2002).
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consortium, has invested USD 2 million in LightPointe Communications Inc., an
71 (sAmerican company that makes wireless optical devices . Thus, while accessing foreign 
technology meant promoting FDI in China and setting up joint ventures with leading 
MNCs, it takes today more and more the form of establishing R&D centres in developed 
countries and entering into international alliances. Huawei Technologies and ZTE
7 1 7Corporation have each established a number of R&D centres abroad and the latter has
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Portugal Telecom to establish
71 8strategic cooperation in R&D and market expansion . It has also concluded an alliance 
with Intel to develop and promote WiMAX.
Chinese operators too have shown impulses to expand abroad. In 2002, China Unicom
7 1 0won the right to operate a mobile-phone service in Hong Kong and signed various 
MOUs involving no cash or equity investment with foreign operators such as Telstra, 
KDDI or Hutchison Whampoa. It later considered taking a minority stake in an overseas
7 7 0network, possibly in Indonesia or India . Even the ultra-conservative China Telecom, 
held talks to with the Rajawali group on the purchase of Excelcomindo, Indonesia’s third- 
largest mobile operator. China Netcom’s purchase of Asia Crossing in 2003 and the 
recent attempt of China Unicom to acquire a 49% stake in Macau Telecommunications 
Co. hint at this increasing regional appetite721.
Table 39: Chinese operators and their M&A activity, 2002-2005
Operator Target Date Amount(USD) Comment
China
Netcom
Asia Global 
Crossing* 2002-11-19 270 million
Initial acquisition in partnership with 
Newbridge Capital and Softbank Asia 
Infrastructure Fund
China
Telecom Excelcomindo 2004-03-17 n.a.
Back-off amidst concerns about pricing 
and strategy
China
Unicom
Macau 
T elecommunications 2004-12-01 n.a.
Acquisition o f x%. Attempt currently 
blocked by CITIC’s refusal to sell
China
Netcom PCCW 2005-01-20 1 billion Acquisition of 20%
Note: *Now Asia Netcom.
Source: Compiled by author from Factiva.
716 San Jose Mercury News (2004).
717 Huawei now has research facilities in Sweden, Germany and America. It announced a USD lOOmillion 
investment to expand its Bangalore facility, which works on mobile-phone software and broadband research 
(Anonymous, 2003).
718 AFX (2005b).
719 The company is licensed to offer MVNO services but the reason China Unicom applied for the licence is 
not to compete in the local market, but to provide better roaming services between Hong Kong and China 
(Hui, 2002).
720 Ubels (2003).
721 Sender (2002) and Dickie (2003). Netcom and a host of investors now own the Asia unit of the collapsed 
Global Crossing entity. The purchase was the first key international acquisition by any Chinese 
telecommunication company.
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Target acquisitions have not been in the most competitive markets, nor has there been 
many large-scale deals. For example Jiming Telecom started the first Chinese 
telecommunication joint venture abroad by setting up an operation in Kirghizstan. China 
Netcom’s purchase of 20% in Hong Kong’s PCCW Ltd for an amount estimated at USD 
1 billion could nonetheless mark a turning point in the “go out” policy722 and confirm the 
rise of Chinese operators as players in mergers and acquisitions with regional and global 
reach . It will be very interesting to study how these companies fare in international 
markets. Beyond the purely financial or strategic nature of these acquisitions, it raises the 
question of whether domestic players can adapt to radically different regulatory 
environments and succeed without direct or indirect government support. It will also be 
worthwhile to study if regulatory “ideas” and policies encountered in foreign markets will 
make their way back to China via the large operators.
722 Then-President Jiang Zemin asked officials to “encourage and help relatively competitive enterprises" to 
invest abroad.
723 It has been followed by rumours of China Mobile’s intention to buy Hong Kong’s CSL, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Australia’s Telstra Corp.
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Concluding remarks
It is tempting to establish a causal link between the transformation in the international 
regime and China’s domestic telecommunication reforms. On the one hand, China is a 
long-time member of the ITU and all the other multilateral agencies that have played a 
significant role in reforming telecommunication markets across the world. On the other 
hand, there has been a very limited cooperation on reforming telecommunication between 
China and international agencies. Despite being the key recipient of World Bank loans for 
many years, both parties seem to have set their priorities elsewhere.
It has been argued elsewhere that much of the evolution in Chinese policy and attitude 
toward international market norms is a result of China’s participation in global and 
domestic markets per se, not the influence of multilateral institutions724. The agreements 
have undeniably enabled the Chinese to become familiar with international practices in 
the telecommunications sector and to gauge the importance of the discrepancies between 
these and the situation in China, bringing out into the open the main points of 
contention725. There are signs that the bureaucracy is increasingly attuned to regulatory 
development across the world. Whether through World Bank sponsored projects or 
mandates to domestic research institutes, Mil pursues an effort of benchmarking and 
scanning of best practices726. Thus, in addition to confronting China with some 
liberalisation issues, it has locked the country in the process of coming closer to 
international telecommunication regulations (ITR).
This chapter has argued that, until the WTO accession in 2001, there was no significant 
pressure at the government level to enshrine the telecommunication reforms in a supra­
national institutional framework. The shift of the telecommunication agenda from ITU to 
WTO, and China’s absence from the latter, deprived domestic reformers from using the 
on-going transformation of the telecommunication regime as a lever for pushing their 
domestic liberalisation agenda. In addition, long-held concerns over sovereignty and 
national security have mitigated the impact of China’s inclusion in the international 
regime. China’s on-going dilemma between the need for development and concerns over 
sovereignty is crystallised by its position on FDI, where foreign players have confined to 
the value-added sectors. This stands in stark contrast with the telecommunication 
equipment sector, where foreign investment was not only welcomed by even encouraged.
724 Pearson (1999b: 227).
725 Sautecte (2002: 37).
726 The most recent example is the World Bank funded project to implement price cap regulation.
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This is not to say that the transformation of the international telecommunication regime 
will not have an impact on China’s telecommunication policy-making and reforms. To 
the contrary, the regulatory conventions embedded in the Reference Paper will sooner or 
later confront the Chinese regulators and policy-makers with their responsibilities, either 
through a domestic push to benefit from the new regulatory framework derived from the 
international rules or because of pressure exerted by a foreign government.
Finally, the increased integration in the world economy has also expressed itself through 
the presence of Chinese firms abroad. Equipment vendors clearly lead the trend of “going 
out” but operators have also recently started to cast their eyes on foreign markets.
The next chapter examines into more details the relationship between trade and China’s 
telecommunication reforms.
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6 Trade and telecommunication
Trade policy is the result of a mixture of economic theory, political pragmatism, and commercial 
sawy. In managing their trade policies, countries have to balance the political concepts of 
national sovereignty and independence and the economic reality of interdependence.
(Feketekuty, 1988: 150-151)
On December 11, 2001, the People’s Republic of China officially joined the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). During the 15 years that separated the resumption of its status as a 
contracting party and its accession to the multilateral trade institution, the country 
underwent profound economic transformations spanning across most industries. But, as 
we will see, the extent of the transformation brought upon China’s telecommunication 
sector by its deeper integration in the emerging supranational telecommunication regime 
has been on the whole uneven, and to say the least, very disappointing for foreign 
operators.
An enormous amount of literature has been devoted to China’s WTO accession727. It is 
not the purpose of this section to discuss the ins and outs of the bid to join the multilateral 
trade institution. Suffice to say that China’s protracted GATT/WTO accession process has 
been dynamic and complex, affected by broad political and economic factors at both the 
international and the domestic levels, and by the complex process of bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations (see Figure 13) over more than fifteen years728. On the one hand, 
the commitments and obligations China accepted involved substantial political and short­
term economic costs, in terms of the necessary domestic adjustments and of overcoming 
domestic opposition. On the other hand, the accession negotiations were there to help 
provide the reformers an essential commitment to consolidate the necessary internal 
reforms729.
727 See among many others (Lardy, 1996,1999; Wang, 1999c; Zheng and Yu, 1999; Fewsmith, 2000; 
Ianchovichina, Martin et al., 2000; Yang, 2000; Pearson, 2001).
728 In this sense, China’s accession to the WTO is different from its participation in other international 
organisations (Harris, 1996: 140).
729 Accession negotiations often provide reformist governments in the queue for WTO membership with an 
essential commitment to consolidate die necessary internal reforms. In addition to influencing the progress 
of domestic reforms, the WTO accession process becomes a vital part of the acceding country’s 
development strategy because of the interplay between the domestic and international politics of trade 
(Lanoszka, 2001: 578-586).
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Figure 13: China's WTO accession process
Negotiation phase
(Working party)
WTO approval phase
(General Council)
Implementation
phase
(China)
M u lt i la tera l
Complete negotiations on 
how China will implement 
WTO rules
Finish documenting 
China’s commitments in 
the protocol and working 
party report
Bilateral
Complete negotiations 
with remaining members 
on China’s market access 
commitments
Consolidate and verify 
China’s commitments on 
tariffs, nontariff barriers, 
agriculture, and services 
(approx. 90 days)
China and working party reach consensus
Forward final accession package with draft declaration for review 
by all WTO members (several weeks)
Each member must decide 
whether to invoke “non-
a n n l i r a t i o n ”
General Council
Accepts/rejects China’s accession package
China completes all domestic 
requirements to accept and 
implement agreements and 
formally notifies the WTO
China 
becomes a 
WTO member
Source: GAO (2000).
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Initially, it was thought that China’s WTO membership would strengthen the position of
the reformers, legitimise and promote economic reform and assist the management of the
reform process of deregulation”730. Similarly Studwell noted that,
"Accession to the WTO was regarded by reformers as a solution to the 
nation’s bureaucratic impasse — an external pressure to force deregulation 
and greater competitiveness on a recalcitrant bureaucracy. The 
government committed to the WTO from a position o f weakness, not 
strength because o f quiet desperation, not unified political resolve. It 
reached for outside force to do a job it was failing to do itself -  the 
deregulation and de-bureaucratisation o f China’s economy. ”731
Scholars have argued that since its application to become a “member” of GATT in 1986, 
China’s reform agenda has been increasingly set by membership requirements of the 
GATT and the WTO732. This assertion needs to be qualified. In comparison to GATT, 
WTO rules applied to a whole new range of industries, including services such as 
distribution and telecommunication733. In fact, it is not until 1998 that basic 
telecommunication services were included in the schedule of commitments offered by 
Chinese negotiators.
This chapter presents both the history and an analysis of China’s WTO negotiations on 
telecommunications services. It argues that the very limited extent of the concessions 
offered by the government resulted from the rift, staged or not, between MOFTEC and 
Mil as well as from the relatively weak amount of political pressure that the State Council 
was able to exert on MIL The chapter also aims at better understanding how the 
commitments fit into the overall process of telecommunication reforms. The overall 
assessment is that both processes were on a “dual track” and that the institutional setting 
was unable to bridge the two tracks. The first section traces back the various offers made 
by the Chinese government in its bid to join first the GATT -  and later the WTO -  as well 
as the role played by the United States and the European Union in “shaping” the 
telecommunication commitments. The second section looks at how the commitments fit 
within the broader reform process and evaluates the prospects of compliance. The last 
section discusses additional regulatory concerns and compares the pre and post WTO era.
730 Harris (1996:138).
731 Studwell (2002: 262-263). See also Kim (2002: 439).
732 Zhang (2003: 711).
733 Pearson (2001: 342).
179
History of the accession process and chronology of offers
“Opening the telecommunication market cannot be a condition o f  entering the WTO. ”
(Wu Jichuan quoted in Chetham, 1997)
Although the first reaction from government officials after China had missed entry to the 
GATT was “we will not open the operation o f telecommunication network for a 
considerable long time”134, the WTO accession process has been marked by a gradual 
improvement of the conditions offered by the Chinese side735. Telecommunication 
services were mostly absent from the negotiations during most of China’s accession to 
GATT and WTO. Before 1998, the concession made by the Chinese negotiators consisted 
in the limited opening of two cities for value-added services. The signing of the BTA in 
1997 and consequent pressure from foreign governments marked a turning point both for 
domestic reforms and for the negotiation. Following the July 1998 concessions made by 
Long Yong Tu in Geneva, Zhu Rongji called on Mil in August 1998 to make preparations 
for the opening up of the telecommunication market. Shortly after that, Zhu put an end to 
the CCF investment scheme via State Council order 98736. While until July 1999 China 
continued to disfavour the “radical” idea of trading telecommunications network and 
services for WTO accession, the government decided to significantly lower trade tariffs 
and reduce non-tariff barriers, and worked out new packages of concessions in previously 
prohibited industry sectors to meet the WTO criteria737. A first breakthrough came with 
the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between China and the United States in 
November 1999, quickly followed in May 2000 by the agreement with the European 
Union. Table 40 shows the chronology of WTO commitments. A number of elements 
emerge. First, the scope of the negotiation grew larger with time -  before 1998 the 
negotiations mentioned only value-added services. Second, the weight of 
telecommunication in the overall negotiation changed over the years. Initially, China 
hardly bulged from its negotiating position. But telecommunication became a core issue 
with the dramatic change in the international regime brought forward by the BTA
734 Ma (1996).
735 Two factors have driven this progression. First, the Working Party has insisted on the necessity to abide 
by the BTA, including the signing of the Reference Paper. Second, and more importantly, the bilateral 
agreements negotiated with the US and the EU largely determined the concessions made by China.
736 Mueller and Lovelock (2000: 735) argue that WTO accession was not a significant factor in the 
bargaining that went on within the sector until the middle of 1998. Indeed, until July 1998, the Chinese 
proposal was limited to allowing 25% of foreign investment in telecommunications value-added services 
ventures in Shanghai and Guangzhou. Although the signing of the BTA in February 1997 meant to re-think 
the deal, it seems that at first, China was not willing to incorporate the telecommunication element in its 
bid, arguing that it was not there at the time o f its original application (O'Neill, 1997).
737 The Chinese Premier's 1999 tentative offer of 35% foreign investment in telecommunications sector had 
not yet been granted final bureaucratic approval (Fan, 1999: 5).
738 Interview (B-037) conducted in Beijing. November 25,2003.
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Table 40: Chronology of WTO commitments
Date Basic telecommunication Mobile communication Value-added services
Pre-1998 No proposal No proposal 25% in Shanghai, Guangzhou0
July 1998 No proposal 25% equity stake 5 YAAa 30% equity stake
March 1999 No proposal 35% equity stake 3 YAA
April 1999 49% equity 4 YAA in telecom services 51% equity 4 YAA for paging and VAS
July 1999 25% in basic telecommunication 30% in VAS
October 1999 n.a. n.a. 49% equity OAb 50% equity 2 YAA
Implement the pro-competitive regulatory principles of the BTA and allow foreign 
suppliers to use any technology to provide services (technological neutrality)
November 1999 No geographic restrictions on wire line 6 YAA
No geographic 
restrictions on mobile 5 
YAA
No geographic restrictions 
on paging and VAS 2 YAA
49% foreign ownership across all services 50% 2 YAA on VAS 50% 3 YAA on paging
May 2000
Liberalise domestic-leased circuit services739 
Operate between cities740 
Satisfactory settlement on mobile investments in China Unicom (CCF)
25% 3 YAA 
49% 6 YAA
25% OA 
49% 3 YAA
30% OA 
49% 1 YAA 
50% 2 YAA
Notes: “Years after accession (YAA) and b On accession (OA).0 At the very beginning, the USA asked for 
67%, then came with a second proposal of 51%; China firstly only agreed on 25%741.
Source: Compiled by author from various sources.
Third, some areas of the negotiation proved more difficult than others. For some sensitive 
topics, such as limitation on equity, the progress was slow. As no decision could be 
reached on where to draw the line (49, 50 or 51% equity) the negotiation was 
postponed742. Last, one can distinguish two main phases in the negotiation. Prior to April 
1999, the negotiation was rather open and the Chinese were receptive to the American 
point of view743. The bombing of the Embassy in Belgrade delayed the negotiations 
several months744. After the summer, negotiations resumed and in November 1999, the 
USA concluded their agreement with China, which then laid the ground for the EU 
negotiation. After November 1999, the agreement underwent some modifications, which 
allowed to improve the transitional phase aspect. For example, the EU negotiators 
managed to obtain an agreement where communication between cities was added to the 
initial city opening.
739 Allowing foreign telecommunication companies to sell spare capacity.
740 As opposed to restricting them to activities within each city where 75% of Chinese domestic mobile 
traffic occurs.
741 Interview (B-038), conducted in Beijing, 25 November 2003.
742 Interview (B-031), conducted in Beijing, 15 November 2002.
743 The agreement at the time was good but remained sensitive.
744 Some voices say that the agreement in April 1999 was better than the one in November. For example, 
value-added services were at one point open at 51% (instead of the final 50%).
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Role played by foreign countries and domestic actors
As pointed out by Mueller and Lovelock, China was engaged simultaneously at two 
levels. At one level, the Chinese government had to enter bilateral negotiations with over 
100 member states in order to achieve a consensus on the terms and conditions of its 
accession745. In addition, it had to work through the Working Party. Members of the 
Working Party were mostly concerned by the lack of transparency surrounding the 
process of extending and receiving licences for service provision. They wanted China to 
publish a list of licensing regulators and of bodies authorising and approving the licences, 
which the Chinese government confirmed it would do746. In essence, Members wanted to 
make sure that: licences would not be barriers to trade, licensing procedures would be 
published prior to their effectiveness, enough time would be given to review a licensing 
decision, a prompt decision would be made, information would be made available in 
written form and the regulating institution would be separated from the regulated 
business. At another level, bargaining occurred between China's State Council and 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) on one side, and the 
various line ministries that managed the industrial sectors that would be affected by WTO 
concessions on the other. The resulting set of domestic trade-offs defined the offer 
China's government was willing and able to make to other states in the WTO
747negotiations .
The United States and the European Union’s pivotal role in the negotiation 
Given their interest in opening the Chinese telecommunication market to their domestic 
operators, it is no surprise that both the United States and the European Union played a 
dominant role during the bilateral negotiations748. The start of the US-China bilateral 
negotiation can be dated to 1993 with AT&T’s agreement to cooperate on switching 
equipment manufacturing, which rationale was to ensure continued backing of the USA 
in China’s application to rejoin GATT749. At the end of 1994, in its new offer to the 
GATT, China had, apparently for the first time, “swung the door wide-open in 
telecommunication” although it appeared later that it had only plans to open the valued- 
added services segment750. Despite some high-level visits to China751, negotiations were
745 Mueller and Lovelock (2000: 734-735).
746 Interview (A-004), conducted in Geneva, 28 May 2001.
747 Mueller and Lovelock argue that at a third level, industrial ministries and state enterprises with a 
substantial stake in the sector bargained with the State Council over policy, resources, and regulation.
748 Other countries with large telecommunication interests, such as Japan or Australia, do not seem to have 
placed telecommunication at the centre of their demands.
749 Reuters (1993).
750 Jin (1994).
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suspended in 1998 following the ban of CCF, and US negotiators threatened China with 
trade sanctions752. However, American and Chinese negotiators kept working hard on the 
WTO deal. In April 1999, many observers saw Zhu Rongji’s visit to the United States as 
a potential breakthrough753. The visit caused significant stir in China and the conservative 
fringes used the opportunity to voice their complaints754. The bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade dealt a severe blow to the overall negotiations dynamic and, by 
September 1999, 15 areas of disagreement remained, one of the most important being in 
the area of telecommunications. According to the USTR posting , China agreed to allow 
foreign companies to own up to 51% of telecommunication companies in the service area, 
but Shi’s message was that the Chinese had only offered 49%756. To some, one of the 
main reasons why the Chinese government could sail through the perfect storm in 1999 
towards a WTO agreement is that its decision-making was restricted to a small circle, 
thanks to senior leaders’ takeover of decision-making powers over the WTO bid, and to 
the closed political system. Top-down decision making, bypassing bureaucracy, and 
restraint of the media were the key components in Chinese decision-making regarding the 
WTO757. On November 15, 1999, the USA and China finally signed the bilateral treaty, 
followed in May 2000 by the signature of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) 
status. By settling earlier, the USA provided a base for other countries’ negotiations. In 
the area of telecommunication, the major difference between the various bilateral deals 
that followed rested in joint venture equity shares758. In February 2000, EU negotiators 
were seeking the right to a 51% foreign ownership of Chinese telecommunication firms, 
going beyond the 49% ownership rights negotiated in 1999 by the United States on 
mobile and fixed-line networks and the 50% for VAS, including Internet Service 
Providers759. Mil officials managed nevertheless to convince foreign negotiators to scale
751 In October 1997, Commerce secretary William Daley opened the first China U.S. Telecommunication 
Summit, a forum for discussions on telecom policy between government representatives.
752 Telenews Asia (1998).
753 This surge of activity followed an exchange of correspondence between President Clinton and Jiang 
Zemin at the end of 1998 and the beginning of 1999. It turned out that both countries signed only an 
agreement on the commercial use of US digital telecommunication technology in China.
754 Minister Wu reportedly tendered his resignation, which was not accepted (Fewsmith, 1999: 5).
755 During the negotiations, the USTR was supported by various lobbying groups, such as TIA, which 
provided input of what the telecom industry wanted to see in an agreement as well as information on the 
status of the Chinese market (Interview (E-001), conducted by e-mail, January 5 2004).
756 Fewsmith (1999: 8). Shi Guangsheng was the head of MOFTEC.
757 Lai (2001: 244).
758 Interview (B-037), conducted in Beijing, 25 November 2003. EU officials have claimed that the content 
of the US deal covered about 80% of their requirements. The remaining 20% included further reductions of 
tariffs on priority products including autos, and more concessions on ownership of telecommunication 
operators (Anonymous, 1999).
759 Reuters (2000b).
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back from the 51% ownership by explaining China’s actual situation in terms of “reform,
760opening, economic strength and o f what China could bear” .
Difference between the EU and US negotiations
Since the Reference Paper had already been agreed upon, the negotiation with the EU
IfArevolved around issues of licensing, transparency and choice of partner . A number of
differences emerge both from the process and content of the negotiation. EU negotiators
have indicated they were aware of “a red line they could not cross” . They remained
conscious of the fact that the government wanted to control the sector but nevertheless
managed to push the US-China agreement further and clarify certain points. American
negotiators focused more on systematic matters, while Europeans concentrated on the
complete, sector-specific liberalisation and concrete benefits. As a result, the former were
focused on issues such as Intellectual Property Right (IPR) protection, trading rights or
the pricing system, while the latter were mostly seeking to obtain a number of licences. In
the words of a Chinese negotiator:
“The EU was as greedy as the USA but didn’t push very hard from the 
political point o f view: it was not soft on concrete benefits but refrained
7 A ?from applying political pressure. ”
One factor explaining the difference in negotiating styles was that, at the time, some 
European countries were themselves in the process of reforming their telecommunication 
system, and were not persuaded that the full liberalisation and deregulation of 
telecommunication was the best solution.
The mobile sector turned out to be of particular importance to the EU. Buoyed by the 
economic environment at the time and the industry’s offensiveness, the trade 
commissioner Pascal Lamy managed to glean an additional 1% in the mobile sector. 
Insiders claim that for strategic reasons, Mil did not want to see the investment level go 
above 50%764. Once the ceiling was fixed, the EU focused on negotiating the clarification
760 Interview (B-031), conducted in Beijing, 15 November 2002. This echoes the call for 
“telecommunication reforms in conformity with China’s actual situation” (Zhou Deqiang quoted in Xinhua, 
1998).
761 Interview (B-030), conducted in Beijing, 13 November 2002.
762 Interview (B-030), conducted in Beijing, 13 November 2002.
763 Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
764 The negotiation around majority ownership contained a strong symbolic element. In basic services, a 
50% ownership meant to disburse a considerable amount of money (Interview (B-041), conducted in 
Beijing, 28 November 2003).
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of the partner in joint investment765. Thus, while Lovelock saw bilateral negotiations as 
“or means for the Chinese government to play countries off against each other*' it turned 
out to be quite the contrary766. Having reached an initial bilateral agreement with the 
United States, the Chinese team had to negotiate hard to prevent making further 
concessions to the European Union.
The rift between MOFTEC and Mil
Despite claims that the Chinese government presented a “single face” at the table of 
negotiations, at least two constituencies can be identified. On one side, the Ministry of 
Information Industry (Mil) and its arch-conservative Minister Wu were defending a very 
limited opening of the sector to foreign participation. On the other side, MOFTEC, led by 
Minister Long, was attempting to answer its broad mandate to negotiate an overall WTO 
accession. In practice, this meant bridging the gap between the international demand for 
market access and strong domestic reluctance to do so, in addition to answering the 
demand of the State Council to further liberalise the market.
Throughout the overall WTO accession negotiation, MOFTEC was responsible for most 
of the day-to-day work on China’s GATT/WTO bid and for the coordination of China’s 
negotiating position with other interested domestic bureaus and industries767. Through its 
role of overall coordinator for the WTO negotiation, MOFTEC collected views from 
academics and industrial associations, while other ministries were responsible for 
submitting their plans768. Indeed, different concerns existed around the table and 
MOFTEC was in charge of preparing the position, offers and counter-offers769. To reach a 
negotiation position, MOFTEC involved a number of stakeholders. For the 
telecommunication negotiation, it consulted with officials from Mil or leaders of China 
Telecom and China Unicom. It also talked to foreign investors, since the results of the 
negotiation would impact all parties interested. The round of consultation was about what 
to do and what to offer. It also had to take account of the issues pertaining to the sector. 
MOFTEC studied the process of opening other countries’ telecommunication sector as
765 The partner is ‘undetermined’, i.e. a joint venture can be set up with any partner, meaning that the 
company has to be Chinese but does not need to be a SOE. It can come from any industry, i.e. does not need 
to be from the telecommunication sector.
766 Lovelock (1999: 313).
767 Pearson (2001: 346-347).
768 In its function of coordinator for the overall negotiation. MOFTEC acted in the same function as the 
USTR (Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003).
769 In 1998, the State Council Inter-ministerial Coordination Group on GATT Negotiations (SCICGATTN) 
was renamed the State Council Inter-ministerial Coordination Group on GATT (SCICGATT) but later 
dissolved because of lack of results in coordinating ministries. The role of coordinator was taken up by 
MOFTEC (Lai, 2001).
185
well as current liberalisation progress, consulting with experts and consultants, both 
foreign and domestic. To do so, MOFTEC convened a services team and held frequent 
meetings as telecommunication was felt to be a very complex issue770. In addition, 
MOFTEC had to cater for the “demands” originating from the USA and the EU in the 
framework of the bilateral agreements. As a result, it organised and conducted those 
negotiations. MOFTEC was not only directly involved in the negotiation process but also 
responsible for the implementation of the negotiation771.
One factor that rendered the process more complex was that, from the outset, MOFTEC’s 
authority was limited. For example, it did not have a formal responsibility to negotiate or 
coordinate certain issues in the WTO negotiations -  such as telecommunication, where 
Mil took the lead -  neither did it have final authority to make the major decisions on 
issues related to WTO negotiations. At the level of day-to-day coordination and 
negotiation on telecommunication, MOFTEC appeared quite weak, failing to bring to the 
table representatives of the industry invited to coordination meetings and even 
negotiations772. In addition to the strain between MOFTEC and Mil, tensions also existed 
between the team that lead the WTO negotiation and the various Ministries that were 
going to have to implement the commitments773. An additional difficulty was the 
differing view that each constituency had of its role in the accession process. MOFTEC 
saw itself as being in a better position to negotiate for two reasons. First, it was acting on 
behalf of a mandate of the State Council. Second, it had a better idea of the offers and 
counter-offers that could be made to balance the different sectors774.
The second actor engaged in the telecommunication negotiation was Mil775. Mil and 
Minister Wu Jichuan firmly believed that they could very well develop their own 
telecommunication system. In their eyes, the tremendous growth experienced by China’s 
telecommunication sector during the 1990s attested that it had the capacity to develop
770 It turned out to be less complex than audio-visual, legal or financial services (Interview (B-037) 
conducted in Beijing. November 25,2003).
771 Interview (B-033), conducted in Geneva, 12 November 2003.
772 Pearson (2001: 362).
773 Interview (B-039), conducted in Beijing, 27 November 2003.
774 Interview (B-033), conducted in Geneva, 12 November 2003 and (B-037), conducted in Beijing, 25 
November 2003.
775 Before 1998, the two ministries (MPT and MEI) had their own responsibilities for submitting a plan. 
After the merger of the two Ministries, there were two fields: goods (huowu) and services (fuwu). For goods 
trading (maoyi) the main question was imports tariffs (jinkou guanshui) and market entry (shichangjiu.ru). 
For services, the questions were how to chose the opening to the world and what should the scale be 
(Interview (B-031), conducted in Beijing, 15 November 2002).
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without having to rely on foreign participation776. In other words, Mil believed that 
market liberalisation forced by WTO membership would bring more disadvantages and 
risks than benefits to the country’s fledgling telecommunications and information 
services, even though it may have provided more incentives for China’s information 
technology sector to grow777. An important driver of M il’s position was that the 
negotiations were to be pursued “according to China’s economic development skill and to 
what could be undertaken”. Having said this, Mil has changed gradually during this 10- 
year process, being at first a hardliner, then softening its position -  but remaining 
nevertheless very tough with USTR778. The other driver for Mil was to preserve the 
interest of China Telecom. As a result, from 1998 onwards, Mil was present during all the 
negotiation process and was most active and tough on the equity restrictions. Some 
observers hypothesised that Mil became concerned with the possibility that 
telecommunication liberalisation would be used to keep the heat out of other areas like 
financial services779.
The official explanation on the relationship between Mil and MOFTEC is that the former 
was in charge of market opening, while the latter had to bundle the policy into the service 
commitments, thus shouldering their duties separately780. For Mil, MOFTEC was just a 
channel through which commitments were negotiated. As a result, Mil often had the final 
say on major issues781. In fact, Premier Zhu Rongji and President Jiang Zemin made the 
final decision. For sure, the process did not appear to run smoothly at all times but there is 
no conclusive evidence on whether the tension between MOFTEC and Mil was staged or 
not. Minister Wu’s letter of resignation, as an answer to the concession made by Zhu 
Rongji during his trip to the United States in 1999, would indicate that there was actually 
quite a gap between what the State Council and Mil saw as acceptable. On the other side, 
MOFTEC’s ability to set the commitments at a relatively low level from the start and to 
maintain such a position throughout the negotiation tends to confirm that the State 
Council remained extremely conscious of the necessity to keep Mil satisfied. It seems 
that a certain amount of distrust existed between Mil and MOFTEC. Mil thought that 
MOFTEC wanted to extract too many concessions, while MOFTEC officials claimed that
776 Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
777 Fan (1999: 5).
778 Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
779 Chetham (1997).
780 Interview (B-040), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
781 Interview (B-003), conducted in Beijing, 28 August 2001.
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787they were well aware that sectoral interests could not be sacrificed . Whenever 
MOFTEC challenged Mil too much and faced significant resistance, the former played its 
trump card -  it was acting on behalf of the State Council . In fact, voices within 
MOFTEC deny the assertion that there was any specific goal in a particular sector, 
insisting rather on the fact that accession was the goal, together with further opening of 
the Chinese market784. At times, the position of MOFTEC and Mil were irreconcilable 
and the disagreement had to be taken up to the State Council. The latter would then 
instruct both parties on the way to go. However, the divide between both Ministries 
should not be overestimated. Both administrations were working with China’s national 
interest in mind785.
In summary, Mil’s power turned out to be a considerable factor in the end-game 
negotiations, with telecommunications being the major stumbling block in concluding 
bilateral negotiations with both the US and EU786. Domestically, little evidence indicates
7 8 7that the bureaucracy or other institutions played a key role in the 1999 WTO talks . 
Foreign multinationals, like Motorola, which worked hard to establish Permanent Normal 
Trading Relations (PNTR), lobbied their respective governments788. Yet little evidence 
suggests that it influenced the position of the American or Chinese negotiators.
782 Interview (B-037) conducted in Beijing. 25 November, 2003.
783 Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
784 Interview (B-037) conducted in Beijing. 25 November, 2003.
785 Interview (B-037) conducted in Beijing. 25 November, 2003 and Interview (B-033), conducted in 
Geneva, 12 November 2003.
786 Macintosh (2001: 15).
787 Lai (2001: 246).
788 Interview (B-005), conducted in Beijing, 13 September 2001.
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The commitments
As noted, prior to its WTO accession, China prohibited foreign companies from providing 
any type of basic telecommunications services. During the accession process, Chinese 
negotiators made important commitments allowing foreign firms to provide a broad array 
of telecommunications services, including both basic and value-added services. Having 
said this, foreign providers remained subject to significant limitations. First, they had to 
establish joint ventures with Chinese partners in order to enter the telecommunications 
market. Second, limits were placed on the share of foreign equity in the joint ventures. 
These limitations on the participation of foreign equity in the joint ventures in China 
allow an increasing share of foreign equity over a 1-6 year period following China’s 
accession to the WTO, but prohibitions on foreign majority ownership will remain at the
noQ
end of the phase-in period . Third, geographic limitations were placed although these 
are to be completely phased out over a 2-6 year period following accession (see Table 
41).
Table 41: Final schedule of commitments
Upon
accession
After 1 
year
After 
2 years
After 3 
years
After 4 
years
After 5 
years
After 6 
years
Value-added and 
paging services790,
791
30%a 49%b 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Mobile voice and 
data services 25%a 35% b 35% b 49% b 49% b 49% 49%
Fixed-line and long 
distance792 0% 0% 0% 25%a 25%8 35% b 49%
a Limited to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou
b Limited to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, 
Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang, Xiamen, Xian, Taiyuan, Wuhan
Note: Under article XVIII of GATS, parties are allowed to schedule commitments in addition to market 
access and national treatment commitments.
Source: WTO (2001a).
The Chinese negotiators had a vast spectrum of options to choose from, with commitments 
representing less than the status quo to ones exceeding the market opening at the time. They 
opted for a formula that mixed equity, geography and a phase-in period. By insisting on 
equity joint ventures, China guarded itself against the risk of losing of too much revenue
789 These types of limitations are common among WTO members that have made telecommunications 
commitments.
790 In the value-added service, all items (H-N) are listed. JVs in VAS are without restrictions on the number 
of suppliers but only in foreign equity (see table above). Item left out is E (telex) but it is of little 
importance nowadays. One can conclude that it covers all telecommunication services.
791 Electronic mail, voice mail, on-line information and database retrieval, electronic data interchange, 
enhanced/value-added facsimile services (including store and forward, store and retrieve), code and 
protocol conversion, on-line information and/or data processing (including transaction processing).
792 Voice services, packet-switched data transmission services, circuit-switched data transmission services, 
facsimile services, domestic private leased circuit services, international closed user group voice and data 
services (use of private leased circuit service is permitted).
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to foreigners through other arrangement, such as cooperative JVs . The second 
characteristic of the commitment is the geographical opening of the sector. Chinese 
negotiators felt that the opening of cities was very important to foreign investors, since in 
other industries they tended to focus on the large Chinese cities794. Unsurprisingly, the 
foreign community greeted with moderate enthusiasm the geographical limitation, calling 
it “a crazy patchwork approach”195. The opening based on geography followed on a well- 
established tradition of opening up on an experimental basis. It resembled the Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) approach, which provided a testing zone for liberalisation that 
allowed to experiment with new ideas and new business models without binding the state 
to an excessive extent. In the negotiators’ view, limiting the market opening to only three 
cities at the beginning prevented foreign companies from immediately gaining a big share 
of business or from massively cutting down prices. In turn, the solution offered domestic 
service providers a transitional period in which they could adjust to the new situation796. 
The third salient feature of the agreement is the extensive use of the phase-in approach to 
accommodate China's demand for adjustment. While China's commitments take 
advantage of the flexibility given to developing countries under Article IV of the GATS, 
they compare favourably to those made by many Asia Pacific WTO Members during the 
Uruguay Round and the BTA (see Table 42)797.
Table 42: Policies and WTO commitments of selected Asian economies (fixed and mobile)
China Hong India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Singapore
Kong
Past
policy 0% 100% 49%
GATS”  100% 25%up to 49%
35%
35%
100% *
100% *
49% for 
facilities- 
based 
20% for KT 
33% for 
facilities- 
based 
20% for KT
49%
30%
49% direct, 
73.9% 
indirect 
40% for ST
49% direct, 
73.9% 
indirect
Note: *Except NTT and KDD; ** Describes a country’s commitment to the WTO Basic Telecom 
Agreement.
Source: Compiled from Low and Mattoo (1998).
Both Mil and MOFTEC appear to have been very satisfied by the outcome of the 
negotiation. MOFTEC judged that it was satisfactory for the sector and that the 
commitments could always be brought forward ahead of schedule. Mil felt that it had not
793 Interview (B-034), conducted in Shanghai, 21 November 2003. In terms of equity, the negotiation floor 
was defined by Article 4 of the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, which requires at least 25% of 
foreign participation.
794 Interview (B-037) conducted in Beijing. 25 November, 2003.
795 Interview (B-039), conducted in Beijing, 27 November 2003.
796 Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
797 Macintosh (2003: 267).
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surrendered to foreign demands and managed to maintain control over the sector798. In the
words of a Chinese negotiator:
“Strictly speaking, the most ambitious goal would have been no opening at 
all. Reasonable expectations in negotiations depend on four factors: 
ability to accommodate change when making commitments, nature o f 
foreign demands (in line with WTO or discriminative), ability o f both sides 
to balance andfind a middle ground and ability to predict andforecast the 
development o f a sector. ”799
As noted earlier, the Chinese leadership was keen on locking in domestic reforms as 
much as possible via the WTO agreement. Some commentators think that MOFTEC 
actually played a critical role in accelerating the reform process. Through Minister Long 
Yong Tu, MOFTEC acted as a catalyst for the opening and reform. MOFTEC’s ultimate 
goal was to gain membership, and to reach it the Ministry was always moving things 
forward800. But two factors prevented the Ministry from taking a more liberal approach. 
First, the slow progress in state enterprise reform meant that outright opening of the 
telecommunication services sector would pose a serious competitive threat to the 
domestic operators, as well as endanger a valuable source of revenues. Second, the 
perception of telecommunication as a key to sovereignty and national security shared by 
the State Council gave Mil significant leverage in its bid to defend the incumbent. As far 
as the nature of the demands is concerned, market access was an issue, as at the time of 
the negotiations the sector was not really open and “people couldn’t differentiate basic
service from value-added service (VAS)”. At times, Beijing appeared unwilling to
bulge801. Towards the end of the bilateral negotiation with the United States, the 
liberalisation of services industries, such as telecommunication, insurance or banking 
became very sensitive issues. MOFTEC played an important role in breaking the 
stalemate. By explaining the respective negotiating positions to the USTR representatives 
and to the experts from Mil, it managed to get both sides to meet halfway and move the 
overall negotiation forward. At times, it extracted concessions from Mil -  for instance, 
raising the maximum amount of equity to 49% in basic services, which would have been 
otherwise limited to 25%802.
In addition, the international environment was very helpful in pressuring the Chinese 
negotiators. The Basic Telecommunication Agreement (BTA) and the ensuing opening of
798 Interview (B-037), conducted in Beijing, 25 November 2003.
799 Interview (B-033), conducted in Geneva, 12 November 2003.
800 Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
801 Pearson (2001: 347) argues that the highly bureaucratic decision-making process played a large part in 
creating the stalemate in the bilateral negotiations with the United States.
802 Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
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telecommunication markets worldwide offered a framework for the negotiation. Like in 
many countries, both developed and developing, telecommunications ranked among the 
last sectors to be opened and Mil needed to be “pushed”, both in the negotiation and 
negotiation offerings. At the same time, domestic pressure -  brought mainly through the 
questioning of China Telecom’s monopoly from various quarters -  was useful for the
O A -J
negotiators, since MOFTEC had no sectoral authority .
In our view, Mil’s overwhelming presence during the final rounds of the negotiation 
coupled with MOFTEC’s relative lack of power to broker a telecommunication deal 
early, partly attest Pearson’s theory that a bureaucratic interests model, in which narrow 
economic interests of industries and ministries dictate their positions on the WTO, 
prevailed for the WTO negotiations804. One of the key differentiator between 
telecommunication services and other services laid in the strategic and political aspects of 
the telecommunication sector, which were giving Mil a very strong position from which 
to lead the negotiations. The issue of national security, close to the heart of the top 
leadership provided an additional cushion of comfort. Another distinctive factor of the 
telecommunication negotiation laid in the confidence exhibited by MIL In contrast with 
the banking sector, which was burdened by problems such as bad loans, the network 
development had been achieved without having to resort to direct government investment 
and support. Minister Wu therefore found himself in a very comfortable position to 
negotiate the conditions of opening with MOFTEC. A direct consequence was that, unlike 
what happened in other sectors, very little consultation happened within the industry805. 
Telecommunication commitment did nevertheless share similarities with other sectors -  
for example, insurance and local currency services also followed a geographic approach 
in market opening.
The lack of a decision-making authority prevented MOFTEC from pushing the 
commitments too far away from what Mil was prepared to offer. Thanks to a largely 
constructive approach, it bridged positions that had seemed irreconcilable. But it did even 
more by accelerating the reform process. When compared with other sectors -  in 
particular financial services -  it turns out that Mil was not the most conservative 
Ministry. Since the telecommunication sector generated a lot of interest, it was the focus
803 Interview (B-037), conducted in Beijing, 25 November, 2003.
804 Pearson (2001: 351).
805 Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
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of constant attention. In a sense, the WTO negotiations over-protected the 
telecommunication sector, by making it a central object of negotiations806.
The most important influence of the WTO accession probably rests in the change of 
mindset that took place. Officials, bureaucrats, managers of state-owned enterprises and 
entrepreneurs were all exposed to new concepts, such as transparency or fair competition. 
The accession process shifted the idea of a market economy with Chinese characteristics 
to a market economy based on WTO rules. At the same time, it furthered the promotion
OAT
of foreign trade and the protection of foreign direct investment .
806 Interview (B-023), conducted in Beijing, 19 September 2001.
807 Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
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The issues of regulatory consistency and compliance
“Compliance acquires a market value under an impartial regulatory system. ”
(Levi and Sherman, 1997: 322)
“Ifproperly implemented by the Chinese government, application of the regulatory framework 
providedfor by the GATS and the Reference Paper will bring about an extraordinary change in 
the nature of the telecommunication market in China. ”
(Kantor, 2000: 149)
“A slow implementation of WTO market entry may yet save many foreign investors from 
themselves. ”
(Ure, 2002: 18)
“Compliance acquires a market value under an impartial regulatory system. ”
(Levi and Sherman, 1997: 322)
In the eyes of many observers, China’s accession to the WTO represented at most half of 
the task at hand. The serious work was to start with the actual implementation of the
Q A O
negotiated commitments . The main issue in implementing the WTO agreement lays in 
the decentralised administrative structure of the telecommunication sector as well as in 
the institutional characteristics of the industry. China’s traditional power structure, 
established during the central-planning era, divided administration of all aspects of the 
economy among different agencies. Liberalising trade regulations thus requires depriving 
these economic agencies of their powers and interests, or at least reducing their authority 
substantially809. In fact, out of five administrative levels (national, provincial, municipal, 
prefecture and county levels) identified by Lovelock, only one was relevant to the 
negotiation. Whereas bargaining was happening between all the levels for funding or 
network development, only the national level was involved in the WTO negotiations. As 
a result, lower-level bureaucrats may experience resistance in implementing the
OIA
agreement . As noted, the policy-makers have, over the past decade, shown a strong 
tendency to resist change, preferring status quo. New policies -  even those dictated by 
political leaders -  have only met with partial success. In addition to these factors, 
implementation issues will manifest themselves through consistency and compliance.
Consistency
The area that causes problems of consistency with the WTO commitments is the 
classification of services and the telecommunication regulation. For this purpose, China
808 most difficult challenge is not specifying the policy and regulatory objectives but implementing 
them effectively” (Melody, 1997c: 16).
809 Wang (1999c: 42).
810 In an attempt to minimise such resistance, the central government has started to organise training classes 
at the provincial level (Lovelock, 1996: 690-691). However, without a strong judiciary, this will have only 
little impact on the provinces’ discretion.
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has revised and complemented the existing framework. First, the government issued a 
revised classification of services in 2003. While China’s definition of basic and value- 
added services is itself not inconsistent with the WTO GATS and the BTA (see Table 43), 
Mil effectively “gutted” the value of licences in early 2003 by issuing a 
telecommunication services classification catalogue (with no prior notice) that eliminated 
or reclassified as basic service the VAS applications most useful to MNCs and large 
Chinese enterprises. Foreign telecommunication providers are effectively prohibited from 
providing value-added services in the China market under the current classification 
scheme811. In foreign quarters, there is hope that the telecommunication law will replace 
the existing categories of basic and value-added services with the more objective and 
transparent Type I (facilities-based) and Type II (non facilities-based) classifications812.
Table 43: WTO Schedule versus Classification, 2003
WTO Schedule Classification 2003
Basic Telecommunications Services: 
Mobile voice and data services Mobile cellular communications services
Domestic services:
a. Voice services, f. Facsimile services; c. Circuit 
switched data transmission services
b. Packet switched data transmission service 
g. Domestic Private Leasing Circuit Services
Fixed network local telephone services; fixed 
network long distance telephone services 
Type II data communications services 
Services for domestic communications service 
facilities
International services:
a. Voice services; f. Facsimile services; c. Circuit 
switched data transmission services; g. International 
closed user group voice services
b. Packet switched data transmission services
Fixed network international long distance telephone 
services
Internet data transmission services; International 
data communications services
Internet:
International closed user group data services Internet data transmission services
International private lines:
International closed user group data services International data communication services
Value-added telecommunications services: 
n.. On-line information and/or data processing 
(including transaction processing); k. Electronic data 
interchange
h. E-mail; i. Voice mail; 1. Enhanced/value-added 
facsimile services (store and forward, store and 
retrieve)
j. On-line information and database retrieval 
m. Code and protocol conversion
On-line data processing and transaction processing 
services
Storage and retransmission services
Information Services 
[Not applicable!
Source: Baker & McKenzie (2003b: 23).
In addition to the classification of services, China issued in March 2002 a revised 
guidance category for foreign investment813. Second, in order to be consistent with the
811 China’s definition of leading telecommunication services providers is the following: those providers who 
possessed necessary basic telecom facilities, whose fixed local telephone business represented more than 
50% shares of the market within local networks, and who had a substantial impact on the market access of 
other telecom operators -  China Telecom and China Netcom (GAO, 2004: 72).
812 Brilliant and Waterman (2004).
813 Interview (C-004), conducted in Beijing, 12 June 2002.
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requirements of the BTA and in replacement of the long-awaited telecommunication law, 
Mil passed a number of administrative measures, which complement the regulations 
issued in September 2000. While most of the requirements are addressed in the regulation 
or in the complementary measures, the principal ground for concern remains the lack of 
regulatory independence. Table 44 details the inconsistencies between the WTO’s BTA 
and China’s main telecommunication regulation.
Table 44: Comparison between the telecommunication regulation and the Reference Paper
requirements
Requirement of WTO Basic , , . . . ., . .. China’s telecommunication _  ,Telecommunication . . .  /0 . . RemarksA regulation (September 2000)
Anti-competitive practices Article 41-42814 In line with WTO requirements
Interconnection Article 17-22 Complementary measures in 2001
Universal service obligations Article 44 No clear definition of USO
Licensing process Article 9-10,13 Complementary measures in 2002
Resource allocation Article 27-30 Room for administrative discretion
Regulatory independence Article 3 Principal ground of concern
Source: Adapted from (Lu and Wong, 2003).
Finally, a limited number of inconsistencies between the commitments and the regulation 
on foreign-invested telecommunication enterprises (FITE) have emerged. For example, 
the requirements for registered capital found in the FITE (issued in December 2001) are 
not inscribed in China’s schedule of commitments and therefore inconsistent with 
accession obligations815.
Compliance
Much of the literature on WTO compliance in China draws from a formal institutionalist 
focus that analyses the laws and regulations at the national level to the exclusion of other, 
possibly more salient factors affecting implementation816. Concerns are centred on three 
core issues: independence of the regulator, licensing and market access. Indeed, by 
signing onto the Reference Paper, China accepted a number of regulatory principles. In 
theory, this meant changing from its traditional sporadic intervention on an ad hoc basis 
into a transparent legal and regulatory framework817. There was a strong hope that the 
acceptance of the regulatory framework provided for by the GATS and the Reference 
Paper, as well as its implementation, would help China in transforming its regulatory
01 o
regime . While the record to date suggests that the government is making a substantial
814 Macintosh (2003: 271). Articles 41 and 42 of China’s telecommunication regulation address the issue of 
competitive safeguards. In fact, they exceed the relatively limited requirements of the Reference Paper.
815 Macintosh (2003: 274).
816 Mertha and Zeng (2005: 335).
817 Xu and Kan (2000: 20) and Mattoo (2002: 15-16).
818 Lardy (2002: 67). Kantor argued that China would move towards a competitive telecommunications 
market supervised by an independent regulator (Kantor, 2000).
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effort to comply with a broad range of its obligations and that it believes that further 
economic liberalisation and opening up are essential to meeting long-term economic 
goals819, it remains short of the letter of its commitments. It is true that, as part of its 
massive legislative effort at the time of accession820, China has formulated the FITE. 
However, the legislation regulates mostly issues of principle rather than implementation 
details. It also lacks transparent transaction and complete notary and hearing systems. 
Finally, we know that implementation is more likely to be successful where the network 
is integrated and actors have a shared understanding of the policy problems faced and 
how to solve them within a governance framework, conditions which are not entirely 
satisfied at present821.
Two additional questions are worth examining. First, how much could the WTO 
concessions and the ensuing opening to foreign investment be kept separate from 
domestic reforms? Second, how much pressure did WTO negotiation put on the opening 
of the telecommunication sector to domestic investors? Deputies to the 3rd Session of 9th 
NPC have submitted a proposal to the session calling on the government to open up the 
entire telecommunications sector to domestic private companies after China joins the 
WTO. The rationale behind this was that allowing domestic private firms to enter the 
field first and compete on an equal basis would be a good rehearsal, making both private 
and state-owned firms more competitive822. Some of the demands raised were later 
satisfied in an indirect manner by the rules governing foreign investment in the 
telecommunication sector as the document included the participation of private domestic 
industry into the value-added sector823.
Independence o f the regulator
As noted previously, the State Council separated the regulatory body from the operational 
business by establishing the Mil in 1998 and giving up all its management functions to 
China Telecom. In theory, the administrative re-shuffle was aimed at creating an 
environment in which Mil could regulate in an impartial, fair and transparent manner and 
act as an independent regulator. Independence of the regulator is addressed in paragraph
819 Lardy (2002: 142).
820 MOFTEC announced in May 2002 that, in order to comply with WTO rules, more than 2,300 laws and 
regulations had been amended and 830 abolished since December 2001.
821 Gains (2003: 77).
822 China Online (2000) and Hou (2000).
823 Reuters (2000a). The opening of telecommunication services to private investment alongside with other 
key sectors, such as power and civil aviation, was confirmed in 2005 by the NDRC (BBC Monitoring, 
2005)
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309 of the Working Party Report. It provides that, for services that China has scheduled 
in the GATS, “regulatory authorities must be separate from and not accountable to the 
service suppliers they regulate”. Since the RP only requires that regulatory authorities be 
independent from operators -  and not from government -  one could argue that China 
fulfils the principle of regulatory independence. Having said this, the structural 
characteristics of the regulator notably differ from other services. In the energy sector, the 
State Electric Regulatory Commission (SERC) has been operating since March 2003824 
and a number of commissions have been put in place in the financial services sector (see 
Table 45).
Table 45: Status of independent regulators and competition authorities in China, by sector
T elecommunication Energy Financial services Competition
authority
No regulatory 
commission. Relative 
independence from the 
operators but not from 
the government
State Electric 
Regulatory 
Commission 
(SERC)
China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(CIRC)
China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC)
China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(SCRC)
No competition 
authority. Anti- 
monopoly law 
in draft
Note: The Countering Unfair Competition Law is the only effective competition law of China up to now. In 
most developing nations, the scarcity of competition legislation and competition authorities makes it very 
difficult to consider solutions to the challenges laid down by liberalisation, other than the setting up of an 
independent, professional regulator, capable of promoting competition in a transparent and fair manner 
(WTO, 1999b).
Source: Compiled by author.
While the mere existence of these commissions does not guarantee a fair regulatory 
environment, they signal at least the government’s intention to bring some order to these 
sectors. In addition, the lack of independence of China’s telecommunication sector is 
compounded by the fact that there is no competition authority825.
Discussion
Cortell and Davis identify two factors that determine whether a domestic actor’s 
appropriation of an international norm will affect the state’s policy choices: the domestic 
salience or legitimacy of the norm and the domestic structural context within which the 
policy debate transpires826. Issues of compliance are both sectoral and cross-sectoral. In 
the field of telecommunication, the most important cross-sectoral issues lay in the
824 It seems that the World Bank has been very closely involved in the creation of the commission. See 
World Bank (2002).
825 In many countries, the typical policy configuration in telecommunications at the national/regional level 
is a dual regime consisting of sector-specific regulation, on the one hand, and enforcement of antitrust rules, 
which apply to other sectors as well, on the other hand (Koopmann, 2001: 5-6).
826 Two elements of a country’s domestic structure appear significant: the relative centralisation of decision­
making authority and the extent to which international rules are institutionalised into domestic law (Cortell 
and Davis, 1996).
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domains of transparency (regulatory transparency and independence of the regulator), 
excessive capitalisation requirements and standards.
Many countries have set up commissions to supervise China’s compliance with its WTO
obligations. The most active is undoubtedly the United States, which relies both on
government and non-government resources (e.g. USTR and GAO reports for the former
and U.S.-China Business Council, American Chamber of Commerce in China or USITO
for the latter). As noted by Pearson,
“For a country that is centralised and exclusionary, international rules 
will only affect national policy when and if  authoritative officials are 
predisposed to the prescriptions and proscriptions embodied in
827international institutions. ”
Compliance to the WTO in spirit is not surprising at all828. China has a very good record
in complying with international regimes: it seldom breaks its promise on the regulations
or commitments made829. In addition, the Working Party clearly insisted on the issue of
compliance. The Report of the Working Party explicitly mentions that:
“The WTO Agreement fell within the category o f ‘important international 
agreements' subject to the ratification by the Standing Committee o f the 
National People's Congress. China would ensure that its laws and 
regulations pertaining to or affecting trade were in conformity with the 
WTO Agreement and with its commitments so as to fully perform its 
international obligations. ” 830
The real question thus lies in whether China will in the position to comply with the letter 
of the law and whether other members will make use of the WTO to ensure potential 
trade issues are solved. As of today, only one case against China has been brought in front 
of the WTO. While not directly linked to telecommunication, the row over 
semiconductors with the USA serves as a reminder that China is keen to play a growing 
role in the information technology sector. It also indicates that its major trading partners, 
and notably the USA, are keeping a close eye on China’s technological developments and 
on any attempts to erect tariff or non-tariff trade barriers.
The central concern lies with China’s capacity to adapt to the regulatory order imposed by 
the Reference Paper. As discussed in Chapter 3, the telecommunication regulation 
((dianxin tiaoli) formally addressed all of China’s obligations under the Reference Paper.
827 Pearson (1999b: 214).
828 Economy (1998: 23) argued early that, notwithstanding ups-and-downs, China had the potential to be an 
effective, responsible, and committed participant in international regimes.
829 Interview with author (B-020), conducted in Beijing, 17 September 2001.
830 Paragraph 67 (WTO and Working Party on the Accession of China, 2001b).
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In some cases -  for competitive safeguards, for instance -  China has even undertaken 
commitments greater than those required under the WTO Reference Paper. Many areas 
remain grounds for concern. Licensing may not fulfil the requirements of transparency 
and non-discrimination. While the regulation deals with independence of regulation, 
interconnection, scarce resources, and USO obligations in a manner formally consistent 
with the Reference Paper, the uncertainty lies in the capacity to enforce and implement it 
in a WTO consistent manner. Given the lack of judiciary, China’s compliance to its 
broader WTO commitments will rest on two actors: Mil and the operators. This is 
perhaps the most worrying aspect of the compliance issue. Mil has shown over the years 
to pay little heed to the regulatory framework. Operators, often closely connected to Mil 
for historical reasons, or because of administrative re-shuffling, may not be the most 
adamant proponents of WTO compliance. Having said this, the compliance issue should 
not be over-exaggerated. Few governments have had any experience or institutional 
context for this kind of regulatory activity in the telecommunication sector, and those who 
have accumulated regulatory experience took a number of years to acquire it831. It is 
therefore not astonishing that the Chinese government faces and will face implementation 
issues.
It is doubtless that the nature and level of China’s compliance with its obligations will 
become clear only over a long period of time. The implementation is subject to political, 
legislative, and administrative constraints, which has led scholars to seriously doubt the 
impact of the WTO accession on the telecommunication industry . In the realm of 
legislation, evidence suggests it has been common for the Ministry in charge to come up 
with some fairly conservative implementation regulations that undermine some of the 
commitments or take advantage of some of the legal and market infrastructure to undercut 
the commitments833. In terms of transparency, MOFTEC continues to have to wage 
battles internally with other Ministries as to the interpretation of China’s commitments 
and the resultant implementation requirements. Moreover, concerns go beyond 
transparency of regulation to quality of regulation. Administratively, the massive 
capacity-building effort required to train thousands of civil servants at the provincial and 
local level has only begun. Finally, the huge gap between China's telecom regulatory 
institutions and the requirements of the Reference Paper, plus weak and moderate terms 
and conditions, constitute extra barriers for China's implementation of its commitments.
831 Low and Mattoo (1998: 26).
832 Zhang (2000: 31).
833 Interview (B-039), conducted in Beijing, 27 November 2003.
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Additional issues of concern
In addition to the issues of compliance and consistency brought forward by the accession, 
the current weakness of the regulatory environment raises a number of concerns. They 
centre around three issues: pricing, universal service and interconnection.
When setting prices for public utilities, important public welfare services and goods 
subject to natural monopolies and services, which are of vital interest to the general 
public, government pricing authorities would hold public hearings and invite consumers, 
operators and other concerned parties to comment and debate on the necessity and impact 
of a price adjustment. However, government pricing “shall be applied in a manner
Q 'l A
consistent with Article 6 o f GATS and the Reference Paper .” Under the terms of the 
Reference Paper, each country can define its own objectives for universal service as long 
as it is administered in a neutral manner and is not more burdensome than necessary. In 
order to implement a universal service programme domestically, a government could take 
a variety of approaches, but most of these will be inconsistent either with the spirit of 
GATS or the 1997 Telecommunications Commitments835. The current support system of 
universal service obligations is no longer consistent with competition in 
telecommunications and China’s accession to WTO. China could speed up the reform, in 
order to provide operators with incentives to fulfil universal service obligations and to 
achieve the goal of universal service policy836. However, by accepting the regulatory 
principles specified in the Telecommunications Reference Paper, China has committed to 
ensuring that the incumbent supplier does not undermine market access by charging 
prohibitive rates for interconnection to its established networks. The creation of a 
regulator is only a first step. Persuading the dominant interest groups to concede control 
is fraught with difficulty837. Regulatory responses should define adequate terms and 
prices of interconnection in order to prevent the anti-competitive behaviour of dominant 
operators. The lack of adequate remedies that governments could design to eradicate 
these practices in order to ensure fair network interconnection constitutes a non-tariff 
barrier838.
834 Paragraph 60 of the Working Party indicates that “China would publish in the official journal the list of 
goods and services subject to state pricing and changes thereto, together with price-setting mechanisms and 
policies” (WTO and Working Party on the Accession of China, 2001b).
835 McLarty (1998: 55-56).
836 Several scholars have asked for the implementation of an effective universal service policy. Their 
proposal included the setting up of a new accounting system compatible with international standards and 
the building of the necessary legal framework. Even though Article 44 of the TR mentions universal service 
policy, there are no concrete implementation guidelines (Lin, Ma et al., 2002: 61-62).
837 Mattoo (2002: 15-16).
838 Stephenson (2001: 19-20). In 2004, interconnection accounted for 7.53% of China Telecom’s revenue.
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How strictly China complies with its obligations will no doubt become clear only in the 
long run. How pressures for compliance play out in the context of different national 
institutions, especially when these institutions are evolving, will be crucial for China839. 
As part of the transitional review mechanism, China agreed to regularly update its lists of 
laws and regulations, its licensing procedures and conditions. It also confirmed the 
independence of the regulatory authorities from the service suppliers and its pledge to 
indicate the state of play of licensing applications on sector and sub-sector levels840. In 
addition, four members of the WTO -  namely the USA, the EU, Australia and Japan -  
seem intent on forcing China to comply with its commitments841. The institutional 
interests of MOFTEC have become increasingly aligned with the norms of the 
international regime, and it often has been an able advocate within the government for 
China’s adoption of international practices . But, as Harris notes, the WTO’s accession 
is seen as different from others as it will involve substantial political and short-term 
economic costs (in the form of domestic adjustment and domestic opposition)843. Thus, 
making it a protracted process.
Deeper integration
China, like many other developing nations involved in broad economic and state reforms 
as well as telecommunication reforms, has and will require considerable regulatory 
flexibility to test various forms of market arrangements and the role of the state in the 
emerging regulatory environment. However, the growing presence of private investments 
in the sector and the increasing influence of multilateral agreements such as those 
developed in the context of the WTO are putting limits on the legal and operational 
flexibility of regulators. In addition, the regulatory reforms are constrained by China’s 
desire to play an increasingly central role in the sector. China’s ambition to become a key 
player in the telecommunication sector is best embodied in the development of domestic 
standards for the third generation of mobile telephony (3G). The next section explores 
how the central government’s ambition to transform a number of companies into global 
champions has raised the fears of protectionism in various capitals.
839 Pearson (2004: 574).
840 Annex 1 A, chapter V, paragraph a-e (WTO and Working Party on the Accession of China, 2001b). 
Paragraph 309 expresses concern about maintaining independence of regulators from those they regulate.
841 GAO (2004).
842 Pearson (1999a: 189).
843 Harris (1996: 140).
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Shifting barriers
"Standards have become one of the most important non-tariff barriers to trade, especially 
national product standards that specify design or performance characteristics of manufactured 
goods. ”
(Mattli and Blithe, 2003)
Since China’s WTO accession, the regulator and the other policy-making agencies have 
made efforts -  crowned or not with success -  to dismantle barriers of trade and erect the 
basis of a regulatory environment compliant with international norms and rules. These 
positive developments contrast with more worrying signs. Foreign governments and 
MNCs are increasingly concerned with the shifting of visible barriers of trade, like 
restrictions on market access, to more subtle forms of protectionism. Recent cases show 
that China has moved to develop, adopt, and increasingly mandate unique national 
technology standards across a wide range of technology products844. This attitude, which 
is not new, is reminiscent of the tendency toward techno-nationalism observed in a 
number of countries during the 1980s845. This once again point toward a continuity in 
policy-making. The role of standards is assuming a growing policy importance, especially 
at the intersection of national technology policies of norms and practices characterising 
international trade and investment in the global economy. Standards are essential for 
addressing market failures -  such as imperfect information -  and negative externalities -  
such as environmental degradation. They are also important in facilitating well- 
functioning markets where technical compatibility -  network externalities -  is 
important846.
QAHA large body of literature discusses the issue of standards in telecommunication . Apart 
from the many goods-related standards that may apply to the equipment used in supplying 
telecommunications, technical standards may affect the supply of telecommunications 
services in two important respects. First, standards, which are often technical in nature, 
may be applied to the suppliers themselves -  such as service or network performance
844 Examples include a mandated encryption standard for wireless communications devices and the 
development of unique national standards for AVS for media/TV, IGRS for connectivity, and EVD for 
recording media.
845 China has long pursued technological strategies motivated by nationalism, and elements of techno­
nationalism are clearly still evident in contemporary research, technology, and industrial policies (Suttmeier 
and Yao, 2004: 18). For a discussion on earlier forms of techno-nationalism, see (Reich, 1987; Ostry and 
Nelson, 1995).
846 At the same time, the design and operation of standards must also be such as to avoid the 
misappropriation or capture of public policy in these areas to construct unwarranted obstacles to 
competition and trade (WTO, 2005).
847 For a discussion on standards in telecommunication, see (Knight, 1992; Genschel and Werle, 1993; 
Joseph and Drahos, 1998; Schmidt and Werle, 1998; Gruber and Verboven, 2001; OECD, 2001b; Werle, 
2001a).
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requirements that the suppliers must satisfy -  in discriminating manners. Second, 
technical standards are the principal basis for spectrum management and frequency 
allocation and assignment. In addition, standards may have direct implications on 
policy848.
The main sources of standards-related elements of the WTO telecommunications regime 
are the GATS, including the Annex on telecommunications, the BTA, including the RP, 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) including a code of good practice 
for the preparation, adoption and application of standards, and the agreements on 
government procurement (AGP)849. Regarding technical standards, paragraph 7(a) of the 
Annex states, “Members recognise the importance of international standards for global 
compatibility in inter-operability of telecommunication networks and services and 
undertake to promote such standards through the work of relevant international bodies, 
including the International Telecommunication Union and the International Organisation 
for Standardisation”850. Werle notes that for the WTO, standards are to be used as 
instruments of pro-competitive trade policy while national governments tend to use them 
in an anti-competitive way. Therefore, according to the WTO rules, divergent national 
standards should be aligned to only one (international) standard in negotiations aiming at 
harmonisation851.
Two rules are of particular interest to the telecommunication services sector. The first 
grants national authorities the right to adopt as regulations standards concerning essential 
requirements in order to ensure, for example, environment and health protection or the 
technical integrity of telecommunications systems852. The second rule includes 
transparency and public availability requirements concerning standards and technical 
regulations853. Suttmeier and Yao have argued that, accordingly, Chinese decision makers 
have turned their attention to standards as part of “a strategy for meeting new competitive
848 In industries with significant network externalities, standardisation and compatibility issues raise 
important questions both for regulation and for competition policies (Bourreau and Dogan, 2001: 173).
849 GATS contains standards-related provisions on services, specifically, in Article VI paragraphs 4 and 5. 
TBT focuses on products and not on services. The AGP does not explicitly address telecommunications but 
covers all areas of public procurement of goods and services. Standards are referred to in Article VI, which 
requires that technical specifications shall not be prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the 
effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade (Werle, 2001b).
850 WTO (1999a).
851 Werle (2001b: 39).
852 Under TBT, formal provisions to discourage using standards as TBT’s have been strengthened, but 
implementation has been difficult (Suttmeier and Yao, 2004: 23).
853 In recent years a number of voices have called for the inclusion of binding rules on technology neutrality 
throughout the telecommunications sector in the next round of negotiation.
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854challenges and obligations resulting from China's accession to the WTO” . Akin to the 
regulatory environment, China has given reassurances about its intention to play by 
international rules. It has recognised the importance of adopting international standards, 
which had been used as a basis for the development of its technical regulations, standards 
and conformity assessment procedures855. Table 46 provides some indicators, which 
allow us to measure China’s effort to adopt international standards.
Table 46: Selected indicators of standard organisations
Country
Staff
directly
employed
Annual
budget
(thousand
CHF)
Government 
subsidy in 
% of total 
revenue
Total 
number of 
standards 
published 
(12/2002)
Voluntary 
standards in 
% of total 
number of 
standards
Number of 
international 
standards adopted 
as national 
standards (12/2002)
China 60 16*580 100 20*206 86 8*931
India 1’996 23*844 n.a. 17*764 99 1*070
Japan 108 26*500 100 9*009 100 n.a.
Korea 244 32*732 100 15*176 100 7*054
USA 77 24*426 3 n.a. 100 836
Source: Adapted from WTO (2005).
The war for standards in China’s telecommunication sector
That said, in recent years, the war for standards has been an increasing cause of concern 
to the telecommunication sector. The majority of the issues were affecting the equipment 
sector. While considered by some as a red herring, the saga of radiation standard 
illustrates well the new sort of non-tariff barriers that China could consider using856. It 
was followed a few years later by the row over a new standard for wireless applications -  
the Wireless Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) -  which prompted the 
reaction from the US Commerce and State Departments. The State General 
Administration for Quality Supervision and Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), and the 
Standardisation Administration of China (SAC) issued WAPI, which forbade the import, 
manufacture, and sales of equipment that did not accord with the new standard of wireless 
network products. These standards went into effect in December 2003 without having
854 Suttmeier and Yao (2004: 5-9).
855 Moreover, the Administration for Quality Supervision and Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) has 
recognised as international the standards issued by 42 international organisations.
856 The draft regulations, first published late 2001 by an official committee developing mobile phone safety 
standards, diverged from a standard that prevailed elsewhere in the world and was endorsed by the World 
Health Organisation. One reason for the government to back out from its initial plan appears to be the 
concerted answer by various actors in the industry, like the telecommunication association, some foreign 
manufacturers and the European Union. Representatives from the China Mobile Communications 
Association urged the government to follow international benchmarks. More probably though is the 
disastrous consequences it would have had on the domestic manufacturers like Huawei, ZTE, TCL or 
Haier: such a strict standard would have greatly increased the cost of both domestic telecom network 
operators and mobile phone makers as well as engendered obstacle for the export of mobile phone.
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been notified to the WTO857. The government’s attempt to push through the new standard 
contravened in several ways to international rules -  including the denial of national 
treatment to imported products, the use of standards that are more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, the use of mandatory standards that do not 
comply with accepted international standards, or local content requirements for access to 
the Chinese market858.
Most standard issues are confined to the equipment sector. Some of them nonetheless 
have direct bearings on the service sector. A case in point is the choice of standard for 
3G. By agreeing to the Reference Paper, China has committed to technology-neutral 
scheduling, which means that any basic service may be provided through any means of 
technology -  cable, wireless or satellites. The upcoming attribution of 3G licences will 
give the Chinese government a golden opportunity to prove at the same time its 
commitments to technology neutrality and to regulatory independence. To satisfy both 
principles, it will have to “de-link” the licences from any given technology -  CDMA- 
2000, WCDMA or the domestically developed TD-SCDMA. In other words, it will not be 
allowed to force an operator to use of a particular technology in exchange for a 3G 
licence. The logical choice for the operators is mostly conditioned by the technology of 
the existing network. For example, China Mobile, who runs a GSM network, should 
adopt W-CDMA859.
For the time being, China has agreed to suspend indefinitely its proposed implementation 
of a mandatory wireless encryption standard and revise its standard, taking into account 
comments received from Chinese and foreign firms860. Moreover, it has promised to 
support technology neutrality with respect to the adoption of 3G standards . China also 
announced that Chinese regulators would not be involved in negotiating royalty payment
857 WAPI was drafted by M il’s technology office in May 2003 (Interfax, 2003a). The new standard differed 
significantly from the internationally recognised standards that MNCs have adopted. In addition, the 
government was trying to impose its standard by providing the necessary algorithms only to a number of 
domestic companies, forcing multinational manufacturers to work with the licensed Chinese companies.
858 Trade-related standards include those governing product categorisation and product codes, for example, 
as well as standards for services. Industrial standards are typically the purview of particular line ministries, 
while the SAC governs “national” standards for multiple industries.
859 The company has apparently taken pre-emptive actions in this direction by applying for a W-CDMA 
licence (SinoCast, 2005c).
860 It has also agreed participate in international standards bodies on wireless encryption for computer 
networks.
861 During the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) held in May 2004, China announced 
steps toward a market-based and technology neutral approach to the development of next generation 
wireless standards for computers and mobile phones. It remains nevertheless to be seen whether domestic 
pressures from equipment manufacturers who have invested large amounts of money into the development 
of TD-SDCMA technology will remain unheard.
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terms with relevant intellectual property rights holders. By the end of 2004, however, it 
had become evident that there was still pressure from within the Chinese government to 
ensure a place for China’s home-grown 3G standard. The United States will therefore
869carefully monitor developments in this area in 2005 . This will allow, in theory at least,
telecommunications service providers in China to make their own choices as to which 
standard to adopt -  and to refrain from negotiating royalty payment terms with 3G IPR 
holders . The IPR cost is a major concern for vendors who do not own any or enough 
tradable essential patents and the largest groups in this camp are the Chinese and other 
Asian equipment vendors. In the case of a very large and diversified manufacturer such as 
Samsung, the lack of sufficient 3G patents is mitigated by the ownership of other patents 
in other technology streams — e.g. memory, Plasma, LCDs — that can be used for barter 
purposes. Other vendors, such as the Chinese, don’t have any such relief and are therefore 
much worse off.
China's battle for specific standards is obviously not only linked to a given technology, 
but also to economic and political considerations864. The IPR costs of Asian 3G handset 
manufacturers range from 18% to 25% of the handset’s average selling price or as much 
as USD 50 per handset. As a reference, 2G royalties on handsets range from 3% to 8% of 
the average selling price. China has made no secret about its desire and ambition to 
develop its own intellectual property. This has however put the government in front of a 
dilemma. On the one hand, relatively few firms have succeeded in the development of 
infrastructure and phones based on non-domestic standards. In other words, firms are 
given a significant competitive advantage when their countries create a system, which 
eventually becomes a worldwide standard865. On the other hand, the government does not 
want to create a “debased” telecommunication market because it imposed its own 
standards. In addition, the government does not necessarily want to favour one domestic 
company if that means that all the other ones risk losing their competitiveness in their 
battle for global market share866. For the time being, and given China’s ambition to 
nurture national champions, it comes as no surprise that the government has backed a
862 USTR (2004).
863 The government is likely to choose the technologies that will generate best prospects for the equipment 
industry in China. In the case of 3G, the Government is expected to issue licenses based on both W-CDMA 
and CDMA2000, so that China’s manufacturers can leverage the scale of the domestic market to become 
global players. TD-SCDMA may have a small role, for example in limited franchise areas, for the sake of 
national pride, but no nation-wide rollout.
864 Fan (2001: 183).
865 Funk (1998).
866 Interview (B-007), conducted in Beijing, 31 August 2001.
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limited number of domestic companies . It remains, nonetheless to be seen, if the 
government will take the risk of imposing TD-SCDMA, or for that matter any other given 
standard, on the domestic operators.
867 Jensen and Thursby (1996) argue that governments set standards in order to improve the chances of 
domestic firms in R&D competition.
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Concluding remarks
For Joseph and Drahos, the significance of the GATS does not lie in what it achieved 
initially, but rather in the set of expectations it generated. The GATS set up the 
expectation of a liberalisation of telecommunications and made use of a multilateral 
bargaining mechanism (the NGBT) to make sure that some action followed these 
expectations868. A similar analogy can be drawn with the impact of the WTO accession 
on the China telecommunication’s reform process. Instead of provoking a radical shift in 
the regulatory environment, the accession set up a framework locking in the reform 
process.
Several elements allow us to put into perspective the importance of the WTO accession 
on reforms. First, while China’s initial request for GATT membership preceded the initial 
reforms of the sector, telecommunication services were not included in the negotiations 
until the mid-1990s. It is only with the Basic Telecommunication Agreement (BTA) in 
1997, that telecommunication services became part of the accession package. Second, 
there is evidence that the leadership in charge of telecommunications could not conceive 
that the WTO would entail a change in the way the industry was run. Former Minister Wu 
put all his weight to limit market access for both domestic and foreign operators. The 
combination of pre-emptive actions and of institutional setting thus limited the impact of 
the WTO’s accession process. The tension was increased by the differing objectives of 
the various players involved in the telecommunication negotiations. On one side, foreign 
countries were keen on obtaining very precise concessions in terms of market access or 
equity holding, while on the other side Mil was willing to open up in a very limited 
manner. In the middle, MOFTEC and the leadership were conceiving the WTO accession 
as an important goal in the wider reform process869. Third, institutional weaknesses in 
general, and the one in the telecommunication sector in particular, make implementation 
difficult. While there is no doubt that a number of key issues, such as interconnection, 
independence of the regulator or licensing remain unresolved, it seems hasty to jump to 
the conclusion that the impact of the WTO accession has vanished. China’s WTO 
accession protocol is “here to stay”. The government has shown its strong commitment to 
abide by the agreement and -  unless there is an extraordinary and highly unlikely turn of 
events -  to build on the accession to further the reform process in all sectors of the 
economy. Thanks to the relentless efforts of Minister Wu, telecommunication has so far 
been shielded from massive inroads of foreign operators. Instead, the government has
868 Joseph and Drahos (1998: 101-102).
869 Interview (B-041), conducted in Beijing, 28 November 2003.
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been able to restructure the sector (and the operators) without haste, while maintaining 
control. At the same time, the breadth and depth of the negotiation implies the 
engagement of an enormous amount of resources, from the altering, or in certain cases, 
the creation of a legal framework to the training of thousands of civil servants to 
understand and implement the commitments.
While this chapter has argued that reforms and accession were on dual tracks, both 
processes can be viewed as independent only to a certain point. Given the commitments 
made by the Chinese government, it is only a question of time before foreign investors 
and private operators are able to enter the market. The next chapter discusses the 
reconciliation of domestic and international pressures and how the institutional setting 
will mediate the reconciliation.
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Part IV: 
Conclusions
7 Domestic reforms, substantive issues and the state
“Telecommunication reforms are not the mechanical outcome of policy implementation. To the 
contrary, they are the product of complex and dynamic interactions among conflictive interests. ”
(Petrazzini, 1995: 5)
“There is nothing automatic about the definition ofpolicy preferences or the path ofpolicy and 
institutional change as internationalisation grows. ”
(Keohane and Milner, 1996: 255)
In their classic study of China’s telecommunication reforms, Mueller and Tan have 
argued that policy changes could be initiated in three ways -  proposals from top leaders, 
government ministries and agencies-initiated policy changes within their own jurisdiction, 
or a coalition of rival ministries proposing a redistribution of power, control, and assets 
among rival ministries870. This thesis set out to examine the evolution of China’s 
telecommunication policy-making in light of the major transformations that were taking 
place in the international telecommunication regime -  both in terms of market 
liberalisation and creation of a supranational framework. One of the key questions raised 
throughout the research was whether the process of China’s accession to the WTO was to 
act as an additional factor that could fundamentally disrupt the way policy was initiated 
and conducted in the telecommunication sector. As of today, this has not been the case. 
Strong vested interests and institutional path dependency have largely undermined the 
effect of imposing a supranational framework onto the existing policy-making structure.
Part I and II have shown that China’s regulatory policy-making has overwhelmingly been 
crafted by domestic factors. The first round of reforms, initiated in 1993 saw the 
introduction of competition. For this to take place, the new entrants relied mainly on the 
support of the State Council and the desire of rivalling Ministries to secure a share of the 
emerging telecommunication market. The partial listing of corporatised operators on 
foreign stock exchanges, which followed a few years later, was driven more by 
consideration to maximise financial revenues than by the wish to align with international
R71practices . The hopes that listed operators -  now subject to investor scrutiny -  would 
improve the sector’s governance and regulatory transparency, were rapidly squelched. 
Instead, it led to an idiosyncratic model of liberalisation in which the state remained very 
much involved in the telecommunication services sector, either through its ownership of 
the operators via SASAC or through the actions of the various policy-making agencies,
870 Mueller and Tan (1997: 53).
871 We are witnessing today similar developments in the railway sector where the government has initiated 
reforms in pricing, rights of operation and opening to private capital (Xinhua, 2005a).
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whose interests are not always aligned. The influence of non-domestic factors on 
regulatory policy-making should nonetheless not be completely discarded. The 
legislations passed in 2000 and thereafter satisfy more or less the requirements defined by 
the WTO’s Reference Paper. The nature, scope and extent of the reforms have, in a sense, 
shown some signs of harmonisation with regulatory frameworks found in other countries. 
While it is clear that the future of its domestic regulatory policy-making will be dictated 
in parts by the supranational telecommunication framework, major concerns subsist. As 
of today, relatively limited progress has been achieved in terms of market access -  for 
foreign or Chinese private companies -  and there are continuing concerns about the 
implementation of the regulations passed since 2000, leading to a number of pressing 
substantive issues.
The first section summarises China’s telecommunication regulatory policy-making in the 
era of economic and trade reforms. It reviews China’s telecommunication reforms 
through a summary of the structural reforms, the process of regulation and the substantive 
regulatory issues. It then weights China’s telecommunication liberalisation programme 
against other experiences around the world and more particularly in Asian countries. The 
second section discusses the substantive issues, which plague the sector’s reform. The last 
section turns to the issue of the emergence of a regulatory State in China. A central 
question raised by the research is indeed whether the bargaining framework, often used to 
analyse and to explain policy-making in China, maintains its explanatory power in light 
of the economic and trade reforms and of the internationalisation process.
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Framing China’s telecommunication reforms
“Reform in policy-making was coming from two directions: internally where reforms were 
needed, and externally where the WTO promoted reform. ”
Senior Mil official872
Reforms can take one of three directions: rationalisation, democratisation and power 
shifts. As this thesis has shown, reforms in the Chinese telecommunication sector went in 
at least two directions! Ministries with policy-making functions were streamlined and 
downsized -  through outright reduction of civil servants and the spinning off of 
departments . Provincial and municipal telecommunication bureaus became empowered 
with regulatory functions -  setting up regulatory bodies and supervising provincial 
markets -  and took advantage to experiment with regulatory measures at the local level. 
Power shifts have been more difficult to assess. Since the replacement of the 
archconservative Minister Wu in 2003 by Wang Xudong, it has become harder to locate 
the centre of decision-making. The mere fact that the telecommunication law is still in 
drafting -  after more than a decade -  shows Mil’s failure to establish itself as a credible 
regulatory authority. It also indicates a lack of consensus among the policy-makers who 
are unable to compensate for the absence of the long awaited telecommunication 
commission. The episodic intervention of SASAC and NDRC on a number of issues -  
such as the merger of the six operators into two or three super-providers, or the timing of 
3G licences -  further indicates that no finite boundary has been set around the various 
policy-makers’ functions874. In our view, it is precisely the overlapping of some of the 
functions and of the policy domains that leads to the current status quo of the 
telecommunication reform875.
Structural reforms
The structural reform took the form of partial liberalisation. The most visible structural 
reforms have, no doubt, been the introduction of competition, the creation of Mil in 1998 
and the passing of the telecommunication regulation in 2000876. Table 47 summarises the 
history of China’s telecommunication reforms877.
872 Interview (B-031), conducted in Beijing, 15 November 2002.
873 These departments were “re-bom” as research institutes and have taken the role of think tanks for Mil 
and other policy-making bodies.
874 In theory, SASAC remains in charge of optimising state assets and NDRC entrusted with further sectoral 
reform.
875 For example, in telecommunication SAIC is responsible for checking anti-competitive conduct under the 
Unfair Competition Law, NDRC is charged with responsibility for checking anti-competitive conduct with 
respect to price-setting, and Mil has the right to check anti-competitive conduct (Guan, 2003: 240).
876 The paradox of regulating while liberalising should not come as a surprise. As noted by Pearson (2003: 
5) “in transition economies, regulatory reform combines some deregulation -  stepping back of the state
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Table 47: Overview of reform period and reform components
Pre-reform
era
First round 
of reforms
Second round of 
reforms
Third round 
of reforms
1978-1993 1993-1995 1995-1998 1998-2001 Post-2001
Policy-makers MEI, MPT MEI, MPT, SPC, SETC Mil, SDPC, SETC Mil, NDRC, SASAC
Regulator MPT MI :
Regulation Ad hoc administrative measures T elecommunication Regulation FITE
Ownership
State-owned, 
controlled by 
MPT
i
Corporatisation IPOs (majority state-owned)
State-owned 
but control 
grouped under 
SASAC
Competition None
Creation of 
China 
Unicom
Spin off of China 
Mobile and 
creation of China 
Netcom
Breaking up of 
China Telecom 
into Northern 
and Southern
units
Pricing Set by government Flexibility for VAS
Limited 
flexibility for 
operators
Source of 
funding
Government 
and foreign 
loans
i
Domestic loans and 
international financing IPOs and 3onds
Adoption rates Minimal Exponential Steady Steady Declining
Market access 
and FDI Explicit ban
Circumventing 
the ban Renewed ban
Limited
investment
Source: Compiled by author.
Funding aside, most of the structural reforms undertaken by the government have met 
with limited success878. The creation of China Unicom in the first half of the 1990s or the 
spin-off of mobile operations into a new company (China Mobile) bore little effect in 
promoting competition; neither did the break-up of China Telecom into a northern and 
southern territory put an end to monopolistic behaviours. Interconnection issues and more 
importantly incumbent power have severely limited the new entrants’ capacity to 
compete. In theory, the objective of government policy should be to promote competition 
in those market segments that are highly contestable -  such as distribution services -  and 
to provide a mix of liberalisation and pro-competitive regulation in those markets where
from the economy -  but also new regulations and re-regulation, often for the first time codifying the 
relationship between government and market, and building new institutions to direct this relationship.”
877 It proposes a periodisation of the events around four distinctive periods: a pre-reform era, followed by 
three rounds of reforms. While subjective by nature, periodisation allows us to discern potential causal links 
between a given set of institutions and reform periods. Periodisation is a cornerstone of virtually all 
historical analysis that involves the simplification of history through the recognition of certain types of 
events or processes as more “important” than others and that uses the dates of those events as dividing lines 
for a chronology (Katznelson, 1997).
878 The key problem for developing countries is attracting hard currency capital, skills and technology on 
terms that are sustainable for the long-term, while retaining control over policy direction (Melody, 1997c: 
20; Pisciotta, 1997: 337).
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R7Qthe degree of contestability is low, such as basic services . Unfortunately, the 
government has failed to pass authoritative legislation to this end. True competition 
remains a distant goal. The impact of the structural reforms has also been mitigated when 
it comes to regulatory independence. By accepting the regulatory principles specified in 
the Reference Paper, China has committed to instituting an independent regulator and 
thus to changing its traditional sporadic intervention on ad hoc basis into a transparent
QQA
legal and regulatory framework. . With the separation of the incumbent from the MPT 
and later Mil, China has in theory filled the RP’s condition that “the regulatory body is 
separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services” 
and that “the decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall be impartial with 
respect to all market participants”. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and reality 
remains wide. Although corporatisation took place in the mid-1990s, formal 
independence of the operators can only be traced to the transfer of ownership to SASAC 
in 2003. Moreover, whereas regulatory and policy authority tend to be separated -  e.g. 
through the existence of a Ministry in charge of telecommunication and an independent 
regulatory agency -  China has for now kept both functions under MIL This, combined 
with the lack of a clear definition of each policy-maker’s function and to informal policy­
making influences, have left the regulator almost powerless. The Telecommunication 
Regulations represented a welcome first effort by a national rule-making body to 
standardise the administration of China's rapidly changing telecommunications industry. 
It also helped prepare and position China to undertake many of its telecommunication- 
related WTO commitments881. Unfortunately, it failed to address the issue of convergence 
and suffered from the lack of a more general law regulating the sector. In addition, Mil’s 
lack of power and enforcement capacity render this legislation largely useless. Overall, 
the structural reforms carried out since 1993 proved to be disappointing. The regulatory 
process can at least in part, explain this.
The regulatory process
The principles of good regulatory decision-making are well-known. They include 
transparency, objectivity, professionalism, efficiency and independence882. The two main 
issues in defining a transparent regulatory process are the institutions to which the 
regulator is accountable and the set of mechanisms through which accountability takes
879 Stephenson (2001: 19).
880 Xu and Kan (2000: 20) and Mattoo (2002: 15-16).
881 Horsley (2001a).
882 Intven, Oliver et al. (2000: 1 - 19).
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place. An essential step in achieving legitimisation is the establishment of transparent and 
inclusive procedures for the reconciliation of conflicting interests using public-interest
Q Q '3
criteria. Merely establishing transparent procedures is not enough . For now, China 
lacks a mechanism where operators’ views can be formally heard when a piece of 
legislation is getting drafted884. The performance of a regulatory system also largely 
depends on the regulator’s determination to promote competition regardless of the form 
of the institutional structure. In addition, risks of poor regulatory performance are higher
O O f
in transitional countries due to fewer checks and balances on regulatory behaviour . 
Levy and Spiller have argued that performance can be satisfactory with a wide range of 
regulatory procedures, as long as three complementary mechanisms restraining arbitrary 
administrative action are all in place: a) substantive restraints on the discretion of the 
regulator; b) formal or informal constraints on changing the regulatory system; and c) 
institutions that enforce the above formal -  substantive or procedural -  constraints886. 
Table 48 applies Levy and Spiller’s framework to analyse China’s regulatory history 
throughout the successive reform eras. In the first place, China crucially lacks a set of 
mechanisms through which accountability takes place887. In addition, the core agency to 
which the regulator is accountable -  the State Council -  seemed to have lacked sufficient 
restraining mechanisms to prevent Mil discretionary actions.
Levy and Spiller have argued that regulatory commitment can be developed in what 
appears to be problematic environments, but that without such commitment, long-term 
investment will not take place888. China’s regulatory history has so far shown that, and 
contrary to what Levy and Spiller argued, commitment has been quite difficult to 
develop. This has however not prevented investment, since telecommunication companies
883 Samarajiva (2000a: 185).
884 Interview (C-004), conducted in Beijing, 12 June 2002.
885 For instance because the transparency framework is usually not as well developed, inefficient judicial 
review functions under a weaker rule of law, consumer interests are poorly organised, in line with a weaker 
vigilant civil society in general, parliaments carry out less oversight of performance or competition 
authorities are weaker or nonexistent (Min, 2000: 4-6).
886 To understand a country’s ability to commit to particular regulatory processes and institutions, they find 
it useful to look at regulation as a “design” problem with two components: regulatory governance and 
regulatory incentives. The governance structure incorporates the mechanisms a society uses to restrain the 
discretionary scope of regulators and to resolve the conflicts to which these restraints give rise. The 
regulatory incentive structure comprises the rules governing pricing, subsidies, competition and entry, 
interconnection, and the like (Levy and Spiller, 1996: 4).
887 For Stem and Trillas (2003: 197) accountability is the key to achieving regulatory stability through 
political legitimacy and market credibility.
888 Levy and Spiller (1994) also found evidence of the need for institutional constraints to ensure the 
credible commitment of regulators to increased infrastructure investment. Henisz (2002) empirically 
confirmed these findings for the electricity and telecommunications sector. His analysis showed that 
institutional constraints on political actors, which limited the potential for arbitrary policy change, were 
positively related to increases in infrastructure growth rates, even when accounting for unobserved country- 
level heterogeneity.
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were in large part state-owned, allowing the government to implement its FYP “through” 
the operators. More surprising though is the enthusiasm displayed by MNCs to invest. All 
knew indeed that they were treading a regulatory grey zone. There, it seems, the factor 
that helped convince those foreign operators was the China is the “only market that
889combines the critical mass with enormous potential for further growth.”
Table 48: Regulatory history and restraining mechanisms of China’s telecommunication sector
Restraining mechanisms
Period Regulatory Substantive restraints Restraints on system Enforcement of
history changes restraints
1978
to
1993
No law 
No independent 
regulator and 
internal regulations
Opaque
Vagueness provided 
for administrative 
discretion in 
interpreting the law
Weak judiciary but 
strong executive 
(State Council)
1993
to
1998
No law 
No independent 
regulator and 
internal regulations
Opaque Conflicting interests among stakeholders
Weak judiciary but 
strong executive
1998
to
2001
No independent 
regulator but major 
regulation passed 
in 2000
T elecommunication 
regulation complemented 
by administrative measures
Major overhaul of 
country wide 
legislative system
Weak judiciary and 
weakening 
executive, weak 
regulator
Post
2001
No independent 
regulator but major 
regulation passed 
in 2000
T elecommunication 
regulation complemented 
by administrative measures
Major overhaul to 
comply with WTO
Weak judiciary, 
weakening 
executive, weak 
regulator
Note: The legislative and executive institutions provide room for the State Council to draft regulations 
although there is increased questioning at the NPC. Judicial institutions remain weak and politically 
manipulable.
Source: Adapted from Levy and Spiller (1996).
The objective of broad economic and state reforms coupled with telecommunication 
reforms requires considerable regulatory flexibility to test various forms of market 
arrangements and the role of the state890. Having said this, too much flexibility causes 
other problems since operators and investors alike prefer having a certain amount of 
regulatory visibility891. It is true that the government, through Mil and other institutions 
such as SASAC or NDRC, gives the impression of having retained a significant control 
over the sector892. At the same time, the government control has been eroded by the 
extension of the market economy, institutional fragmentation, investor scrutiny and the 
lack of an overarching telecommunications commission, given that the once all-powerful 
Mil has not been able to establish itself as a credible independent regulator. Moreover, the
889 Interview (C-002), conducted in Beijing, 11 June 2002.
890 Petrazzini (1997: 359).
891 In addition, the introduction of new telecommunication services and products, including cellular 
systems, communication devices, and information technology products, is significantly affected by the 
degree of regulatory control (Wilson, 1997: 81).
892 The major shake up o f telecommunications operators’ top executives in November 2004 serves as a 
reminder of the government’s ability to interfere in corporate activities and signals its intention to maintain 
a firm grasp over the sector.
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listed telecommunications operators must now take account of capital market opinion893. 
Abrupt regulatory changes now risk attracting immediate sanctions from the market 
place.
893 In 2002, Mil approved a 750% hike in the ‘call completion rate’ -  the rate charged to foreign 
telecommunication companies, including those based in Hong Kong, to complete calls to China. The 
sudden increase drew sharp criticism from Hong Kong officials and some carriers. It seemed the increase 
was sought by China’s largest phone company China Telecom, in a bid to boost interest (by boosting its 
profits) in its then upcoming IPO, which was meeting with lukewarm interest among investors. The move 
failed to spark momentum, however, and the IPO was eventually halved from its originally planned size. In 
addition, it is reported that China Unicom and China Mobile lost USD 25 million in market capitalisation 
due to rumours that Mil would introduce a Calling Party Pays regime (Anonymous, 2005).
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Substantive regulatory issues
“Regulatory outcomes ultimately structure market outcomes. ”
(Vogel, 1997: 181)
Despite impressive growth figures and technological leapfrogging, China’s 
telecommunication reforms have been confronted with a number of serious substantive 
regulatory issues, such as licensing, interconnection, price regulation or the provision of 
universal service. Although these issues are not unique to countries undergoing 
liberalisation of their telecommunication sector, China’s institutional setting renders the 
tasks to solve them extremely difficult. This section reviews the main issues that plague 
the sector’s reform.
Table 49: A summary of best practice in telecommunication regulation
Area Best practice regulation
Universal service A fair and transparent telecommunication regulatory framework, technologically
neutral licensing practices and an effective regulatory body responsible for
implementing policies
Licensing Transparency, public consultation, balancing certainty and flexibility
Interconnection Provide advance regulatory guidelines, focus interconnection obligations on the
incumbent, transparency and non-discrimination
Price regulation Financing, efficiency and equity objectives
Source: Intven (2000) and ITU (2003).
Licensing
In 1994, as part of eight policies of telecommunication development, the State Council 
announced the licensing of value-added and mobile telecommunication services894. 
Further clarification of the licensing process was provided in the September 2000
O Q C  R O A
telecommunication regulations . But, in spite of the introduction of regulations and 
the foreign community's repeated calls for transparent procedures897, information on 
existing licences and, more importantly, on licensing schedules (how many licences are to 
be issued and when) remains hard to get. Licensing of third-generation mobile telephony 
(3G) provides a prime example. Both Mil and NDRC have made contradictory public 
announcements on the number and timing of the 3G licence issuing898. In addition,
894 Lu (2002a: 17). Regulation 55 issued by the State Council but drafted by MPT defined certain 
telecommunication services as open to domestic competition and established a licensing system for new 
entrants to be administered by MPT and its provincial branches.
895 Articles 7 to 22 (State Council of the People's Republic o f China, 2000).
896 In theory, licensing issues are covered both by the telecommunication regulation and by the Decree No. 
19 “Measures on the Management of Licence for Telecommunication Businesses Operations” (dianxin 
yewu jingguan xukezheng) (Ministry of Information Industry, 2002b).
897 Interview (B-001), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001. Transparency was also debated within the 
Working Party during the WTO accession.
898 The latest rumour announced that China would release four third-generation licences with a price tag 
between RMB 100 and 200 million (Dow Jones Chinese Financial Wire, 2005).
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licensing requirements may be inconsistent with Reference Paper requirements of 
transparency and non-discrimination899: under WTO commitments, national policy­
makers are free to adopt a variety of criteria in the granting of licences, as long as they are 
public and transparent900. However, China’s licence application is still not streamlined as 
the framers of the relevant provisions of the Working Party Report intended901. In spite of 
paragraph 308 listing the requirements around licensing procedures, a strict interpretation 
of the FITE regulation could lead to the basic telecommunication service licensing 
process for a foreign operator to take a minimum of 496 days902. Table 50 describes the 
official licensing procedures issued by Mil.
Table 50: Overview of licensing procedure, 2004
Type of operator Licence authority and capital requirement
Application
review Duration
Equity
requirement
o Basic
telecommunicationa Mil and State Council 180 days
State-owned > 
51%
<D
6o
Q
Value-added 
services b
Mil and State Council if  more 
than 1 province, else provincial 
regulatory body
60 days None
.1
Basic
telecommunication
Mil and State Council if  more 
than 1 province (RMB 200 
million), else provincial 
regulatory body (RMB 2 
million)
180 days 5-10years 49%
otu
Value-added
services
Mil and State Council if  more 
than 1 province (RMB 10 
million), else provincial 90 days 5 years 50%
regulatory body (RMB 1 
million)
Note:a Provision of public network infrastructure (data and voice); Using public network to provide 
services.
Source: Adapted from Lu and Wong (2003: 87).
In addition, the high capitalisation requirements offer little incentive to a potential 
Chinese joint venture partner to tie up with a foreign partner (at least RMB 1 million in 
passive capital). With basic telecom infrastructure and services already in place, there is 
little reason for a potential Chinese partner to build a separate infrastructure through a 
joint venture that would compete with the Chinese parent. China’s capitalisation 
requirements are also inconsistent with the licensing practices of other liberalising 
economies. A global review of start-up capital requirements for basic telecom services 
providers finds none in the United States, EU member states, Canada, Japan, Australia,
899 In 2002, the Law on Administrative Licensing was promulgated by the Standing Committee. It states 
that only the NPC, the State Council and local People's Congress have the right to determine whether one 
activity needs an administrative licence. Departments under the State Council will no longer have the right 
to do so.
900 Blouin (2000: 140).
901 Paragraph 306 (WTO and Working Party on the Accession of China, 2001b).
902 Interview (B-034) conducted in Shanghai, 21 November, 2003.
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Argentina, Brazil, or Chile. Hong Kong requires a performance bond. India requires a 
bank guarantee ranging from USD 5 to 10 million, depending on geographic scope. Korea 
requires a USD 2.5 million performance bond or bank guarantee. Singapore requires a 
performance bond, scaled according to business scope. Only Taiwan maintains 
comparable capitalisation requirements to those of China.
One of the great ironies of China’s telecommunication reforms lies in the fact that some 
of its most pressing issues, such as interconnection, independence of regulators or 
competitive safeguards, are all part of the Reference Paper, but that in spite of signing it, 
the government has largely been unable to comply with its obligations903.
Interconnection
In network industries such as telecommunications, it is not enough simply to introduce 
competition through licensing904. The fundamental issue posed by interconnection is 
straightforward: without a right to interconnection, the incumbent can combine positive 
network externalities with its installed base to foreclose or severely handicap other 
competitors905. Furthermore, without regulatory intervention, interconnection 
arrangements are likely to reflect the respective market power of the players at the time of 
the negotiation, and to be used by the PTO to create artificial barriers to entry and shape 
competitive opportunities to its own interest. Three interconnection principles are critical 
for the promotion of non-discriminatory telecommunication markets -  mandatory 
interconnection of networks, no discrimination across network operators for the same 
service, pricing rules involving reciprocity, unbundling and imputation of 
interconnection906. To this end, interconnection charges must reflect multiple objectives. 
It goes without saying that reaching good decisions in interconnection policy requires a 
sophisticated understanding of the economics of network interconnection, technological 
expertise, and information on cost and demand907. Thus interconnection regulation and,
903 In other areas, such as interconnection, scarce resources or universal service obligations, the regulation is 
formally consistent with Reference Paper obligations, but there is uncertainty to what extent the regulation 
will be enforced and implemented in a WTO consistent manner.
904 Even at the point of introducing competition a number of related actions are necessary, especially with 
regard to interconnection and access to scarce resources such as frequencies, numbers and rights of way 
(Samarajiva, 2000b: 712).
905 Economides (1996) and OECD (2001a: 44).
906 Melody (1997a: 55-57, 61) identifies four interconnection issues: technical (e.g. standards), service (e.g. 
uniform definitions), competitive (e.g. terms of access and use) and regulatory (e.g. criteria to determine 
access) See also Stephenson (2001: 19-20).
907 An intelligent interconnection policy is the key to the harmonious development of competition in the 
telecommunication industry. To this end, interconnection charges must reflect multiple objectives. They 
must induce an efficient use of networks, encourage their owners to invest while minimising cost, generate
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more importantly, empowerment of the regulator are crucial to solving interconnection 
issues908. Furthermore, the power of an incumbent telecommunications network to control 
the terms of interconnection depends both on the size of its own network relative to the 
rival and whether or not the incumbent could expect to gain the rival’s customers in the 
event of failure to interconnect909.
Like in other countries, interconnection has been an uphill battle for new entrants. While 
the SPC had passed, as early as March 1996, a regulatory document on the financial 
settlement for network interconnection910, China Unicom had not only to apply for 
interconnection to various subsidiaries of China Telecom, but to re-apply to Mil to be 
granted interconnection rights911. Likewise, the ability of the two new regional fixed 
network incumbents created from the break-up of China Telecom -  China Netcom in the 
north and China Telecom in the south -  to enter each other’s regions has been 
conditioned on their progress in providing interconnection to each other912. Finally, it is 
reported that some specialised networks owned by different government departments and 
SOEs are beyond interconnection regulations and are only willing to sell access at much 
higher prices913.
Several causes underlie China’s interconnection problems. First, the existing regulatory 
instruments dealing with interconnection seem largely ineffective. Although the 
September 2000 regulation dealt with interconnection of telecommunication networks in 
Articles 17 to 21, the regulator had to issue three subsequent measures shortly after. In 
addition to the “Measures on the Settlement of Call Charges between Telecommunication 
Networks” (dianxin wangjian ionghuafei jiesuan banfa), Mil had to pass Decree No. 9, 
“Provisions on Administration of Interconnections Between Public Communications 
Networks” (gongyong dianxin wangjian hulian guanli guiding) and Decree No. 15, 
“Measures for Settlement of Interconnection Disputes in Telecommunications Networks” 
(dianxin wangjian hulian zhengyi chuli banfa)914. It seems however that operators tend to 
ignore these measures and that Mil lacks the power to implement them. Second, the
an efficient amount of entry into infrastructure and services, and do all of this at a reasonable regulatory 
cost (Laffont and Tirole, 2000: 98-99).
908 Schwarz and Satola (2000: 8).
909 OECD (2001a: 44).
910 Xu and Pitt (2002: 71).
911 China Tietong too has seen its launch delayed by interconnection problems with China Telecom, as it 
had to apply for interconnection with each of the provincial subsidiaries.
912 Willner (2002: 46).
913 Lu and Wong (2003: 104).
914 See Ministry of Information Industry (2001b; 2001a; 2002a).
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current settlement criterion does not seem to constitute the right incentive for operators 
ensuring interconnection915. For instance, China Telecom argued that the burden of 
universal service was not adequately represented in the interconnection price. Similarly, 
China Mobile has argued that it incurred large investment costs to develop its mobile 
network916. Third, the pressure exerted by financial markets has further complicated the 
issue. Revenue derived from interconnection is indeed significant (see Table 51).
Table 51: Interconnection revenue assumptions/estimates, 1999-2003
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003E
Total local (million minutes) 106,000 117,700 117,800 146,212 152,107
Total domestic long distance (million minutes) 32,311 42,431 48,059 68,650 69,505
Total international long distance (million minutes) 1,409 1,677 2,421 1,325 1,485
Total minutes 139,720 161,808 168,280 216,187 223,097
% of minutes subject to interconnection revenue 56.90% 49.60% 36.00% 33.60% 32.50%
Average interconnection tariff (RMB/min) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Interconnection revenue (RMB million) 4,770.04 4,855.53 3,816.59 4,358.33 4,350.39
Interconnection revenue (USD million) 574.70 585.00 459.83 525.10 524.14
Source: CSFB (2003).
In 2002, access charges accounted respectively for 3.6% and 3.3% of China Telecom and 
China Netcom total revenues917. China Mobile has to pay something like RMB3 billion 
per year for interconnecting with fixed line. It is so expensive that the mobile operator 
decided to build its own fixed-line backbone918, 919. To solve the interconnection issue, 
Mil formed in 2003 a special group with the aim of creating an inter-carrier settlement 
and interconnection monitoring system920. Later that year it announced new regulations 
for the settlement of interconnection charge and relay expenses among telecom operators.
915 China applies revenue sharing to interconnection charges. In such an approach, new entrants pay the 
incumbent operator a share of their revenues from interconnected services (or all services). This approach is 
simple but considered as non-transparent, potentially inefficient and anti-competitive (Intven, Oliver et al., 
2000:111-24). In telecommunications, access and interconnection prices are also to a large extent 
determined on a revenue sharing basis. For instance, no charge is imposed on termination between mobile 
networks. But since China adopts RPP in mobile networks, such regime is equivalent to an equal sharing of 
revenues under CPP. Indeed, such revenue sharing scheme is also explicitly implemented for the 
interconnection from fixed line to fixed line networks. The interconnection charge is regulated to be equal 
to half of the rival’s retail prices (Laffont, 2004: 204).
916 Interview (B-035), conducted in Shanghai, 21 November 2003.
917 Access charges usually account for 15 to 30% of the dominant operator’s revenue in other countries (Lu 
and Wong, 2003: 103).
918 Interview (B-011), conducted in Beijing, 6 September 2001.
919 Starting in December 2003, interconnection charges for calls made between fixed-line and between 
mobile networks were settled at RMB 0.06 (USD 0.007) per minute. Previously, fixed-line telephone 
operators charged mobile operators interconnection fees when a mobile phone called a fixed-line number 
while the reverse would not be charged (Interfax, 2003b, 2003c).
920 The system is scheduled for completion in die middle of 2004, and was to inspect 31 municipalities, 
provinces, and autonomous regions across China. On August 14, 2003, the Chinese Government issued the 
75th governmental file to seriously regulate the Chinese chaotic telecoms market. The document mainly 
aimed at improving telecoms interconnecting services among different China-based telecoms carriers, 
limiting malicious price competition, and ensuring rational competition in the Chinese telecoms market 
(SinoCast, 2004c).
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The new regulations, which became effective in December 2003, specified the amount for 
interconnection charges -  prior to these new regulations, there had been no 
interconnection charge between China Mobile and China Unicom. In addition, operators 
have taken things into their own hands by allying in aspects of interconnection and 
pricing system. In Jiangsu, they have recently reached a self-discipline agreement 
composed of 26 articles that clearly prescribe carrier interconnection, inter-carrier 
settlement, billing rate reduction for promotion, and telecom facility construction921.
In brief, there is already a push in the right direction from the regulator, but anywhere 
else, incumbents have found more sophisticated ways to stay one step ahead of the 
regulator and hold onto the advantage of economies of scale from being the biggest 
operator in the market. The difference has been that in China the incumbent found a very 
receptive voice (or a regulator), which was willing to ignore the roadblocks that the 
incumbent was throwing up922.
Price regulation
Closely linked to interconnection is the issue of price regulation. Of all utility services, 
telecommunications is often regarded as the only sector to have seen sufficient 
competition to begin to reduce the need for tariff regulation923. Telecommunication prices 
in China have traditionally been government-set prices {ding jia) or government-guided 
prices {zhidao jia) -  that is where the government usually specifies a range of prices. As a 
result, operators had very limited flexibility in setting their own tariffs. In 2001, 
companies were allowed to set their own prices for certain services “in accordance with 
market levels”924. In addition to the tariff regulation introduced at the beginning of 2002, 
a new rule on price statements for telecommunication services, jointly drafted by Mil and 
the SDPC, took effect on August 1, 2002 (see Table 52). It requires service providers to 
clearly display their service content and billing rate, and to provide a channel for public 
inquiry925. Retail service prices are still regulated where effective competition is lacking, 
based not on a single transparent test but on a mixture of cost concepts and other factors 
such as perceived needs of the industry .
921 SinoCast (2004d).
922 Interview (B-008), conducted in Beijing, 3 September 2001.
923 Harris (2003: 37).
924 Mil gave up control on long-distance pricing, especially for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) 
services, leading to major price cuts by China Unicom and China Netcom.
925 Interfax (2002c).
926 For example, China Unicom had a 10% discount buffer (Interview (B-029), conducted in Beijing, 12 
October 2001).
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Table 52: Telecommunication services subject to tariff deregulation, August 2002
Segment Comment
Fixed local Voice messaging, narrow-band ISDN value-added services, tele-info services
Long-distance Video and voice teleconference
IP services Domestic and international long-distance
Paging Usage tariffs, data services
Data services Both domestic long-distance & international
Cellular SIM card fees, domestic/international long-distance roaming, SMS and VAS
Satellite Transponder leasing, VSAT, satellite phones and pagers
Note: Basic tariffs for fixed-line local calls and long-distance calls, as well as mobile tariffs, have been 
excluded, as they remain regulated at fixed rates by the government.
Source: MIL
Like in other countries, the tariff structure had a clear cross-subsidising feature, with the 
rate of return much lower (intra-city) for city services and higher for long-distance and
o oninternational services . The various tariff adjustments have also impacted China 
Telecom’s revenue stream and its capacity to provide universal access928.
For many years, the current official line was that the government would continue to set 
prices for basic telecom services affecting national security and the national network, 
whereas value-added services would be priced by enterprises themselves or through 
government-guided prices929. In fact, in 2004, the State Council declared that the 
communications companies had no rights to change charge ratings at their discretion930. 
By March 2005, rumours were circulating that carriers would gain pricing power after 
Mil’s plan to introduce market principles into the reforms931. Regulatory officials 
nonetheless openly admit that telecommunication price regulation is not as effective as it 
is used to be. In fact, even though administered prices without any flexibility are officially 
imposed, price wars are common932. This opinion is qualified by a local manager: “the 
local government, the bureau o f telecommunication management can decide to a large 
extent if  you can make a price war”933. Lately, there have been rumours of a change in the 
policy direction: the government would no longer directly set prices, but instead would 
adopt a system by which the enterprises apply (shenbao), the government approves 
(shenpi), and then the government publicly announces (gonggao). In addition, a clear
927 Lu and Wong (2003: 22).
928 Lin, Ma et al. (2002: 22).
929 The principle for setting prices should be cost-based pricing.
930 SinoCast (2005b).
931 There have also been talks about launching an independent regulatory body to supervise 
telecommunications fees. The State Telecommunications Management Commission is expected to see the 
light around 2006 or 2007. It is hoped that the commission will be able to curb the sector’s price wars and 
fierce competition (Anonymous, 2005). In the meantime, China Telecom and China Netcom obtained 
approval from NDRC and Mil to adjust fixed-line phone charges. Under the notice jointly issued by the two 
departments, the country's top two fixed-line phone carriers are permitted to collect advance payment for 
basic services calculated by days (SinoCast, 2005a).
932 Laffont (2004: 198).
933 Interview (B-035), conducted in Shanghai, 21 November 2003.
226
distinction will be made between what prices are administered by Mil, and what prices 
are administered by the newly established provincial Telecommunication Administration 
Bureaus934. The trend is thus to gradually create a free market environment for pricing, by 
gradually giving more flexibility on tariffs to the service providers rather than having the 
government making the decision935.
Universal service
According to Mil, there were about 101.6 million fixed-line phone subscribers in the rural 
areas at the end o f 2004, up from 93.1 million at the end o f 2003. In urban areas, there 
were about 215 million users, against 175 million at the end o f 2003 (see Figure 14, Table 
53 and Table 54)936. The respective annual growth rates (respectively under 10% and
Q ' l n
above 20%) underline the mounting divides between both areas , which the government
O ?J?
attempts to bridge through its ‘Go West’ policy (xibu da kaifa ). The uneven
Table 53: Mobile and fixed-line switching capacity, 2003
Region Population Breakdown Mobile Breakdown Fixed line Breakdown 
______________(million)________________ (million)___________________ (million)_________________
East 399 32.3% 181.3 53.8% 167.8 48.0%
Central 480 38.8% 87.2 25.9% 109.0 31.2%
West 357 28.9% 68.6 20.3% 72.6 20.8%
Total 1,236 100.0% 337.0 100.0% 349.3 100%
Source: MIL
Table 54: Urban vs. rural fixed-line penetration, March 2004
Region Urban Rural Total Penetration
East 95 47 141 35.4%
Central 59 36 94 19.6%
West 42 17 59 16.5%
Total 196 99 295 23.9%
Penetration 38.2% 13.7% 23.9%
Source: MIL
The concept of universal service consists in ensuring quality telecommunications services 
at affordable rates to consumers, including low-income consumers, in all regions of the 
nation, including rural, insular, and high-cost areas940. Universal service policies are 
typically justified through a combination of network externalities, ‘merit’ goods and 
political factors or regional development goals, although Clarke and Wallsten find little 
evidence that subsidies have been used to meet universal service goals under monopoly 
provision. Methods of funding universal service obligations include cross-subsidies 
(financed through the general tax and transfer system), as well as universal service funds 
and auctions941. However, both privatisation and liberalisation trends make it impossible 
to maintain significant cross-subsidies in the structure of prices942. The compatibility of 
competition and universal service obligations is the object of intense political and 
economic debates, and there is no definite conclusion as to whether competition is 
harmful or beneficial to the universal-service objective943.
In many Asian countries, internal cross-subsidisation was widely used to promote 
universality944. In China, the current system of universal service obligations is based both 
on internal cross-subsidies of the dominant operator and “favourable” government fiscal 
policies945. In fact, universal service policy was for a long time implemented through
940 Laffont and Tirole (2000: 219).
941 Clarke and Wallsten (2002: 4-12).
942 Kessides (2004: 25).
943 Barros and Seabra (1999: 59) and Gasmi, Laffont et al. (2000: 222).
944 Intven, Oliver et al. (2000: VI-55).
945 Actually, from a legislative perspective, Article 44 of the September 2000 regulation provides for 
universal service obligations. Although Article 44 specifies that the administration is incumbent to the
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offering fiscal policy support to the operator to make investments in expanding network 
coverage. Currently, the operators do not equally share universal service obligations and, 
as a matter of fact, only China Telecom has such obligations based on implicit contracting 
inherited from the monopolistic era946. The policies concerning universal access were 
often made explicit via the Five-Year Plans. For example, there was a requirement in the 
9th FYP (1996-2000) to have at least one telephone line going to every administrative 
village (cun cun tong dianhua) by the end of the plan947. The government then reverted to 
more realistic objectives. It achieved 80% of administrative connectivity by 2000, and 
planned that the proportion of villages with access to telephone services would increase 
from 80% by the end of 2000 to 95% by 2005 -  those of urban areas would reach 
100%948. Later, the 10th FYP called for the establishment of a universal service 
contribution and government subsidising mechanism949.
China’s ultimate stated goal remains the implementation of “one family, one telephone” 
in urban area and telephone services in every rural administrative village950. According to 
the state mid-term and long-term plans, the fixed line project into villages will be 
implemented in two stages. At the end of the first stage, all the administrative villages 
would have access to fixed lines by 2010; at the end of the second stage, all the “natural 
villages” would have access to fixed lines and Internet. Mil launched the fixed line 
project into villages at the beginning of 2004, saying that by the end of 2005, it would 
open fixed line phones to 40,000 administrative villages, giving 95 % of them access to 
fixed line951. In addition, policy-making bodies have also started to debate the creation of 
a universal service fund. In 2000, SDPC proposed two scenarios to that end: collect a 
proportion of the revenues of all operators952 or transform installation and connection fees 
directly into a universal service fund953. In January 2004, Mil commenced a trial on 
universal service obligations (USO) in five provinces in conjunction with the country’s
department in charge of the information industry, it emphasises the centrality of the State Council in the 
overall management of universal service.
946 Lin, Ma et al. (2002: 20).
947 Interview (B-002), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001.
948 Lin, Ma et al. (2002: 65).
949 Including flexible taxation and investment policies to encourage the development of telecommunications 
services in poor areas and villages’ government subsidies for the provision of dedicated government and 
Party networks, emergency communications services and the publishing of the Party’s doctrine and books 
for blind people (TRP, 2001).
950 Li and Wang (2003: 2).
951 Xinhua (2004b).
952 On the condition that installation fees for fixed line phone, connection fees for mobile phones, and all 
kinds of surcharges and government funds on top of telecom services are repealed (Lin, Ma et al., 2002:
23).
953 And, on top of that, to collect the remaining funds as a proportion of the revenues of all operators (Lin, 
Ma et al., 2002: 23).
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six basic-service telecom carriers. The focus was on using alternative wireless and 
satellite technologies, such as CDMA450, SCDMA400 and VSAT. The initial fund size 
for USO is likely to be less than RMB 10 billion, or 2% of telecom spending954.
Discussion
All the issues discussed above are not restricted to China’s telecommunication sector. In 
fact, even the most “mature” telecommunication sectors have had to tackle them during 
their transition from a state-owned monopolistic operator to a competitive 
telecommunication sector. In many transition economies there is an important political 
link between the scope of the Ministry’s power and the level of independence of the 
regulation bureau955. In China too the reforms have initially failed to create a truly 
independent regulator. Instead, the regulator remains fully integrated within the Ministry 
in charge of telecommunication (Mil). A direct consequence of the regulator’s lack of 
independence is that it remains subject to political influence and strong vested interests.
In order to address the substantive issues brought by the telecommunication reforms, the 
government will have first to resolve the nature of the regulatory authority itself. But even 
if a regulatory authority is established with the necessary jurisdiction, it must still be 
effective956. As noted by Pearson “regulatory authority and independence in China does 
not yet derive from legal sources, nor is regulatory enforcement backed up by legal 
means”957. While the days of selective enforcement seem to fade away, a sense of weak 
enforcement capacity still largely prevails in the telecommunication sector958. The gap 
between Mil, which has remained shielded from a fundamental re-structuring and kept 
operating along state-run lines, and operators who need increasingly respond to market 
forces is only more apparent.
It is also important to keep in mind that the impact of regulatory incentives -  such as the 
rules governing utility pricing or interconnection -  comes to the forefront only if
954 The government may allocate funds from the budget and, as such, contribution from the telecom carriers 
should not exceed 1.0% of revenue. China Telecom has not disclosed its spending in rural areas, but it 
should be a net beneficiary of USO implementation (Deutsche Bank, 2004).
955 Schwarz and Satola (2000: 22). The more powers are granted to the Ministry, the more palatable, from a 
political perspective, it will be to confer a healthy level of independence on the bureau.
956 Pisciotta (1997: 348-349). It is also critical to establish a legal framework for fair and consistent 
regulatory decision-making. Finally, any regulatory process must be customised to meet the unique 
requirements of a particular country.
957 In short, independence is constrained by the fact that the regulator is not independent from policy­
making bodies and that it lacks authority (Pearson, 2003: 21, 28).
958 Interview (B-003), conducted in Beijing, 28 August 2001 and interview (B-005), conducted in Beijing,
13 September 2001.
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regulatory governance has successfully been put into place959. Laffont and Tirole point 
out that the adoption of high-powered schemes must go hand-in-hand with the existence 
of political and bureaucratic institutions that alleviate capture problems960. Otherwise, as 
argued by Stem and Trillas, countries with limited institutional capacity should carry out 
regulation by simple, minimum discretion procedures or, if possible, by reliance by the 
regulatory agency on contract enforcement961.
Table 55: Comparison between standard institutional structure in developed market economies and
China
Function________Responsible organisation______ China_________________________________
Policy Government Ministry or Mil, NDRC, SASAC
development Executive Branch
Regulation Separate regulatory authority Mil
Network PTOs (privately or China Telecom, China Netcom, China Mobile,
operations commercially operated) China Unicom, China Tietong
Source: Adapted from Intven (2000).
Unfortunately, China’s existing regulatory governance remains opaque and to a large 
extent subject to capture by vested interests. Moreover it seems ill equipped to build new 
institutions with meaningful implementation power in the short run962. What was 
perceived by Lovelock as a factor contributing to the implementation of China’s national 
information infrastructure policy framework -  the lack of institutional constraints -  has 
proven a stumbling block to in-depth reforms of the regulatory environment . Thus one 
of the key dilemmas faced by China is to balance a development of telecommunications 
that fits into a global framework for progress while accommodating its national 
interest964. As noted by Henisz and Zelner, “the ability o f a laggard country to catch up 
with countries with more developed telecommunications infrastructure depends not only 
on economic characteristics but also on the ability o f that laggard country's institutional 
environment to constrain arbitrary behaviour on the part o f government officials”965 The 
failure of the Chinese government to create a regulatory regime to effectively implement 
the new policy of liberalisation represents essentially a problem of institutional change. 
As institutional analysts have observed, institutional change very rarely has revolutionary 
dimensions and is most often undertaken with cognisance of the existing arrangements,
959 Levy and Spiller (1994). Likewise Spiller and Tommasi (2005) emphasise the institutional aspects that 
impact on the nature o f regulatory institutions, and thus on regulation and sectoral performance.
960 Laffont and Tirole (2000: 58).
961 The alternative view is that proper regulatory governance arrangements are crucial precisely because 
telecom and other utility regulation cannot avoid discretion (Stem and Trillas, 2003:197).
962 In theory, institutions determine the capacity of governments to legislate and implement policies. 
Institutions also determine the strategies o f political or economic actors by virtue of the opportunities and 
constraints they provide. Finally, they determine the distribution of power among political or economic 
actors.
963 Lovelock (1999).
964 Fan (2001: 238).
965 Henisz and Zelner (2001: 144).
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resulting in institutional path-dependency. The set of existing institutions -  Ministries and 
Commissions -  prevented, or at least, reduced the impact of the new institution 
represented by the telecommunication regulation passed in 2000.
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Comparison with other Asian and developing countries
As noted earlier, the late 1980s saw telecommunications policy in developed and 
developing countries alike enter an era of liberalisation. However, the origins, modalities 
and outcomes of reforms have varied according to countries’ level of development966. For 
example, telecommunication restructuring in many developing countries has been linked 
to economic adjustment programs driven by fiscal crisis and economic decline . In more 
developed countries (MDCs), the pressure of large corporate users and actors outside the 
state apparatus played a key role in bringing about the initial push for telecommunication 
reform while in least developed countries (LDCs) the reform often emerged at the core of 
the state itself968. Approaches to policy reform have differed markedly across regions and 
countries and in practice few developing countries have embraced the liberalisation 
programme wholeheartedly. For example, most governments have been unwilling to 
commit to complete liberalisation immediately, preferring instead a gradual reform 
process, encompassing the privatisation of state-owned operators and the introduction of 
competition969. While Snow had predicted that developing countries would evolve 
towards a more competitive deregulated environment as they experience economic 
growth970, many of them have been reluctant to introduce full competition in basic 
services. Regulators in transition and developing countries (TDCs) have been too 
reluctant to do so, assuming that an open market would lead to high unemployment in the 
sector and to the likely bankruptcy of PTOs. In addition these countries generally did not 
have a body of competition legislation or competition commissions, nor had the judicial 
systems capable of dealing with the emerging complexity and dynamism of the service 
sector. Another trend in TDCs has been to leave key strategic decisions, such as overall 
sector policy and final selection or approval of the licences applicants, with the Ministry 
in charge of telecommunication, while locating responsibility for all other day-to-day 
regulatory issues with the regulatory bureau971.
A number of procedural and structural reasons have been used to explain differences in 
outcome. First, the best successes with telecommunication reforms have been experienced 
by countries that attended to regulatory reforms first, thus underlining the importance of 
making an effective transition from govemment-as-operator to govemment-as-
966 Petrazzini (1997: 360) links the divergent policy outcomes of telecommunication reforms in developing 
countries to a long tradition of state intervention.
967 Petrazzini (1995: 14) and Kessides (2004: 33).
968 Petrazzini (1995: 21).
969 See (Fink, Mattoo et al., 2003: 462); Noll (1999b: 1); Li, Qiang et al. (2000:1).
970 Snow (1985: 290).
971 Schwarz and Satola (2000: 22).
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regulator972. Efforts to “de-politicise” operations, decision-making, and resource 
allocations in the telecommunication sector of developing countries have taken two main 
paths. On the one hand, governments have privatised state-owned carriers and opened the 
market to third party entry. On the other, they have started to restructure the regulatory 
process by creating relatively autonomous agencies operating at arms’ length from 
government. For example, setting up a highly professional, well financed, and 
independent regulatory agency, and opening the telecom market to the disciplines of 
competition should be at top priority in every country’s development agenda. But 
experience has shown that reforms can increase the demand for regulatory intervention 
and stretch regulatory resources in developing countries to their limits. In addition, 
regulatory agencies are still heavily involved in the pursuit of more general socio­
economic goals, such as expansion of basic services, the building of a national 
telecommunication infrastructure, and the control of the industry “in the national 
interest”973. Second, the process will be most effective if attention is paid to the order in 
which structural changes occur974. Wallsten, who finds that the sequencing of the 
liberalisation matters, confirms this: countries that established separate regulatory 
authorities prior to privatisation saw increased telecommunications investment, fixed 
telephone penetration, and cellular penetration compared with countries that did not975. A 
comparison with other Asian countries is particularly informative (see Table 56).
Table 56: Telecommunication performance indicators of selected Asian economies, 2002
Telecom revenues
Country Telecom revenues USD million
GDP/head 
in USD
Main lines 
/100
As % 
of GDP
Per
head
USD
Per
line
USD
China 50,994 995 3.4 4.03 40.1 237
Hong Kong 6,255 23,140 56.5 3.87 896.0 1,628
India 8 7,645 484 4.0 1.50 7.3 185
Indonesia 8 2,167 796 3.7 1.25 10.0 279
Korea 21,737 10,050 48.9 4.56 458.3 934
Thailand 4,141 2,036 8.3 3.27 66.6 637
Note:8 in 2001.
Source: Compiled by author from ITU and UNCTAD.
The evaluation is conducted along the main axes of liberalisation -  privatisation, 
competition and regulation -  and includes the dimension of the international
972 Pisciotta (1997: 348). Slow development of regulatory agencies has often limited the benefits of reform 
(Smith and Wellenius, 1999: 1).
973 Petrazzini (1997: 360-361) and Petrazzini (1997: 333-337).
974 The first-level conditions relate to the establishment of an institutional structure that clearly defines 
separate and distinct roles for the basic functions. The second-level issues are concerned with the necessary 
resources (human and capital) for telecommunications development (Melody, 1995).
975 Wallsten (2002).
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telecommunication regime. According to Fink, Mattoo et al., the vast majority of Asian 
economies have, over the past decade embarked on a telecommunication reform path. 
Liberalisation programmes undertaken by Asian governments combine, with some 
variations, three elements: a shift from public to private ownership, increased scope for 
foreign ownership (and/or control), and the establishment of pro-competitive regulations 
(see Table 57)976. In addition, a number of things can be observed. Despite the move 
away from traditional public monopolies, most Asian governments are still unwilling to 
allow unrestricted entry, to eliminate limits on private and foreign ownership, and 
establish strong independent regulators977.
Most private investment in other regions -  Latin America or Africa -  came from 
divestiture and reforms to create competitive markets, but in Asia most private investment 
in infrastructure came from greenfield investments to meet growing demand . Second, 
independence of the regulator has also been subject to resistance from Asian 
governments. By 1999 only Singapore had an independent regulator in place. Third, the 
introduction of competition in the fixed-line segment varied both in time and in the 
segments (local, long distance or international long distance)979. Fourth, when it comes to 
foreign investment, the picture is more or less balanced (see Table 42). Asian 
governments traditionally kept a tight hold on foreign investment in telecommunication, 
although there are some cases where political leaders were willing to trade total control 
for maximum growth980. In brief, and despite marked differences among Asian countries 
-  notably if one considers the level of development, governments have preferred a 
gradual reform process, opting for a programme of “managed liberalisation” 981.
976 Low and Mattoo (1998: 16) and Fink, Mattoo et al. (2001). They identify as drivers of growth the fast- 
paced evolution of telecommunications technology and the general trend towards policy reform to foster 
network expansion and the introduction of new services.
977 Fink, Mattoo et al. (2001: 1).
978 Countries have opted for a “mixed” model where public service monopolies were maintained but private 
investment was allowed through build-operate-transfer (BTO) arrangement.
979 Duch (1991: 94) finds that cross-national variations in competition policy is a function of political 
constituencies and institutions.
980 Chong and Chow (1999: 5) and Wang (1999a: 286).
981 See Noll (1999b: 1), Li, Qiang et al. (2000: 1) and Fink, Mattoo et al.(2003: 462).
235
Table 57: Sequence of telecommunications reform in 6 Asian countries, 1989-1999
2
national long
China
Privatisation
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Fixed competition LD '
Mobilea 
IRA
1 2
India
Privatisation
Fixed competition L '
Mobile3
IRA
8 14 19 19
. •-
20
Indonesia
Privatisation 19% 23%
Fixed competition
Mobile3
IRA
1 3 4 6 7
Korea
Privatisation 10% 20% 29%
Fixed competition LD LD L
Mobile3 
IRA
1 2 5
Malaysia
Pri viatication_______ >■
1 V 1 U U U C
IRA
Singapore
I B M
Privatisation 1 1% 17%
Fixed competition
Mobile3 
IRA
1
Note: IRA=Independent Regulatory Agency; L=Local; LD=Long distance; ILD=Intei 
distance;a Number of providers.
Source: Mattoo (2002).
services. It also shares one of the central characteristics defining many Asian 
governments’ approach to telecommunication policy-making, namely strong state 
involvement. A number of differences nonetheless emerge. First, China is among the few 
countries that have allowed some degree of competition -  in long distance services -  prior 
to allowing a change of ownership in the incumbent supplier and creating an independent 
regulator. Second, China has opted for maintaining in one locus the Ministry and the 
regulator983. These differences in the liberalisation programme should come as no 
surprise as many studies of liberalisation in utility industries stress the importance of 
national institutions for reform984. Each country designing and conducting
Q O C
telecommunication reforms faces unique political, economic and cultural issues . For 
example, deregulation strategies have been self-evidently different in Hong Kong and
A Q /
China due to differences existing in political and economic systems .
The broad objectives of China’s telecommunication policy have been -  and still are -  
mostly articulated through the FYPs987. Most of them were centred on quantitative 
objectives, such as increasing the switchboard capacity or the number of terminals per 
one hundred residents988. In addition, like other Asian countries, the government 
embarked on the development of a national information infrastructure (see Table 58). 
However, it never formally announced any formal national information infrastructure 
(Nil) initiative. The closest China came to defining an Nil initiative was through the 
creation of the leading group on informatisation and the ensuing Golden Bridge
Q 0 Qprojects .
983 The future of the Ministry has always given rise the wildest speculations. Whether it is to be dissolved 
and replaced by some kind of organisation like the FCC or OFCOM remains unanswered. Some scholars 
forecast that the TAB might become an independent regulator in the future (Interview (B-003), conducted 
in Beijing, 28 August 2001).
984 Bartle (2002).
985 Pisciotta (1997: 347) and Li et al. (2000; 2002b).
986 Xu and Pitt (1999).
987 Various policies and approaches have been put in place over the reform period to make sure that enough 
financing was available to support the industry’s development. Early on, fiscal decentralisation allowed 
provincial authorities to expand networks at their own pace. It also prepared for the progressive transfer of 
investment that originated almost exclusively from the state to a structure resting mainly on self-raised 
funds.
988 Starting with the 8th FYP (1991-1995), the government also set as a goal to achieve connectivity of 
100% of China’s administrative village.
989 Golden Bridge was initiated in March 1993 by Zhu Rongji. It was more formally known as the National 
Public Economic Information Communications Network. Its aim was to develop an infrastructure for the 
informatisation of the national economy around a hybrid network architecture (Dai, 2002: 146). On the 
Golden projects and Nil, see also (Sviokla, Clark et al., 1996; Farhoomand and Lovelock, 1999; Lovelock, 
1999; Fries, 2000; Ure and Liang, 2000; Gao and Lyytinen, 2003)
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Table 58: Information infrastructure initiatives of selected APEC member economies
Country Initiative Date
Australia Networking Australia's Future December 1994Towards an Australian Strategy for the Information Society July 1998
Chinese Taipei National Information Infrastructure (Nil) August 1994
Canada The Canadian Information Highway April 1994
Indonesia Nusantara-21 Network and Information System January 1997
Japan Reforms toward the Intellectually Creative Society o f  the 21st Century
May 1994
Korea Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) May 1995
Malaysia
Vision 2020 February 1991
Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) August 1995
Singapore IT2000 -  A Vision o f an Intelligent Island March 1992
Thailand IT2000 -  Thailand IT Policy into the 21 Century May 1997
Source: Adapted from Blanning, Bui et al. (1997) Lovelock (1997) and Saga (1999: 341).
As noted by Lovelock, at the policy level the Nil was been first and foremost a statement 
of intent: the intent to coordinate across what have been previously disparate industries in 
order to create (or maintain) a competitive economic framework990. This is not to say that 
telecommunication policy-making was not affected by China’s informatisation drive. In 
fact, the development of a high-quality telecommunication infrastructure lay at the core of 
the xinxihua programme. The Nil was, however, not articulated around specific reforms. 
Moreover, in spite of the high-ranking officials who sat in them, the successive leading 
groups and their sub-commissions did not dispose of sufficient clout to push through any 
significant reform.
990 Lovelock (1997).
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Rise of the regulatory State?
“At its most general, the rise of the regulatory state describes a shift in policy emphasis from 
macro-economic stabilisation and redistributive welfare policies towards a greater concern with 
competitiveness and economic efficiency, and favouring legal authority and rule-making over 
alternative policy instruments such as public ownership, planning or centralised administration
(Majone 1994,77-80).
As pointed out by Mueller, pricing, finance, competition, ministerial politics, trade policy, 
national security and sovereignty, and political control are often decisive factors shaping 
the future of telecommunications991. The challenge for the regulatory framework of the 
future is to develop consistent, relevant and pro-competitive regulations that are flexible 
enough to adapt to new development, in both technologies and services, and to reflect the 
different perspective of both providers and consumers992. Substantive issues aside, the 
telecommunications sector has traditionally been characterised by national, and to some 
extent regional, variations in regulation, wherein domestic provision and consumption has 
been subject to the regulatory strictures put in place by state authorities. Regional and 
global organisations are now functioning as key nodes of telecommunications regulation 
-  organisations that together constitute the emergence of a global system of regulation993. 
Pearson attributes the idiosyncratic evolution of China’s telecommunication policy­
making to the fact that at the time of the 1998 administrative restructuring, Mil remained 
outside the scope of the SETC. In her view, regulation of telecommunications is thus 
positioned to evolve with different structures and norms994.
According to Lovelock, we are assisting at the demise of the previous regulatory 
framework, putting an end to the era of coordinated competition995. Whereas the 
emerging regulatory framework is indeed characterised by a clearer definition of the 
functions of the policy-making agencies and a better definition of the legal instruments 
regulating the industry, the era of coordinated competition may not yet be history. The 
various proposals of NDRC to merge the operators in order to have two mobile operators 
and three to four fixed-line operators attest of the government’s heavy-handed 
interventionism. An additional factor that has prolonged the system is the country’s 
difficulties to establish an independent regulatory agency with implementation capacities 
that run from the centre to the provinces. Whereas we observe a shift to regulation by 
independent agencies in many parts of the world, China still applies regulation by
991 Mueller (1994: 172).
992 Li, Qiang et al. (2000: 8).
993 Simpson and Wilkinson (2001: 3-4).
994 Pearson (2004: 576).
995 Lovelock (1999).
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statutory control in which a legislature or local government passes a law regulating some 
activity, and the administration enforce the law and monitors its application.
The future of China’s telecommunication regulatory structures will, doubtlessly, also be 
dictated by domestic political judgments concerning the appropriate pace of China's 
economic reform. Telecommunications has so far been a particular area of contention, 
with substantial resistance to change at all levels of the administration996. Moreover, 
thanks to unabated growth, the State Council has seen its power to restructure the sector 
limited, thus preserving Mil from too much policy-making “interference”. There are 
nonetheless encouraging signs that the reforms remain on track. In February 2005, China 
has opened up a number of state-owned and once-strategic sectors of its economy to local 
and foreign private investment, in a decision that will extend the role of entrepreneurs in 
industries that have long been monopolised by the government997. The sweeping reform -  
which was announced in a policy document released by the State Council -  will legalise 
private investment in sectors including power, rail, aviation and oil.
The type of regulations -  and their content -  issued by Mil after 2000 indicates that 
policy-makers are increasingly concerned with economic efficiency and competitiveness 
-  rather than with redistributive welfare policies998. In contrast to the welfare state, the 
regulatory state governance form involves a complex set of changes in public 
management involving the separation of operational from regulatory activities in some 
policy areas (sometimes linked to privatisation), a trend towards separating purchasers 
and providers of public services (through policies of contracting out and market testing) 
and towards separation of operational from policy tasks within government departments 
and the creation of executive agencies999. In other words, the regulatory state entails a 
shift from traditional bureaucratic mechanisms towards instruments of regulation and 
greater emphasis placed on formal rules and monitoring by freestanding agencies1000.
996 Macintosh (2003: 282).
997 State-owned enterprises raise special problems for regulatory institutions, since agency-to-agency 
relationships require clear lines of authority and accountability -  lines that political leaders often leave 
vague. International experience suggests that predatory pricing and other anti-competitive behaviours must 
be monitored by the regulatory agency or by some antitrust authority (Yu, Berg et al., 2004).
998 Until September 2000, the Chinese government created and modified the regulatory framework through 
broad policy statements rather than legislation.
999 Mitnick identifies four modes of regulation: by the common law, by statutory control, by franchise 
contract or by independent agencies (Mitnick, 1980).
1000 Scott (2004: 4). This is not to say that the rise of the regulatory state brings only positive effects to the 
sector. Jordana and Sancho (2002: 2) find that the introduction of regulatory policy-making led to a type of 
policy process which was more focused on interest groups, where costs and profits were distributed among 
a very defined set of groups or companies -  for example, conflicts between new entrants to the market 
versus established companies.
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Are we then witnessing the rise of a regulatory state in China’s telecommunication 
sector? A number of scholars have put forward the hypothesis that the Chinese state is 
learning how to regulate the market1001. As we have seen, the government made great 
efforts in the 1990s to improve its bureaucratic capacity to regulate market behaviour. 
These efforts were translated in the creation of a governmental regulator1002. China’s 
regulatory reform maintains nonetheless a strong social and industrial policy imperative. 
Regulation of network industries -  seen as central to the industrialisation goals of the 
government -  is designed to achieve social policy such as continuing the inflow of 
revenues from large state enterprises, as well as the provision of universal services and 
development of the Western region.
Table 59: Dimensions of China’s regulatory state in telecommunication
Dimension Particular issues China
Ownership and 
market structure
Ownership distribution
Partial transfer of ownership from state to public via 
listing on foreign stock exchange. State ownership 
is in the hands of SASAC
Structure o f policy domain Fragmentation of policy-making between Mil, SASAC and NDRC
Vertical separation Increased vertical integration
Allocation of
regulatory
authority
Authority and organisation o f 
regulatory agency
Mil act simultaneously as Ministry and regulatory 
authority. Appointment procedures and funding 
opaque
Distribution o f regulatory 
competencies across actors
MU in charge of telecommunication but SARFT 
still in charge of cable
Decision­
making style
Formalised relationships 
between actors in terms o f social 
obligations, price control and 
enforcement
Increasingly transparent procedures despite episodic 
heavy-handed intervention. Enhance interaction 
between policy-makers and industry players 
through hearings.
Source: Adapted from Lodge and Stirton (2004).
In a sense, China has initiated a shift from regulation by statutory control to regulation by 
independent agencies1003. Loughlin and Scott have identified three basic changes 
associated with this shift: 1) the separation of ‘provision’ from ‘production’, that is, the 
separation of policy-setting and operational activities -  for example, through the transfer 
of state-owned enterprises to the private sector (‘privatisation’) but also through state- 
owned enterprise reforms, such as ‘corporatisation’; 2) the creation of free-standing 
independent regulatory agencies which perform such activities as regulating prices, 
monitoring compliance with licence provisions and handling consumer complaints and; 3) 
the formalisation of relationships within the policy domain, including a shift from implicit
1001 Lu (2004).
1002 Pearson (2003: 4,28). See also (Pearson, 2004).
1003 The independence of regulatory institutions must not the understood as autonomy for developing 
actions and programming policies ignoring the government, but rather as the probability of implementing 
policies without the interference of political agents or of agents of the private sector (Baudrier, 2001: 5).
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understanding of norms of adequate service towards greater reliance on explicit formal 
rules, service standards and performance measures1004. The first “condition” has been 
fulfilled through the corporatisation of the state-owned operators in the mid-1990s and the 
subsequent transfer to SASAC. The creation of an independent regulatory agency1005 is 
another matter. The USTR sees China’s inability to establish an independent regulator in 
the telecommunications services sector as the result of continuing resistance within the 
government to fully divorce itself from key decision-making1006. But given the current 
political institutions and structure in China, it is hard to conceive that regulatory 
independence from politicians, government and the regulated industry could be achieved 
in the near term. The rise of the regulatory state also goes together with the creation of 
national regulatory agencies (NRA). In general, the telecommunication regulator is 
responsible for technical regulation (e.g. spectrum allocation, number allocation, type 
approval, and standard setting) as well as telecommunication specific economic and 
social regulation (e.g. licensing, universal service, price regulation, the interconnection 
regime and rights-of way)1007. While the concept of regulator could in general be 
considered as referring primarily to the activity of rule-making, the concept of NRA does 
not, at least in the telecommunications sector, mean an institution entrusted with the 
setting up of the rules (e.g. institutions like parliaments or government) but is, in 
principle, used to describe the body in charge of rule implementation and application1008. 
China’s telecommunication sector remains thus short of the type and reach of institutions 
that comprise a regulatory state. This is not surprising. The advance of the regulatory state 
is conditioned by sectoral characteristics, the coexistence of multiple modes of regulation, 
path dependency and locus1009. For example, a recent study has shown that in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean the emergence of the institutional properties of the regulatory 
state has been both partial and patchy1010.
1004 Loughlin and Scott (1997: 205-207).
1005 The definition of a regulator’s independence is still subject to intense debate. Gilardi offers a 
comparison of seven European telecommunication regulators and finds scores of independence ranging 
from 0.36 for Belgium to 0.74 for the United Kingdom (Gilardi, 2002).
1006 USTR (2004: 68). USTR has singled out concerns about China’s telecommunication environment in 
respect to burdensome capitalisation requirements, the barrier to offering of basic services on a purely 
resale basis and the elimination of restrictions on the entities with whom a foreign licensee can partner 
(USTR, 2005).
1007 OECD (2000: 22).
1008 Queck (2000: 252).
1009 Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004: 5-9).
1010 The imperative of prioritising efficiency considerations over redistributional objectives, as well as 
heightened complexity and interdependence within key policy domains are thought to have given rise to the 
regulatory state in Europe (Lodge and Stirton, 2004).
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Concluding remarks
As this thesis suggests, regulatory arrangements to make the new liberalised market 
structure workable are by no means adopted easily. The economic reforms that took place 
from the mid-1980s, and the ensuing restructuring in the telecommunications sector had 
proportions of revolutionary change in the basic policy regime. Subsequent 
developments, however, also evidenced the assertions that institutional change is 
evolutionary and that institutions persist in the face of a change in the market and 
technology conditions that might require a different institutional configuration in order to 
be efficient. The slow pace in reforming telecommunications regulation can be explained 
by the fact that regulators reveal a preference not to introduce policies that vastly 
diminish their roles1011. In addition, Ministerial rivalries have represented a domestic 
counter-constituency that has blunted the impact of both the domestic constituency in 
favour of engagement, and of international forces1012.
Joseph and Drahos have argued that “the single most important institution that is creating 
a whole new set of relations and structures in modem telecommunications is the 
market”1013. Evidence suggests that market forces have nonetheless started to shape 
China’s policy-making and regulatory environment. The government and regulator 
expose themselves to reaction from the stock market in case of unexpected policy 
announcements. In spite of high bureaucratic resistance, the central leadership has 
frequently intervened to mould the evolution of policy into a more liberal direction1014. 
However, this has done little to ease some of the crucial regulatory issues that plague the 
sector’s reform. Issues of interconnection, price regulation hold back the development of 
a competitive telecommunication market. The comparison of China’s reform model with 
other countries in Asia has confirmed that the impetus, process and outcome of the 
reforms differed from other countries. In other words, following the example of its 
economic reforms, China developed an idiosyncratic model of liberalisation. The 
restructuring of the telecommunications sector, which started along the lines of global 
liberalisation programmes and which could have been buttressed by the accession to the 
WTO was both shaped and blocked by diverse interests emanating from the fragmented 
Chinese political structure.
1011 Noll (1999a: 19).
1012 Pearson (1999b: 228).
1013 Joseph and Drahos (1998: 100).
1014 Mertha and Zeng (2005: 321-322).
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China’s regulatory failure in the telecommunication sector must be analysed at several 
levels: first of all, and despite the government’s pledge to grant independence to the 
regulator, the sector still suffers from continued and excessive political involvement -  for 
example, the announced government-engineered merging of operators. Secondly, one 
could not fail to observe a tendency to agency drift. During the WTO negotiation, Mil 
showed enormous resistance, which culminated with the alleged resignation of Minister 
Wu after Zhu Rongji’s visit to the United States in 1999. Thirdly, the regulatory 
environment suffers from poor design. Some regulatory incentives are self-defeating -  
universal service and production efficiency must be balanced against the objective of 
efficient pricing. The sector also suffers from limited formal participation of a number of 
actors -  notably the operators -  in the regulatory decision-making process. More 
damaging, though, is the regulatory’s slow response to environmental change. 
Convergence has created a new set of issues which the current agency rivalry and 
legislation are ill-suited to address. Finally, there is already a certain amount of regulatory 
capture.
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8 Reforms in the post-WTO era
“The accession process did not have an impact on China’s telecommunication. ”
Interview with retired senior Mil official1015
In theory, the rules specified by the WTO shape -  at least to some extent -  members’ 
domestic telecommunications regulatory institutions1016. Views on the potential impact of 
China’s WTO membership on the sector’s reforms were controversial, to say the least. On 
one side, some scholars expected the influence on the sector’s regulatory reforms to be 
“limited and transit unless accompanied by significant changes in the institutional 
regulatory environment”1011 and to contrast with the powerful impact of China’s 
economic reforms. It was argued that both the regulatory barriers and conservative 
regulatory stance supported the view that the WTO accession would not have a dramatic 
effect on the liberalisation process. In addition, it was argued that much had already been 
done to prepare and defend against the threat of foreign entrants1018. On the other side, the 
argument went that the pressure to enter the WTO pushed forward the reform of China's 
telecommunication sector1019. For instance, the publication of regulations was seen as a 
substantial regulatory response to the accession1020. Sautede went even further arguing 
that:
“The procedure for entry into the WTO and the signing o f bilateral 
agreements have been accompanied by an important restructuring o f the 
sector, conceived and implemented precisely with that background in 
mind. ”1021
Few elements allow to categorically support his statement. The WTO’s regulatory 
principles may nonetheless prove to be the most important single aspect of the results of
i 099 109^the telecommunications negotiations, in terms of real guarantees of market access 
The WTO accession process did not cause a direct restructuring of the policy-making 
actors. However, it further integrated the Ministries and the various commissions in
1015 Interview (B-038), conducted in Beijing, 25 November 2003.
1016 Zhang (2001: 462).
1017 Zhang (2000: 3; 2001: 468) and Zhang (2001: 462).
1018 Pangestu and Mrongowius (2002: 40).
1019 See Fan (1999: 7) and Nolan and Hasecic (2000: 171).
1020 DeWoskin (2001:649).
1021 Sautedd (2002: 38).
1022 Low and Mattoo (1998: 26).
1023 Foreign direct investment in the telecommunications sector is essentially subject to three types of 
international agreements: multilateral agreements, regional agreements and bilateral agreements. For 
example, the settlement of international traffic and payments under the auspices of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) agreement, government regulations on technical standards, which are 
subject to the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, or practices on government purchases, 
which are subject to the Government Procurement Code, as well as countries commitments’ on TRIPS. 
Furthermore, FDI decisions are also affected by host countries trade policies towards merchandise imports 
and hence these countries' WTO commitments (Drabek, 2001:11).
245
charge of telecommunication in the global environment. While not dictating the 
behaviour of the policy-makers, it set boundaries around the sector, which, in theory, will 
limit their margin of manoeuvre in the future. The accession process had the largest 
impact on regulations.
Table 60: Regulation by type and body, 1978-2004
Ministry of Information Industry State Council
Notice Provision Measure Notice Provision Regulation
(tongzhi) (guiding) (guanli 
banfa)
(itongzhi) (guiding) (tiaoli)
Pre-WTO 1 4(1) 5(5) 1 1 2
Post-WTO 1 2 7 - 1 -
Note: Number in parenthesis indicated temporary nature (zanxing).
Source: Compiled by author.
Before 1998, all the regulations were drawn by MPT, which had both the function of 
administration (guanli) and of operations1024. With the merger of MEI and MPT, 
regulatory responsibilities fell upon MIL Unlike in some other sectors, part of China’s 
new regulatory environment for telecommunication started to come out in advance of 
WTO accession1025. But those who had seen this anticipation as a sign for the 
development of a strong legal regulatory framework and the opening of the 
telecommunication sector to non-state and foreign players quickly became 
disenchanted1026. While Mil showed at times encouraging signs of withdrawing from 
areas such as pricing, the regulatory environment has remained overwhelmingly non­
transparent and subject to ad hoc intervention. Indeed, in order to comply with the WTO 
commitments and to address some crucial domestic regulatory issues, Mil keeps relying 
on administrative measures {guanli banfa), such as the “Measures on the Administration 
of International Communication Gateway” (guoji tongxin churu kouju guanli banfa) and 
to a lesser extent on provisions (guiding), such as the “Provisions on Marking Clearly the 
Prices of Telecommunication Services” (dianxin fuwu mingma jiage guiding), instead of 
being able to rely on an all-encompassing law. Having said this, the long-overdue 
telecommunication law is once again on the agenda1027. The legislation is expected to 
provide the industry with a solid legal basis as well as clarify the role of the various 
policy-making bodies. Enactment of the law is only a first step into the establishment of a 
sound regulatory structure. Without an institutional framework capable of 
implementation, the reach of the law -  like that of existing regulations -  is likely to 
remain limited.
1024 Interview (B-031), conducted in Beijing, 15 November 2002.
1025 Interview (B-032), conducted in Beijing, 18 November 2002.
1026 Lu (2002b: 11-12).
1027 Xinhua Financial Network News (2004).
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China has done fairly well in beginning to implement public access to laws and 
regulations. Nevertheless, standards by which the government agencies exercise their 
discretion -  discretionary approval authority -  are also badly needed. The new regulations 
seem to have incorporated some elements to this effect -  at least in the Mil regulations 
before accession. The government agency is now required to make a decision within a 
fixed time frame, as well as to give written replies, and expose their reasons when an 
application is rejected1028.
In our view, the impact of the WTO accession on the regulatory framework can be seen 
as dual. On one side, in order to comply, at least in theory, with the conditions set forth by 
the Reference Paper and with the requirements of the Working Group for clear and 
transparent licensing procedures, a number of regulations were required to be in place at 
the time of accession1029. The most visible evidence of how regulatory institutions were 
lies first and foremost in the two regulations enacted in 2000 and 2001. In themselves, 
both the telecommunication regulation and the FITE represented significant improvement 
of China’s telecommunication regulatory framework.
Melody argues that the keys to telecommunication reform are a clear separation of 
operational management, regulatory and policy-making functions, an increase in 
competitive market forces through liberalised market entry and access to network and the 
establishment and maintenance of effective regulation1030. A central finding of this thesis 
is that even a strong Ministry like Mil or the State Council failed to push through much- 
needed telecommunication reforms. The post-WTO era has been characterised by a 
number of regulatory developments. Regulatory transparency has improved -  most laws 
and regulations are readily available and made public before their enactment (see Table 
61 and Table 62).
1028 Interview (B-032), conducted in Beijing, 18 November 2002.
1029 Until the WTO accession, Ministerial pronouncements and notices were treated in the same way as 
administrative regulations originating from the State Council. In the WTO era, formal laws and 
administrative regulations have a higher status than Ministerial pronouncements (Interview (B-032), 
conducted in Beijing, 18 November 2002).
1030 Melody (1995: 259; 1997b: 2).
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Table 61: Comparison of main telecommunication issues before and after WTO accession 
Issues Pre-WTO Post-WTO
Licensing No transparency Commitment to transparency but weak
implementation
Interconnection Subject to incumbent goodwill and Theoretical compliance but lack of
Mil complacency enforcement power
Tariffs Determined by Mil Determined by Mil and NDRC but
increasingly in the hands of operators
Independence and No independence No independence from the government
impartiality o f regulator but relatively less interventionist that
before
Universal service Responsibility of China Telecom Various schemes to devise an USO
fund
Competitive safeguards Exceed WTO requirements but hard to Exceed WTO requirements but hard to
implement implement
Source: Compiled by author.
Table 62: Telecommunication regulatory environment assessment, fixed sector
Pre-1994 1994-1998 1998-2001 2001-present
Market entry Poor Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
Interconnection Poor Poor Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
Price regulation Poor Unsatisfactory Neutral Neutral
Regulation o f anti-competitive practices Poor Poor Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
Universal service Poor Poor Unsatisfactory Neutral
Source: Compiled by author.
Without an authoritative law, China's governance of the telecommunication industry has 
traditionally relied on a combination of provisions from other laws, decrees and 
administrative measures from relevant ministries and industry bureaus and policy 
decisions handed down from the State Council. One of the hopes attached to China’s 
WTO accession was that it would promote telecommunication law making and end up in 
the issuing and implementation of a comprehensive telecommunication law 1031. But as 
noted by Horsley:
“China was not ready to enact a comprehensive telecommunications law, 
but mindful o f the need to establish a national regulatory framework in 
anticipation o f China's impending entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO), China's State Council issued the
Telecommunications Regulations. ”1032
On the other side, the overall accession caused the amount of legislative work to be 
carried out by the State Council to grow enormously. The scattering of the resources 
available, added to the streamlining of most administrations, hindered the government’s 
ability to further improve the regulatory environment. Paradoxically, thus the amount of 
legislation that the State Council needed to review, consolidate and get out in relation to
1031 Magida (2001: 78) and interview (B-031), conducted in Beijing, 15 November 2002.
1032 Horsley (2001a: 34).
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the WTO commitments, the passing of both regulations diminished the necessity and 
urgency of passing the new telecommunication law
Finally, some saw the WTO accession as “the termination of the historical restriction over 
foreign direct investment in the public telecommunications network and the 
commencement of intensified telecommunications deregulation in China”. While the role 
of governments across the world shifts from participation to regulation, China’s 
telecommunication sector still displays worrying signs of government interference.
One thing is certain: the world telecommunication slump further shielded the Chinese 
market from global operators’ reach1034.
Whether the pressure emanating from China's entry to the WTO played a role to propel 
China's government to restructure China’s telecommunication regulatory regime and 
industry remains debatable. What is sure, however, is that the Chinese leadership found in 
the BTA a mean to anchor its reform programme. In other words, without the pressure 
from the WTO, China would have probably not taken such drastic actions in so short 
time. Second, even though the separation of regulatory and operational function is the 
most significant progress in China's telecommunication reforms, it is just a necessary 
rather than sufficient condition to create a fair, transparent, pro-competitive, and 
independent regulator in accordance with the requirement of Reference Paper. In any 
case, the WTO accession came into the collective consciousness of the Chinese people at 
all levels -  certainly at all high levels of government and in the leadership of Chinese 
companies. It signalled that China was integrating the world economy and therefore not 
able to continue with the age-old proposition that “the country is different and therefore 
does things its own way”.
1033 Interview (C-001), conducted in Beijing, 10 June 2002.
1034 Interview (B-039), conducted in Beijing, 27 November 2003.
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Overview and contribution of the dissertation
The thesis set out to examine the evolution of China’s telecommunication regulatory 
policy-making in the context of trade and economic reforms. Two main themes were 
investigated. The first one assessed the nature and extent of the telecommunication 
reforms that took place since the mid 1990s. The thesis offers a case study to the debate 
between the experimentalist and the convergence school1035. China’s telecommunication 
reforms tend to re-enforce the former. Reforms have been characterised by gradualism, 
and in spite of the remaining issues, the performance of the institutions have been 
successful. The question nonetheless remains whether the outcome of the reforms has 
proceeded from a deliberate experimental approach of China’s political leadership or 
whether they emerged from a lack of consensus between reformers and conservatives. For 
DeWoskin, regulatory and structural change in the sector has been highly motivated by 
four converging pressures: 1) high-level recognition of the need to support China's 
economic growth with a vastly improved IT infrastructure; 2) intense and meticulous 
negotiations with major trading partners to bring China into the WTO; 3) technology 
change that obviated many regulations that were either not adjusted with sufficient 
nimbleness or unenforceable from their beginning, and 4) dependence and exposure to 
international capital markets1036. While all three rounds of reforms bear similarities with 
the liberalisation trends observed in most countries, it is very interesting to note that the 
Chinese “development model” has more adapted than adopted the orthodox programme 
proposed by a Washington Consensus type of liberalisation. For example, China’s 
telecommunications reforms have been carried out by governmental orders (and applied 
through administrative measures), which is different from other countries where the 
transformation is enacted by laws1037. Two additional arguments explain this. First, the 
government wished to continue with a gradual liberalisation in order to allow domestic 
companies to adjust to full competition. Second, the reform-oriented members of the State 
Council were probably seeking a more significant liberalisation of the telecommunication 
sector but did not want to (or could not) assume the political cost of such liberalisation.
China’s particular institutional setting -  opaque regulatory mechanisms and ill-defined 
regulatory boundaries -  coupled with the increasing complexity of the issues at stake in a 
liberalised telecommunication market -  interconnection, universal service obligations -  
explain in large parts the difficulty the country faces in further reforming the sector.
1035 See Sachs and Woo (2000: 5).
1036 DeWoskin (2001: 652).
1037 Gao and Lyytinen (2003: 228).
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While Mil’s role as a policy-making agency has remained important during the reform 
process, its influence on the reforms themselves is less clear. Despite public 
announcements of restructuring, Mil has mostly put its feet against the wall when it came 
it to reforming the industry. Since its creation in 1998, there are few successful 
components of the telecommunication liberalisation that can be attributed to its work. The 
economic reforms that took place from the mid-1980s, and the subsequent restructuring in 
the telecommunications sector -  through corporatisation and the introduction of 
competition -  had proportions of revolutionary change in the basic policy regime. 
Subsequent developments, however, also proved the assertions that institutional change is 
evolutionary and that institutions persist in the face of a change in the market and 
technology conditions that might require a different institutional configuration in order to 
be efficient. The failure of the Chinese government to create a regulatory regime to 
effectively implement the new policy of liberalisation represents essentially a problem of 
institutional change. As institutional analysts have observed, institutional change rarely 
has revolutionary dimensions, resulting in institutional path-dependency. As this thesis 
suggests, regulatory arrangements to make the liberalised market structure workable were 
(and are) by no means adopted easily. Zhao found that policy-making in economic issue 
areas was increasingly fragmented and policy debates and bargaining are increasing 
among bureaucratic institutions involving technical criteria. This institutional pluralism 
that characterises economic policy, as well as the science and technology issue area, tends 
to lead to incremental policy changes1038. In other words, the restructuring of the 
telecommunications sector, which started along the lines of global liberalisation 
programmes and which could have been buttressed by the accession to the WTO, was 
both shaped and blocked by diverse interests emanating from the fragmented Chinese 
political structure and its particular institutional setting.
In our view the Chinese government’s response to potential regulatory competition from 
other developing countries that could have led to a disinterest of foreign investors lies in a 
very subtle strategy to use the carrot and stick approach. Although it became rapidly clear 
that the prospects of foreign investment in the telecommunication sector would remain 
limited, the government banked on the two major characteristics that define the Chinese 
telecommunication market: the fact that it has both a substantial critical mass and at the 
same time huge potential for further growth. Contrary to all expectations, most foreign
1038 In contrast, the ideological policy area was becoming somewhat more pluralistic, but with authority for 
making decisions about sensitive political issues still more concentrated in the hands of a few top leaders 
than in institutions (Zhao, 1995: 238-242).
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telecommunication operators maintained their presence in the market -  through their 
representative office in Beijing.
Cross-ministerial conflicts of interest, overall leadership, and market regulation will 
remain the most critical policy issues that the central government has to address in the 
next round of structural reforms.
The second theme explored the relationship between domestic and international factors in 
crafting the reforms. In particular, it examined impact of the China’s WTO accession 
process on the telecommunication reforms. Today, the rules created and enforced by 
traditional regulatory bodies on a national scale are now only part of a multi-layered 
regime that includes international treaties, voluntary self-regulation, and semi-public 
cooperative arrangements under the umbrella of a vast collection of organisations1039. 
Historical institutional analysts, and more specifically those looking at economic 
performance, argue that despite similar external pressures, national policy responses and 
outcomes differ owing to their contrasting institutions. They thus largely downplay the 
role of trans-national forces and do not expect strong levels of convergence. This thesis 
largely confirms the historical institutional axiom -  already invested by Thatcher’s claim 
that national institutions strongly affect patterns of policy-making1040. The thesis also 
confirmed Hall’s assertion that the directions and logics of policies as well as the interests 
served by them show a high degree of continuity over time1041. The shift in the 
international telecommunication regime did not lead to a significant shift in China’s 
telecommunication policy-making. Several reasons explain the lack of China’s WTO 
accession on the sector’s reform. First, the negotiated agreement allowed the government 
and the domestic operators to “buy some time and re-organise” in face of the coming 
foreign competition. Second, a weak regulatory framework and the absence of an 
overarching telecommunication law have maintained a lack of transparency in the sector. 
Third, the government’s desire to maintain an overall control over the sector for security 
and sovereignty reasons has definitively tilted the balance in favour of a conservative and 
gradual restructuring of the sector. In other words, both processes were on dual tracks.
1039 Galperin (2004: 166).
1040 Thatcher (1999). On the contrary, Serot (2002: 974) suggests that international pressures are not 
subsumed under institutional factors. For him, powerful international forces -  encompassing technological, 
economic developments, as well as regulatory change at the supranational level -  overcome the impact of 
national institutions.
1041 Hall (1986).
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In spite of that, evidence shows that the government took its pledge seriously. The issuing 
of several regulations and administrative measures shortly before and after accession 
attests this. Passing legislation unfortunately represents only half of the necessary effort 
to reform the sector. A set of institutions -  a judiciary or an independent regulator vested 
with authority -  capable of enforcement or of avoiding regulatory discretion and capture 
are also required. In other words, while having to deal with a limited amount of external 
pressure, the Chinese model of liberalisation was being written from the inside.
The thesis has also argued that the bargaining approach to policy-making in the 
telecommunication sector has allowed, and even facilitated, the first stage of reforms but 
that it is ill suited for participation in the emerging supranational telecommunication 
framework. In fact, given China’s commitment to abide by internationally defined norms 
and rules, the room for bargaining will be severely limited. Finally, the thesis suggests 
that we need to understand the institutional determinants of regulatory governance to 
understand regulatory performance. In this sense, this approach to regulatory institutions 
differs from the two main strands of the economics of regulation literature of the last 
twenty years -  the Chicago school and the incentives theory of regulation.
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Limits of the research
Given more time, an in-depth comparison with other utilities would have been useful to 
evaluate the idiosyncrasy of China’s approach to telecommunication reforms. Instead, 
brief points of comparison are provided in Chapter 2 and 4, notably on the issue of 
regulatory independence and competition.
Henisz, Zelner et al. propose that coercion and emulation as the two basic mechanisms 
that underlie policy diffusion across countries. For them, countries adopt market-oriented 
policy reforms in telecommunications “as external actors with coercive power gain 
leverage over the domestic policy-making apparatus, and as the legitimacy of reforms 
grows through their prior adoption by peer countries”1042. One aspect of the reform that 
has been neglected is the role of epistemic communities. Epistemic communities are 
“networks of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or 
issue-area”1043. Milner notes that in environments of high uncertainty policy-makers are 
likely to rely on such communities for their advice. Epistemic communities frame the 
issue for collective debate, provide novel solutions, and create new perceptions of 
national interests1044. The academic dispute over the ways of breaking up China Telecom 
is one example of the role of epistemic communities in China’s telecommunication 
sector.
Perhaps the most fundamental theoretical problem faced by institutionalism might be 
deemed the paradox of constraint. On the one hand institutions gain much of their 
explanatory power from the argument that they impose constraints on the behaviour of 
their members, and that individuals cannot function effectively in unrestrained, market­
like situations1045. This constraint is important whether researchers employ a normative, 
historical, or rational choice orientation toward institutions. On the other hand, if 
institutions are the products of human choices then there are few real constraints on 
behaviour. If this is true then the decision by each individual to accept the restraint on 
behaviour is a more important predictive factor than the rules themselves.
1042 Heniss, Zelner et al.(2004: 39).
1043 Haas (1992: 3).
1044 Milner (1997) argues that the preferences of both societal and political actors influence policy choices. 
Preferences do not translate directly into policy as in standard arguments. Instead policy is determined by 
the strategic interaction among the actors’ preferences, given the institutional context. The role of political 
actors and the strategic interaction between them and societal actors becomes central to the domestic game 
of intemaional cooperation.
1045 See Granovetter (1985).
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Throughout this thesis, only scant reference has been made to the judiciary. In our view, 
the influence of the China’s judiciary branch in telecommunication policy-making 
remains extremely limited. There have, nonetheless, been a few cases where 
telecommunication issues were brought in front of a court and where the regulator was 
overturned1046. It remains to be seen how the eventual challenging of service providers 
would play out in a domestic court1047. More interesting will be to witness how the 
relevant authorities would implement a potential ruling of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) against China. For now, the only dispute brought against China to the WTO 
was the case filed by the United States regarding discriminatory tax rebate policy for 
integrated circuits1048.
1046 The Chen brothers were running a comer shop in Fujian. They also had a computer-based IP telephony 
service that they offered to people who bought a certain amount of produce in their shop. The IP telephony 
service became so popular that they started to “sell time” and do only that. At that time, Mil began to feel 
that they were being sidelined and called it smuggling of information. The brothers were arrested and their 
equipment confiscated. They appealed and when it reached an intermediate people’s court level, the judge 
who, unusually, brought in Internet experts, ruled that what they were doing was not covered by any extent 
regulations and therefore could not be prosecuted. Mil was furious but responded in the only way it could, 
which is to issue regulations stating that only an approved telecommunication operator could supply IP 
telephony. By doing so, it opened the door for Jitong and China Unicom to offer IP telephony services. 
Jitong leapt at the opportunity because they had no other business. Unicom followed shortly afterwards 
(Interview (B-002), conducted in Beijing, 27 August 2001).
1047 See Guan (2003).
1048 Xinhua (2004c).
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Future Research
As noted, telecommunication is an area of regulation characterised by technical 
complexity and uncertainty, which combined with the fact that state actors are anxious to 
secure the benefits of reform, makes it an area ripe for modelling. The shift to competitive 
markets in telecommunication is an example of global regulatory convergence rather than 
harmonisation, because the details of regulation of matters like equipment, basic and 
enhanced services still vary greatly1049. The first research area is to further investigate the 
reforms of China’s telecommunication sector in light of the on-going WTO negotiations 
on telecommunication and see whether China is able to pursue its idiosyncratic approach 
to regulation. Since 2000, nine WTO Members have made specific submissions regarding 
further liberalisation of telecommunications services and three additional Members have 
addressed liberalisation of telecommunications services in their general GATS 
submissions1050. These documents indicate that the primary focus of the services 
negotiations will be on: (1) improving specific commitments to liberalise
telecommunications services; (2) clarifying the scope and coverage of specific 
commitments on telecommunications services given the convergence of and development 
of new high tech services; (3) developing disciplines on the regulation of 
telecommunications services; and (4) development-related issues1051. A central theme of 
this thesis has been the relationship between domestic and international factors in 
defining telecommunication policy-making. Now that China is a formal member of the 
WTO, it will be very interesting to witness how the country positions itself and what role 
it intends to play -  for instance as a leader of the G21 -  in the current WTO negotiation.
Given the government’s emphasis on xinxihua and of the on-going negotiations at the 
WTO on e-commerce, a second area of interest could be to extend the research to Internet 
policy-making by conducting a comparison between both sectors. In January 2005, the 
State Council has promulgated an opinion reflecting the government's determination to 
encourage the development of e-commerce in China1052. It is interesting to notice that the 
government considers that its main function in the development of e-commerce in China 
is that of a supportive administrator, and that enterprises should lead the way in 
advancing development. Although the support has yet to be detailed, one can imagine that
1049 Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 355-356).
1050 The Members are Australia, the United States, the European Community, Canada, Switzerland, South 
Korea, Mexico, Colombia and Cuba (in chronological order of submission).
1051 Wunsch-Vincent (2004: 98).
1052 “Several Opinions on Accelerating the Development of Electronic Commerce” (State Council of the 
People's Republic of China, 2005).
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it entails the implementation of the Electronic Signature Law1053 as well as the 
formulation of measures concerning e-commerce, online payment and taxation, security, 
privacy protection and other activities.
The thesis aimed at being a “building block” of a cross-national institutional analysis of 
telecommunication reforms in developing countries. Russia sits on top of the list of 
countries sharing quite a number of similarities with China -  Russia has been negotiating 
its entry into the WTO while reforming its telecommunication sector and both are 
transition economies1054. It could also be interesting to make a comparison with India 
since it is one of the only developing countries of similar size to China. This would 
further enlighten our understanding of whether China’s policy-making and reform path is 
really unique. Finally, whereas this thesis centred on the institutional factors that 
contributed to the “stability” of the reform, more research needs to be conducted about 
the relationship between the details of the reform and subsequent performance. If the state 
control on the telecommunication sector has been as great as the previous chapters 
suggest, what explains such phenomenal growth in spite of an adverse institutional 
environment?
1053 The Law on Electronic Signature was issued by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress and will take effect on April 1, 2005. It grants electronic signatures the same legal effect as 
handwritten signatures and seals in business transactions, with the exception only of the unilateral 
electronic notice to the public cancelling services like water, electricity, and gas. It aims at setting up 
market access system for online certification providers to ensure the security of e-commerce.
1054 See (Schwarz and Satola, 2000; Bruce and Elixmann, 2002).
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Appendix 1: Key telecommunication policy-makers
Policy-Maker Scope of Authority Notes
National People's 
Congress (quanguo 
renmin daibiao dahui or 
NPC)
• State’s highest and only authority 
responsible for:
-  promulgating laws
• Expected to adopt the 
Telecommunication Law 
(TL)
State Council (guowuyuan 
or SC) and State Council 
Informatisation Office 
(SCIO)
• Central administrative authority responsible 
for:
-  promulgating regulations
-  issuing administrative orders
-  approving certain administrative measures
-  drafting certain laws for the NPC
• Promulgated the Telecom 
Regulations
• Promulgated the FIE 
Telecom Regulations
• Submits draft TL to NPC
Ministry o f Information 
Industry (xinxi chanyebu 
or M il), ex-Ministry of 
Post and
Telecommunications 
(youdianbu or MPT)
• Government body responsible for 
overseeing:
-  telecommunications, including:
-  multimedia
-  broadcasting
-  satellite
-  the Internet
• Also responsible for promulgating:
-  administrative measures
-  notices
-  circulars
-  industry standards
• Promulgated the Notice 
on the Adjustment of the 
Telecom Business 
Catalogue and other 
telecom related 
administrative measures
• Formed by a merger of 
MPT and the Ministry of 
Electronics Industry (MEI)
• Rumoured merger with 
SARFT
State Administration of 
Radio, Film & Television 
(guangbo dianxin dianshi 
zongju or SARFT)
• Government body responsible for 
overseeing:
-  Cable channels
-  Satellite
-  Broadcasting, Film, and TV
• Rumoured merger with 
the Mil
National Development 
and Reform Commission 
{fazhan he gaige 
weiyuanhui or NDRC), 
ex-State Development and 
Planning Commission 
(SDPC)
• Government body responsible for 
formulating policies applicable to:
-  foreign investors
-  large scale projects
-  pricing
-  manufacturing licences, including handset 
vendors
-  other long-term and macro-economic plans
• Promulgated and 
amended the Investment 
Catalogue of Foreign 
Investment Industries
• Promulgated relevant 
telecom pricing policies
Ministry of Commerce 
(shangwubu or 
MOFCOM), ex-Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC)
• Government body responsible for:
-  formulating and carrying out detailed 
polices applicable to foreign trade, economic 
cooperation and foreign investment
-  guiding national foreign investment 
administration
-  governing establishment and operation 
foreign-invested enterprises
• Formulated the 
Investment Catalogue of 
Foreign Investment 
Industries
• One of the examination 
authorities in respect of 
foreign investment in 
telecom industry
Ministry of Finance 
(caizhengbu or MOF)
• Government body responsible for 
formulating:
-  finance policies
-  taxation policies
-  certain macro-economic policies
• Manages budget planning 
and execution
• Manages the use of 
international loans
State-owned Assets 
Supervision and 
Administration 
Commission (SASAC)
(guoyou zichatt jiandu 
guanli weiyuanhui), ex- 
SETC
• Government body responsible for:
-  maintaining/increasing the value of State 
assets
• Completed the ownership 
transfer of all the 
telecommunication 
operators
• Proposed several plans to 
restructure the 
telecommunication sector
Source: Adapted from Dudek, Weaver II et al. (2001) and Soderberg, Bjorkstrom et al. (2005)
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Appendix 2: Comparison between draft and final FITE
A. Basic Telecom Investor Qualification Requirements
Draft
A.l Foreign Investor
• Licensed operator in home jurisdiction
• > USD 10 billion average revenue
• PRC Representative Office > 3 years
• Good operation reputation
• No foreign consortium (each foreign 
investor must qualify)
A. 2 Chinese Investor
• State majority-controlled
• Licensed operator
• > RMB 3 billion average revenue
• Good operation reputation
• No Chinese consortium (each Chinese 
investor must qualify)
Final
• Licensed operator in home jurisdiction
• No minimum revenue test but must have ‘adequate’ capital 
and specialised personnel
• No Representative Office requirement
• Clean operational record
• Foreign consortium permitted; only Principal Foreign 
Investor (PFI) required to meet above tests, PFI must be 
largest foreign investor with > 30% of total foreign investor 
equity
• No state ownership requirement
• No licence requirement but must comply with non-specific 
Mil ‘industry requirements’
• No minimum revenue test but must have ‘adequate’ capital 
and specialised personnel
• No prior basic telecom operation test
• Domestic consortium permitted; only Principal Chinese 
Investor (PCI) required to meet above tests; PCI must be 
largest Chinese investor with > 30% of total Chinese investor 
equity
B. Value-Added Telecom Investor Qualification Requirements
B.l Foreign Investor
• > USD 500’000 average revenue
• > USD 1 million assets
• Good operation reputation required
• No foreign consortium
B.2 Domestic Investor
• > RMB 2 million average revenue
• > RMB 3 million assets
• Good operation reputation
• No domestic consortium
• No minimum revenue test
• No minimum asset test
• Prior positive value-added telecom operation
• Foreign consortium permitted (same PFI tests)
• No minimum revenue test
• No minimum asset test
• No prior value-added telecom operation test
• Domestic consortium implicitly permitted
C. Other (Applicable To Both Basic And Value-Added Telecom FITEs)
• EJV only
CA Investment Vehicle 
• Equity Joint Venture (EJV) only
C.2 Management
• Chairman of board and General Manager
C.3 Approval/Licensing
• 2 step process:
- Mil and MOFCOM approval for 
establishment of telecom FITE followed by 
SAIC issuance of business licence
- Mil approval o f operating licence for 
telecom FITE
• No restriction on appointment of Chairman and GM 
appointed only by Chinese party
• Consolidated multi step process:
- Mil telecom FITE project approval (=< 180 days for basic 
and = 90 for value-added)
- SAIC issuance of telecom FIE business licence
- MOFCOM approval of telecom FITE JV contract and AA 
(=< 90 days)
- Mil issuance of telecom operating licence (period not 
specified)
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Appendix 3: Milestones in China’s telecommunication reforms, 1979-2003
Date Milestone
June 1979 The State Council approves the Ministry for Post and Telecommunication (MPT) 
proposal to set up a dual leadership system. MPT assumed central planning role for Post 
and Telecom. Vertical structure of MPT-PTA-PTB-PTE emerged
1980-84 MPT and Ministry of Finance authorize the regional bodies to charge installation fees, 
retain profits and use them for infrastructure development. Reform in tariff and 
accounting policies
October 1984 The State Council stipulates a six-point instruction to give priority to postal and 
telecommunication development. Adoption of the “Three 90-percent” policy by State 
Council.
1984-86 MPT contracts performance responsibilities to local PTAs and PTBs
1988 MPT links PTB and PTE wage fund increase to growth measured on various parameters. 
Controversial move of letting PTAs set up their own telecommunication regulatory 
bodies. China Telecom (Directorate General of Telecommunications1055) is recognized. 
The State Council announces 16-character policy outlining the principles of unification 
of planning, coordination of ministerial administration, definition of responsibilities at 
different levels, mobilization of resources for infrastructure construction.
1989 MPT instructs province-level PTAs to set up telecommunication regulatory bodies
1990 PTAs allowed to set local telephone rates on their own and charge a cost based 
installation fee as opposed to stiff predetermined charges earlier
1990-93 Non-MPT suppliers of value-added services, mobile telephone services and satellite 
communication services emerge in some regions
April 1994 China Unicom (supported by MEI, the Railways and Power ministries) is set up to 
compete with China Telecom. It provides fixed line and mobile services. Ji Tong is set up 
under MEI to provide value-added and data services
1994 Wages further incentivised and linked to stricter growth parameters
1995 China Telecom de-linked from MPT and registered as a legal enterprise. Corporatisation 
of local postal and telecom enterprises started. Internet commercially available
June 1995 The State Council promulgates the “Catalogues of Industries for Guiding Foreign-Funded 
Investment”, banning FDI from telecommunication
March 1998 The Ministry of Information Industries (Mil) formed by the merger of MPT, the Ministry 
for Electrical Industries (MEI), the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT) and 
portions of other ministries with telecom services. Mil is to distance itself from 
administrative and operational functions and focus on regulation
October 1998 CCF ventures are declared illegal by Mil
1999 China Telecom is broken up along functional lines into 4 parts. The CCF financing 
model (mostly used by Unicom) is banned by the State Council
November
1999
China signs the bilateral agreement with the USA. National Informatisation Leading 
Group is formed by State Council
September
2000
Promulgation of Telecommunication Regulations by the State Council, providing the 
industry with a legal framework
March 2001 Railcom starts operations offering basic telecommunication services
September
2001
State Leading Group for Informatisation set up to oversee the ICT sector. National 
Informatisation Promotion Office set up under State Council to implement policies and 
measures for informatisation.
October 2001 State Council splits China Telecom into two regional companies along North-South lines
December
2001
State Council promulgates the Regulations on Foreign-Invested Telecom Enterprises
June 2003 Completion of a nationwide supervision system overseen by Mil and provincial 
governments
2004 Transfer of operators’ ownership to SASAC is completed
Source: Compiled by author and adapted from Lu and Wong (2003)
1055 The DGT comprised 29 provincial PTAs, all of which offered local and long-distance services through 
the 1990s.
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Appendix 4: Revised classification (2003)
Class 1 BTS
Basic Telecommunications Services (BTS)
Class 2 BTS
Fixed Communications Services
• Fixed Network Local Telephone Services
• Fixed Network Domestic Long-Distance Telephone Services
• Fixed Network International Long-Distance Telephone Services
• IP Telephone Services
• International Communications Facilities Services
Cellular Mobile Communications Services
• 900/1800 MHz GSM 2G Digital Cellular Mobile 
Communications Services
• 800 MHz CDMA 2G Digital Cellular Mobile Communications 
Services
• 3G Digital Cellular Mobile Communications Services
Class 1 Satellite Communications Services
• Satellite Mobile Communications Services
• Satellite International Private Line Services
Class 1 Data Communications Services
• Internet Data Transmission Services
• International Data Communications Services
• Public Telegraph and Subscriber Telegraph Services
Note: BTS sub-categories to be managed as VATS: analogue trunking communications services; radio paging services; 
domestic VSAT telecommunications services; class 2 data communications services (including fixed network domestic 
data transmission services and wireless data transmission services); CPN services; and network custodian services.
Value-Added Telecommunications Services (VATS)
Trunking Communications Services
• Analogue Trunking Communications Services
• Digital Trunking Communications Services 
Radio Paging Services
Class 2 Satellite Communications Services
• Lease/Sale of Satellite Transponders
• Domestic VSAT Communications Services 
Class 2 Data Communications Services
• Fixed Network Domestic Data Transmission 
Services
• Wireless Data Transmission Services Network 
Access Services
• Wireless Access Services
• Customer Premises Network (CPN) Services 
Domestic Communications Facilities Services
Network Custodian Services
Class 1 VATS
On-line Data Processing and Transaction Management Services 
Domestic Multi-party Communications Services 
Domestic Internet Virtual Private Network (VPN) Services 
Internet Data Center (IDC) Services
Class 2 VATS
Store and Forward Services
• Voicemail
• X.400 Email Services
• Facsimile Store and Forward Services 
Call Centre Services
Internet Access Services (ISP)
Content Services
Note: China's WTO telecommunications services commitments and the sub-categories under the new Catalogue are 
correlated as follows:
• China's WTO commitment with respect to "mobile voice and data services" falls under cellular mobile 
communications services (1.1.2 of the new Catalogue)
• China's WTO commitments with respect to domestic "voice services", "facsimile services", "circuit-switched data 
transmission services" are included within fixed network local telephone services and fixed network [domestic] long­
distance services" (1.1.1 (a) and (b) under the new Catalogue)
• Packet-switched data transmission services" under the domestic telecommunications WTO commitments falls under 
class 2 data telecommunications services (1.2.4 above)
• Domestic private leased circuit services" under the WTO commitments correlates to domestic communications 
facilities services (1.2.6 of the new Catalogue)
• China's WTO commitments with respect to international "voice services", "fax services", "circuit-switched data 
transmission services" and "international closed user group voice services" are included within fixed network 
international long-distance services" (1.1.1 (c) under the new Catalogue)
• Packet-switched data transmission services" under the international communications WTO commitments falls under 
internet data transmission services and international data telecommunications services (1.1.4 (a) and (b) of the new 
Catalogue)
• While internet "international closed user group data transmission services" under the WTO commitments belongs to 
internet data transmission services under the Catalogue (1.1.4(a)), "international closed user group data transmission 
services" utilising international private leased lines falls under international data communications services (1.1.4(b) of
the Catalogue)_______________________________________________________________________________
Source: Lovells, Beijing (2003)
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